Paul Manata and others, The Closet and Possibility

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austinbrown2

Puritan Board Freshman
Hello to Paul and to all those interested,

We haven’t talked before, but I have been lurking about. I have appreciated the extended conversations you have been a part of and they have helped me think through certain issues from different angles.

I’d like to comment on your “coming out of the closet.” First, let me say that I share your concerns about TAG. And I would add that the emotional, as well as intellectual, struggle behind such reflections can be exhausting (As I’m sure you would agree). So I don’t come to you with a dagger, but simply as one who is ever trying to understand these issues more faithfully.

Allow me to quote you from the Triablogue, “The only threat: thought experiments and made up worldviews which are basically the same as mine.” [Let’s just call this the Great Pumpkin…remember Charlie Brown?].

In this vein, you have raised a host of questions about a quadra-god to illustrate an arbitrary element to TAG. How is it that such things can be knocked down by a Christian TAG? The ability to reductio seems to stand at an impasse, especially if each worldview has justified mystery elements to counter some unknowns or unexplainables. I continue to wrestle with this. It seems difficult to decisively beat this. Nevertheless, I have a few thoughts. I’d be interested in any comments from you or anyone else.

I think we have to keep a keen eye on where our feet are planted (Hear me out) . Do they stand on the Christian plantation, or do we have one foot firmly placed in the land of autonomy. The significance to this isn’t to point out once again the apparent impasse that arises from TAG wars, but the nature of probability and our knowledge. When we raise thought experiments or toy around with Great Pumpkins I perceive that we are meddling with “What if’s.” Here we have invoked a greater issue than simply the Great Pumpkin itself. We have, idealistically, stepped out into the realm of possibility, which is intimately connected with autonomy. This has dire implications for us with respect to all things, not simply the Great Pumpkin under consideration. The issue becomes, not simply, COULD the Great Pumpkin be true, but COULD X1, X2, X3, ad infinitum, be true? Could we be a brain in a vat that is being stimulated to think this way? Could we be in a sophisticated video game? A Matrix? Could there be multi-verses that have different physics and/or logics? Could there be a quadra-god? A god who is really evil and is simply tricking us with the façade of goodness? Such examples could be multiplied indefinitely.

As soon as we humans step off of the Christian plantation possibility rises to ascendancy and it becomes ultimate. If possibility is ultimate to us, then chance is ultimate. And those things will reduce human knowledge to probability wars that cannot be resolved. For at any point we think we know X, then there is also possible defeater Y out there or knowledge P that might overturn X. We don’t know everything, so it follows that every X is also facing potential wrongness that cannot be calculated because we don’t know the parameters with which to even calculate the relative rightness or wrongness or probability to the truth claim. I think of this as the probability problem, or the “What if?” problem.

So when we invoke questions about the Great Pumpkin we are putting one of our feet in the sphere of autonomy, which is a bottomless pit. In that realm there is no hope for getting a foothold. Every finite point requires an infinite point of reference to know anything… or do I know that to be true?

“But how do I know that the Great Pumpkin isn’t that infinite point?’ You ask. But notice again what kind of question this is. If I seek to answer this question with possibility as ultimate, then I can’t answer it. I can’t answer anything without being aware of its equally ultimate potential failure.

“Ok, so how do you get to the Triune God?”

The Lord is ultimate, there is no chance. Possibility will not rise to ascendancy if and only if I stand on His sure footing. I will become lost in the “What if” problem if I don’t root my mind in His revelation and the implications of that revelation. He is ultimate, so I cannot appeal to anything outside of that ultimacy to ground that ultimacy.

“But in light of the Great Pumpkin you are begging the question. Why can’t I say that the Great Pumpkin is ultimate and in him all this chance goes away?”

Well, you can say that, and God's world does allow for this kind of thinking. But again, by so exercising our minds in this fashion you have stepped out into the realm of possibility. What are you standing on to posit such questions? The question springs from a foundation of “What if.” You could assert that you stand on the ground of the Great Pumpkin, but you really aren’t. You are a Christian, Paul, who is engaging in thought experiments and “What if’s.” By so doing you have one foot outside of the Christian plantation, so as to entertain speculations about ultimate truth. By so doing we loose our footing and get real confused real fast because possibility and our finiteness bite us in the butts- and this leads to frustration. In heaven, our minds will be so fixed and rooted in the truth that both feet will be securely fixed in that truth. Otherwise, think about it, the “what if” problem could just as well plague us there. Maybe heaven is all an illusion. Maybe the Great Pumpkin will burst on the scene and change heaven itself?!? X1, X2, X3, etc. The only way to avoid this now is to be so heavenly minded, by faith, that both feet are firmly planted on that which can deal with the possibility problem.

