Philosophy of Revelation: Herman Bavinck

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Stephen L Smith

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Does anyone know of review articles, explanatory commentary, or other resources discussing Bavinck's classic book. I would prefer material from a sympathetic Reformed perspective. Thanks.
 
Any takers? I am particularly interested in some form of study material that would help someone study this work.
 
Thanks Jacob. That is helpful. I have been reflecting on one of your quotes from Bavinck:

"The only way unity can preserve true differentiation is when it includes and enfolds the entire world seen as the product of divine wisdom (57-58)."

In Bavinck's Reformed Dogmatics 2:568 ff he says this:

"Because God is the creator, man a creature; ... an infinite distance between the two is a given. No fellowship, no religion between the two seems possible; there is only difference, distance, endless distinctiveness. If God remains evated above humanity in His sovereign exaltedness and majesty, then no religion is possible, at least no religion in the sense of fellowship. Then the relation between the two is exhaustively described in the terms of "master" and "servant". ... Accordingly, if there is truly to be religion, if there is to be fellowship between God and man ... then religion must be the character of a covenant. For then God has to come down from His lofty position, condescend to is creatures, impart, reveal, and give Himself away to human beings; then He who inhabits eternity and dwells in a high and holy place must also dwell with those who are of a humble spirit (Isa 57:15). But this set of conditions is nothing other than the description of a covenant. If religion is called a covenant, it is thereby described as the true and genuine religion.This is what no other religion has ever understood; all peoples either pantheistically pull God down into what is creaturely, or deistically elevate Him endlessly above it. In neither case does one arrive at true fellowship, at covenant, at genuine religion. But scripture insists on both: God is infinitely great and condescendingly good; He is sovereign but also Father; He is creator but also Prototype. In a word, He is the God of the covenant."

It seems to me this is Bavinck's key to how unity can preserve true differentiation. Does this make sense?
 
Thanks Jacob. That is helpful. I have been reflecting on one of your quotes from Bavinck:

"The only way unity can preserve true differentiation is when it includes and enfolds the entire world seen as the product of divine wisdom (57-58)."

In Bavinck's Reformed Dogmatics 2:568 ff he says this:

"Because God is the creator, man a creature; ... an infinite distance between the two is a given. No fellowship, no religion between the two seems possible; there is only difference, distance, endless distinctiveness. If God remains evated above humanity in His sovereign exaltedness and majesty, then no religion is possible, at least no religion in the sense of fellowship. Then the relation between the two is exhaustively described in the terms of "master" and "servant". ... Accordingly, if there is truly to be religion, if there is to be fellowship between God and man ... then religion must be the character of a covenant. For then God has to come down from His lofty position, condescend to is creatures, impart, reveal, and give Himself away to human beings; then He who inhabits eternity and dwells in a high and holy place must also dwell with those who are of a humble spirit (Isa 57:15). But this set of conditions is nothing other than the description of a covenant. If religion is called a covenant, it is thereby described as the true and genuine religion.This is what no other religion has ever understood; all peoples either pantheistically pull God down into what is creaturely, or deistically elevate Him endlessly above it. In neither case does one arrive at true fellowship, at covenant, at genuine religion. But scripture insists on both: God is infinitely great and condescendingly good; He is sovereign but also Father; He is creator but also Prototype. In a word, He is the God of the covenant."

It seems to me this is Bavinck's key to how unity can preserve true differentiation. Does this make sense?

That seems correct. I'm somewhat hesitant to say that "covenant is the key" for Bavinck, since that kind of thinking gave birth to the Federal Vision. But there is a truth, there. Man can never rise to God. God has to reveal himself, but revelation qua revelation is not enough. It has to be in the form of a covenant.
 
That seems correct. I'm somewhat hesitant to say that "covenant is the key" for Bavinck, since that kind of thinking gave birth to the Federal Vision.
That may be true Jacob. It is only true in how the FV wanted to interpret and define it. I believe you have missed that.
 
God has to reveal himself, but revelation qua revelation is not enough. It has to be in the form of a covenant.
i believe you are incorrect here as God has given his parameters. He has defined his terms in scripture and placed them on a very high pedestal. The Church received that testimony.
 
I'm somewhat hesitant to say that "covenant is the key" for Bavinck
That may be true Jacob. It is only true in how the FV wanted to interpret and define it. I believe you have missed that.
If you read the fuller sections on the covenant in Reformed Dogmatics vols 2 and 3, and also Bavinck's "Saved by Grace", I think one can say there is a beautiful balance in Bavinck's covenant theology. Surely his book "saved by grace" itself would undermine the FV (I do acknowledge though that Bavinck lived many rears before the FV).
 
Yes, there was a gracious part in the Covenant of Works. God did Condescend but that was grossly misinterpreted as the Covenant of Grace and that is where we got the term Monocovenantalism.
 
i believe you are incorrect here as God has given his parameters. He has defined his terms in scripture and placed them on a very high pedestal. The Church received that testimony.

That doesn't contradict anything I've said. My point was that revelation by itself isn't enough. Natural revelation doesn't save. I'm not sure what you think I am saying.
 
