Presuppositional Apologetics: Biblically Defensible?

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heymike

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In my cursory reading of presuppositional apologetics, it seems that it is more often defended in a philosophical way, rather than with the teaching of the Bible. Is anyone aware of an expositional defense of the presuppositional method?
 
In my cursory reading of presuppositional apologetics, it seems that it is more often defended in a philosophical way, rather than with the teaching of the Bible. Is anyone aware of an expositional defense of the presuppositional method?

An article by Richard Gaffin in WTJ was reprinted in "Revelation and Reason," ed. Oliphint and Tipton, which contains very useful exegetical work in laying a foundation for presuppositionalism, focussing especially on Matthew 11 and 1 Corinthians 2. These texts were also the loci classici of the traditional reformed distinction between archetypal and ectypal theology, so the essay will be of some interest to historical theologians also.
 
In my cursory reading of presuppositional apologetics, it seems that it is more often defended in a philosophical way, rather than with the teaching of the Bible. Is anyone aware of an expositional defense of the presuppositional method?

An article by Richard Gaffin in WTJ was reprinted in "Revelation and Reason," ed. Oliphint and Tipton, which contains very useful exegetical work in laying a foundation for presuppositionalism, focussing especially on Matthew 11 and 1 Corinthians 2. These texts were also the loci classici of the traditional reformed distinction between archetypal and ectypal theology, so the essay will be of some interest to historical theologians also.

Agreed,I've been peeping some of Oliphant and Tipton's works and it's real edifying stuff! I'm going to buy all their books on Van Tillian Apologetics
 
The best I've seen is K. Scott Oliphint's The Battle Belongs to the Lord: The Power of Scripture for Defending our Faith. The book features lengthy expositions of six passages.
 
"Revelation and Reason," ed. Oliphint and Tipton

The whole first section of this wonderful book deals with exegetical foundations of Van Til's apologetics. Section two deals with theological foundations. So in a sense, if you believe that Reformed theology is the most exegetical theology out there than this section will be of interest as well. The third section deals with methodological implications and is very good as well, but it has little to do with your question.

---------- Post added at 07:27 PM ---------- Previous post was at 07:23 PM ----------

Agreed,I've been peeping some of Oliphant and Tipton's works and it's real edifying stuff! I'm going to buy all their books on Van Tillian Apologetics

Go to WTS media center and sighn up for it, it is free, and listen to William Edgar's intro to apologetics. Westminster Theological Seminary - Media Center.
Bahnsen, Frame, Tipton, Oliphant, and Van Til himself are all in there to listen to. I am listening to Oliphant's doctrine of God series as I am writing this.
 
An article by Richard Gaffin in WTJ was reprinted in "Revelation and Reason," ed. Oliphint and Tipton, which contains very useful exegetical work in laying a foundation for presuppositionalism, focussing especially on Matthew 11 and 1 Corinthians 2. These texts were also the loci classici of the traditional reformed distinction between archetypal and ectypal theology, so the essay will be of some interest to historical theologians also.

I would have thought 1 Corinthians 2 was an important, if not the central text, but it surely has to be read with respect to the record of Paul's ministry in Acts. Jerram Barrs wrote of this in The Heart of Evangelism. Also, based on my own cursory reading, I find it difficult to see how Matthew 11 leads to an exclusively presuppositional apologetic. In all, I find the Bible has many ordinary, albeit exceptional examples of using reason, evidence, eyewitness testimony and scripture, rather than "Bible only" persuasion.
 
Mike, does the presuppositional method not use reason, evidence, or eyewitness testimony?
 
I'm not sure. How does it handle arguments for the resurrection of Jesus?

Presuppositionally, of course :)

A presuppositional naturalist is logically justified in denying the ressurection at the same time a presuppositional theist is logically justified in affirming the ressurrection when presented with the same data.

The evidence for the ressurection, therefore, is helpful in showing that our belief in the resurection as Christians is justified given our starting presupposition. The presentation of evidence to an unbeliever, then, cannot be given without a foundational presuppositional argument at the same time, undergirding why the data is evidence.

in my opinion, if you present the "data" under evidentialist paradigm, the most you could get the unbeliever to admit is that he has no reason for denying the resurrection apart from his presuppositional naturalism -- that is, you would just demonstrate he approaches the ressurrection in a question begging way. Which is to say, you would demonstrate that the debate hinges around presuppositions, not evidence.
 