Naturally, the onlooker will think the Christian is engaging in the biggest question beg of all time. But as presupp’s well know every worldview does this. The question of circularity and ultimacy pervade all of reality precisely because we do live in Jesus’ universe. And we know that we can’t get to the true God unless He reveals Himself. Given the “What if” problem, revelation is necessary. And given our finiteness which will lead to the “What if” problem, we must have a sensus divinitas. How else might people be held accountable when they couldn’t know for sure? And given our sin, God must effectually draw people to Himself. That is how we come to embrace Christianity. That is how we arrive at the Triune God. God must grant revelation and faith (see footnte 1). It is the world we presently live in and is our current state of affairs. To ask how we know this is going to require these answers on some level. It begs the question big time, but if Christianity is true, then it must beg the question in the ultimate sense. The irony is that people who question this do so from the “What if” plantation and I felt the thorns of that ground in my feet.

Austin

Footnote 1: If we ask whether or not the Great Pumpkin might grant faith and revelation to only one person and we are left out, then I have to recognize what I am doing here. I am asking a "What if" question. How do I determine the answer to a "What if" question? Either I do it in accordance with the Christian worldview or I don't. If not according to the Christian worldview I'm at a loss to know how to know anything. The possibility of Great Pumpkin is equally as likely as, say, Matrix and is equally as unlikely as Matrix. How do we quantify Likelihood in these instances? It's impossible... or maybe it's not (who knows). There appears to be a pragmatically equal likelihood and unlikelihood of X1 and X2.

If I answer it according to my Christian convictions then I resound that the Lord God is the only true God. And if I want to seek to demonstrate that this is true, well, I might just talk about the "what if" problem...

At the end of the day I must stand on the Rock, for other ground is sinking sand.
 
***:amen: :amen: :amen: :amen: :amen: :amen: :amen: :amen: :amen: :amen:***!!!!

I have had much experience with the ultimate asking of "What ifs?" over on the Internet Infidels site.

If you weaken your presuppositional stance, it is a pit that will suck you in quickly.
 
Austin - Thanks for expressing this so clearly. This rationale had also been perculating around in my mind - mind if I edit it slightly and post it on my blog? Will certainly extend credit due! :D
 
Well thanks jdlongmire, I appreciate your comments and commendation. Sure, feel free to use whatever suits your interests. Give credit to the one who inspired Romans 1:22, however :)

Austin
 
As soon as we humans step off of the Christian plantation possibility rises to ascendancy and it becomes ultimate.

:2cents:

Am glad to see people coming out of the closet, etc., but isn’t this the inherent problem with TAG since it has been more times than not offered as a proof? in my opinion the whole thing has been oversold, which is why I suppose the closet door has been opened in the first place.

Also, if the “Christian plantation” is defined as Scripture and all necessary inferences from Scripture (how else might it be defined?), aren’t you left with Gordon Clark’s Scripturalism? Clark at least argued that axioms or starting points are chosen, not proven and that all systems, if they’re going to start, must start somewhere, and that “somewhere” is that system’s unproven and unprovable axiom. Similarly, while axioms are chosen and not proven some axioms can be disproven. Clark argued that logical coherence is the best evidence and defense of the Christian system, which is the only system Christian apologetics should be interested in defending.

in my opinion that the claims of TAG’s defenders have often put them outside of presuppositionalism properly understood (which, I if I'm understanding you correctly, is the point of your piece), for if TAG could do all that some claim it could, there would really be nothing to presuppose.

As to the question of hypothetical and competing systems, Frame writes:

Clark admits that more than one system of thought could be logically consistent, and that fruitfulness is a relative and debatable question. So Clark’s method is more like an exploration than like a proof. By renouncing proof, he avoids the circularity of having to prove the axiom by means of the axiom.

