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Berkouwer: A Hole in the Dike?
Carl W. Bogue
My mind is transported back to 1966. The theology faculty of the Free University had not yet moved to the "œsuburbs" of Amsterdam, but was packed into that wonderful complex of old buildings on the Keisersgracht. I took a seat close to the open window looking out on the canal. I had never heard or studied the Dutch language; I had never even known a member of the Christian Reformed Church. That first year I heard with understanding very little. More than once I yearned for an extra long fishing pole that could reach the canal. Yet I was drawn, as many students have been, to the enthusiasm with which Professor Berkouwer "œdid" theology right there before your eyes. Theology fascinated him. I sensed that long before I began to understand the language.
Then there was a cultural gap that was more severe in some ways than the language. Gerrit Cornelis Berkouwer had the international stature of his two most distinguished predecessors, Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck, but he wrestled with theological issues and historical debates that form a bewildering maze to an outsider. When I read the news of his death, I noted with surprise that a total of 42 students obtained doctorates under his guidance. Somehow, I thought it would be a lot more. I certainly feel unworthy to be in such elite company. That feeling is not lessened when I have from time to time been given opportunity to write about him. Is it possible for an outsider to point out a hole in the dike, without transgressing the bounds of arrogance? I do not know. I do know that during the lectures, in my marginal notes of his many books which I have read, in correspondence during the finalizing of my dissertation, and in private conversations there were questions and problems about which I could not be completely at peace. I sometimes felt very much alone and suspecting that I had missed the point altogether. Some years later Berkouwer published a work that was to confirm that my concerns were not imaginary.
In 1974 a significant book appeared which was translated into English three years later: A Half Century of Theology. The unique value of this volume among his many writings is the autobiographical insight it reveals of Berkouwer´s participation in the period from 1920 to 1970. Expanding on a survey given during the completion of his regular lectures at the Free University of Amsterdam, Berkouwer seeks to give "œan overview of the fascinating events, with all their struggles and discussions, of the theology of this half-century."[1] There are aspects that "œare still profound and important, and, far from disappearing, still meet us as we scout today´s theological arena." It is Berkouwer´s contention "œthat we are wrestling today with questions put on the agenda a half century ago."[2] Yet his closing chapter in this revealing work is entitled, "œConcern for the Faith," and is punctuated with thoughts about doubt, fear, unrest, uncertainty, alarm, and theology´s inadequacy in understanding. "œThe quest," says Berkouwer, is "œfor a deeper and richer understanding,"[3] but one suspects the measure for judging success in this quest has changed from what has historically guided the church.
The relevance of Berkouwer´s pilgrimage for this side of the Atlantic needs to be understood. His direct and indirect influence is considerable. During this same half century the American evangelical community has witnessed a profound transformation. There were those respected evangelicals who, willingly or not, began to be identified by the presence of "œneo" in front of the name "œevangelical." A growing split was emerging that was to become more than a mere intramural struggle. Part and parcel of this struggle was a growing difference of opinion on the doctrine of Scripture, a difference popularized by Lindsell´s The Battle for the Bible.[4] The focal point is inerrancy. So aggressive had the errantists become that the erosion among Evangelicals was rampant. The situation had deteriorated to the point that we saw the emergence in 1977 of an evangelical counter-offensive in the form of the International Council on Biblical Inerrancy. Warfield versus Berkouwer, a distinction underlined by Berkouwer himself, has become a popular symbol of the battle.[5]
Whether disciple or critic, those referring to Berkouwer as a "œReformed" theologian feel a necessity to qualify the definition. Rogers, for example, qualifies to remove him from the "œbad company" of Warfield or Protestant scholastics.[6] Van Til qualifies to include him with the "œbad company" of the neo-orthodox.[7] Berkouwer stands with one foot in a confessional heritage which he refuses to abandon and another foot in the world of ecumenical ventures which frequently conflict with his heritage. To some, Berkouwer represents a breath of fresh air, providing the evangelical with a way out of the dilemma between "œconservative" and "œliberal." To others his theology is at best a frustrating inconsistency and at worst a theological capitulation. The thesis of this article is that Berkouwer has made some significant departures from his heritage, and on the basis of these departures there is justification for seeing a line of development from Berkouwer to the neo-evangelical movement and the rejection of biblical inerrancy. As contemporary evangelicals wake up to the fact that they have been robbed of much of the heart of classical Reformed orthodoxy, the "œDutch connection" may not be overlooked. Berkouwer is, of course, but one of many influences. He is, however, a considerable influence.
Early and Later Berkouwer
Among disciples and critics alike, it is commonplace to distinguish between an early and later Berkouwer. Whether one calls it maturity or capitulation, there is certainly change. Berkouwer believes he missed the "œreal intentions of Barth" in his 1932 dissertation on the new German theology.[8] His sympathy with Barth had increased significantly a couple of decades later in The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth, and by 1974 he was defending Barth against the likes of Van Til and Pannenberg.[9] His two main works on Scripture (1928 and 1966-67) reflect this change as dramatically as any. Krabbendam sees the early Berkouwer on Scripture as "œpractically identical" to Warfield, while the later Berkouwer is "œcritical of Warfield" and "œendorses and adopts the neo-orthodox position."[10] Berkouwer´s two books on Roman Catholicism subsequent to the Second Vatican Council breathe a different spirit from his early work, The Conflict with Rome.
It is a fair assumption that this "œearly/later" evaluation of Berkouwer accounts for the fact that only in more recent years has there been a growing chorus of critics willing to question the orthodoxy of such an esteemed "œReformed" theologian. In late 1975, I presented a paper critical of Berkouwer which was subsequently published as a monograph entitled A Hole in the Dike. The most prevalent response to that paper was from those who had become uneasy with Berkouwer but were not quite sure why. The absence of firm criticism of Berkouwer was no doubt to be attributed to their judgments of charity about a man of his stature and to the style of his writing, which is circumlocutory. The critical voices are on the increase, however. With the appearance in 1975 of the English translation of Berkouwer´s work on Holy Scripture, a new wave of criticism was heard. At a time when evangelicals were growing in the awareness that biblical inerrancy is the issue where the battle must be fought, Berkouwer´s Holy Scripture was tried and found wanting. One need only read the papers from the "œInerrancy Summit" in Chicago (1978), sponsored by the International Council on Biblical Inerrancy, to see Berkouwer attacked from a variety of quarters. Paralleling this increasing criticism is the emergence of Berkouwer as a rallying point of the neo-evangelical and errantist movement . Find someone in the Reformed tradition who denies inerrancy but wants to affirm a "œhigh view" of Scripture and its "œinfallible message," and he will probably model his doctrine of Scripture from Berkouwer. Because of his prominence in the battle, Jack Rogers has become the most symbolic of this influence. Editor of Biblical Authority, a book which attacks inerrancy and the "œHodge-Warfield...rationalistic defense of Scripture," Rogers had earlier written a doctoral dissertation on the doctrine of Scripture in the Westminster Confession and pushed credulity to the limits by trying to make the Westminster Divines´ view of Scripture essentially the same as that of Berkouwer.[11] Such an un-historical conclusion apparently is the fundamental credential by which Rogers has become a spokesman for the errantist movement among neo-evangelicals in this country. Such "œrevisionist" interpretation of the Westminster Assembly has continued in this disciple of Berkouwer, who is today a prominent spokesman within the old line liberal Presbyterian denomination.
