Luther vs. Edwards

[jwithnell]

A thorough review of God's Eternal Decree would settle most of the discussion on determinism. In my understanding, this is not a debatable issue on Puritan Board. WCF Chapter 3:1 "God, from all eternity, did by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely, and unchangeable ordain whatsoever comes to pass." And to the issue of free will and the end of this section: "yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creature; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established."

This part of the confession would have remained intact in the Savoy Declaration and would have been the doctrinal standard for Jonathan Edwards -- given the wide circulation of His sermons both in the colonies and in Europe, any divergence from this standard would have been well noted.

 

[CharlieJ]

According to Richard Muller, Edwards' divergence from standard Reformed teaching on the will was in fact noted by many, both inside and outside Reformed circles.

http://www.jecteds.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/Richard_Muller_Lecture.mp3

 

[a mere housewife]

Rev. Winzer, if I understand correctly, you are saying that 'compatibilism' seeks to take what properly belongs to the decree of God, and is both hidden from us and irrelevant to our actions, and bring it into the human perspective, in limiting our definitions of 'time and chance' and the agent's freedom. In doing so, it robs God of what is His --and 'fuses' into some sort of mechanism His freedom to determine events and our freedom to act. Is it right to understand that the decree of God not only places no constraint from the perspective of second causes; but is in fact, the only arena of that unconstraint (because it is the only arena where 'determination' is kept outside the realm of contingencies, and in which contingent causes operate quite freely?)

 

[Prufrock]

A thorough review of God's Eternal Decree would settle most of the discussion on determinism. In my understanding, this is not a debatable issue on Puritan Board. WCF Chapter 3:1 "God, from all eternity, did by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely, and unchangeable ordain whatsoever comes to pass." And to the issue of free will and the end of this section: "yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creature; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established."

This part of the confession would have remained intact in the Savoy Declaration and would have been the doctrinal standard for Jonathan Edwards -- given the wide circulation of His sermons both in the colonies and in Europe, any divergence from this standard would have been well noted.

Rest assured, there is no denial of God's explicit ordination of all that comes to pass. And please be assured, as well, that there is no slight to Edwards here - his "new directions" in different areas of Reformed thought were widely discussed and debated at the time. With respect to his doctrine of philosophical necessity, many in the Reformed world accepted it gladly - but by no means did all. What is under discussion is not whether it is both true that God has ordained all that comes to pass, and that creatures have freedom - that is happily accepted by all; it is simply over the specific manner in which Edwards reconciled the two. Mr Pugh is asserting Edwards' way is the only way; others will point out that, while the Westminster Confession (for example) allows Edwards' teaching, it does not require it - there are older ways of dealing with the issue. Reformed theology simply hardly requires Edwards' explanation.

.........

Mr. Pugh, it has been noted to you already, but you've (whether intentionally or unintentionally, it doesn't matter) exploited an ambiguity in the term "compatibilism." Yes, I am more than aware that the idea that all things are determined, or that things aren't determined, or that things being determined is compatible with liberty and contingency are far older than Reformed theology: that is an obvious statement.

I would note that you stated earlier in this thread: "Further, Edwards is writing after there has been a huge change in the definition of "free." For Luther, freedom has to do with the ability to do good, whereas for Edwards, it has to do with the ability to choose either good or evil." Precisely. Older Reformed formulations were produced in the context of the essence of freedom being found in "rational willingness," not in "indifference." Any attempt to be satisfied with an answer presented from the former context is bound to be unsatisfying to you if you are accepting as your starting point a definition of freedom based upon indifference. If you are accepting the latter, please be sure not to import any technical definitions of terms which are built upon this foundation or within this paradigm into words which older theologians (or, in the context of this discussion, Mr. Winzer) are using.

 

[Philip]

Any attempt to be satisfied with an answer presented from the former context is bound to be unsatisfying to you if you are accepting as your starting point a definition of freedom based upon indifference.