This appears to be a distinct advantage over TAG in particular and Van Tilian apologetics in general. Frame also adds; “But if Christianity is not provable, how can Paul say in Romans 1:20 that the clarity of God’s self-revelation leaves unbelievers without excuse?” Of course, this is not a problem in the slightest for Clark, but it does say something about Frame’s exegetical skills. It seems to me Frame asserts that unless Christianity can be proven no unbeliever can be held to account, however this doesn’t follow nor do I see this as a valid inference from Rom. 1:20. But I digress. :blah:
 
I agree. People do not need TAG to be held accountable to God. I think you are misunderstanding the intentions of my original comment.
 
Magma2,

The overarching intention of my post was to interact with Paul Manata and to try and shed some light on those difficulties inherent to TAG when one considers something like an adoption of a quadra-god as their ultimate starting point. I think the move towards such potentialities creates a problem that is similar to, but larger than, the quadra-god question. A movement in that direction will open the door to possibility as ultimate. I personally don't think the "What if" problem trumps a Biblical presuppositionalism, indeed, it serves to illustrate the truthfulness of Christianity.

As for Clark and axioms and all that stuff, I realy don't want to comment about that here. Suffice it to say that I think Christianity is true and unique. If it is true and unique, then it follows that all those explanations of reality that don't line up with the true interpretation of reality are necessarily false. Hence, those contrary positions will be irrational and frustrating.

Austin
 
I agree. People do not need TAG to be held accountable to God. I think you are misunderstanding the intentions of my original comment.

That was just me digressing a bit in reply to a criticism by Frame and not anything you wrote. I know it’s not what you intended. Maybe an unintended consequence? For what it's worth I’ve come across a number of folks over the years, more so recently, who have abandoned Van Tilianism in favor of Clark and, in my view, the problems with TAG are just symptomatic.

As for Clark and axioms and all that stuff, I realy don't want to comment about that here. Suffice it to say that I think Christianity is true and unique. If it is true and unique, then it follows that all those explanations of reality that don't line up with the true interpretation of reality are necessarily false. Hence, those contrary positions will be irrational and frustrating.

No problems here, but even if you could demonstrate that all contrary position are irrational that would still not prove that the Christian system is true. As I’ve said, TAG has been oversold. OTOH, given Van Til’s view of Scripture, I don’t think it would be difficult for an opponent of the Christian faith to demonstrate Christianity is irrational given Van Til’s analogical view of truth and his contradictory and incoherent doctrine of Scripture. Another reason to abandon Van Tilianism for the Westminister principle advocated and defended by Clark.

:worms:
 
Sean, with respect to your last paragraph, if you don't have anything good to say, then don't say anything at all. This thread is not about Clark vs. Van Til.
 
Magma2,

You obviously have some strong convictions about Clark's deductive presuppositionalism. Fine. I'm not going to squabble. That's not my intention.

Blessings,
Austin
 
two quick things:
2) Despite the fact that I think you're seriously misrepresenting modal language, or yu're unfamiliar with that modalities, TAG is the one who raised the issue of "impossiblity." When *they* did so, they were saying that there is no *possibility* that another worldview could possibly provide the preconditions, thus making Christianity provide *sufficient* preconditions, but not necessary. My objection isn't a "what if" such and such were real. The quadrune position is false, but it still does the job.

I do not see how the quadrume position does any job. Unless someone claiming something to be true makes it possible to be true, then I still do not see the force.

Look, it's false that the sky is pink, but it's *possible* that it could be pink. it's *impossible* that it could be blue and pink all over. So, it's false that it's pink, but that doesn't mean that that's another possible color the sky could be.

Likewise, quadunity (and the other stuff) is false, that doesn't mean that it doesn't sufficiently answer the questions.

A couple questions:

1)If your analogies are going to be illustrative it would seem that the next question is "Is it possible for God to be Four in One and Not Three in One"? If one answers yes, then one has needs to say on what basis they are finding this possibility.

2)Are logical contradictions the only things that we can say are impossible? A counter that I have read is, the square circle. It is impossible (primarily) because it violates laws of space. If those laws were different then is it not possible that a square circle would not be a problem?
[/quote]

CT
 
Great post Austin.

One thing I've noticed about JW's or Atheists or Unitarians and a whole host of other unbelievers is that they engage in sinful speculation. Rather than rooting themselves in what the Word teaches them there is a consistent expression of unbelief that "I will not accede to the Truth but stand on my own reasoning."

