On Free Will- Anselm's major works Oxford World's classics

[John The Baptist]

Just obtained my copy today. I wasn't planning on reading any of it quite yet, but his treatment on Free Will caught my eye (of course it did, I am Reformed after all).

Three things I picked up on that were encouraging.

1. Anselm seems to affirm some sort of compatibilism, or at least the foundation of it.
From page 181:
"No one is deprived of this rectitude except by his own will. One who acts unwillingly is said to act against what he wills; and no one is deprived of this rectitude against his will. But a man can be bound unwillingly, because he does not wish to be bound, and is tied up unwillingly; he can be killed unwillingly, because he can will not to be killed; but he cannot will unwillingly, because one cannot will to will against his will. Every willing person wills his own willing."

Other than being a tongue twister, this was a fairly useful way to see this, and I think lays a great foundation. He does not answer the question of the origin of our desires, but he does make clear that we will what we want most.

2. Anselm makes a great distinction between what he calls the 'instrument of the will' and the will itself. I think there would be a lot less Arminians in the world if this was better understood, this leads to point 3...

3. Anselm is clear that man has the freedom of the will to do good, and yet he is a slave to sin in a way that he cannot not sin. How does he manage this seeming contradiction? He does not fully flesh it out, but it seems to be the beginnings of a Reformation view (think Luther's bondage of the will) on man's will.
From page 190:
"For just as, even when the sun is absent, we have in us the sight whereby we see it when it is present, so too when the rectitude of the will is lacking to us, we still have in us the aptitude to understand and will whereby we can preserve it for its own sake when we have it. And just as when nothing is lacking in us for seeing the sun except its presence, we only lack the power to make it present to us, so only when rectitude his lacking to us, do we have that powerlessness which its absence from us brings about."

So, we still have the capacity for willing, but we have not all the tools to act rightly. What are we missing?

This is where we must go beyond this short work of Anselm and say a good heart and proper desires. We have not the right actions because we have not the right desires. Praise God for the regenerating work of the Holy Spirit, that it may now be a battle, not slavery.

It was nice to see the little points of connection, once again reminding us not to divorce ourselves from those who came before.

 

[RamistThomist]

This is very good stuff. Although Anselm never reaches the sophistication of our Reformed Scholastics, he was on the right track. We tend to overreact to "free will" without ever defining it.

Our Reformed scholastics rejected the Jesuit view of free will as "indifference." They did not reject free choice as such.

Zanchi defines free choice as “the free agreement of the will” (55). The agreement is that the will follows the intellect. Considered in the abstract, free choice is always free in man. “But if we consider the powers,” it is a slave (quoted in Van Asselt 63).

Gomarus: Free choice is not identical to free will. Will has to do with potency. Arbitrium is the means to be chosen (Van Asselt 135).

De Moor applies the coup de grace to Jesuitical indifference. There cannot be a complete indifference of the will because there are several prerequisites for acting that even traditional Roman Catholics concede (and here we side with the Dominicans). There is the decree of God, his infallible foreknowledge, and the judgment of the intellecting mind. The last one is particularly thorny for the Jesuits. There cannot be complete indifference because the mind is not indifferent to the perceived Good.

 

[John The Baptist]

This is very good stuff. Although Anselm never reaches the sophistication of our Reformed Scholastics, he was on the right track. We tend to overreact to "free will" without ever defining it.

Our Reformed scholastics rejected the Jesuit view of free will as "indifference." They did not reject free choice as such.

Zanchi defines free choice as “the free agreement of the will” (55). The agreement is that the will follows the intellect. Considered in the abstract, free choice is always free in man. “But if we consider the powers,” it is a slave (quoted in Van Asselt 63).

Gomarus: Free choice is not identical to free will. Will has to do with potency. Arbitrium is the means to be chosen (Van Asselt 135).

De Moor applies the coup de grace to Jesuitical indifference. There cannot be a complete indifference of the will because there are several prerequisites for acting that even traditional Roman Catholics concede (and here we side with the Dominicans). There is the decree of God, his infallible foreknowledge, and the judgment of the intellecting mind. The last one is particularly thorny for the Jesuits. There cannot be complete indifference because the mind is not indifferent to the perceived Good.

Would ‘indifference’ be similar to the idea of libertarian free will?

Also, I love to see RCs accidentally disagreeing with past theologians who they claim for themselves. Makes their claims of tradition hard to swallow.

 

[RamistThomist]

Would ‘indifference’ be similar to the idea of libertarian free will?

That's a very explosive question. When Richard Muller and Willem Van Asselt explained (by numerous sources) what the Reformed scholastics believed on free choice, certain Reformed guys got extremely angry and responded how Jonathan Edwards was right and the Reformed never believed in libertarian freedom. None of which, of course, has anything to do with the actual discussion. You can see the beginning of said dumpster fire in my review (and the responses) of Muller's book on free choice.

To answer your question, probably.

 

[RamistThomist]

Also, I love to see RCs accidentally disagreeing with past theologians who they claim for themselves. Makes their claims of tradition hard to swallow.

The tradition is rather clear and the Jesuits know it. They are closet-Pelagians and for that reason the popes have never fully endorsed them on this view.

 

[John The Baptist]

That's a very explosive question. When Richard Muller and Willem Van Asselt explained (by numerous sources) what the Reformed scholastics believed on free choice, certain Reformed guys got extremely angry and responded how Jonathan Edwards was right and the Reformed never believed in libertarian freedom. None of which, of course, has anything to do with the actual discussion. You can see the beginning of said dumpster fire in my review (and the responses) of Muller's book on free choice.

To answer your question, probably.

I’ll check out that thread, and will return with any follow ups. I’ve heard Jonathan Edwards had some unique thoughts in this area, but I haven’t looked into it much at all, so I have no say.

Yeah that thread is way above my head at this time catch me in 10 years maybe.

 

[Charles Johnson]

As I understand the reformed tradition, the basic definition of free-will they adopted is that free will is the freedom to act in accordance with one's will. I will good and do good; I will evil and do evil.
It is not, as mentioned above, a mere indifference of the will, or the ability to will anything, good or evil, independent of the potential corruption of one's nature.
Turretin does a good job of distinguishing various senses in which the will could hypothetically be said to be free, though, and stating which ones do and do not apply to man in his present condition.