Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein)

[RamistThomist]

I read this because of Wittgenstein’s importance in 20th century analytic philosophy, not because I enjoyed it. The book is tough sledding. It is a series of notes loosely following larger sections of ideas. That’s not a bad style, and if pulled off correctly, it can be philosophically devastating. Nietzsche was the undisputed master of it. Blaise Pascal good do it as well. Wittgenstein...doesn’t quite accomplish it.

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But his ideas are important.

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I haven’t read Tractatus Logicus Philosophicus, but I get the idea that he is rejecting that work. In this work he is analysizing Augustine’s statement (Confessions I.8) that words describe objects. True, but words do far more.

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Words act. The meaning of a word is often in how it is used (5 red apples example). Language game: the speaking of language is part of an activity/form of life (para 23). The definition of a word is seen in its use. “Language is a medium of action.”

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Language games. All Language Games are public. They have rules that are established through repeated trials. Language games operate on tacit presuppositions.

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Is this speech-act theory? It points the way towards it. And I think this is Wittgenstein’s biggest pay-off.

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An excursus on Being and Non-Being.

Problem: if everything that we call being and non-being consists in the connections between elements, it make no sense to speak of an element’s being...existence cannot be attributed to an element, for if it did not exist one could not name it (sec. 50).

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Can there be the Platonic form of a negative number? Do negatives have being? What about placing a negative sign in front of the infinity symbol? What is Platonic universal for that?

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-∞

Conclusion

It wasn’t conceptually hard to read, but it was hard to “get to the next page.” For those of us who cut our teeth on John Frame and Vern Poythress, a lot of Wittgenstein will be familiar. There were many valuable and keen insights (e.g., Moore’s Paradox). However, I don’t know if I would make this the staple of my philosophy diet.

 

[MW]

The definition of a word is seen in its use. “Language is a medium of action.”

If I follow this through, the statement, "language is a medium of action," is itself an action of which I cannot understand the meaning until I have grasped the use. So now I am in the sorry state of having to judge motives before I can take a man at his word. The idea that there are men who wish to be taken at their word, and who speak of the more important matters of life in plain language, must itself be judged as having some motive other than what it professes. Where does that leave the gospel and its simple proclamation?

 

[RamistThomist]

I don't think Witt. is saying it is either/or. (He might be; half the time I couldn't follow him). I think he is saying that sometimes we don't understand a word until we see it in its "use."

Or we understand words in their language-games (contexts maybe?)

 

[MW]

I don't think Witt. is saying it is either/or. (He might be; half the time I couldn't follow him).

If we were supposed to understand his "meaning," he would be self-refuting. He who finds that frustrating might be more of a realist than he thinks.

 

[Philip]

So I've been fascinated by Wittgenstein for a number of years, ever since I attended a series of lectures by Peter Hacker at Oxford.

You are correct, Jacob, that Witt is pointing toward what would become speech-act theory. What he's reacting against is the so-called picture theory of language which sees propositions as the only interesting feature of language and sees all words as corresponding either to objects or to logical relations.

Every time I come back to this one I find something new. Witt's style is calculated so that you have to follow the entire thing from the beginning to get what's going on. This is in conscious contrast to the Tractatus which had been analyzed and over-analyzed by the logical positivists of the 20s and 30s.

One place of caution, though, is what I've called the Helen Keller problem. His philosophical analysis of language works well when describing how competent language users use language and discern meaning. What it doesn't really address, except circumspectly, is that the only people we know of who are able to report what the process of becoming competent in language looks like don't describe it that way. For example, Helen Keller in the wellhouse.

 

[Philip]

If I follow this through, the statement, "language is a medium of action," is itself an action of which I cannot understand the meaning until I have grasped the use.

I think you misunderstand here. He isn't talking about use in terms of intention but in terms of place in the language. In other words, meaning is often understood in terms of use in relation to other words. He's pointing out that plain language is actually more complex than it appears. But he's not denying its reality.

 

[MW]

But he's not denying its reality.

What are you "doing" in saying this? If you follow him I can't follow either you or him.

 

[Philip]

What are you "doing" in saying this?