I'm not at all against using reasoning but when our reasoning ever takes us down speculative trails that all ultimately lead to unbelief.

I certainly appreciate philosophical rigor as a defense of the faith but I'll never understand a Christian, even for purposes of philosophical argumentation, even allowing for the possibility that Jesus is not Lord.

Those who are actively suppressing the truth will never accept such a simple axiom but neither in didactic teaching nor in historical narrative do I see precedent for moving away from a perspicuous Gospel message that exposes human sin and demands man submit to the Lordship of Jesus Christ.
 
If you don't see how it does any job then I suggest reading my discussion with the guys on Butler's blog. I went through all this in detail. Maybe you can answer some of the questions for them? (btw, who's claiming it's true?)

I will look into your adventures as John Calvin in the near future.

I have spoken to Don, a fellow participant, since the discussion on Butler's blog. That discussion broke down when it came down to what is possible vs. impossible.

1) Why, is that necessary for the preconditions of intelligibility to be met or something?

If Four is impossible then how can it be a possible counter for Christianity? Would it not be akin to saying, "It is just like Christianity but there are differences in ways that are impossible."

2) Logical contradictions are logically impossible. But, there's other types of possibilties - physical, epistemological, metaphysical and, lastly, logical.

So you accept that there are other forms of impossibilities beyond logical?

You're square-circle counter is false, I think. It violates definitions, not space.

For your objection here to have teeth, it would seem that you would have to claim that our defining of space came before actual space. If not, then our definitions just recognize what is there.

My thoughts aren't confined by space, so why can't I *conceive* of a square circle?

Imagine a *Possible* world where everything is the same shade of blue. You grew up in and continue to live in this world. What would happen if I came up to you in this world and asked you to talk to me about the color red.

CT
 
"I certainly appreciate philosophical rigor as a defense of the faith but I'll never understand a Christian, even for purposes of philosophical argumentation, even allowing for the possibility that Jesus is not Lord."

And this is not the case with what I've done.

The problem for us, though, is being able to *show* what we *believe.*
I should have been more careful in not ascribing this to anyone in particular Paul. I was not aiming this comment at you. I guess I read Austin's comments as more of an indictment upon speculation and not aimed at you. Admittedly, I did not carefully read the whole post so if I jumped in and implied more than I should then I apologize.
 
1) I await the argument for the impossibility of 4 + whatever else you say is necessary for the preconditions (along with the argument that these are indeed necessary preconditions).

I can only give an argument once I understand which premises you accept? Is it possible for God to be Four in One instead of Three in One? I have not yet seen a straight answer for you.

Can a system have the preconditions for intel. while having false statements?

2) Of course. It's pretty standard.

Alright, then that is where the fight is.

3) I don't see how that's the case.

The definitions concern space. If space is different then the definition would follow. The definitions come after not before. Therefore an appeal to violation of definition is just an implicit appeal to the violation of space that the definition apply to.

4) I don't get your position. Do you deny possible worlds? Why appeal to them?

I was just having fun, I do deny possible worlds, but I do not deny counterfactuals. There was no need to use possible worlds. I could just have easily said, what if you had eye issues where everything you saw was the same shade of blue. Now talk to me about red.

Anyway, (a) you wouldn't be coming up to me and asking me to talk about red, so you can't use your objection,

I never said that I grew up there. I said that you did. I've seen red.

and (b) I could tell you at least two things about red, it's not blue (by definition) and something couldn't be both red and blue at the same time (by definition).

You call that conception? I can do the same thing with space. "Whatever this thing, I have never experienced is, cannot contradict itself."

(Lastly, for any one else, if you don't like possible worlds talk I maintain that you cannot make sense out of our use of modalities, or modal notions. See this paper: http://www.georgetown.edu/faculty/ap85/papers/PhilThesis.html)
[/quote]

And as you said about friend Vincent, there are objections hanging over the head of anyone who uses S5. Until those are addressed, why should anyone care about claims that possible worlds semantics has to be right?

You have called Mr. Choi up, right?

CT
 
I had to dig around a little to see what the "coming out of the closet" stuff was in reference too. (See the post on Triabologue). Personally, I can only applaud Paul's striving for intellectual honesty. We may not agree on some key points, but his post on hard line TAG was straight forward.