Any discussion of an early and later Berkouwer should also take into account a significant article by Hendrikus Berkhof, a neo-orthodox theologian, on "œThe Method of Berkouwer´s Theology." Berkhof finds three phases in Berkouwer´s theology, the first of which acknowledges "œthe absolute authority of Scripture."[12] The second phase Berkhof calls "œthe salvation content of Scripture," which begins as early as the beginning of Berkouwer´s Studies in Dogmatics in 1949.[13] This phase is less polemical and moves from the authority of Scripture in an absolute sense to the nature of that authority, namely, the salvation content via Christ. The third phase is "œthe existential direction of Scripture," with its kerygmatic-existential correlation manifesting itself in Berkouwer´s changed view on Dordt and his "œasymmetrical" emphasis on election.[14]
This methodological analysis by Berkhof is a strong indictment to anyone from an evangelical perspective. Simply put, Berkhof is saying that Berkouwer went from traditional Reformed orthodoxy to existential theology via a form of neo-orthodoxy. Whether one agrees with this analysis or not, a theologian of Berkhof´s stature writing in an academic Festschrift honoring Professor Berkouwer must have seen some radical evidence to draw such a far-reaching conclusion. I was in the Netherlands at the time and understood that Berkouwer protested vigorously to Berkhof, though I saw nothing in print. Later, however, Hendrick Krabbendam has provided an important reference in this issue by citing a Dutch work by F. W. Buytendach to the effect "œthat Berkouwer has acknowledged the transition from the first to the second phase, but objected to the construct of a third phase."[15] Apparently Berkouwer is willing to acknowledge a significant change, a change which resulted in seeing Scripture content as not necessarily bound to scriptural form. This change, according to Krabbendam, would have been impossible "œwithout Barthian type of neo-orthodoxy."[16]
Looking back at the conclusion of his "œhalf century," Berkouwer came to acknowledge how he changed or softened his former criticism of modern trends in theology. Not surprisingly, there is a chapter devoted to Karl Barth. In that chapter and throughout A Half Century of Theology, one is struck by Berkouwer´s acknowledged sympathy with Kierkegaard, Brunner, and Barth in opposition to religious self-confidence. Berkouwer relates his change in attitude toward Barth on the question of faith certainty, and many quotes are given from Barth which sound very much like Berkouwer´s own solution to the certainty question, i.e., knowing "œin faith." In a chapter on Scripture, Berkouwer admits that he used to see kerygmatic theology as "œthe "˜way out´ of the problems of uncertainty." He now sees it differently. Opposing Pannenberg in support of Barth, he now sees such accent on the kerygma "œnot as a "˜way out,´ but as the way in which the witness employs its power."[17]
As we move to a more specific analysis of Berkouwer´s thought, a significant fact will emerge concerning the early and later Berkouwer. While such a distinction is valid and helpful, we will see that the seeds of what many consider the later Berkouwer were present very early. No doubt to the surprise of some, Berkhof is correct in seeing a significant change as early as the beginning of Berkouwer´s Studies in Dogmatics in 1949.[18] The "œhole in the dike" was present even that early. To the extent Berkouwer accurately reflects on the "œhalf century" in which he participated, the seeds were present even at the beginning.
As I read the earlier Studies in Dogmatics, there was often the feeling that Berkouwer was orthodox on many doctrines in spite of his methodology. Perhaps it was not Berkouwer himself but the flood of his disciples in whom unorthodox views were more glaring which alerted so many in recent days to trace these views back to Professor Berkouwer. It was in this light that I began more and more to use the phrase, "œhole in the dike," as descriptive of Berkouwer´s influence.
Scripture and Confession
A fundamental impression that emerges from Berkouwer´s writings is that he seeks to be in subjection to the Word of God.[19] Theology is "œrelevant" only when it is "œrelative to the Word of God." "œ...Theology is occupied in continuous attentive and obedient listening to the Word of God." Because God´s love in Jesus Christ is revealed in Scripture, "œbeyond the word of Scripture we dare not go."[20] The English translation adds, "œThere is nothing beyond that." That sentence is not in the Dutch, but it does reflect the total dichotomy in Berkouwer´s thought between explicit scriptural teaching and all other knowledge, whether deduced from Scripture or from non-biblical sources. The commendable aim of obedience to Scripture may be abused by such a dichotomy, however, and Berkouwer´s aversion to the "œgood and necessary consequence" statement in the Westminster Confession is a prime example of this.[21]
It is important to realize that Berkouwer is doing more than claiming to be in subjection to the Word of God. He is critical of the inerrancy doctrine and believes his view is really honoring God´s Word while the inerrantist´s is not. "œSome," he says, "œare fascinated by a miraculous "˜correctness,´" but "œin the end it will damage reverence for Scripture more than it will further it."[22] "œIn appealing to its authority we are not dealing with a formal principle but with a deep spiritual witness to Jesus Christ...."[23] Thus a person who operates with "œa certain theory of inspiration" (i.e., inerrancy) "œis almost certainly going to cry "˜It stands written´ and still come out with something that misses the truth and power of Scripture."[24] "œTo speak of errors...is to speak of an unhistorical approach."[25] "œThe slogan, "˜It stands written,´ is not a magic wand that can be waved to eliminate all problems...."[26] Berkouwer, reflecting on his 1938 work on Scripture, affirms he is no less committed to the significance of "œIt stands written,"[27] even though his present understanding of what that means has changed considerably.