The older formulation is as satisfying to me as the newer, given that I see no conflict between them. I have long noted the synthesis between the earlier Anselmian/Thomist/Lutheran formulations and the later formulations of Anglo-American theologians, following Edwards.

Any attempt to be satisfied with an answer presented from the former context is bound to be unsatisfying to you if you are accepting as your starting point a definition of freedom based upon indifference.

Indifference is probably a bad term---natural ability is slightly better. The solution of Edwards makes the distinction between natural ability and moral ability such that Luther's "bondage of will" is covered under moral ability. While one may disagree with the precise mechanisms by which he describes the workings of moral ability, the distinction is no less helpful.

 

[a mere housewife]

I thought Dr. Muller's assessment at minute 26 of the lecture Charlie linked to was interesting: 'Edwards seems to have reversed what I think was a very old traditional Reformed assumption of a radically contingent world order, and reduced all to necessity, with acts of will standing in no contrast either to natural or physical necessity. His understanding of causality and necessity is remarkably akin to that of Hume: specifically, causality is reduced to efficiency; necessity is uniformly identified as physical necessity, and generated in the chain of causality. In short, Edwards understood the causality of the human will in much the same way that he understood efficient causality in the world around him. There is no room for change, for actual choice, certainly not for liberty of contradiction. His formulations are illustrative of something that happens in the 18th century -- which is, a loss of the philosophical foundation for the expression of the older reformed theology on issues of contingency and human freedom.'

 

[Don Kistler]

And you guys think that EDWARDS is hard to understand???

 

[MW]

Not at all---all things are contingent upon the will of God. For any event X, God could have created the world such that X does not happen. The reason why probabilistic theories are needed is because of our finitude. As you say, such constructs are mere circumstances of our point of view as secondary agents.

If you allow contingency of events then you have denied the first condition of your compatibilism -- determinism. Why not have a think about it before responding.

 

[MW]

Is it right to understand that the decree of God not only places no constraint from the perspective of second causes; but is in fact, the only arena of that unconstraint (because it is the only arena where 'determination' is kept outside the realm of contingencies, and in which contingent causes operate quite freely?)

That's correct. As the saying goes, I don't know what the future holds but I know Who holds the future.

 

[Philip]

If you allow contingency of events then you have denied the first condition of your compatibilism -- determinism.

By determinism, I mean that all things are determined and knowable. You are assuming that my position is a particular brand of determinism. I consider any sort of foreordination to be deterministic. If God has ordained the future, then the future is determined. And contingency simply means that for any event X, God did not have to create the universe such that X comes to pass.

 

[MW]

You are assuming that my position is a particular brand of determinism.

You earlier maintained a particular form of determinism, namely, that which is espoused by compatibilism. In that definition "determinism" is one of the conditions to be logically explained in harmony with free will. The compatibilist position argues that there is an internal causation such that the willing person could not have chosen anything other than what he has chosen. There is no "contingency" in that "necessary" process of causation. If you are now willing to allow that there is contingency from the perspective of the secondary cause, then all's well that ends well; if not, please don't play word games.

 

[a mere housewife]

As the saying goes, I don't know what the future holds but I know Who holds the future.

Listening through the lecture by Dr. Muller today, with the question at the end about the practical use of this doctrine, this has been my thought this evening as well. It would detract from the comfort and joy of that personal knowledge to deposit any of it instead in a string of necessary events.

 

[Philip]

The compatibilist position argues that there is an internal causation such that the willing person could not have chosen anything other than what he has chosen.

Are we talking natural or moral ability here? Certainly there are possible worlds in which I chose different things than I in fact chose. Possibility and contingency are functions of logic.

Now, in practical terms, certainly there is a level of agent determinism: I have conflicting desires that play out in my mental (and physical) processes that eventually lead to various actions. Doesn't make them any less mine or me any less responsible for them. I, the agent, am acting of my own accord. What I don't see is how human freedom could be anything other than this and still be rational rather than arbitrary or random.

