Neolegalism and RC Sproul Jr?

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Who are the Neo-legalists?
1) Neonomians?
2) the Dallas Willard bunch?
3) NPP/FV?

If it's the last one, he's not. Positively not!
 
In the latest Trinity Foundation article, John Robbins makes this charge against him directly. See footnote #6 at the end of article.
http://www.trinityfoundation.org/journal.php?id=206

Not sure about Sproul Jr.'s personal positon on Justification, but you would think he would be in for a good spanking from his daddy if he wandered in this regard.
Soli Deo Gloria,
Darrin

[Edited on 4-5-2005 by Canadian Baptist]
 
John Robbins has also come close to charging Westminster Seminary with abandoning the gospel. Seriously, who hasn't Robbins charged with heresy. And no, RCjr isn't involved with "Neolegalism." In fact, he debated against them in teh Auburn Symposium.
 
Didn't Robbins also charge Van Til with denying the Trinity? When I read that I stopped taking him seriously.
 
Originally posted by Draught Horse
John Robbins has also come close to charging Westminster Seminary with abandoning the gospel. Seriously, who hasn't Robbins charged with heresy. And no, RCjr isn't involved with "Neolegalism." In fact, he debated against them in the Auburn Symposium.

Sadly, John Robbins has done alot of damage to/against orthodoxy. Many people have used his invective to excuse the errors of others.
 
Originally posted by turmeric
3) NPP/FV?

Just for clarification, these two things are not exactly the same, either. There is more information on them both here.

Originally posted by Draught Horse
Didn't Robbins also charge Van Til with denying the Trinity? When I read that I stopped taking him seriously.

I think so - and I seem to remember him claiming that C. S. Lewis is in hell unless he changed his beliefs at the end of his life. One could go on and on...
 
I had the unpleasant experience of being around a group of people who hold John Robbins in high-esteem. Not only is he invective, but he excuses this as biblical and a virtue. He wanders off the course of classical orthodoxy at key points, I believe. Anyone who disagrees with him is exposed publicly on the internet in the harshest of ways. The gospel to him seems to mean everything that G. Clark taught. Any slight variation from this and you have supposedly denied the gospel. In this regard, on his website, he seems to charge Mike Horton, Sproul Jr and Sr., Roger Nicole, John MacArthur, Spurgeon, Piper and others as either antichrists, gospel deniers, or roman catholics. Classical calvinists are considered hypo-calvinists (i.e arminians). And one of the more prominent hyper-calvinists of our time used to write for him. And lastly, in his writings he consistently misrepresents those he disagrees with. When you read the authors in context that he says have moved into heresy, you see that he distorts their words and meanings.

Here are links to Sproul Jr.'s squiblog. I think they will show explicitly that Sproul Jr. is not part of the FV or NPP. I was particularly intrigued how he mentions that he never read Shepherd, except for Robbin's critique of Shepherd, yet Robbin's in his latest heresy hunt (posted by Canadian Baptist) states with certainty that Sproul Jr. is getting his teachings from reading Shepherd's book.

http://www.gospelcom.net/hsc/journals/hsc/2004_03_01_archive.html

(see Six Degrees of Condemnation)

http://www.gospelcom.net/hsc/journals/hsc/2003_10_01_archive.html

(see auburn affirmations)

http://www.gospelcom.net/hsc/journals/hsc/2004_06_01_archive.html

see Cutting off one´s nose)

http://www.gospelcom.net/hsc/journals/hsc/2003_12_01_archive.html

(see He´s heavy, he ain´t my brother)


I was either told once or read somewhere that Mr. Robbins wasn't a member of any church. Is this true?
 
I have also read those links by Sproul and talked with him on the phone, although for a different reason. I don't have the trinity foundation "Horror File" with me but I seem to remember Robbins linking Banner of Truth was either Arminiansim or Roman Catholicism.
 
My question was in response to Robbins' article, but I couldn't get the article to link yesterday. Robbins does like to make heresy claims against many people. After reading his article on Piper ("Pied Piper") I knew that he needed to be taken with a grain of salt. Piper isn't perfect...but he isn't a heretic either.
 
Originally posted by RAS

I was either told once or read somewhere that Mr. Robbins wasn't a member of any church. Is this true?

Ruling Elder at Midway Presbyterian (PCA) in Jonesborough, TN, about 30 minutes from me.

I'm not a fan of his stuff, but I thought that one needed to be put to bed.
 
Originally posted by Fly Caster
Originally posted by RAS

I was either told once or read somewhere that Mr. Robbins wasn't a member of any church. Is this true?

Ruling Elder at Midway Presbyterian (PCA) in Jonesborough, TN, about 30 minutes from me.