Of course, anyone may claim obedience to Scripture. He may do so with utmost integrity.[28] The neo-orthodox, no less than neo-evangelicals, claim to be those who are truly honoring and reverently listening to God´s Word.[29] Van Til, acknowledging some validity in Berkouwer´s criticism that he was not sufficiently exegetical, nevertheless makes this timely observation: "œOne can be "˜exegetical´ in terms of the neo-orthodox schematism of thought, and this is, after all, to be speculative first, and biblical afterwards."[30]
Closely related to Berkouwer´s subjection to Scripture is his concern that confessions not lose their derivative character. Their subordinate status is coupled with another qualification. In an important article on confessions with special regard to the Canons of Dordt, Berkouwer speaks of the increasing awareness in recent times of the historically conditioned nature of confessions.[31] There is, according to Berkouwer, a certain vulnerability in all confessions brought about by their reaction against a particular heresy with consequent selection and exegesis of "œappropriate" passages.
Writing elsewhere concerning the question of whether Chalcedon is a Christological terminal point, Berkouwer writes: "œFor the Scriptures are richer than any pronouncement of the church, no matter how excellent it be...."[32] "œChalcedon is not as rich as that Scriptural fullness on which the church...is continually allowed to draw."[33] What is perhaps the only basic difference in his most recent work is the stronger emphasis on the inadequacies of any confessional statement. Answering the fear that questioning Chalcedon is "œanother alienation from the church´s confession," Berkouwer writes:
It is worth remembering then that any fixed definition can fossilize, especially if the definitions are no longer understood. Indeed, we should remember that no definition is adequate.... Orthodoxy is maintained only in conformity with the truth that the church had in mind when it tried to state truth in its inadequate formulas.[34]
This is a subtle but significant move from a warning of the inadequacies of language to what is almost an obsession with a confession´s inadequacies necessitating a different measurement for certainty.
While Berkouwer himself has a high regard for the creeds of the church, such a theoretically accurate stance acknowledges the possibility of significant error in all human statements and runs the risk of relativizing any doctrinal statement. Berkouwer rejects relativizing run wild, but the danger lingers of an increasing transformation of what we once believed to be truth by one who zealously maintains the absolute authority of Scripture.
Any student of Berkouwer would, in this context, have one key word constantly in mind. In both lectures and writing, one word increasingly appears as fundamental to his historical understanding of theology. Intent! "œWhat was the intent of the apostle or prophet in Scripture?" "œWhat is the deepest intent of the framers of the confession?" "œWhat was Rome really intending to say at Trent?" And on it goes. In a confessional statement, therefore, one must be alerted to the relation between the "œunchangeable affirmation and changeable representation," the "œreally intended content and the form, in which this content comes to expression," and the fact that no form can adequately express the intended content in final form.[35]
There is an unfortunate temptation in the use of this valid interpretive method of seeking the true intent of those who spoke. The danger is that when we come to disagree with our theological heritage, but do not want to step out of that rich heritage, we can simply claim their commitment to our content while using historically conditioned forms. The result may be, and has been, the sneaking in of new content under the guise of a new form for the old content. Berkouwer´s re-interpretation of the Canons of Dordt throws out the "œcausal" framework as an unfortunate historical form which tried to say too much and restricts the content (the Synod´s real intent) to a doxological reference to the sovereignty of God´s grace.[36] The legitimate question is whether what the Synod of Dordt intended to confess regarding the sovereign, predestinating God has disappeared in such a re-interpretation.
The form-content distinction provides Berkouwer with a ready-made vehicle for ecumenical dialogue where "œhang-ups" with past formulations may be politely set aside to clear the way for "œfresh" insights on old problems. Nowhere has this been more visible than in Berkouwer´s discussions with and about Roman Catholic theologians. In his first book on the Second Vatican Council, and even more so in lectures, Berkouwer radiates excitement and enthusiasm over similar methodological developments in the Roman Catholic Church.
Pope John XXIII opened the door by declaring some things to be not absolute (the plea for "œunity in the essentials" implied there was an area of non-essentials where differences could be tolerated).[37] Berkouwer gives great importance to this statement of the pope on the first day of the council:
The certain and unchangeable doctrine, to which we must ever remain faithful, must be examined and expounded by the methods applicable in our times. We must distinguish between the inheritance of the faith itself, or the truths which are contained in our holy doctrine, and the way in which these truths are formulated, of course with the same sense and the same significance.[38]
Berkouwer relates the pope´s distinction "œbetween the substance and the formulations of the truth" to "œsimilar distinctions that Roman theologians of the new stripe have been making in the recent past."[39] This was an entrance into "œthe danger zone of Roman Catholic problematics," quite different from the 1950 encyclical Humani Generis of Pius XII.[40] And even though Paul VI was less inclined in this direction, Berkouwer sees this new attitude as a significant breakthrough. In this context a whole chapter is given over to "œUnchangeability and Changeability of Dogma."
In a second book growing out of Vatican II, the "œintent" idea comes out strongly in a chapter on the continuity of dogma and its sameness. Dogma, Berkouwer says approvingly, was not "œtimelessly formulated" but used "œhistorically fixed terminology, thought patterns, and pre-suppositions" which were not without philosophical presuppositions and which must be understood out of their polemical setting.[41] "œ...The task of the church and theology is to penetrate through to what the church intended in these formulations and what she wanted to confess."[42] Hand in hand with this new approach is "œa strong resistance" against a view of dogma as fixed presuppositions from which logical implications may be drawn.[43] This view also was mentioned approvingly in The Second Vatican Council, where it is said that revelation "œis not a reservoir of intellectual propositions" but rather "œa personal self-disclosure by God in which He encounters the total person."[44]
Via the form-content distinction Berkouwer had, with qualification, become a part of a new ecumenical alliance within and without the Roman Church where neo-orthodox theology tends to be the common denominator. While this must be said with care and qualification, it is nonetheless a true perspective on Berkouwer´s development.
Correlation versus Systematics
Another aspect of Berkouwer´s methodology has early roots and shows significant development through the years. While not formalized as a methodological principle, the word and the concept "œcorrelation" permeate his theology. Lewis B. Smedes, a former student of Berkouwer and frequent translator of his books, calls "œcorrelation" the "œguiding principle" and "œperhaps the greatest single most influential principle in Berkouwer´s theology."[45]
This principle emerges clearly in an early work, Faith and Justification, as a valid attempt to understand the scriptural and Reformation understanding of faith. Discussing Abraham in the context of Romans 4, Berkouwer writes,
...where Abraham is concerned, there is not a causal relationship between Christ´s righteousness and the righteousness of faith, but a correlative association in which the subjectivity of faith has meaning and significance only as it lives off grace.... We are prohibited from abstracting a "œsubjective righteousness of faith" from the imputed righteousness of Christ, since it is precisely His righteousness with which faith is concerned.[46]
Faith, says Berkouwer,
...is not added as a second, independent ingredient which makes its own contribution to justification in Christ. On the contrary faith does nothing but accept, or come to rest in the sovereignty of His benefit.[47]
"œThe way of salvation is the way of faith just because it is only in faith that the exclusiveness of divine grace is recognized and honored."[48]
The correlation idea, however, is much broader than an attempt to articulate the instrumental, receptive aspect of faith or the sovereignty/human responsibility question. Even in this early stage, an anti-systematic attitude is being expressed typical in much of modern theology. Correlation was being set forth not so much as an explanation as a denial of the possibility of an explanation. Berkouwer sets a "œreal theology of the Word" over against a "œbeautiful system."