I am making a descriptive statement. When saying that we are doing things with words, what Witt is pointing out is that descriptive statements (the obsession of Logical Positivism, Bertrand Russell, etc) are not the only thing we do with words. For example, we promise things. We ask questions. We compliment. We supplicate. We even pray (though Witt is curiously silent on that one). Austin's work is clearer here, but speech-act theory isn't obscurantism. On the contrary, it's actually fairly basic in terms of how we actually use language.

For example, as a minister of the Gospel, when you perform a marriage, you say "I pronounce you man and wife." This is a type of speech act that accomplishes that which it pronounces. That is, you, speaking as a minister of the Gospel, have authority to make certain pronouncements which take effect.

 

[RamistThomist]

Proponents of speech-act aren't saying that all verbal moments are necessarily speech act. We are just saying that words can do things. Words can produce effects. Let's say I am an American soldier behind German lines. I only know a few lines of German, but I won't to convince the German or Italian soldiers that I am German. I say to them "‘Kennst du das Land, wo die Zitronen blühen?’ I don't particularly care whether they in fact know where the lemon trees are. My question aims at a perlocutionary effect.

 

[MW]

What are you "doing" in saying this?

I am making a descriptive statement.

What are you "doing" in stating that you are making a descriptive statement?

You see the problem. You never actually say anything meaningful because meaning is always subordinate to use.

 

[Philip]

You see the problem. You never actually say anything meaningful because meaning is always subordinate to use.

Meaning is not subordinate to use. Meaning is use. A word's meaning depends on how it is used. For example, the difference between "A Panda eats shoots and leaves" and "A Panda eats, shoots, and leaves." The word "shoots" in one instance seems to be a noun referring to small plants, while in another instance it seems to mean an action involving a weapon. Most puns are examples of plays on ambiguities in use.

Similarly, speech-act theory merely points out that we use words to do various kinds of things. I think your worry is that there is a kind of skepticism involved here, but more likely it is a hermaneutic circle.

Take, for example, all kinds of everyday cliches, metaphors, and allusions that we take for granted. "There's method in his madness." This, of course, is an allusion to Hamlet but most of us, when using it, are not intentionally referencing Shakespeare, but commenting on how someone's seemingly irrational behaviour is making sense. Even the use of the word "mad" here is a metaphorical one.

The point is that even in the kinds of plain speaking which you clearly prefer, there are layers of complexity that we are able to take for granted, whether speech-acts, common metaphors, or homophones, and I would hold that these phenomenon are part of God's intention in language--they are aids to understanding, not necessarily impediments.

 

[MW]

Meaning is not subordinate to use. Meaning is use. A word's meaning depends on how it is used. For example, the difference between "A Panda eats shoots and leaves" and "A Panda eats, shoots, and leaves." The word "shoots" in one instance seems to be a noun referring to small plants, while in another instance it seems to mean an action involving a weapon. Most puns are examples of plays on ambiguities in use.

Trying to dress up non-realism to look like the science of semantics is just silly.

 

[Philip]

Trying to dress up non-realism to look like the science of semantics is just silly.

I'm curious as to which realism you mean here. For example, if we're talking about epistemological realism, then Witt is not necessarily in conflict with it. On the other hand, he probably is opposed to realism about universals, but that doesn't necessarily make him wrong, as Thomas Reid (along with much of the reformed tradition) is a nominalist about universals. In fact Reid's philosophy of language looks very similar to that of the ordinary language philosophy that followed Wittgenstein.

 

[MW]

I'm curious as to which realism you mean here. For example, if we're talking about epistemological realism, then Witt is not necessarily in conflict with it. On the other hand, he probably is opposed to realism about universals, but that doesn't necessarily make him wrong, as Thomas Reid (along with much of the reformed tradition) is a nominalist about universals. In fact Reid's philosophy of language looks very similar to that of the ordinary language philosophy that followed Wittgenstein.

Reid's nominalism only related to abstract ideas and essences, and was based on the presupposition of personal creation: "Yet, as was before observed, our conception of them is always inadequate and lame. They are the creatures of God, and there are many things belonging to them which we know not, and which cannot be deduced by reasoning from what we know: they have a real essence or constitution of nature, from which all their qualities flow; but this essence our faculties do not comprehend: they are therefore incapable of definition; for a definition ought to comprehend the whole nature or essence of the thing defined."