I'm not a fan of his stuff, but I thought that one needed to be put to bed.


Correspondence with him a year ago says differently(I should have said denomination, not church), as does this recent article.
http://www.trinityfoundation.org/latest.php

Apparently even the critics of "neo-legalism" are apostate in some peoples eyes. More and more credibility flys out the window every month with this organization.

Thank God for the critics on the PB, Knox colloquium, and elsewhere, who have an evident christian character towards others while they rightly criticize these errors of "neo-legalism". Their example has helped tone me down in my own discussions with those I disagree with.

[Edited on 5-4-2005 by RAS]
 
Originally posted by WrittenFromUtopia
Originally posted by Draught Horse
Didn't Robbins also charge Van Til with denying the Trinity? When I read that I stopped taking him seriously.

Well that's worthy of stoning! :mad:

If Van Til's doctrine is as they say, I stand side by side with them in this claim. Here is a small section from a Trinity Review entitled "Why I am Not a VanTillian" by Gary Crampton, professor at Whitefield Theological Seminary:


The Trinity

As the arrangement of the Westminster Confession of Faith would indicate, apart from the doctrine of Scripture (WCF 1), the most fundamental doctrine of Christianity is that of the Trinity (WCF 2). Orthodoxy maintains, as so clearly set forth by the Confession, that "in the unity of the Godhead there are three persons, of one substance, power, and eternity; God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost" (2:3).

Dr. Van Til demurs. He writes:

We do assert that God, that is, the whole Godhead, is one person.... We must maintain that God is numerically one, He is one person.... We speak of God as a person; yet we speak also of three persons in the Godhead.... God is a one-conscious being, and yet he is also a tri-conscious being.... [T]he work ascribed to any of the persons is the work of one absolute person.... We do assert that God, that is, the whole Godhead, is one person.... [W]e must therefore hold that God´s being presents an absolute numerical identity. And even within the ontological Trinity we must maintain that God is numerically one. He is one person (18-19).

Lamentably, this peculiar teaching has spread. John Frame, a disciple of Van Til and professor of apologetics at Westminster Theological Seminary, also says that "Scripture...does refer to God as one person" (20). Speaking of the Trinity, Van Tilian Gary North writes: "We are not dealing with one uniform being; we are dealing with Persons who constitute a Person."5

David Chilton, another follower of Van Til, has written: "The doctrine of the Trinity is that there is one God (one Person) who is three distinct Persons "“ Father, Son, and Holy Spirit "“ and that each of those Persons is Himself God. There are not three Gods "“ only One. Yet those three Persons are not different ways or modes of God making Himself known to us, nor are they to be confused with one another; they are three distinct Persons. Cornelius Van Til states it about as clearly as anyone has...."6

One of Van Til's more creative and imaginative disciples, James Jordan, has added another twist: While Van Til, Frame, and North state that God is one person and three persons, Jordan adds tri-theism. God, says Jordan, is one essence and three essences. He writes; "First of all, God is One and Three in essence. The Father and the Son are One; the Father and the Spirit are One; the Son and the Spirit are One; and the Three are One. This is a mystery, and is an ontological or metaphysical reality. But second, the Father, Son, and Spirit are each persons, and they exist in Society. There are relationships between them."7 Jordan´s one and three essences are another deviation from Christian orthodoxy, and the notion is as Biblically and logically fallacious as saying that God is one person and three persons.

Now it is simply jejune to argue, as some have done, that these are merely "apparent contradictions." These are irreconcilable contradictions. It is a violation of the law of contradiction to say that God is one person and three persons, or one essence and three essences, at the same time and in the same respect. But this is precisely what Van Til taught and many of his disciples are teaching. It is a strange alchemy that can make 1 = 3 and 3 = 1.

This is by no means the classical (non-contradictory) formulation of the Trinity.
 
Since we are playing "Footnote Refutation," I'll add my two cents:

Doug Jones refutes:

Review:
Cornelius Van Til: The Man and the Myth by John Robbins

Reviewed by Douglas Jones III

From the May-June 1987 Journey Magazine

Thomas Sowell notes despairingly that (in regards to civil rights discussions) the contemporary scholarly scene is surrounded by a "œpoisonous atmosphere;"¦ straw men do the landscape."¦ If the only reaction to other visions or uncomfortable evidence is blind mudslinging, then the limitations that are common to all human beings become, for them, ideological prisons." [Sowell, Thomas, Civil Rights: Rhetoric or Reality? (William Morrow & Co.: New York, 1984) pp. 123, 140.] The results of "œideological prisons" are not confined to political debates but, sadly, also appear in almost all contemporary academic discussions"”including Christian apologetics. Regretfully, the pamphlet Cornelius Van Til: The Man and the Myth, by John W. Robbins, is a telling example of this attitude.