As we reflect on faith and justification, we shall confront not merely theories, but realities"”realities seen and understood only in faith, but, when thus perceived, definitive for our own lives and the life of the Church.[49]
Here and throughout Berkouwer´s writing, the suggestion is ever present that a theory cannot (a priori) correspond to reality. Reality is a different dimension from theories and logic and systematics.
One should not miss this close affinity with the neo-orthodox emphasis on supra history even in this early work. The recent publication of A Half Century of Theology throws some valuable light on even earlier roots of this unorthodox aspect of Berkouwer. He begins his reflections on his "œhalf century" by noting that "œ"˜ethical theology´ was a prominent issue for conservative theology in 1920." "œEthical Theology" was characterized by the anti-dogma slogan: "œnot dead doctrine, but the living Lord."[50] In the following chapter, "œThe Era of Apologetics," Berkouwer begins by criticizing the way dogmatics came "œas a rounded-off and finished system," and then states: "œBut later we came in touch with all sorts of doubts and uncertainty about facets of the system; problems and questions unsettled us."[51] This anti-systematics bias has characterized Berkouwer throughout but has become increasingly noticed by a larger audience.
K. H. Roessingh, professor at Leiden who died in 1925 at the age of 39, represented "œa new form of modernism" and made a strong impression on Berkouwer. At Roessingh´s death, Berkouwer wrote in the student paper: "œThe effect of his work was not to make everything clear and certain."[52] What impresses one in his evaluation of Roessingh a half century later is the reference to his stand against orthodox Christology. Of Roessingh he writes: "œWhile he saw no reason to deny the historicality of Jesus, he wanted his christology to be independent of this question."[53] Berkouwer goes on to write:
He was intrigued by the historical-critical question of how much Jesus´ real self was actually reflected in the New Testament profile. But he preferred the language of trust and commitment. "œChrist"”I can venture with him." There was always a tension at the point where theological problematics met personal piety.... But his piety did not turn him away from the problems.[54]
As I read these words describing Roessingh, I was struck by how accurately they describe what I understand Berkouwer himself to be saying. Taking Scripture as an example, Berkouwer wants the authority of Scripture and even its historicity without being tied to the historical-critical battleground. He is intrigued by the historical-critical question of how much of Scripture is historically accurate, but he prefers the language of trust and commitment. One could continue this parallel in many areas. This direction suggested by Roessingh, coupled with Berkouwer´s anti-systematics bias, is manifested in Berkouwer´s Studies in Dogmatics under the name "œcorrelation," and it has consequences more far-reaching than many have realized. The code word is "œin faith." We must understand "œin faith." What that means is difficult to ascertain, but it is set in contrast to logic, system, and the like. It is clearly affirmed as a "œknowing," but a knowing that is distinctly another nature from the speculative knowledge of a non-believer. And the intent is not the traditional distinction in Reformed theology of the believer "œacquiescing" or "œrelishing" in the truth as contrasted to the resistance of the person outside faith. It is a "œdeeper" knowing that sees "œmore clearly" and avoids the contradictions (real) within the speculative realm.
One can with justification use the word "œsubjective" in speaking of Berkouwer. It is true he attacks subjectivism, but what he is attacking is subjectivism à la Schleiermacher, which "œgave the human subject a determinative, creative function and made revelation dependent upon the subjective creation."[55] "œCreative" subjectivism is opposed, but a subjectivism in receiving truth, even to the extent of ignoring logic or "œgood and necessary consequences," is acceptable. What elevation of the Word of God means for Berkouwer is an a priori distinction between speculation (even true speculation) and theological study. "œTheology can only bow before mystery."[56] Berkouwer went down this road a long way to come under attack by Van Til for opting in favor of the Kantian noumenal realm and the neo-orthodox Historie/Geschichte distinction. Van Til would be far less critical of Berkouwer in this 1949 book on Faith and Justification, and we have, to be sure, drawn out some implications, but it is worth noting that the seeds of his later position are already implicitly present.
When Smedes sets forth Berkouwer´s correlation principle, his summary confirms what we have just said regarding the faith/knowledge conflict. Paraphrasing Berkouwer, Smedes writes:
Theology is a work of faith, and all of its statements must be such as the believer can recognize as objects of faith.... It means that the object of theology is never the construction of a logically coherent system.... Only those matters that the believer can and ought to confess as his personal faith and which the Church can proclaim as the faith of the Gospel are the proper conclusions of theology.[57]
Berkouwer, says Smedes, "œdeclines the temptation to let deduction and inference determine theological conclusions: the demand for faith, not the dictates of logic, must characterize the kerygma."[58] Such an evaluation by Smedes is basically a correct statement of Berkouwer´s position.
We again find an updated confirmation of Berkouwer´s views in this regard in A Half Century of Theology, especially in a chapter entitled "œFaith and Reasonableness." Berkouwer is unhappy with past solutions and again finds sympathy with the same struggle in recent Roman Catholicism. In rejecting the classical Reformed approach, as well as a subjective, existential "œleap," he sometimes confuses faith with knowledge of God and at other times seems to divorce them. In representing the issue as it emerged in the "œhalf century," it sounds very much like a description of Berkouwer´s view.
Faith...is not against reason, though it is above reason.... Faith becomes defenseless, in a sense. It has no defenses for itself; it has no apologia, maybe no way of giving answers"”except private ones.[59]
Here we see a parallel to the reference above of subjectivism in Berkouwer. Words like "œtension" and "œparadox" are preferred to "œargument," "œlogic," and "œgood and necessary consequences." There is sympathy in the notion that a faith founded upon truth that is rational would cause faith to lose its dynamic and destroy true freedom. Against this background, Berkouwer´s repudiation of faith as a subjective leap sounds somewhat hollow.
