WrittenFromUtopia
Puritan Board Graduate
I brought up the question in my Philosophy Seminar class the other day of, "How can naturalists account for the laws of logic, math, etc. if there is nothing immaterial or metaphysical?"
Here is a reply on our class forum:
I have asked him a few more questions, but I was wondering what you all had to say about his thoughts here?
Here is a reply on our class forum:
In class thursday, Gabe asked the question: How does a naturalist or a physicalist account for his use of mathematics or language or logic? (If I`ve misrepresented this, please let me know)
Here`s what I see as an answer:
First, I am assuming that the naturalist/physicalist is a physicalist also about mind, that is he believes that mental states are reducible to physical (brain) states (this is a contentious framework, I realize, but it is the framework that the question is posed to). Secondly, the question(s) of math and logic are far more interesting to me, because it is easy to see an evolutionary account of how we get to the use of langugage (one that, in fact, some linguists adopt). We can set aside that math and logic are languages, becuase there is something different about them that still needs to be accounted for. The difference, and the difficulty, is that mathematical and logical truths are often relegated to the set of "a priori know-ables." So, the underlying question is "How does a naturalist/physicalist account for a priori knowledge?"
Some naturalists deny it, which is, as I see it, the easy way out. And, I think what`s left is the same problem using different words to characterize it.
Here`s my proposal:
1. A priori truths are true in virtue of a conceptual relationship. (one concept contains another, for example).
2. In order to know some proposition, P, a priori, S1 must know the concepts and the relationship that holds.
3. Knowing the relationship is the result of S1`s intuitions.
4. But belief states, concepts, and intuitions are all mental states (and therefore physical states).
5. Any "a priori" relationship that can be said to hold between concepts must be a physical relationship.
6. The relationships of math and logic are conceptual relationships and therefore physical relationships (within S1).
This, I believe, is an account of how an individual can be said to have this a priori knowledge, and to use it. What remains to be shown is how S1 and any S2 can arrive at the same beliefs "a priori." So,
7. S1 and S2 have, by evolutionary accounts, analogous cognitive apparati.
8. S1 and S2, then, may hold contradictory beliefs about any "a posteriori" P.
9. Further, S1 and S2 may utilize different mechanisms in arriving at any "a priori" P.
10. But, intuitions, in virtue of an evolutionary account, are such that S1 can appeal to those (intuitions) of S2 in order to establish agreement on an "a priori" P. (consider this an argument for the importance of society in achieving epistemic aims)
11. This is because intuitions, as a reasoning (therefore physical) mechanism, in S1 and S2 must be the same process.
Now, whatever other problems naturalists and non-naturalists alike might have with these accounts, I would like to mention the problem I have with this account. Philosophical naturalism involves appeals to the evidence available to empirical science to answer philosophical questions (ones about morality, epistemology, etc.). While this account is a plausible route for a naturalist to argue, and while there is empirical evidence that suggests that mental states are physical (brain) states, there is not sufficient evidence to suggest that a priori relationships are physical (brain) relationships at this time. Thus, this argument is more a research proposal for empirical psychology than an answer to the question. That research in hand (provided it does not falsify the hypothesis) would justify a naturalist in taking this route. Until such time, this is just speculative.
I have asked him a few more questions, but I was wondering what you all had to say about his thoughts here?