The pamphlet is of little help for anyone trying to learn more about Van Til or his apologetic, The reason is that Robbins doesn´t attempt any serious consideration of Van Til. Robbins´ approach is largely a popular "œhit and run" criticism of Van Til with little regard for depth or accuracy. As a result, the text is full of misinterpretations, fallacious inferences, and pretentious overstatements.

There are no new criticisms raised in this pamphlet; moreover, Robbins´ objections have been answered many times before.

Robbins, like most unsympathetic critics of Van Til, derives many of his criticisms from false preconception. Consequently, he has to ignore or embarrassingly brush-off all of Van Til´s statements that are contrary to the thesis being forced.

One can grant Robbins´ sincerity and love for truth and still fault his reasoning and interpretation. To his credit, he invites us to do this (pp. vii, 40). Let´s now look at instances that support the general comments listed above.

Embarrassing Misreadings

1) Robbins begins by criticizing Van Til´s lack of clarity. This point alone is uncontroversial; Van Til does use dated philosophical expressions and vocabulary. All Christian teachers (including Gordon Clark, who is no beacon of clarity himself) should strive for clarity. However, Robbins attempts to show much more. He claims that Van Til defends confusion "œas a sing of piety and condemns plain speaking as impious" (p.7). If this is true then Van Til deserves condemnation. But the evidence that Robbins uses to justify this grave accusation (twenty pages after the original accusation) is embarrassingly inadequate. Robbins´ evidence is Van Til´s statement that he and others refuse to "œ´state clearly´ any Christian doctrine"¦" (An Intro to Syst. Theol. P. 172). But Robbins completely (and embarrassingly) ignores the quotes around "œstate clearly" that signify a special meaning is intended.

Van Til explains his intentions explicitly"”directly above Robbins´ quote; he uses "œstate clearly" as "œexplain exhaustively". In Short, Robbins uses the very opposite of Van Til´s explicitly stated meaning in order to support his very serious accusation. This sort of basic exegetical sloppiness occurs several times in the pamphlet.

2.) Other examples of the above are found in Robbins´ treatment of Van Til´s view of logic. Robbins asserts that Van Til "œcontinually criticizes, belittles, and deprecates logic, not the misuse of logic, but logic itself" (p. 23; my emphasis). Robbins immediately cites two statements from Van Til to prove his point. Yet both explicitly refer to misuses of logic: the first to "œlogicism" and the second to Roman Catholic practices.

Once again Robbins´ serious accusation against Van Til is "œjustified" on imaginary evidence. In regard to Van Til´s statements that support logic, Robbins fallaciously concludes that they are "œexplicable only on the basis of utter confusion" (p. 27). Whatever does not fit Robbins´ preconception is attributed to a confusion on Van Til´s part. This sort of Procrustean move is generally a sign that one does not understand a position under analysis.

In Short, Van Til holds that we use logic under the guide of Rom. 3:4: "œ(L)et God be true, though every man be found a liar." We adopt what can be deduced from Scripture by good and necessary consequence unless our inferences force us to deny other biblical teachings. [See John Frame´s: Van Til: the Theologian (pp.28-37) [online at: http://www.reformed.org/apologetics/frame_vtt.html] for the full explication of this point. Since, many of Robbins´ objections are answered by Frame in that article, one would have expected Robbins to attempt to criticize Frame´s responses before raising the same objections.] For example, we do not rule out the doctrine of human responsibility by citing those passages that teach God´s predestination of all things (or vice versa).

This is exactly the move found in the Westminster Confession; Chap, I, iv explains the legitimacy of deducing truths from Scripture and Chap. III demonstrates the above qualification by designating the doctrine of predestination a "œhigh mystery (a paradox)." In essence, Van Til merely repeats the position of the Confession"”Chap. I, ix, "œthe infallible rule of scripture is the scripture itself."

3). Robbins also repeats some of the objections and mistakes made by Gordon Clark. Robbins argues that if, as Van Til holds, God´s knowledge and man´s knowledge "œdo not coincide at any point", and God knows all truth, then "œnone of the things in our mind can be true"(p. 34). Robbins lack of adequate homework once again surfaces.

Robbins misses or ignores a statement of Van Til´s that refutes his objection: "œthe knowledge of God and the knowledge of man coincide at every point in the sense that always and everywhere man confronts that which is already fully known or interpreted by God. The point of reference cannot but be the same for man as for God." (An Intro. To Syst. Theol. P. 164, 165; Van Til´s emphasis).