Given this increasing commitment to faith versus logic, correlation versus systematics, it is not hard to detect why Berkouwer has increasingly been at odds with classical Reformed orthodoxy, whether seventeenth-century or the Princeton theologians.[60] He is frequently maintaining a false dilemma between "œlogically coherent systems" and matters one confesses as "œpersonal faith," between "œthe demand for faith" and "œthe dictates of logic." The assumption of their incompatibility is gratuitous. For those who operate with that assumption, or for those who see a contradiction because they are aware only of an abused or errant system (which would not then be "œlogically coherent"), Berkouwer gives the appearance of a solution via the attempt to lift theology out of the world of logic and reason and into the noumenal realm of Kantian philosophy.
To one who has read Berkouwer, that may seem like a strong statement. He wrestles with all of the hard issues that come along. He does not avoid the conflicts of church history. Yet at the end of the discussion, when each side has been brilliantly criticized, Berkouwer says in effect: "œYou´re both wrong ultimately; if you look at it "˜in faith,´ you can see the answer is deeper than you thought; come with me from the realm of the "˜phenomenal´ world of Historie to the "˜noumenal´ world of "œGeschichte." It is a pattern which, once seen, becomes increasingly apparent in all his work.
Providence and Election: A Case Study
Prior to the latter volumes on Scripture, the area where Berkouwer´s correlation principle of viewing all theology "œin faith" (as we have defined it above) was most visible is in the areas of providence and election. These are crucial areas which deserve some special attention at this point. In a chapter entitled "œA Third Aspect," Berkouwer treats the concept of "œconcurrence" as a way to express God´s exercise of providence in the world.[61] This is an important chapter. The problem arises of "œwhether total human dependence upon God leaves room for significant creaturely activity...."[62] Berkouwer´s concern is to avoid "œspeculation." Given the biblical a priori that "œGod is not the author of sin," how do you "œconceive of Divine cooperation in sin?" "œIs sin wholly a product of the first as well as the second cause?"[63] According to Berkouwer, "œthe dilemma is usually construed as: determinism or indeterminism."
Berkouwer, not wanting indeterminism, is reacting against what he feels is a logical consequence of all determinism, namely, a kind of causality that excludes human responsibility and makes God the author of sin. In this reaction he makes several crucial assertions. "œThe essential error of identifying the Providence doctrine with determinism is the de-personalization of the God-concept."[64] "œThe Reformed confession of Providence does not reason from the idea of causation. It simply recognizes the invincibility of God´s sovereign activity."[65] "œ...The use of the terms first and second causes implies that God is only the most important cause among equal causes.... This brings God even...less disguisedly down into the world-process."[66] For Berkouwer there is apparently a contradiction between Creator and cause. Concerning the biblical reference to Jehovah as the "œfirst and the last," he says, "œThe word first points to the absolute Creator, not the first cause of all things."[67] At best one can agree with these statements if qualified. At worst one sees caricatures and false dilemmas.
Berkouwer apparently is convinced of the inescapable dilemma, however, since he seeks a way out, a third or middle way. The problem, he says, is not properly formulated as determinism-indeterminism.[68]
The alternatives, determinism or indeterminism, are true alternatives only on a horizontal, anthropological level. They pose a dilemma which is resolved in the relationship that man sustains to God. This vertical relationship between God and man alone gives possibility to a correct understanding of the problem of freedom. Both determinism...and indeterminism neglect the religious aspect of the problem.[69]
"œFaith knows its boundaries," says Berkouwer. "œRational conclusions...give way to living faith in Him."[70]
The problem is resolved, though not rationally, in confession of guilt and in faith. There is a solution, but it is the solution of faith, which knows its own responsibility"”as it knows the unapproachable holiness of God. He who does not listen in faith to God´s voice is left with an insoluble dilemma.[71]
We are again struck with the conclusion that Berkouwer´s solution, the "œreligious" approach "œin faith" contra "œrational conclusions," has ended in the subjective, noumenal sphere.
When we turn to the doctrines surrounding election, we would expect to see a similar pattern, and this is the case. Lewis Smedes´s summary may serve as a helpful starter.
Perhaps the most significant contribution that Berkouwer has made to the doctrine of election is his rescue of it from the doctrine of reprobation as its logical corollary. The notion of reprobation as a logical consequence of election is inescapable, as long as election is viewed as an arbitrary selection of individuals. To Berkouwer this is as objectionable as it is logical.[72]
One must understand that Berkouwer moves back and forth on these issues in a way that is hard to pin down. He writes a chapter on "œElection and Arbitrariness" and states as a priori evidence that God is not arbitrary.[73] "œArbitrary" seems to be a word to be avoided, whatever the qualifications, even though it has been used, properly qualified, within the Reformed tradition. Berkouwer accepts Calvin´s expression that "œGod is a law unto Himself" as a rejection of "œpotentia absoluta as well as a law above God."[74] "œThe protest against the term potentia absoluta was not directed against the absoluteness of divine power, but against its unbiblical formalization."[75] Berkouwer seems thus to open the door for a qualified arbitrariness, but he insists that despite qualifications, the concept brings into question "œthe stability and trustworthiness of God´s revelation."[76] "œ...We shall not be able to discuss the election of God properly without continually reminding ourselves that there is no arbitrariness in God´s acts."[77]
In the statement of Smedes quoted above one spots a problem. Apparently the "œabsoluteness of divine power" which Berkouwer affirms cannot be understood rationally without falling into the "œerror" of arbitrariness, potentia absoluta, and formalization. What is significant is that Berkouwer does not deny the logic of it. It is not sloppy thinking. In Smedes´s words, "œthis is as objectionable as it is logical." Our problem is in not seeing that logic (Kant´s phenomenal world?) is a secondary reality. "œThere is a third way," says Berkouwer, "œbetween the potentia absoluta and the subjection of God to a law. The third way is the way of revelation."[78] Thus, logic is set over against revelation; the "œnoumenal" realm of a third way, a "œreligious" and "œin faith" way, is set over against rational conclusions.
Much of the election doctrine centers around "œthe boundaries of reflection." When Berkouwer deals with the Synod of Dordt, the issue of "œgood and necessary consequences" is at the forefront. The "œhard sayings" of Dordt as deduced from Scripture as consequence, culminating in the phrase "œpredestined to sin," is an area that disturbs Berkouwer. The issue of reprobation, the rejection of some, is crucial.
