I've been thinking about apologetics as of late, and have typically viewed Classical and Evidential apologetics as unbiblical and erroneous, due to their divorced nature from one's theology, versus presuppositionalism's consistency with the rest of Reformed systematic theology, including man's depravity, the Creator-creature distinction, special knowledge of God and regeneration, universal knowledge of God as set forth in Romans 1, the fear of the Lord as the beginning (not the end result) of wisdom and knowledge (Proverbs 1:7), all hidden in Christ (Colossians 2:3), and other issues. And I am still an ardent presuppositionalist, and believe the Classical and Evidential approaches as a whole as employed by men like Aquinas and Lee Strobel are unbiblical. But what do other presuppositionalists - who are committed to standing against neutrality, and not standing on the foolishness of unbelief on the so-called "neutral" level of the unbeliever - think of the possibility of legitimate use of certain Classical and Evidential arguments as particular parts to Proverbs 26:5, answering a fool according to his folly, by taking his perspective for the sake of argument? In other words, after making our ultimate commitment to Christ as the beginning and source of all true knowledge, and stating that we will not surrender that in our apologetical discussion with the unbeliever, and presenting the Christian worldview and how it explains life around and within us, once we also begin to answer a fool according to his folly, could we not in that part say something to the effect of, "OK, and for the sake of argument, taking your assumptions that reason and science can be neutral or objective with regard to the question of the Christian worldview, here's how even that perspective of yours (employing "neutral" philosophy in the Classical arguments, and "neutral" science in the Evidential arguments) only points toward the reasonableness of Christianity, rather than the doubtfulness." Of course we also still have to answer the fool according to his folly by showing him that his view logically leads to utter absurdity and chaos in all spheres of reason, experience and life (e.g. showing the impossibility of laws of logic and uniformity of nature without the Christian worldview), but could not these arguments also serve as additional points in the "reason" and "experience" categories in that regard? Some presuppositionalists may say that doing so would render the most basic demonstrations of Christianity's necessity as "insufficient," but that is hardly the case any more than the fact that we use arguments about logic and science being impossible with autonomy, for as Dr. Bahnsen well noted in his "Challenge to Unbelief" lectures, we are in effect done once we have shown even one of those as being impossible - yet showing several of them as such on many levels is part of answering a fool according to his folly, as he always raises many objections of many types.