I am perfectly willing to grant contingency, by all means. I don't see how this particular brand of compatibilism is inconsistent with it.

 

[MW]

Are we talking natural or moral ability here? Certainly there are possible worlds in which I chose different things than I in fact chose. Possibility and contingency are functions of logic.

Now you have introduced a distinction which has nothing to do with the discussion. For this discussion to be meaningful it can only refer to what has come to be called "natural ability." This realities of God's decree and human willing are true in all man's moral conditions and relations. Please try to stay on track.

You have also introduced another irrelevancy by speaking of "possible worlds." A possible world requires its own "book," which contains all the conditions of a real world. The confession is speaking about the contingency of events in the real world in which God has foreordained all things which come to pass. In that real world of foreordained events, the events are "contingent" on the secondary causation. Again, please try to stay on track.

 

[Philip]

For this discussion to be meaningful it can only refer to what has come to be called "natural ability."

If we're speaking of natural ability, then you and I are in agreement.

You have also introduced another irrelevancy by speaking of "possible worlds."

A possible world is simply a hypothetical---God could have created the world such that X. If X is contingently true, this implies that God could have created the world such that ~X.

 

[MW]

For this discussion to be meaningful it can only refer to what has come to be called "natural ability."

If we're speaking of natural ability, then you and I are in agreement.

Good; there is "contingency," not "necessity," in human choice. Compatibilism is dead. May it rest in peace.

You have also introduced another irrelevancy by speaking of "possible worlds."

A possible world is simply a hypothetical---God could have created the world such that X. If X is contingently true, this implies that God could have created the world such that ~X.

Obviously that is the way it is stated. It is irrelevant. The Confession is dealing with a real world -- the world which God has fore-ordained. In that real world there is contingency.

 

[Philip]

Compatibilism is dead. May it rest in peace.

Correction: one (straw-man) form of compatibilism is dead. I would contend that my position is what might be called "soft" compatibilism.

In that real world there is contingency.

And possible worlds are a necessary theoretical construct when speaking of contingency.

 

[MW]

Compatibilism is dead. May it rest in peace.

Correction: one (straw-man) form of compatibilism is dead. I would contend that my position is what might be called "soft" compatibilism.

In that real world there is contingency.

And possible worlds are a necessary theoretical construct when speaking of contingency.

In Edwardsean terms, my inclination to preserve my sanity prevails over my inclination to continue discussion. Good day!

 

[jwithnell]

If God has ordained the future, then the future is determined.

It is this perspective that was giving me heartburn. I suppose we are free to redefine terms, but determinism has centuries of usage behind it (along with the question of how it interfaces with free will).

And I'm a Jonathan Edwards groupie; what can I say? (How's that for thoroughly academic philosophy?)

 

[MW]

And I'm a Jonathan Edwards groupie; what can I say? (How's that for thoroughly academic philosophy?)

You were bound out of necessity to do it. What could you do?

 

[Philip]

You were bound out of necessity to do it.

Bound by contingency, I would say.

 

[moral necessity]

Would it be safe to say that Dabney would be grouped with Edwards, and not in line with what is "traditionally reformed"? For those wanting to read his lecture entitled Free Agency and the Will, see his Systematic Theology, p.120-132, or simply click here: Free Agency and the Will

Thanks and Blessings!

 

[jwithnell]

Quote Originally Posted by armourbearer View Post
You were bound out of necessity to do it.
Bound by contingency, I would say.

You guys are too funny!