In an important chapter on "œElection and Rejection," Berkouwer defines the issue as symmetry versus asymmetry. When the Canons of Dordt speak of election and rejection, "œwe could get the impression that we are confronted with an obvious duality of two symmetrical "˜decrees´" predestinating to life and to death.[79] Reformed theology rejects the idea that election and rejection occur "œin the same manner," and Berkouwer attributes this to its desire to reject deterministic interpretations. The Scriptures, says Berkouwer, are asymmetrical. God is the "œcause" of salvation; man is the cause of unbelief and hence rejection.[80]
Our criticism of Berkouwer must not be affirming symmetry or a determinism that makes God the author of sin. Berkouwer´s method is again at issue. We do not escape determinism by indeterminism. Reformed theology, he says, affirms asymmetry, and "œin doing so, it reaches beyond the dilemma between determinism and indeterminism."[81] The use of causality can never bring us to a solution.[82] The rising above the dilemma, however, is back in the subjective realm. We must, he insists, rediscover the "œdoxological connections." "œ...We cannot discuss the election of God apart from faith."[83] No metaphysics, but confession. Referring to the words of adoration which Paul speaks in Romans 11:33, he states: "œThat is for us men"”with all our problems"”the profoundest exegetical secret of Romans 9 to 11."[84]
But more than an acknowledgment of the mystery of election is being set forth. Smedes says of Berkouwer´s teaching: "œGod is the source of election. Man is the cause of his reprobation."[85] H. Berkhof says Berkouwer´s book on election "œis built on asymmetrical confession, inspired by "˜the boundaries of Scripture,´ that God elects whom he will and rejects those who reject him."[86] That sounds orthodox enough if interpreted in an orthodox manner. However, couple what we have seen with this statement:
Scripture showed us that in the doctrine of God´s election the issue is not a decretum absolutum, abstracted from Jesus Christ, neither a necessitas rerum which cannot be changed under any circumstances, nor a dark and irrational power of the potentia absoluta. Rather, Scripture points in its doxologies and songs in praise of the free election of God....[87]
One gets the impression that Berkouwer tends to be a Calvinist in election and an Arminian in rejection. But if God´s election is not something "œwhich cannot be changed" (i.e., election can be changed?), even his doctrine of election as Calvinistic is suspect.
Berkouwer would reject such conclusions and say we are not looking in the way of faith. Faith sees things differently, not in causality but in doxologies that point to a way that is true but not transparent to rational considerations. We have yet to apprehend adequately what that means, but apparently one must risk the loss of objective certainty and take the existential leap of faith into the realm of theological (noumenal?) understanding.
It is worth noting that in Van Til´s book on Berkouwer and Dordt he gives an account of Woelderink´s 1951 work on Election which shows his move from the historic Reformed faith to Barthianism. The causal question is called unbiblical and equated with determinism, which is limited to the non-human realm of the I-it dimension. Election transcends causal thinking. "œWe are referring to the noumenal not the phenomenal realm."[88] Though our criticism of Berkouwer has been based largely on his book on Divine Election and is admittedly drawing implications, the validity of our fear is illustrated by Van Til´s comparison of an earlier and later Berkouwer with the position of Woelderink.
It is of interest to note that in 1955 Berkouwer defended the Synod of Dordt as having the concrete biblical view of election against the charge of determinism launched by Woelderink, while in 1965 his criticism of Dordt was practically the same as that of Woelderink.[89]
Van Til equates Berkouwer´s terminology with that of neo-orthodoxy and places him within the Kantian framework of modern theology.
Still, the "œhole in the dike" was there in the "œearlier" Berkouwer, and subsequent writings differ by degree rather than reflecting an essentially new position. Nor was Berkouwer unaware that he was traveling "œother routes." He states in A Half Century of Theology that the publication of Divine Election in 1955 was "œnot without hesitation and persistent questions."[90] At the risk of some repetition we should not overlook what he says about this doctrine in his survey of the last fifty years. Here we have the advantage of an autobiographical reflection of his mature thought, the vantage point of the "œlater Berkouwer," as he views the "œhalf century."
It is Berkouwer´s conviction that election is the very "œheart of the church," and it should therefore be a doctrine of comfort rather than something to dread. There is, therefore, a strong pastoral emphasis in relation to questions that are seen as problems, "œquestions about the certainty of one´s own salvation, about the "˜book of life´ in which names of only certain persons had been written, and questions about the secrecy and mystery of election."[91] Dogmatics and the life of the church merge in the question "œwhether election can be proclaimed without arousing all sorts of new problems in the mind of the listening congregation."[92] Berkouwer cites an experience of his first congregation of the man who argued, "œnothing could help him "˜if he were not elect´ and his own break from the church could not hurt him "˜if he were elect.´"[93]
Berkouwer seems to view such "œproblems" as inappropriate for a doctrine that is the "œheart of the church." He says he probably counseled the man against caricaturing and pointed to the "œrelation between election and responsibility," but then concludes that "œpastoral warning is really powerless over against this sort of logic."[94] Such concerns have led Berkouwer to see the problem not so much in his parishioner´s caricatures as in the traditional statement of the doctrine. One "œsolves" the problem aspect by denying the orthodox doctrine of election.
The orthodox statement of the doctrine, the "œform" if not the "œcontent" (intent) of the Canons of Dordt, is dominated by arbitrariness.
By arbitrariness we have in mind the "œonce-for-all" decision made in eternity that seals the lot of all people forever. The eternal decree of predestination (or predetermination) has its logical corollary in reprobation. The question is: Does not double predestination render pointless everything people decide to do?[95]
Berkouwer believes that is the result, and since the Bible teaches "œtension and struggle" rather than "œself-evident reason for indifference or complacence," double predestination cannot therefore be scriptural. The biblical call for response evaporates "œby the thought of that decree, fixed from eternity...that determines everything and every person, a decree that must be realized in history."[96]
In the notion of double predestination we have something else on our hands than a hymn of praise to God´s gracious election. The question is whether the notion of double destiny does not turn divine freedom into divine arbitrariness.[97]
It is apparent that Berkouwer´s desire to retain the doctrine of divine election as the heart of the church will necessitate a concept of decree quite different from what is normally understood. Berkouwer now decries a resorting "œto obtuse explanations" and a striving "œtoward an elusive harmony and synthesis" in the doctrine of election.[98] Kuyper´s language is charged as being essentially the same as "œarbitrary determination of an "˜absolute might.´"[99] Berkouwer claims to be questioning the form, not the content, of the sovereignty of God, and it is not a desire "œto replace determinism with indeterminism."[100] To negate so much of the doctrine of election and yet boldly affirm it, one has to move "œabove" the rational-historical realm into the "œKantian noumenal realm"; that is, it must be seen "œin faith." Piety is set over against rational harmonization.