 

[Philip]

Reid's nominalism only related to abstract ideas and essences

So the realism you were talking about is universal realism, correct?

 

[MW]

So the realism you were talking about is universal realism, correct?

Realism means the mind knows the real thing, not just an idea of the thing. We know the world; we do not create the world. Language reflects reality; it does not create reality.

 

[MW]

Reid: "Language being the express image of human thought..." "Things that are distinguished in all languages, such as substance and quality, action and passion, cause and effect, must be distinguished by the natural powers of the human mind. The philosophy of grammar, and that of the human understanding, are more nearly allied than is commonly imagined."

 

[Philip]

Realism means the mind knows the real thing, not just an idea of the thing. We know the world; we do not create the world. Language reflects reality; it does not create reality.

As I said, I am not sure that Wittgenstein is entirely opposed to this. What he's skeptical of is the value of much of metaphysical discourse, because he thinks that in many cases we mistake grammatical necessities for ontological or metaphysical truths. Which is why your quote from Reid actually puts a bit of perspective on it: Reid is not an uncritical realist, recognizing that there are certain things that most/all languages have in common, but also recognizing that there are differences. If language reflects human thought, then German-speakers really do think differently from English-speakers.

 

[Philip]

Simply because one is a falllibilist does not mean that one is an anti-realist.

 

[RamistThomist]

I just read Bill Alston's The Reliability of Sense Perception and he suggests that the neo-Reidian take on on doxastic practices (Plantinga, Wolterstorff) is similar to Wittgenstein's language games.

 

[MW]

If language reflects human thought, then German-speakers really do think differently from English-speakers.

Language must reflect human thought for there to be truth-speaking; Psalm 15, "and speaketh the truth in his heart."

Everyone will grant there are differences between humans and broad differences between cultures, although as Christians we are committed to the fact there is a common nature which is shared by all humanity.

 

[Philip]

I just read Bill Alston's The Reliability of Sense Perception and he suggests that the neo-Reidian take on on doxastic practices (Plantinga, Wolterstorff) is similar to Wittgenstein's language games.

It really is. Witt is skeptical, though, about the possibility of metaphysics because he thinks it usually mistakes the structure of language for the structure of reality. I, on the other hand, would tend to say that metaphysics is itself that language-game which is concerned with the structure of reality.

 

[MW]

Simply because one is a falllibilist does not mean that one is an anti-realist.

An atheist and an agnostic differ theoretically but they practically function the same way. Likewise anti-realism and non-realism. Herod and Pilate become friends in condemning the truth.

 

[Philip]

Likewise anti-realism and non-realism.

Again, I don't know that he's a non-realist. His anti-metaphysical stance may indicate that, and on some readings (D.Z. Phillips for instance) he is, but on others (P.M.S. Hacker comes to mind) the question of realism simply isn't one that he is addressing as such. Certainly Austin and the speech-act theorists who followed Wittgenstein would hold to realism (really the whole analytic tradition leans in that direction, sometimes too heavily).

He is a fallibilist, but then again so are most realists.

 

[MW]

Again, I don't know that he's a non-realist. His anti-metaphysical stance may indicate that, and on some readings (D.Z. Phillips for instance) he is, but on others (P.M.S. Hacker comes to mind) the question of realism simply isn't one that he is addressing as such. Certainly Austin and the speech-act theorists who followed Wittgenstein would hold to realism (really the whole analytic tradition leans in that direction, sometimes too heavily).

What does his famous statement about solipsism, idealism, and realism amount to?

That aside, the statement relating to use and meaning, which I originally addressed in this thread, is fundamentally non-realist. Without a realist view of meaning there really is no use because the inquiry into use is an endless one.

He is a fallibilist, but then again so are most realists.

A real realist holds some beliefs as most basic; hence the "fallibilism" would have to be severely modified and/or restricted to specific empirical inquiries. A proper fallibilist is self-defeating. He cannot assert his position with any certainty.