 

[MW]

Would it be safe to say that Dabney would be grouped with Edwards, and not in line with what is "traditionally reformed"? For those wanting to read his lecture entitled Free Agency and the Will, see his Systematic Theology, p.120-132, or simply click here: Free Agency and the Will

That is correct. The tell tale sign of the new psychology is the introduction of a new element, called "appetency," "desire," or "emotion," into human agency. The traditional psychology only spoke of will and understanding, with "appetency" being identified as a function of the will. The introduction of this new element opened the door for the human agent to be passive in some way, which creates the mechanism for "necessary volitions." From a Reformed perspective, the exploitation of this passivity in twentieth century psychology, and the "monstrous" conclusions which were drawn from it, should suffice as an historical condemnation of the idea.

 

[Philip]

That is correct. The tell tale sign of the new psychology is the introduction of a new element, called "appetency," "desire," or "emotion," into human agency.

Careful here---I generally don't will myself into a state of happiness, sadness, hunger, or anger. My rational faculties have some control over my state (ie: "I'm depressed, so let's watch a Jimmy Stewart film"), but there are also aspects of desires, appetites, etc that are not willed and do affect my willing. There are aspects (I won't say "parts" because I'd rather not divide the human being) of my psyche (dispositions, temperaments, etc) that a) aren't entirely rational b) tend toward reaction.

 

[MW]

Careful here---I generally don't will myself into a state of happiness, sadness, hunger, or anger. My rational faculties have some control over my state (ie: "I'm depressed, so let's watch a Jimmy Stewart film"), but there are also aspects of desires, appetites, etc that are not willed and do affect my willing. There are aspects (I won't say "parts" because I'd rather not divide the human being) of my psyche (dispositions, temperaments, etc) that a) aren't entirely rational b) tend toward reaction.

You begin by telling me to be careful; you provide rational considerations which you suppose will give me the motive to take care; but then your rational considerations introduce a non-rational motive over which, you claim, I myself am not actively in control.

As above, I choose sanity over the madness of talking with you about such things.

 

[Philip]

You begin by telling me to be careful; you provide rational considerations which you suppose will give me the motive to take care; but then your rational considerations introduce a non-rational motive over which, you claim, I myself am not actively in control.

I consider your emotions to be as much an aspect of you as your reason. Both of them are you as much as any other aspect.

Let me define freedom (for the purposes of moral responsibility) as follows: Agent X is free action Y iff the only factor preventing X from performing action Y is agent X.

 

[moral necessity]

Would it be safe to say that Dabney would be grouped with Edwards, and not in line with what is "traditionally reformed"? For those wanting to read his lecture entitled Free Agency and the Will, see his Systematic Theology, p.120-132, or simply click here: Free Agency and the Will

That is correct. The tell tale sign of the new psychology is the introduction of a new element, called "appetency," "desire," or "emotion," into human agency. The traditional psychology only spoke of will and understanding, with "appetency" being identified as a function of the will. The introduction of this new element opened the door for the human agent to be passive in some way, which creates the mechanism for "necessary volitions." From a Reformed perspective, the exploitation of this passivity in twentieth century psychology, and the "monstrous" conclusions which were drawn from it, should suffice as an historical condemnation of the idea.

Thanks, Rev. Winzer. Could you direct me to a few writers who lay out the traditional reformed view?

Thanks and blessings!

 

[MW]

Could you direct me to a few writers who lay out the traditional reformed view?

Please see Calvin's Institutes, Owen's Display of Arminianism, Turretin's Institutes, Shedd's Dogmatic Theology, and McCosh's Method of Divine Government. That is in chronological order. It may be best to begin with Shedd and McCosh, as they undertake to explain the traditional view in light of modern developments, whereas the older writers adopt it as a matter of course.

 

[moral necessity]

Could you direct me to a few writers who lay out the traditional reformed view?

Please see Calvin's Institutes, Owen's Display of Arminianism, Turretin's Institutes, Shedd's Dogmatic Theology, and McCosh's Method of Divine Government. That is in chronological order. It may be best to begin with Shedd and McCosh, as they undertake to explain the traditional view in light of modern developments, whereas the older writers adopt it as a matter of course.

Thanks again, Rev. Winzer! I'll enjoy the homework assignment!

Blessings!