Luther vs. Edwards

[NB3K]

Ok I have both Luther's Bondage of the Will and Jonathan Edward's The Freedom of The Will.

My problem is, whenever I try to sit and read Edwards he makes my head hurt. From glossing over the two it seems that Luther speaks in a common language (easier to understand).

Are the two works basically the same?

Is one better than the other?

Or should I give attention to both and suck it up and learn the language of Edwards?

 

[Philip]

Are the two works basically the same?

The position argued is more or less the same. However, the language that each uses is different, so it can apppear that the two are in conflict. Luther is dealing with the moral ability of a sinner to choose to follow Christ, while Edwards is concerned with the subject of that freedom which is necessary for moral responsibility. Further, Edwards is writing after there has been a huge change in the definition of "free." For Luther, freedom has to do with the ability to do good, whereas for Edwards, it has to do with the ability to choose either good or evil.

 

[NB3K]

Are the two works basically the same?

The position argued is more or less the same. However, the language that each uses is different, so it can apppear that the two are in conflict. Luther is dealing with the moral ability of a sinner to choose to follow Christ, while Edwards is concerned with the subject of that freedom which is necessary for moral responsibility. Further, Edwards is writing after there has been a huge change in the definition of "free." For Luther, freedom has to do with the ability to do good, whereas for Edwards, it has to do with the ability to choose either good or evil.

So basically I should read both?

 

[Pilgrim]

With regard to the language and ease of reading, my guess is that your suspicion is correct. But someone would have to have read Luther in the original language to really answer your question. As I'm sure you know, what you are reading is an English translation, one that dates from the 50's assuming it's the Packer and Johnston translation.

I used to have Edwards' book, but never read it, probably in part because I was too lazy to plow through it.

 

[py3ak]

In Bavinck's learned judgment, Edwards wanted to strengthen Calvinism but wound up weakening it. Unless you are interested in intellectual history or American Calvinistic thought I doubt you need to force yourself through the Edwards volume.
However you would probably find it quite profitable to read some of his sermons, like "Ruth's Resolution".

 

[NB3K]

In Bavinck's learned judgment, Edwards wanted to strengthen Calvinism but wound up weakening it. Unless you are interested in intellectual history or American Calvinistic thought I doubt you need to force yourself through the Edwards volume.
However you would probably find it quite profitable to read some of his sermons, like "Ruth's Resolution".

Thank you.

---------- Post added at 03:24 PM ---------- Previous post was at 03:21 PM ----------

In Bavinck's learned judgment, Edwards wanted to strengthen Calvinism but wound up weakening it.

Did he weaken it by using such academic language that is hard to understand by the common folk?

 

[CharlieJ]

Luther at times gets a bit too necessitarian. Human free will almost disappears, absorbed into God. Calvin is more careful in his formulations. Anthony Lane has written on this topic, I think in his introduction to Calvin's Bondage and Liberation of the Will.

Also, I found this PhD dissertation that discusses the matter, starting at p. 220: http://www.calvin.edu/library/database/dissertations/Choy_Kiven_S.PDF

 

[Alan D. Strange]

Edwards on the will is brilliant and maddening. Edwards is speculative in ways that Luther is not, which is to say that Edwards's approach is more philosophical than Luther's. Luther hated the speculative approach of many of the schoolmen, so he is more down to earth in his treatment of the Scriptures and theology. Though I love Edwards for many things, I would say if you need to pick between the two, read Luther's debate with Erasmus (although Charlie is right too, though I think that may be due to the nature of Luther when engaged in direct polemics).

If you are interested in American Intellectual History and the place of Edwards's work in it, pick up Allen Guelzo's Edwards on the Will, a provocative and interesting work. I have a bit of a different take on the relationship of Edwards to the New Divinity that followed in his wake, but Guelzo is worth reading (he has now become a first-rate Lincoln scholar).

Peace,
Alan

 

[Philip]

Did he weaken it by using such academic language that is hard to understand by the common folk?

The academic language has something tod with the fact that Edwards is not addressing the issue of human salvation but of human responsibility.

 

[Prufrock]

In Bavinck's learned judgment, Edwards wanted to strengthen Calvinism but wound up weakening it.

Did he weaken it by using such academic language that is hard to understand by the common folk?

Jason, the case has been made that Edwards brought a doctrine of philosophical necessity into the Reformed system that was not present in earlier teachers, thus changing the shape of this aspect of Reformed thought; and that his concept of freedom was shaped by anthropological factors more philosophical than theological.

 

[py3ak]

In Bavinck's learned judgment, Edwards wanted to strengthen Calvinism but wound up weakening it. Unless you are interested in intellectual history or American Calvinistic thought I doubt you need to force yourself through the Edwards volume.
However you would probably find it quite profitable to read some of his sermons, like "Ruth's Resolution".

Thank you.
Did he weaken it by using such academic language that is hard to understand by the common folk?