That may be true Jacob. It is only true in how the FV wanted to interpret and define it. I believe you have missed that.

What have I missed? My point was that we should be careful in holding a central dogma. I don't think Bavinck was saying that. However, I have sat under sermons by Steve Wilkins where he said covenant was the controlling metaphor of the Bible. That is too far.
 
Yes, there was a gracious part in the Covenant of Works. God did Condescend but that was grossly misinterpreted as the Covenant of Grace and that is where we got the term Monocovenantalism.

I didn't say anything about the Covenant of Works being gracious (in fact, I didn't say anything about grace or the covenant of works).
 
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This is where I pulled the monocovenantalism from Jacob.

Right. Bavinck would reject that, which is why I said he wouldn't hold that the covenant is key. But Covenant is important, and he did note that that theme was missing from other traditions. Further, covenantal thinking allowed him to reject the errors of Feuerbach, Spinoza, and the rest.
 
Maybe I am incorrect here. Did Bavinck think that Covenant and Creation were interlinked as Kline apparently did Jacob? BTW, I believe some Reformed Baptist hold to that view up in Grand Rapids Michigan while I do not believe my friend Richard Barcellos does. I could be mistaken. We have debated that years ago on the PB. I am speaking about Robert Gonzales from years ago. They both were contributors here on the Puritanboard.
Kline's position... is
The [Klinean] republication view teaches that man was in covenant with God at the very moment of creation.
https://rpcnacovenanter.wordpress.c...escension-and-redefinition-of-covenant-merit/
 
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I also admit that I am having a problem with revelation outside of knowing Natural law or the decalogue. What is that about? What is there to reveal?
 
I also admit that I am having a problem with revelation outside of knowing Natural law or the decalogue. What is that about? What is there to reveal?

The heavens declare the glory of God. Day to day pours forth speech/reveals knowledge.

Natural law isn't the same thing as natural theology which isn't the same thing as natural revelation, though they are connected.

Natural law is to reflect on the natural goods in light of reason.
 
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Thanks Jacob. I have a lot to learn still. Thanks for bearing with me. I am actually having to relearn some things also.
The heavens declare the glory of God. Day to day pours forth speech/reveals knowledge.

Natural law isn't the same thing as natural theology which isn't the same thing as natural revelation, though they are connected.

Natural law is to reflect on the natural goods in light of reason.
 
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I have never read Turretin. Just seen quotes by him others have posted. In which of his writings does he address that.

Elenctics, volume 1.

And most people don't realize it, but Rutherford's Lex, Rex is actually a natural law treatise, given his numerous quotations of Suarez, Grotius, and Thomas Aquinas.

Rutherford

If it be natural to one man to defend himself against the personal invasion of a prince, then is it natural and warrantable to ten thousand, and to a whole kingdom ; and what reason to defraud a kingdom of the benefit of self-defence more than one man? (158 [324])?

Key argument: I reduce all that I am to speak of the power of kings, to the author or efficient, -the matter or subject, - the form or power, - the end and fruit of their government, - and to some cases of resistance (Rutherford 1).

Field neatly rephrases Rutherford’s argument: If we reorder the causes (to final, efficient, formal and material) and take “cases of resistance” to be “forms of limitation” we may rephrase the conclusions of Lex, rex as a series of questions: What is the purpose or goal of government? Who or what brings government into being? What is it that makes government government, or what is the essence of government? What is government made out of? What are the due limitations of civil government (Field 5)?

Rutherford gives a book-length response to “P. Prelate.”

C1: “All civil power is immediately from God in its root” (Rutherford 1).

  1. Civil society is natural in radice but voluntary in modo.

  2. The power of creating a man a king is from the people (6).

    1. Judges 9.6; 1 Sam. 11.15

    2. A choice is made to choose this man and not that man.
  3. Is God’s call to not resist ordained authorities always absolute? Rutherford gives a number of reductios to prove otherwise:

    1. A pastor is ordained of God; if a pastor becomes a robber, is it a sin to resist him?

    2. If a king brings in foreign invaders, such as “Irish cutthroats,” it is lawful to resist (15).

C2: Where obligation exists by contract, violation of the faith plighted in the contract, cannot in proper terms be called disobedience or contempt of authority (24).

  1. Government and power-making: the community, not the Pope, doth put forth this act (making a king) as a free, voluntary power (29).

  2. The community keeps to itself a power to resist tyranny (35).

  3. The previous laws of a community or nation give people the right to resist invaders who try to overthrow that order (36).

C3: Idolatry and Prior Laws

  1. If a nation is Christian (or theistic), the people do not have to aid a ruler in making it idolatrous (40).

  2. Rutherford’s hypotheticals are quite interesting: if a king invites Papists to invade and subdue the Protestants, must the Protestants merely accept this?

  3. Covenants limit the power of kings (57).

  4. The Western legal heritage at this time had already limited the power of kings: if a king negates the conditions which made him king (e.g., the people’s investiture), then he may be negated since he violated them “from his own consent” (63).