Thanks Will, that was a helpful response, I am still trying to understand this. Arguments or evangelistic appeals for Jesus' ressurection to first century Jews are indeed different than how they need to be framed for an atheist today. But it is also true that the evidence may be enough to overcome any nontheistic presupposition. Especially if the historical argument is coupled with personal experience in a way similar to the Apostle Peter's argument for the Lordship of Christ in Acts 2.

Now I know that a presuppositional apologist would go after the atheists theory or philosophy of history, and argue that it depends on the God of Bible. And it certainly seems to have merit and I am sure that it has been fruitful. On the other hand, a classical apologist would go after the atheism with arguments for the existence of God. Admittedly, they seem to be less effective. As a philosophy student, I know there is a long tradition of them being refuted, and it seems the philosophical arguments for God have only become more complicated and mind numbing.

My approach is to argue against atheism, and leave the door open to the unbeliever for theism or solipsism. And by a unique set of circumstances, I have been able to grasp the arguments in a very simple way. Where Aquinas made the distinction between the possibility of a set proceeding to infinity, and the impossibility of a set becoming actually infinite; now I have a noted atheist on the run because he is being forced to admit that he cannot logically snap his fingers an infinite number of times. As far as I can tell, this is biblically appropriate, and even encouraged Matthew 13:52.
 
Mike, does the presuppositional method not use reason, evidence, or eyewitness testimony?

Yes but they are all put into perspective. Reason, evidence, and eyewitness testimony all have their uses and their limitations. Ultimatly it is our presuppositions that determine how we think about these things. The empty tomb does not by itself prove Christ's divinity, it only proves that there was an empty tomb.
 
Yes but they are all put into perspective. Reason, evidence, and eyewitness testimony all have their uses and their limitations. Ultimatly it is our presuppositions that determine how we think about these things.

Hi James, I came across an interesting passage from John Frame,

"The law of noncontradiction denies that p and not-p can both be true at the same time and in the same respect. That is a Christian principle, presupposed by Scripture itself. But it is, of course, also highly abstract. Nothing more concrete can be derived from the law of noncontradiction alone. To derive concrete conclusions we need additional principles, principles which are religiously, as well as philosophically, problematic."

The problem though is that he is mistaken to say that concrete conclusions cannot be derived from the principle of noncontradiction. It is this principle that classical apologists like Gerstner would have used to prove a necessary being. And from that they could have considered another principle of reason, to prove that an infinite regress is logically impossible.
 
It is this principle that classical apologists like Gerstner would have used to prove a necessary being. And from that they could have considered another principle of reason, to prove that an infinite regress is logically impossible.

And isn't that the problem? It uses reason as it is found in rationalism.
 
Let me make an addendum to what I put above. Does the bible does endorse rationalism, empiricism, or irrationalism (as isms). If not, what's left?
 
Yes but they are all put into perspective. Reason, evidence, and eyewitness testimony all have their uses and their limitations. Ultimatly it is our presuppositions that determine how we think about these things.

Hi James, I came across an interesting passage from John Frame,

"The law of noncontradiction denies that p and not-p can both be true at the same time and in the same respect. That is a Christian principle, presupposed by Scripture itself. But it is, of course, also highly abstract. Nothing more concrete can be derived from the law of noncontradiction alone. To derive concrete conclusions we need additional principles, principles which are religiously, as well as philosophically, problematic."

The problem though is that he is mistaken to say that concrete conclusions cannot be derived from the principle of noncontradiction. It is this principle that classical apologists like Gerstner would have used to prove a necessary being. And from that they could have considered another principle of reason, to prove that an infinite regress is logically impossible.

What he is refering to is the problem of moving from an abstract principle to a concrete example. It is like cause and effect, you can abstractly work out the law of cause and effect but that law by itself will never tell anything about any particuler instance of causation. you may be able to prove that this law proves a neccessary being but thta tells you nothing about any actual beings out there.
 
Let me make an addendum to what I put above. Does the bible does endorse rationalism, empiricism, or irrationalism (as isms). If not, what's left?

I not exactly sure how to say it... of course the Bible doesn't endorse any of those isms. You do understand that being rational, doesn't mean you've embraced rationalism.

Now what's left? Trinitarianism?
 
What he is refering to is the problem of moving from an abstract principle to a concrete example. It is like cause and effect, you can abstractly work out the law of cause and effect but that law by itself will never tell anything about any particuler instance of causation. you may be able to prove that this law proves a neccessary being but thta tells you nothing about any actual beings out there.