Van Til argues that in one sense we do have complete "œcoincidence" with God´s mind and in another sense we have no such coincidence. This isn´t strange; analogies draw comparisons between two things"”the two things are completely the same in some respects (they coincide) and do not coincide at all other respects. [See Frame (pp.19-23) for the senses of "œcoincidence" or "œidentity of content" in Van Til.]

The above quote appears only a few pages before the passages that Robbins cites.

4.) Robbins´ criticisms of Van Til as an historian fail because of similar misreadings. One has to wince at the way Robbins fallaciously assumes that Van Til, the Scholastics, and Descartes all use the terms "œprior" and "œGod" in the same way. Nothing could be further from the truth; and yet one must equivocate in this way in order for Robbins´ argument to get started.

Van Til, the Trinity, and Presuppositionalism

Robbins accuses Van Til of teaching a heretical view of the Trinity. Of all the charges flippantly tossed about in the pamphlet we might expect that at least this one would be carefully thought out, but it isn´t. Robbins quotes a series of statements by Van Til to the effect that "œWe do assert that God, that is, the whole Godhead, is one person" (p. 19). Robbins argues that this supposed "œUnitarian" heresy ought to be condemned by the church.

Is this heresy? If it is, then embarrassingly, Robbins condemns scripture, the Westminster Confession, Gordon Clark, and even John W. Robbins himself! Van Til is not offering a novel doctrine at all, but, apparently, Robbins´ devotion to Aristotelian principles blinds him to this fact. Robbins fails to distinguish the meaning of "œperson" in the technical sense of the Nicene Creed from Van Til´s more modern usage. Van Til never parts from the traditional formula that God is one in one sense and three in another. In Van Til´s usage of "œperson" we see that Scripture does speak of God as a person without mentioning the distinctions of Father, Son and Holy Spirit: God thinks (Ps 33:11), plans (Gen 41:32), loves (Ps. 91:14), creates (Gen 1:1), judges (Isa. 28:16, 17) , and speaks (Ex. 20:1).

Moreover, the Westminster Confession declares famously that "œThere is but one only living and true God, who is"¦most wise, most holy, working all things to the counsel of his own"¦will, for his own glory; most loving, gracious, merciful, "¦.the rewarder of them that diligently seek him"¦" (Chap. II, I---my emphasis).

Gordon Clark, to whom Robbins directs us to read of the orthodox doctrine, also speaks in the manner of scripture and the confession. Clark writes of the God who intends, acts freely, wills, thinks, knows and is rational (The Trinity, pp. 2, 39, 85, 89, 110, 111, 112, 117). And most embarrassingly, Robbins himself speaks of God with personal attributes without drawing the distinctions: God thinks, wills, commands, is concerned, is not the author of confusion, etc. (pp. 3, 6, 34, 41, 43).

Van Til simply notes that, with regard to the Trinity, this way of speaking is paradoxical. Scripture, not an abusive use of logic, determines scripture. Van Til is obviously not a heretic, but Robbins, in light of the ninth commandment, surely owes Van Til an apology if not more.

Robbins is also seriously misguided in his discussion of Van Til´s presuppositionalism. He argues that a.) Van Til is not a presuppositionalist, and b.) that he never states the proof of God that he espouses.

Robbins, in part, supports a continuing misunderstanding about Van Til. He begins by placing Van Til and Clark in the same apologetic category. This is the height of misconceptions. Many (e.g. Sproul, et al.) have adopted this preconception and have been unable to make sense of Van Til. Van Til and Clark are presuppositionalists by name only. On Van Til´s view, Clark is much closer to the methodology of Montgomery, Geisler, Sproul, etc. If viewed on a continuum, all these positions would be much closer to fideism than to Van Til´s approach.

Robbins declares that all presuppositionalists deny arguments for God´s existence, and Clark asserts that a presuppositionalist is "œOne who assumes or presupposes certain axioms and from there on everything is deduction" (The Trinity p.93). But who would ask, "œWho made these classifications?" Immanuel Kant argued by means of presupposition (though ungodly and futile), yet no scholar would dream of saying that he merely took certain axioms on faith and built a system from them. Both Robbins´ and Clark´s definitions are contrary to normal philosophical usage and conducive to much lasting confusion in Christian circles.

Clark´s position is more adequately described, as he himself states it, as "œdogmatism" or "œfideism" (Three Types of Religious Philosophy. pp. 4, 7, 104). Van Til on the other hand has always held that there is an objective argument for the Christian worldview. He indeed argues by presupposition; he has always opposed simply positing axioms.