I think talk of staying away from "what if-s" is just pious nonsense. We are called to have an answer to the non-believer, even if the arguments are hypothetical. There is no real danger of a Christian jumping towards human autonomy in doing so, as long as the Christian present God's Word as ultimate (Van Til has said as much). But let us avoid making promises to the un-believer we can not keep. Paul is being brutally honest when he says hypothetically, there is always a "possible" worldview that can match the Christian worldview's ability to answer the desiderata of of a comprehensive and coherent system. It is only hypothetical, but we should be total honest and step outside of the confines of our presuppositions to avoid logical fallacies. It does not damage the strength of the Christian worldview in any way. And that seems to me to be Paul's position.

The implications of this honest position is not human autonomy - it is the opposite. It requires us to acknowledge that we are total dependence on the grace of God to believe the truth. We can not come to real knowledge apart from the grace of God. That is Christian humility - not human autonomy speaking.
 
I can only give an argument once I understand which premises you accept? Is it possible for God to be Four in One instead of Three in One? I have not yet seen a straight answer for you.
...
CT


I'm sorry CT, but this question completely misses the point. It's not a matter of "could God be Four in One". It a question of whether a worldview that posits a "four in one deity" could be hypothetical as valid as Christianity.

This is speaking about different definitions of god, not can God have this property or that property. How Christians know God it through revelation.

If God said to us, by logical implication in his revelation, that there were four persons in the Godhead instead of three - then there is your answer. Hypothetically speaking, God could have revealed such. We only know God is Triune through His revelation - not because we have determined that the triune God is ontologically necessary.

The argument should not be: by autonomous human reason we have proven that a triune God is necessary for all reason and thought, therefore the God of the Bible is true. Rather we should reason that God has revealed to us in his Word his triune nature, and this triune nature gives us the answer to our ability for reason and knowledge. God's revelation has logical priority.
 
... I would suggest the same principle applies to our worldview. On the basis of the Christian worldview, we have no grounds to suspect impossibilities becoming possible;...

Two problems here. This line of reason can be used by any worldview to defeat another. Presuming any worldview to prove another worldview is impossible circular. It is no more than saying since Christianity is true, than non-Christianity is false. But it is equally valid for the atheist to say since atheism is true, than non-atheism is false.

Second problem: The statement "...have no grounds to suspect impossibilities becoming possible" is a tautology. It's no more than saying since square circles are impossible, we have no grounds for claiming square circles are possible. You have already assumed the X is impossible, to denying it can not be possible is self evident.
 
I'm sorry CT, but this question completely misses the point. It's not a matter of "could God be Four in One". It a question of whether a worldview that posits a "four in one deity" could be hypothetical as valid as Christianity.

Actually your response, misses my objection. I did not define under which definition of possibility that one could use to respond, I left that completely open. If God cannot be three in one then it cannot be hypothetically as valid as Christianity. What is hypothetically valid is based on a person's worldview. There is no base, neutral possibility that can be appealed to.

This is speaking about different definitions of god, not can God have this property or that property. How Christians know God it through revelation.

Revelation is how we know God because without it without his condescention, we would be up a creek without a paddle. Without his revelation, we would not know Three in one vs. 40 in one.

If God said to us, by logical implication in his revelation, that there were four persons in the Godhead instead of three - then there is your answer.

Most definitely. So it would/is be impossible for God to be Four in One.

Hypothetically speaking, God could have revealed such.

Here it is sticky, you either have to take that God could make himself Quadrinity vs. Trinity or you have to accept the reality of God lying. Both I believe to be quite sticky.

We only know God is Triune through His revelation - not because we have determined that the triune God is ontologically necessary.

I agree to a point. Can we not say that it is necessary because we found out about it due to some form of revelation (Special or General)?

The argument should not be: by autonomous human reason we have proven that a triune God is necessary for all reason and thought, therefore the God of the Bible is true. Rather we should reason that God has revealed to us in his Word his triune nature, and this triune nature gives us the answer to our ability for reason and knowledge. God's revelation has logical priority.

AGreed :handshake:
 
Sean, with respect to your last paragraph, if you don't have anything good to say, then don't say anything at all. This thread is not about Clark vs. Van Til.

When it comes to presuppositional apologetics, everything is about Clark vs. Van Til.
 
