What is the relation between "morality" and "the good?"
(i) Does morality sometimes prohibit us from acting in ways that would be best on the whole? A consequentialist could say: There might be a tension between a moral rule (as seen by others) and the good. For example, not telling a lie is a moral law most would hold to, but in some cases not telling a lie could lead to human lives being killed. In cases like these, one is morally obligated (according to the consequentialist) to lie in order to save the human lives.
(ii) Is there some special value inherent in a morally good will, as Kant apparently thought. Kant says that the moral worth of actions consists in the motivations behind them. [There are three motivations that Kant recognizes: 1. acting from duty (doing something because it’s the right thing to do - tied in with the categorical imperative), 2. acting from immediate inclination (something done for it’s own sake or because you enjoy doing it), and 3., from another inclination (usually as a means to some further end).]
(iii) Is Scanlon right to suggest that morality makes possible a distinctively valuable form of relationship to our fellow human beings? Scanlon's contractualism is stated as follows: "An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behaviour that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general agreement" (Scanlon 1998, p. 153). (More on Scanlon's contractualism here: Contractualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)).
So these are just three ways of looking at the relation between "morality" and "the good." What are some Christian responses to these three views? In my opinion, I think each theory has some grain of truth in it, but they each ultimately fail because they rely too much on one aspect of morality. By putting emphasis one area, they fail to give an account of other ethical considerations. For example, consequentialism leads to some rather justified horrendous acts (such as killing one person in order to save three, since the action will lead to a greater net balance of good). Kant's overemphasis of the "good will" leads to people who are not morally transformed, but act solely in accordance with the moral law. This seems like all we're doing is producing "moral robots." I think "sympathy" does have something to do with morality. Someone who is morally transformed will act out of sympathy (or we could say, act naturally) and whose action will also match with the moral law. Lastly, Scanlon's focus on the value of other human beings disregards much of the personal moral considerations one deals with. There are many actions, thoughts, and so on, that Christians would say are immoral, but under Scanlon's theory would not be immoral, or he could even they are amoral.
(i) Does morality sometimes prohibit us from acting in ways that would be best on the whole? A consequentialist could say: There might be a tension between a moral rule (as seen by others) and the good. For example, not telling a lie is a moral law most would hold to, but in some cases not telling a lie could lead to human lives being killed. In cases like these, one is morally obligated (according to the consequentialist) to lie in order to save the human lives.
(ii) Is there some special value inherent in a morally good will, as Kant apparently thought. Kant says that the moral worth of actions consists in the motivations behind them. [There are three motivations that Kant recognizes: 1. acting from duty (doing something because it’s the right thing to do - tied in with the categorical imperative), 2. acting from immediate inclination (something done for it’s own sake or because you enjoy doing it), and 3., from another inclination (usually as a means to some further end).]
(iii) Is Scanlon right to suggest that morality makes possible a distinctively valuable form of relationship to our fellow human beings? Scanlon's contractualism is stated as follows: "An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behaviour that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general agreement" (Scanlon 1998, p. 153). (More on Scanlon's contractualism here: Contractualism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)).
So these are just three ways of looking at the relation between "morality" and "the good." What are some Christian responses to these three views? In my opinion, I think each theory has some grain of truth in it, but they each ultimately fail because they rely too much on one aspect of morality. By putting emphasis one area, they fail to give an account of other ethical considerations. For example, consequentialism leads to some rather justified horrendous acts (such as killing one person in order to save three, since the action will lead to a greater net balance of good). Kant's overemphasis of the "good will" leads to people who are not morally transformed, but act solely in accordance with the moral law. This seems like all we're doing is producing "moral robots." I think "sympathy" does have something to do with morality. Someone who is morally transformed will act out of sympathy (or we could say, act naturally) and whose action will also match with the moral law. Lastly, Scanlon's focus on the value of other human beings disregards much of the personal moral considerations one deals with. There are many actions, thoughts, and so on, that Christians would say are immoral, but under Scanlon's theory would not be immoral, or he could even they are amoral.
