Because Plantinga's modal logic version of the ontological argument was mentioned in another thread, I had to look it up and refresh my memory of it. Something made me uncomfortable about it and I think I know why. If we add three words in the opening proposition ("solitary in personality") and carry them throughout, I think it has a disastrous result. The ontological argument is an a priori rational argument, so we cannot appeal to anything but reason in developing it. Limited to that arena, I don't see why proposing the one who has maximal excellence is one God .. and one Person. Before you flame me, I know that is heresy of the first order, and that is why I say the argument in this form results in disaster. So, I guess I need to be told why the addition cannot be made in the modal ontological argument. Here is the argument as I understand it: 1.It is proposed that a being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good, and solitary in personality in W; and 2.It is proposed that a being has maximal greatness if it has maximal excellence in every possible world. 3.Maximal greatness is possibly exemplified. That is, it is possible that there be a being that has maximal greatness. (Premise) 4.Therefore, possibly it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good, and solitary in personality being exists. 5.Therefore, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good, and solitary in personality being exists. (By S5) 6.Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good, and solitary in personality being exists.