When it comes to presuppositional apologetics, everything is about Clark vs. Van Til.

Alright, then I might as well ask (to everybody out there), was it Van Til or Bahnsen that set forth the strong modal TAG? (I still have alot of reading to do, which is shown by my asking of the question in the first place. But if it wasn't Van Til that set forth the strong modal version of TAG, then this is more in line with Bahnsen than Van Til.
 
Paul,

Thank you for responding. Unfortunately the thread is getting long and multi-pronged. I was afraid of that. If you are ever willing to have a short discussion over the phone, I would be much obliged. I would seriously like to understand the modal component of your contention more fully. And as I seek to wade through these long discussions (like yours on the Butler site) it is very easy to misunderstand thoughts and intentions. Anyway, email me your phone number if you would be willing to give me 15 minutes of your time so I can better understand this. [email protected].

<<<<<<<<You said >>>>>> Despite the fact that I think you're seriously misrepresenting modal language, or you’re unfamiliar with that modalities, TAG is the one who raised the issue of "impossibility." When *they* did so, they were saying that there is no *possibility* that another worldview could possibly provide the preconditions, thus making Christianity provide *sufficient* preconditions, but not necessary. My objection isn't a "what if" such and such were real. The quadrune position is false, but it still does the job.

Look, it's false that the sky is pink, but it's *possible* that it could be pink. it's *impossible* that it could be blue and pink all over. So, it's false that it's pink, but that doesn't mean that that's another possible color the sky could be.>>>>>>>>>


I may be misrepresenting modal language. Fair enough. I don’t think I am, but maybe I’m wrong here (my exposure is somewhat limited, a bit of Plantinga and Nash here and there.). Again, it may prove most beneficial to simply speak to one another, for my sake anyway, for I am always learning… and have been taught on several occasions to be very humble when talking philosophy.

A few thoughts now:

When I think of TAG and how it works in my mind, I do think that contrary worldviews are impossible. And I want to assert that it isn’t even possible that other worldviews can provide the necessary preconditions for all of the components for life and intelligibility. As a Christian man who sits here typing, and as a Christian man who takes seriously the absolute nature of my Lord, I believe and understand that if (since) my Lord is who is He is, and if He is the source of all truth and the all conditioner of all things, then anything that deviates from Him and His interpretation of things will necessarily be false. There is no possible counter explanation… especially if all the truth in intimately bound up with itself (I think of James Anderson’s article “If Knowledge then God.” http://www.proginosko.com/writing.html ). This body of Truth, or rather, This One of Truth constrains me. He defines what is possible and what is not possible. Yet, I also live in His world where I can think in terms of counter-factuals and possible worlds. But that mental usage must be brought under His Lordship, lest I slip into the “What if” problem. This is my perspective as I approach your response (I’m saying things this way not to suggest that you don’t agree, it’s just the style I have chosen to adopt here).

So what about possible worlds and pink skies and potential defeaters? I will readily admit that the sky could have been pink. But I see questions about ultimacy as intimately bound up with these modal experiments. When the quadrune position is advanced as a defeater in the realm of modal logic, as a logical counter to the claim, I cannot separate myself from what really is. The thought experiment, as a created argument to trump the TAG claim, is, I suppose, successful on one level of modal logic. But I cannot compartmentalize my Christianity. When I think about the situation, as you have advanced, the whole of Christianity comes to bear upon this logical enterprise. As such, I perceive that as soon as I start talking about ultimate possibilities on a logical level I am not all that impressed with something which defeats the TAG in principle, narrowly conceived. My modal logic is constrained by the Lord. And there is much more at play than simply whether or not the quadrune does the job. For how does the quadrune do the job? Does it show a potential defeater to the TAG claim, given their own game? Narrowly considered, as on a modal logic level, yes. But broadly considered, I don’t think so. The TAG claim extends to every facet of reality. As such, I recognize that the quadrune does the job on one level, but the assertion of TAG isn’t concerned with simply one stratum. The TAG looks at the modal quadrune example and says, “Well, what do you expect me to think about this? Yes, I get your point, but possibility cannot be separated from the whole exercise. There is an inherent quality or nature to raising the quadrune against my claims. And that quality is to invoke possibility. The possibility enters the picture from the very posture of the mental exercise. And when this posture is adopted, a new set of issues comes into play. The issue simply isn’t modal argumentation. The whole idea of possible worlds is connected with a finite person who is pontificating upon what could be. If I consider the exercise from the perspective of the “What if” problem, then I am not too impressed with toying around with the potentialities of possible worlds, when considered in the ultimate sense. This is to say that I think there is something which stands over modal logic itself and all possible worlds. This One could have made pink skies, but this One could not have been quadrune.”