No - or at least that's not what Bavinck identifies as the issue. On p.201 of the first volume of Reformed Dogmatics Bavinck says: "By his metaphysical and ethical speculations he attempted to strengthen Calvinism but actually weakened it by the distinction between natural and moral impotence --a distinction that already occurs in John Cameron-- and by a peculiar theory concerning freedom of the will, original sin, and virtue."

 

[NB3K]

Is Bavinck's Reformed Dogmatics worth getting? And can someone please explain what the work is.

 

[JM]

One is biblical the other is more philosophical...get Bavinck, the full set.

 

[py3ak]

Is Bavinck's Reformed Dogmatics worth getting? And can someone please explain what the work is.

Bavinck's Reformed Dogmatics is a 4-volume set of exactly what the title describes - Reformed Dogmatics. Bavinck was an extremely learned and profound Dutch theologian, and this work has only become available in English fairly recently. It's worth not only getting, but reading; but whether it's worth it for you will depend on many factors.

 

[jwithnell]

By Mr. Luther's pounding the point home in Bondage of the Will, I first came to understand total depravity -- and that established the basis for my Calvinist viewpoint. (Most Lutherans give me a funny look when I say that!)

I have not read Mr. Bavink's comments so I can't speak directly to them, though I hugely admire the Dutch theologians in general and they have had a huge impact on my life. However after years of reading Mr. Edwards's sermons, I came to realize that he placed very high expectations on his hearers and this may lead to the idea of his being more philosophical and perhaps less grounded in a sermon text. Here's what I mean: he will make a reference to another text or concept from scripture and draw a conclusion that may not be reached by the exegesis of his original sermon text. However, he is assuming that his listener has had a full exegesis of the text he is referencing and is bringing all that information in to reach his conclusion. If, while you are reading his sermon, you look up these supporting texts and carefully examine them, you will see what I mean.

The historical context is also critical for appreciating Mr. Edwards. The awakening and the developing enlightenment philosophy of the age gives context to his work. He was interested in some of the concepts being developed by the philosophers, but the logical conclusions that later came to full fruition were far into the future. He was a brilliant man, and naturally took interest in the developing thoughts of his time. It would be considerably unfair to fault him for this.

However, in answer to the original post, I think Bondage of the Will is must reading for reformed folk. Read The Freedom of The Will if it interests you. Definitely read some of Mr. Edwards' sermons!

And please don't dis him on my watch

 

[py3ak]

Stating (or quoting others stating) that Edwards was incorrect or that he adopted the wrong approach to attain his desired result is not dissing him. Except for certain superhumans, everyone must make choices about what to read and what not to read, simply as a matter of time and energy; and so recommendations or dissuasions can be quite helpful.

 

[Philip]

Jason, the case has been made that Edwards brought a doctrine of philosophical necessity into the Reformed system that was not present in earlier teachers, thus changing the shape of this aspect of Reformed thought; and that his concept of freedom was shaped by anthropological factors more philosophical than theological.

These issues were inevitable, in any case, given the tack that western thought was taking, and given hard determinists like Thomas Hobbes and libertarians like John Locke. It was Edwards who established that reformed thought is compatibilist (ie: theological determinism is compatible with human responsibility). The fact is that metaphysically, I've never been able to see a solution to the problem of freedom and determinism apart from the compatibilism of Edwards. Does Bavinck offer a different solution here? Or does he play the mystery card?

 

[Prufrock]

These issues were inevitable, in any case, given the tack that western thought was taking, and given hard determinists like Thomas Hobbes and libertarians like John Locke. It was Edwards who established that reformed thought is compatibilist (ie: theological determinism is compatible with human responsibility). The fact is that metaphysically, I've never been able to see a solution to the problem of freedom and determinism apart from the compatibilism of Edwards. Does Bavinck offer a different solution here? Or does he play the mystery card?

I'll leave that question to someone currently reading Bavinck. I've heard rumors that at least one person here is currently reading volume 1 (hint).

As to the inevitability of the issues, well, that's an issue for historians of philosophy - I can't speak intelligibly as to whether it the trains of philosophical thought of the day made the issue inevitable. I *can*, however, say that any such necessity would be limited to the context of that philosophical framework. Each of those "-isms" you mention are too recent on the scene to say that "Reformed thought is _______-ist (insert above mentioned word of your choice)." Reformed thought on the issue of the nature of the will as will existed long before the modern (and by nature, transient) philosophical framework which demands answers in a context it is capable of handling or understanding. The "compatibilism" Edwards brings is not "the" Reformed understanding of the will, though I can see how one would think it would become necessary if for one's starting point they accepted the basic philosophical framework and anthropology emerging in that day. As a side note, though 17th century dogmatics was by no means shy about humbling itself before existent mystery, I'm unaware that mainstream scholasticism played "the mystery card" on this issue (if that was implied in the general tenor of your post).

 

[py3ak]

Bavinck doesn't address that issue in v.1 and my other volumes are in storage - he makes that comment in the context of a brief overview of the history of dogmatics.

 

[Philip]

Each of those "-isms" you mention are too recent on the scene to say that "Reformed thought is _______-ist

Determinism is as old as Greek philosophy, as is the supposed conflict between human responsibility and determinism. Boethius proves interesting on this point.