This raises the second aspect of Robbins´ (a la Clark) charge. We hear again how supposedly Van Til has never stated his argument for God. One must really marvel at such gross misreadings. Van Til´s argument for the Christian worldview has crowded the pages of his works since before Clark made this charge back in the 1950´s.

Van Til has always maintained that it is illegitimate to "œprove" the existence of God in the sense that we autonomously derive the conclusion that God exist at the end of a list of premises. However, Van Til has always argued that the argument for the Christian worldview is a transcendental argument "“ an argument that seeks to demonstrate the very preconditions of knowledge by means of the impossibility of the contrary. This form of argumentation historically and in principle is not deductive or inductive in nature. Apparently Robbins asserts that Van Til has never stated it because he is naively searching for a deductive argument.

Van Til has stated the transcendental argument for the Christian faith many times. In Van Til´s "œMy Credo", the argument is stated as "œThe only "˜proof´ of the Christian position is that unless its truth is presupposed there is no possibility of "˜proving´ anything at all" (C, 5). In An Introduction to Systematic Theology (a text often cited by Robbins) Van Til declares, "œall the theistic arguments should really be taken together and reduced to the one argument of the possibility of human predication. Intelligent predication about anything with respect to nature or with respect to man were impossible unless God existed as the ultimate reference point of it all" (p. 102). From his earliest work, Van Til has argued in this manner. We read in The Defense of the Faith:

Our argument as over against this would be that the existence of the God of Christian theism and the conception of his counsel as controlling all things in the universe is the only presupposition which can account for the uniformity of nature which the scientist needs. But the best and only possible proof for the existence of such a God is that his existence is required for the uniformity of nature and for the coherence of all things in the world. We cannot "œprove" the existence of beams underneath a floor if by proof we mean that they must be ascertainable in the way that we can see the chairs and tables of the room. But the very idea of a floor as the support of table and chairs requires the idea of beams that are underneath. But there would be no floor if no beams were underneath. Thus there is absolutely certain proof for the existence of God and the truth of Christian theism. Even non-Christians presuppose its truth while they verbally reject it. They need to presuppose the truth of Christian theism in order to account for their own accomplishments (p. 103; my emphasis).

Note well, that the above argument (stated in about four different ways in this passage) is not the fideistic positing of axioms, suppositions, or hypothesis. Neither is it an inductive nor deductive argument. It has historically been known as a transcendental argument. Van Til, contrary to Robbins and Clark, has stated the argument many times throughout his career and writings. One stands in utter dismay to see claims such as Robbins even raised.

On Recommending Clark

Robbins ends his pamphlet by recommending that the reader look to the apologetic of Gordon Clark in order to defend orthodoxy and avoid irrationalism. Is this a wise recommendation? Definitely not. The truth is that Clark´s system leads to skepticism; it reduces the demand of Christianity to a recommendation. This is sub scriptural.

Very briefly, skepticism wins out over the Christian worldview because of Clarks´ "œcoherence test of truth." Clark argues that we are to test various systems of thought by means of coherence (not simple consistency only, but in richness and practicality too); the postulate or system that provides the most coherent picture of the world is the one we should choose.

In order to avoid a logical fallacy, Clark reasons that the coherence of the Christian view doesn´t guarantee its truth. We must demonstrate that all other views are false. In criticism, even if it is true that the falsity of all other views guarantees the truth of our view (which it doesn´t), we still would not be able to refute all other views since there are infinitely many of them. Hence, we can only know the truth of our position if we are omniscient (only God can carry out Clark´s apologetic). In other words we can never be justified in holding the Christian view; we are irrational to do so.

At times Clark suggests that the Christian view is more probable because it has less difficulties. This move is similarly of no help because one must know the full extent of failure of every view, to know that our (Christian) view has less difficulties. In order to justifiably assert that one glass of water out of a thousand has the least poison in it, one must know how much poison each glass contains. Hence, once again, we must be God in order to carry out Clark´s apologetic. Skepticism rears its ugly head again.

Much more needs to be said for an even more adequate criticism of Clark´s views but these few unoriginal observations point out that the Clarkian apologetic offers little hope.

Van Til´s apologetic does not encounter these difficulties, and more importantly it is much more faithful to scripture. In short then, Robbins´ pamphlet is an woefully inadequate analysis of Van Til´s thought. The misinterpretations of explicit statements are inexcusable, and the general ignorance of Van Til´s position is frustrating; yet Robbins´ accusations of heresy and confusion abound. The Christian community needs to rise above this kind "œscholarship". I recommend that those who are interested in gaining more understanding of Van Til should keep their eyes open for a top notch exposition of Van Til forthcoming from Greg Bahnsen.
 
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