Basically, I am going to annoyingly drive things back to the interconnectedness between epistemology and ontology. And when the nature of the connection and the nature of the One who binds that connection together is challenged or inquired into, then I have no choice but to root myself in what that One has revealed, lest I fall into the “What if” problem, which is absolutely destructive to all inquiry. I personally cannot separate the brain in a vat from the evil Being who acts nice from quadrune god. They all, in principle, share a “What if” problem status.

Maybe I am misunderstanding what you mean by “strong modal version of TAG.” But this is how I perceive things.

Thanks for you patience,
Austin
 
CT said,

"Here it is sticky, you either have to take that God could make himself Quadrinity vs. Trinity or you have to accept the reality of God lying. Both I believe to be quite sticky."

Though this is a side question of the quadrune question (as it's taken to be a different worldview), first off you've offered a false dilemma. A third option could be that God has always been quadrune but not revealed it to us.

That would only be another option if God has not revealed that he is Triune? If he has then then we only have the two options that I have listed.

God would only be lying if there was something like this in holy Scripture: "I am only three-in-one, there is not another person I have not chosen to reveal to you as of yet."

Come on now.... Something is not ruled out on scriptural grounds only when it is explicitly denied. The scriptures (and I am starting to lean towards natural revelation as well) reveals that God is truine and not just any integer more than 2.

At any rate, if it's *possible* that God could be quadrune, but just not revealed it to us yet (and I'd like to see your argument from Scripture that this is the case),

Your the one that needs to make the case that there is any opening in scripture for more than three or (at least one silent partner)

then I take it that 4-in-1 can "do the job" because if it couldn't, you'd have to say that Christianity doesn't "do the job."

Make your case and then we can deal with the inferences for a successful case.

(Note well: I believe we are warranted in believing the trinity, I confess the trinity with the rest of the Church, and I believe that God is a trinity.)

That is a relief of some sort. I also believe that we are warranted. The question is if we are warranted to believe that there is a possibility of persons that we do not know about.

CT
 
Paul M,
You have the last word, I am out. Until I am prepared to either kill possible worlds or embrace them, there is not much interesting that I believe that I can contribute.

CT
 
>>>>>>>I may call you or email you.<<<<<<<<<<,

Ok.

>>>>>>>>>.I'm not the one holding to another worldview, I'm telling you about another worldview. I, with you, agree that it's false. But, I'd like to see the internal critique done of it.<<<<<<<<<<<,

Got ya. I’m on the same page.


>>>>>>>>>>>>I'd like you to reduce it to foolishness for me. I'd like you to tell me how it does not provide sufficient preconditions, thus making ours provide sufficient preconditions. I'd also like you to tell me *what* these preconditions are. If you don't know, then why say only you have it? If you do know, what are they: creation, fall, redemption, trinity? Well, what if you had: creation, fall, redemption, quadrinity? The only thing different is the quadrinity. So, what is it about being 3-in-one that allows for the *necessary* preconditions while 4-in-one does not? What is it about threeness? Now, maybe you'll say it's: creation, fall, redemption, trinity, and X. Well, you'll need to specify what X is, show how it's necessary for intelligibility and how the worldview I told you about doesn't have it.<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<


There is a part of me that must admit that I don’t know what the necessary preconditions are. And there is a part of me that must admit that doing an internal critique of your quadrune, on a certain level, is daunting. And I feel the force of what you are asserting. You are giving a professedly false position to illuminate that a claim of impossibility to contrary must surely be able to explicate why anything and everything else is in fact impossible. And you are hammering on the Triune nature of God, as one example, to force the issue. Fair enough. I see it and feel it.

Ok, time to think out loud. Do we believe that God is uniquely true? Do we believe that all truth finds its center and meaning in God (ambiguous language, but I think you know what I mean)? Do we believe that truth is intimately bound together- there is an absolute unity and diversity to it? If so, then we must surely say that anything that deviates from this totality of truth will have wrongness, and in principle, the ripple effects of this wrongness overflow in a most unhealthy manner. If we can agree on that, then I think we are constrained to assert TAG is true in principle, right? If God is the true and living God, then the contrary is false necessarily, right?