The "compatibilism" Edwards brings is not "the" Reformed understanding of the will

Has God ordained the future? Are humans responsible agents? Are the two logically compatible in reformed thought? If so, then compatibilism is the reformed position. We are clearly not hard determinists, Molinists, or libertarians. If there is a historic Calvinist position other than one that affirms 1) that the future is knowable 2) that humans are responsible 3) that the two are logically compatible and in fact necessary for one another, then it has yet to be explained to me.

 

[MW]

If there is a historic Calvinist position other than one that affirms 1) that the future is knowable 2) that humans are responsible 3) that the two are logically compatible and in fact necessary for one another, then it has yet to be explained to me.

The future isn't knowable to the human being making the choice. As it is not a real condition of human volition there is no need for a refined theory which makes the freedom of human choice compatible with a divinely determined event. It is not even desirable to know the future should it be remotely possible. It is, in fact, discouraged in many different ways in Scripture. The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.

 

[Philip]

The future isn't knowable to the human being making the choice.

The question is whether it is knowable at all by anyone, including God. Do the reformed affirm foreordination? Yes or no?

 

[MW]

The question is whether it is knowable at all by anyone, including God. Do the reformed affirm foreordination? Yes or no?

That's not the question, and a little experience in dealing with these topics would make that evident. The reformed affirm the fore-ordination of all things which come to pass. They also affirm, "the liberty or contingency of second causes" is not taken away, WCF 3.1. The liberty, in other words, which reformed theology maintains, is not one which requires the necessity of a specific event, but allows for contingency, which means the event may or may not have fallen out from the perspective of secondary causation.

 

[Philip]

The reformed affirm the fore-ordination of all things which come to pass. They also affirm, "the liberty or contingency of second causes" is not taken away

Which is why the reformed position is compatibilist, not hard determinist. This is the classic compatibilist position.

 

[MW]

Which is why the reformed position is compatibilist, not hard determinist. This is the classic compatibilist position.

I'm not interested in word games. Compatibilism, as an "ism," does not merely state that the fore-ordination of all things is systematically compatible with a belief in the freedom of the will; it maintains a specific theory of compatibility, which defines "liberty" in terms of "necessity," and makes the "determinism" internal to the willing agent.

 

[Philip]

Compatibilism, as an "ism," does not merely state that the fore-ordination of all things is systematically compatible with a belief in the freedom of the will; it maintains a specific theory of compatibility, which defines "liberty" in terms of "necessity," and makes the "determinism" internal to the willing agent.

Necessity has to do with whether God could have created the world such that something is other than it is. Certainly God could have created the world such that I had eggs for breakfast this morning---I would still have been free to have not eaten them. I'm not entirely sure how saying that we act rationally based on our desires entails a lack of freedom. The alternative is chance (ruled out by default). If you want to take up indeterminism, be my guest, but those are the logical options available (unless we want to add the self-contradictory "solution" that is Molinism).

 

[MW]

Necessity has to do with whether God could have created the world such that something is other than it is. Certainly God could have created the world such that I had eggs for breakfast this morning---I would still have been free to have not eaten them. I'm not entirely sure how saying that we act rationally based on our desires entails a lack of freedom. The alternative is chance (ruled out by default). If you want to take up indeterminism, be my guest, but those are the logical options available (unless we want to add the self-contradictory "solution" that is Molinism).

I can understand your binding ultimatum given your theology of bondage, but I think I am safe to reject the binding ultimatum in the liberty which the truth of Jesus Christ has brought.

 

[Philip]

I can understand your binding ultimatum given your theology of bondage, but I think I am safe to reject the binding ultimatum in the liberty which the truth of Jesus Christ has brought.

Do you care to propose an alternative solution to the problem? If not, then compatibilism (or Molinism) is the only game in town. Compatibilism does not deny agent causation or contingency---however it does recognize the limits of the ordinary uses of these terms and refuses to admit that there could be an element of chance in either.

 

[MW]

Do you care to propose an alternative solution to the problem? If not, then compatibilism (or Molinism) is the only game in town. Compatibilism does not deny agent causation or contingency---however it does recognize the limits of the ordinary uses of these terms and refuses to admit that there could be an element of chance in either.

Your theory supposes "determinism" is a real condition of human volition. It isn't. The willing agent doesn't know the secret things of the Lord. It is always an hypothetical condition. Your theory denies contingency, or what the Bible calls "time and chance," from the point of view of the secondary cause. Your "determinism" is not the divine foreordination of reformed Theism, but the mechanistic and internal causation which is required by the system of Deism.

 

[Philip]

Your theory supposes "determinism" is a real condition of human volition.

Naturally---even self-determination is a sort of determinism. When a person acts in a random manner, we diagnose him as insane.

Your theory denies contingency, or what the Bible calls "time and chance," from the point of view of the secondary cause.

Not at all---all things are contingent upon the will of God. For any event X, God could have created the world such that X does not happen. The reason why probabilistic theories are needed is because of our finitude. As you say, such constructs are mere circumstances of our point of view as secondary agents.