At any rate, if Jesus is "the truth," we cannot be fallibilist. The gospel is meaningless without realism.

 

[Philip]

What does his famous statement about solipsism, idealism, and realism amount to?

I believe that's in the Tractatus, which he later rejected.

Without a realist view of meaning there really is no use because the inquiry into use is an endless one.

Ok, so there are two things being discussed here: "Meaning as use" is the first. This simply means that in many (not necessarily all) cases, the meaning of a word is understood primarily in its context, both its immediate locutionary context and the larger grammatical context of language and the particular language-game being used.

The second is in regard to speech-act theory, where we understand an utterance by perceiving what the speaker is doing with it. So for example, a reader who picks up A Modest Proposal and comes to the conclusion that Jonathan Swift advocated cannibalizing children has failed to recognize that the speech-act in which Swift is engaged is satirical.

If you like, we could think of speech-acts as similar to literary genres. To understand what you say, I have to read your words according to their genre.

A real realist holds some beliefs as most basic; hence the "fallibilism" would have to be severely modified and/or restricted to specific empirical inquiries. A proper fallibilist is self-defeating. He cannot assert his position with any certainty.

Fallibilism is generally a subspecies of realism. I hold that my faculties are not infallible, but generally reliable. The basic beliefs of which you speak are methodological assumptions grounded, at least in my case, in a particular metaphysical commitment to the God revealed in Scripture, namely the Trinitarian God. Of this I am persuaded and I pray daily that I would grow more and more certain in this truth.

But certainty is a fickle thing. I find myself certain of many things one day and less certain the next. It's not that I disbelieve it, it's just the hermaneutic circle kicking back in.

 

[MW]

Ok, so there are two things being discussed here: "Meaning as use" is the first. This simply means that in many (not necessarily all) cases, the meaning of a word is understood primarily in its context, both its immediate locutionary context and the larger grammatical context of language and the particular language-game being used.

The second is in regard to speech-act theory, where we understand an utterance by perceiving what the speaker is doing with it. So for example, a reader who picks up A Modest Proposal and comes to the conclusion that Jonathan Swift advocated cannibalizing children has failed to recognize that the speech-act in which Swift is engaged is satirical.

If you like, we could think of speech-acts as similar to literary genres. To understand what you say, I have to read your words according to their genre.

As already noted, this is just a silly dress-up. In traditional rhetoric or the science of semantics meaning is not a matter of use. Both require fundamentally realist approaches to meaning in order to have these limited uses. Words "extend" their meanings and function within semantic fields, but this is only discernible because there is meaning in both the word and its field.

Fallibilism is generally a subspecies of realism.

Are you sure? Obviously not! Unreal realism is no realism.

 

[Philip]

Are you sure?

Reasonably.

As already noted, this is just a silly dress-up.

Is use not real?

Words "extend" their meanings and function within semantic fields, but this is only discernible because there is meaning in both the word and its field.

Sure, and that meaning derives from a competent language-user. Apart from intention (illocution) sounds or shapes (locution) will be meaningless. Another way of describing this would be with Peirce's triad of sign-signified-interpretant (or, in Percy's reinvention, interpreter).

 

[MW]

Are you sure?

Reasonably.

So within the confines of your "reason," you are supposing you do not in fact err, and thus contradicting your previous commitment.

As already noted, this is just a silly dress-up.

Is use not real?

Use of what? The "what" requires meaning prior to use. The meaning is not in the use.

Sure, and that meaning derives from a competent language-user.

From wherever it is derived, it has to exist in order to be used; hence meaning is distinct from use. Realism strikes again!

 

[RamistThomist]

Are you sure?

Reasonably.

As already noted, this is just a silly dress-up.

Is use not real?

Words "extend" their meanings and function within semantic fields, but this is only discernible because there is meaning in both the word and its field.

Sure, and that meaning derives from a competent language-user. Apart from intention (illocution) sounds or shapes (locution) will be meaningless. Another way of describing this would be with Peirce's triad of sign-signified-interpretant (or, in Percy's reinvention, interpreter).

when you say Pierce's triad, what book are you talking about?