Once understanding "œin faith" is seen as incompatible with understanding in rational knowledge, many new directions are open for biblical reflection. Commenting on Matthew 20:15, where Jesus says, "œAm I not free to do what I choose with what belongs to me," Berkouwer rejects the "œlogical" conclusion which is double predestination and declares instead that freedom means the goodness of God.[101] Similarly, he denies that Paul could conclude Romans 9-11 "œwith a breathtaking doxology" if his intention was to teach "œthat the destiny of everything and everyone is sealed from eternity."[102] Apparently we cannot truly praise God if He "œordained whatsoever comes to pass."
Noordmans is said to have been "œahead of his time" in teaching that the "œpre-" of predestination "œis a "˜pre-´ of divine desire, not of logical determinism."[103] Predestination, therefore, is not choosing some and rejecting others, but merely "œdesiring" something in regard to sinners without being the cause of it. The "œpre-" of predestination as set forth in the Canons of Dordt "œdoes not let the grace of election come to its own," and "œgrace takes a back seat because of the double focus of the divine decree."[104] Reprobation is made incompatible with God´s grace.
In view of the a priori decree of election and reprobation, universal proclamation is not possible, so long as the seriousness and genuinely intended offer of grace is concerned. The offer of grace could not be directed to people who were excluded from salvation by God´s decree.[105]
Against this background, Berkouwer says he published Divine Election, "œnot without hesitation and persistent questions," surely aware that he was changing not only the form but also the content of the Reformed doctrine of predestination.
Berkouwer believes he has growing support for choosing a doxological approach versus a decree fixed in eternity.
Thus the reconsideration of election has tended for several years, not in the direction of a double decree that merely waits to be executed, but in the direction of grace as the nature, the character of election.... I cannot help noting that this shift...has gained an encouraging consensus, supporting my own efforts to understand the meaning of the confession of election....[106]
In private conversation, Berkouwer mentioned James Daane´s The Freedom of God as an English language work reflecting his view. But he especially mentioned Herman Ridderbos in this connection as one who arrived at a similar view of election on exegetical grounds. In A Half Century of Theology Berkouwer says their mutual understanding occurred before the publication of Divine Election in 1955. "œOur discussion was supportive for me in my conviction that my rejection of consistent views like Hoeksema´s and others need not lead me into a fruitless polarization; I did not have to posit indeterminism over against determinism."[107]
Not surprisingly, we find Ridderbos writing in a similar vein:
In "œelection" there is not of itself the thought of a decree....
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The purport of Paul´s argument is not to show that all that God does in history has been foreordained from eternity and therefore, so far as his mercy as well as his hardening is concerned, has an irresistible and inevitable issue.... It is evident that one may not identify the omnipotence and sovereignty of God´s grace thus upheld on the one hand and of his reprobation and hardening on the other with irrevocable "œeternal" decrees, in which God would once and forever have predestined the salvation or ruin of man....
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
There is...an inner contradiction, if one conceives of the divine purpose and the number of the elect in a deterministic sense as an immutably established decree of the counsel of God; or if, on the other hand, one supposes that without the individual´s power of decision human responsibility toward the gospel becomes a fiction.[108]
Neither determinism nor indeterminism! Ridderbos, like Berkouwer, has sought a third way. What that way is remains elusive and protected in the "œstorm-free harbor of suprahistory."
Berkouwer and the Battle for the Bible
If Lindsell is correct in The Battle for the Bible when he calls biblical inerrancy "œthe most important theological topic of this age," with the battleground being the evangelical community, then the significance of Berkouwer must not be underestimated. His influence is considerable in the shift of the doctrine of Scripture manifesting itself among neo-evangelicalism. Krabbendam sees Berkouwer as "œthe fountainhead of a new type of thinking" which "œled him and his followers to the denial of ...inerrancy."[109] Gordon Lewis, in a paper on "œThe Human Authorship of Inspired Scripture," calls Berkouwer´s view of Scripture "œboth inadequate and unorthodox."[110] John Gerstner says Berkouwer´s view of Scripture "œdoes more than "˜damage reverence for Scripture,´" it "œdamages reverence for God."[111] If the battle is for the Bible, then Berkouwer is a major combatant!
Concerning Berkouwer´s view of Scripture I would make two qualifying comments which could well apply to the whole article. In the first place I will be very selective. This is necessary simply because of the amount of material. But I am also being selective in dealing with what appears to me to be problem areas. I will not spend time relating all the good things Berkouwer has to say, but I will purposely choose that material which suggests deviation from the more generally accepted Reformed doctrine of verbal inerrancy. This is not a balanced study, and is not intended to be, but I believe it is justified. The other qualification I would make concerns the way Berkouwer writes. When he treats the historical development of a doctrine along with the exegetical and theological questions to be considered, there is usually great clarity. But when it comes to a forthright statement of his own view on an area of controversy within the Reformed heritage, there is a studied lack of forthrightness. Here the issue of biblical inerrancy is a prime example. While Berkouwer has been more candid in recent years, one still does not find blatant denials of inerrancy. It is there in rhetorical questions and implication. He is not interested in the "œbattle for the Bible" as Lindsell and others might formulate it. Berkouwer does not wish to state boldly there are errors in the Bible, but under the assumption that there are errors, he wants us to see the authority and certainty questions from a different perspective.
The hesitation of Berkouwer to be drawn into a commitment to inerrancy or errancy is illustrated by an incident related by Lindsell in his recent book. With reference to Berkouwer, he writes:
He was a contributor to the Current Religious Thought Column of Christianity Today for some years. When readers raised the question about his belief in biblical inerrancy, I wrote to him for clarification. Despite extended correspondence, I could get no answer from him either affirming or denying inerrancy. When a man refuses to reply to a direct question about his continued acceptance of inerrancy, the only conclusion that can be drawn is obvious.[112]
I believe it is increasingly obvious, and for those who see this as a critical issue the time is past for giving his "œno comment" the benefit of the doubt.
In treating this subject I made a decision to use something of an historical framework. I have mixed feelings about this method, inasmuch as there will be some duplication which might be confusing. Yet there is a general consensus that Berkouwer had moved in his personal understanding, that there is an early and late Berkouwer, and that consequently we must note this change in his doctrine of Scripture.[113] There is, of course, much truth in the evaluation that Berkouwer´s position has changed. We will begin and end with reference to the contrast. Yet it is also true that the seeds of what he would consider his "œmature" view were present in those early years. Interestingly, in his later publication he chose not to repudiate his early work on Scripture but to see it as a different emphasis.[114]
The historical, or chronological, exposition of Berkouwer´s doctrine of Scripture will begin with a book published almost six decades ago and continue through his work published at the close of his active teaching in which he surveyed the past fifty years of theology as he experienced it. I hope to conclude with some references to disciples of Berkouwer which dramatically illustrate the bearing of his doctrine of Scripture on the current debate over inerrancy.