There are some problems, however. And I think they reside in our abilities and the extent of our knowledge. I frankly don’t know all of the implications to tri-unity. Good. I’m not God. And I frankly don’t know how a quadrune, when considered narrowly (I stress), would overturn knowledge (I stress here because when the issue is considered broadly, i.e., what has been revealed, the issue is much easier to debunk, as you admit the quadrune is false also). We as Christians must admit to progressive revelation and the infinitude of God, which entails profound mystery for finite creatures. I gladly confess that there is much I do not know and cannot know. But as a Christian, I know to whom I am pointing and trusting in. Is it possible that I do not know these things? If I say yes, then the problem of ultimate possibility overwhelms me. If I say no, then I am walking by faith and I am trusting in the One who is ultimate and who has revealed Himself to me… and this is the most epistemologically sound thing for me to do. It is only by exercising this kind of faith that I am sure of anything.

In a sense, you are asking for the impossible, humanly speaking. Christianity has mystery and we are finite and God only reveals so much to us. The onlooker can say, “Oh, see, you are no better off than any of us.” No, not at all. These three aspects of Christianity are necessary aspects of Christianity. It doesn’t disprove anything, it just might not comport with out tastes. Mystery doesn’t undermine the fact that God is the uniquely true God. In fact, knowing what I know and having experienced what I have experienced, I am confident that these elements of mystery fit in perfectly and wonderfully with TAG… again, since God is who He is, aren’t we as Christians constrained to agree here?

I see no way out of HUGE question begging tactics (which is what I smack of). But can we assert anything less? Any other ultimate will prove to be an idol, and idols cannot sustain the weight of absolute status, hence they end up being self-contradictory and frustrating and damaging, which is what other systems of thought entail. I believe they do, even if I can’t demonstrate every aspect to it. That is also why I think the sensus divinitas is absolutely crucial with sovereign grace. These two points only serve to bolster my faith in God. They fit perfectly.

So again, I can’t say I know how to answer your question about threeness or exactly what all the necessary preconditions for knowledge are, I only know to whom I must look. And what He has revealed in contradistinction to other explanations about reality beats them, but according to the rules outlined within the system. The other systems do have internal problems, as I’m sure you well agree, but isn’t the detection of internal problems, to some extent anyway, dependant upon the rules by which we play? Hence, I’m back to sensus divinitas and sovereign grace. And I’m back to a uniqueness of Christianity that so indulges in such wonderfully ultimate circularity. This fits perfectly with sustaining an ultimate and a God whose chief end is to glorify Himself and enjoy Himself forever. That is the one I love and trust.

Austin
 
Paul M,
Concerning the hermeneutics of triune or more, there is a vast difference between reconciling scripture in order to avoid contradictions and scripture leaving something out. Because more than the given number works in one situation does not imply that it, in any way is a valid hermeneutic technique in another.

Concerning natural revelation, I just purchased, a book called, The Secret of the Universe, by Nathan R. Wood, it was recommended by Dr. Francis Nigel Lee, and its basic argument is that the Universe reflects the triune nature of God.

I posted a quote from the book here: http://www.puritanboard.com/showthread.php?t=16574
 
I have spoken to Don, a fellow participant, since the discussion on Butler's blog. That discussion broke down when it came down to what is possible vs. impossible.


If I remember correctly, it broke down when it was *asserted* that the quadrune god was impossible while the triune God was possible. It was not shown that 4 was *impossible*.

I've seen you use Sean Choi's name quite a bit in support. But is Sean Choi even a presuppositionalist anymore? Not according to his comments on Jeff Lowder's blog a while back. Dropping his name as an argument against modality doesn't do much good in defending VT. Even if he does reject modality, he apparently still rejects the strong VT argument - I could be mistaken though. So I guess it could be commented that I'd love to see the convo b/w you and Choi in regards to VT.

In the meantime, I'm still waiting for:

1) what these "preconditions of intelligibility" are?
2) what are the *essential* doctrines of Christianity? and
3) what makes these *essential* doctrines and them *alone* necessary for intelligibility?

Amen and Amen. ;)
 
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