C4: Nature and Destruction

  1. Law is rooted in nature and nature can’t be destroyed. Therefore, a king doesn’t have the power to destruction (66).

  2. What if a people are conquered?

    1. This is why there really can’t be a “blank check to Nero” type interpretation, otherwise it gets really silly.

      1. This means “might makes right.”

      2. So, the new conqueror is automatically “the powers that be”?

      3. Does that mean the old--indeed, legitimate--ruler is now illegitimate?

      4. At what point does he become illegitimate--when the new conqueror conquers 50.01% of the land?
    2. Presumably, given the analysis in 2.1.1-2.1.4, a people would be sinning in resisting. Yet, let’s say they “reconquered” the conquerors. Does that automatically make them “in the right?”
C5: Kingmakers

  1. The Holy Spirit invests the people (Deut. 17.15-16) with kingmaking power.

    1. But that’s the Old Testament!

    2. Fair enough--it is also Western (and Russian) legal tradition.
  2. Can the people cede all of their liberty to the king?

    1. No, for the people do not have absolute power over themselves.

    2. You cannot cede what you do not have (81).
  3. They give the king political power to their own safety, but reserve natural power to themselves. Here Rutherford buttresses his argument with natural law reasoning and the 6th Commandment.

  4. Inferior magistrates are also “powers from God” (else, if Paul were just talking about the king, why didn’t he simply say “power”?).

    1. They also bear God’s sword (90).
  5. Scripture notes the people make the king, never the king the people (113).

    1. The people united to make David king at Hebron.

    2. The king is above the people by eminence of derived authority as watchman, but he is inferior to them in fountain-power, as the effect to the cause (115). This is Rutherford’s key, and in my opinion, strongest, argument in the book.
C6: Parliament and the People

  1. “The princes of the house of Israel could not be rebuked for oppression in judgment (Mic. 3.1-3) if they had not the power of judgment” (95).

  2. Historical reductio: Did Parliament sin by not giving Charles I the tax legislation he wanted?

  3. The Parliament can resist the king, for it, too, his of God, even “a congregation of gods” (111, quoting Psalm 82.6).
C7: Is the King absolute?

  1. God does not give absolute power, because: (101ff)

    1. The king has his power from the people, as already established.

    2. The king is commonly known as a living law, but if he is a law then he is not absolute.

    3. Is the power to do evil from God?

      1. Depends on what kind of distinctions we make. If “power” means “approval from God,” then did David have the power to kill Uriah and deflower Bathsheba (103)?

      2. Obviously, that is not a positive power but a mere permission.

      3. In either case, the king doesn’t have absolute power.
    4. The power to work contrary to the Good cannot be a lawful power, since the king is a minister of God for Good.

    5. The prophets rebuked the kings of Israel; hence, the power was not absolute.

C8: The Goal of Civil Govt.

  1. God’s intention per civil govt is “external peace, and quiet life, and godliness of his church and people, and that all judges, according to their places, be nurse-fathers to the church (Isa. 40.23)” (105).

  2. Therefore, God must have appointed means to this end.

    1. The obstruction of Good and justice works contrary to this end.
C9: The Health of the People

  1. If the people are the cause of the king, then their own safety must be principally sought (119).

  2. What is the end or purpose of the king? The king isn’t the king simply so he can be the king. Therefore, the prelate’s argument is reduced thus:

    1. The king is a lame king unless given the power to waste and destroy.

    2. The king cannot be happy unless he has the power to lay waste the Lord’s inheritance.

C10: Royalty mediately

  1. The king has royalty mediately by the people’s free consent (123).

  2. Power is not an immediate inheritance from heaven but is always mediated in situations.

C11: Judges and the Laws

  1. If judges exist, then the king is not the sole interpreter of the law (137).

C12: War

  1. Private subjects, Rutherford carefully argues, may not officially rise against the king. Estates, however, may (139).

  2. There is a distinction between the king in concreto and the king in abstracto (office of the king).

C13: Venerable authority

  1. The person of the king is not venerable in its authority.

  2. If the contrary hold true, then Manasseh did not shed innocent blood or engage in sorcery (150).

C14: Resistance and patient suffering are not contraries when considered as virtues (153ff).

  1. If resistance can fall under the virtue of self-preservation, then it is not an evil.

  2. Were the entire Parliament and city of London to lay down their arms and go meekly to their deaths at the hand of Irish rebels?

  3. In lighter situations, such as taxes and tribute, we may not use acts of re-offending.

  4. Did Paul meekly submit to the king of Damascus or did he engage in self-preservation and escape (159)?

C15: Self-Defense as Rational and Natural

  1. We must first engage in supplications.

  2. Flight is not always possible or natural, as in the case of the aged and infants.

  3. Rutherford makes an interesting assertion: “No man in the 3 kingdoms sought to harm the king’s person” (162). It does not seem that Rutherford would agree with Charles’ execution.

  4. Humorous reductio on the Irish rebel and natural law (165).

C16: More on Just War Theory and Defensive Wars (166ff)

  1. As the priests executed a ceremonial law on King Uzziah, so may the three estates of Scotland execute the moral law of God upon the king (171).

C17: But what about martyrs? (182ff)

  1. Can Christians defend themselves against murderers?
 
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