In 1938 Berkouwer´s first of two major works on Scripture appeared. Almost 400 pages long, Het Probleem der Schriftkritiek was a positive statement of the Reformed doctrine of Scripture in relation to the debates raging at that time. A central theme was the contrast of the Reformed doctrine to the "œsubjectivism" of the increasingly popular biblical criticism. According to Berkouwer, "œthe modern Scripture examination stands in sharp antithesis with that of orthodoxy," and "œif the Scripture is lost the context of the Christian faith is lost."[115] He apparently saw the deception of the modern critic of Scripture. "œThe battle against petrification of orthodoxy," says Berkouwer, "œwas in reality a letting go of Scripture revelation," and the "œself-sufficient autonomous subject" dominates the "œmodern" reflection on Scripture.[116]
We should pay attention to the striking contrast here to the later Berkouwer. In his later work on Scripture, it is precisely this battle against the petrification of orthodoxy which became his battle, but it is now affirmed that it does not involve a "œletting go of Scripture revelation." This contrast is put in bold relief by Berkouwer´s more recent doubts about the early chapters of Genesis. In the 1938 work, opposing those who questioned the historicity of these early chapters, his position is quite orthodox. Modern theology distinguishes, he says, "œbetween form and content or between the kernel and the husk, between fact and the clothing of that fact."[117] Such a form-content distinction is part and parcel of most of Berkouwer´s dogmatical studies and especially his work on Scripture, but hear what he said about it in 1938: "œThe natural question is what remains of the religious significance when the historical surroundings are considered doubtful."[118] The crux of the matter is how one receives certainty in the "œreligious connection" if the "œreligious relation´s indissoluble connection to the historical givens is devalued."[119] A few pages later he writes: "œAccording to Scripture the character of sin cannot be established apart from the historic fact of the fall and the surrounding trustworthy communications given to us."[120]
The prevailing message of that early work is clear. A modern "œsubjective" viewpoint is clearly set in opposition to the orthodox view of Scripture as revelation of God. There was resistance to all forms of subjectivism which denied the indissoluble connection between the form and the content. Van Til is basically correct, I believe, in seeing Berkouwer in this early work as opposed to the neo-orthodox view of Scripture, a view Van Til now sees as Berkouwer´s own.
It was almost thirty years later when Berkouwer wrote an even larger work on the doctrine of Holy Scripture. Entitled De Heilige Schrift, it appeared in two volumes in 1966 and 1967, the next to last in his Studies in Dogmatics. The English translation appeared in a somewhat abridged one-volume edition in 1975. The translation is done by Jack Rogers of Fuller Seminary, and it is from this edition that I will be citing.
It would be a serious error to suppose that this work represented anything other than the combined development of his thinking during those thirty years, now put down in a somewhat systematic fashion. Berkouwer´s view of Scripture was not unknown prior to this 1966 publication. Indeed, one could without too much difficulty ascertain his doctrine of Scripture from his other writing during that time, not the least of which would be his books and articles on the Roman Catholic Church and the "œnew theology" emerging there. For the sake of space, however, I want to concentrate now specifically on his work, Holy Scripture.
The fact that Berkouwer´s view on Scripture was generally known prior to this publication is not without significance. I was living in the Netherlands at that time, and there was an air of expectancy as people wondered to what extent Berkouwer would repudiate his 1938 book. It was my impression of both church and university circles that no one really doubted that Berkouwer had moved considerably from his early work. What made his new book newsworthy was to find out whether he would ignore, repudiate, or reinterpret it. Those familiar with Berkouwer´s style will not be surprised that he did a lot of ignoring, some reinterpretation, and a studied avoidance of explicit repudiation.
A common denominator in the modernist-fundamentalist debate in the early part of this century and the "œbattle for the Bible" today is the question of certainty with regard to our faith. Berkouwer begins his book with a chapter on Holy Scripture and the certainty of faith. It is not a faith certainty that is grounded in an infallible Scripture, but a recognition that Scripture is the Word of God, a recognition which grows out of one´s existing faith certainty. It is "œan incorrect conception of theology," according to Berkouwer, "œwhich considers it possible to discuss Holy Scripture apart from a personal relationship of belief in it."[121] He acknowledges "œthat for a long time during church history certainty of faith was specifically linked to the trustworthiness of Holy Scripture as the Word of God,"[122] but this traditional view is "œan incorrect conception of theology." The correct view is a correlation between faith and the object of faith, namely, God and His Word. "œOnly God himself can give us definite and indubitable certainty and place us for time and eternity on an immovable foundation."[123] Berkouwer does not tell us how God does this. He says he does not mean "œa miraculous voice of God," and he strongly denies charges of mysticism, spiritualism, or subjectivism. Yet his correlation is strongly influenced by the existential character of modern theology, what Berkhof calls Berkouwer´s third phase of "œthe existential direction of Scripture" with its kerygmatic-existential correlation.[124]
Berkouwer sees a strong parallel with the struggles within Roman Catholicism over the certainty question and sympathizes with the approach of neo-orthodox type liberal Roman Catholics. The final chapter of A Half Century of Theology is entitled "œConcern for the Faith," and has this same certainty theme. Some people feel betrayed and threatened, he says. "œFor Protestants, it is tied to a fear that the complete trustworthiness of Scripture is somehow being subverted. For Catholics, it is related to a loss of respect for the authority of the church as the last word for questions of faith."[125] Both books by Berkouwer on the Second Vatican Council and subsequent developments are illustrative of this. But one page from A Half Century of Theology will dramatically illustrate how this parallel between Rome and Protestantism functions.
Hans Kung, according to Berkouwer, "œcalled for a hard look at the actual history of papal statements in which error was, as a matter of fact, mixed with truth. He wanted complete honesty and integrity."[126] We, of course, agree with Kung that there is a great deal of error in papal statements. But remember, Berkouwer is drawing a parallel with the Protestant doctrine of Scripture. "œThe church is, Kung insisted, indefectible. But this does not require, as a conditio sine qua non, that its techings are infallible nor that the church´s path is marked by irrevocable statements."[127] The church is "œindefectib