It's one thing to say there is a problem, and it's another to say that it cannot be done. The ontoligical and cosmological arguments have a limited scope, but they do go far enough in proving atheism to be absolutely false. It's almost like what you say about cause and effect, the difference is in that you know there is a cause. And that may be concrete enough given the nature of the disagreement.
 
I not exactly sure how to say it... of course the Bible doesn't endorse any of those isms. You do understand that being rational, doesn't mean you've embraced rationalism.

Now what's left? Trinitarianism?

I would say that revelational epistemology is left...that is, presuppositionalism.

Edit: so, back to my origional question. What is your epistemological ism if it is not rationalism, empiricism, irrationalism, or subjectivism etc. You have to have something.

---------- Post added at 08:20 AM ---------- Previous post was at 07:53 AM ----------

...cosmological arguments have a limited scope, but they do go far enough in proving atheism to be absolutely false.

If we use WLC's formulation: 1) everything that begins to exist has a cause; 2) the earth began to exist; 3) therefore the earth has a cause; as an atheist I would counter as the following:

1) every material thing that begins to exist has a material cause;
2) the material earth began to exist
3) therefore, the material earth has a material cause
3b) therefore, an immaterial God did not cause the material universe
 
Let me try to explain this as best as I can, and I'll begin be pointing out that just because a classical apologist uses reason, doesn't mean he or she has embraced rationalism. In the same way that a scientist makes an empirical observation, and is not committed to empiricism. A classical apologist would be the first to say that the principle of noncontradiction is part of God's revelation. It's neutrality is in that the atheist and theist have traditionally held it in common. But this is not always the case, and the fool is free to say that God doesn't exist. Also for the presuppositionalist, like John Frame, these principles are undoubtedly Christian and revelatory, but not given to concrete examples, which in other words means the arguments don't work.
But if they work to a limited extent, then agreement would be very good thing.

I have no problem picking up with the cosmological argument, more specifically that a material effect must have a material cause. This is most simply dealt with by the way in which you or I cause an action... and believe me I have been down this road to the point where an atheist denied his ability to snap his fingers.
 
Let me try to explain this as best as I can, and I'll begin be pointing out that just because a classical apologist uses reason, doesn't mean he or she has embraced rationalism.

I understand that Mike. That is why earlier post I asked rhetorically if the presuppositionalist doesn't use reason, evidence, and eyewitness testimony. Of course they do, and of course that doesn't make them rationalists or empiricists. The reason, however, is because reason and evidence are used within a revelational epistemology. I don't see a problem using classical arguments (as long as they are logically valid) within the presuppositional framework. But still, I am not sure what your answer is?

I have no problem, picking up with the cosmological argument, more specifically that a material effect must have a material cause. This is most simply dealt with by the way in which you or I cause an action... and believe me I have been down this road to the point where an atheist denied his ability to snap his fingers.

Right, I think the existence of an immaterial mind and rationality is the best route to take. But, that is not the "cosmological" argument and results in a much more inductively controversial point of view when you are talking to materialists.
 
What he is refering to is the problem of moving from an abstract principle to a concrete example. It is like cause and effect, you can abstractly work out the law of cause and effect but that law by itself will never tell anything about any particuler instance of causation. you may be able to prove that this law proves a neccessary being but thta tells you nothing about any actual beings out there.


It's one thing to say there is a problem, and it's another to say that it cannot be done. The ontoligical and cosmological arguments have a limited scope, but they do go far enough in proving atheism to be absolutely false. It's almost like what you say about cause and effect, the difference is in that you know there is a cause. And that may be concrete enough given the nature of the disagreement.

You are right, I am not saying that it cannot be done. Only pointing out what he is refering to. So causality alone cannot provide any jump from abstract to concrete.
 
I don't see a problem using classical arguments (as long as they are logically valid) within the presuppositional framework. But still, I am not sure what your answer is?

It's not a big deal, but I think using the term "presuppositionalism" as an overarching term to describe biblical epistemology is a bit confusing. Using it as a term to describe an apologetical method is quite helpful though. I tend to prefer reformed epistemology as a descriptive term.

Right, I think the existence of an immaterial mind and rationality is the best route to take. But, that is not the "cosmological" argument and results in a much more inductively controversial point of view when you are talking to materialists.

I was responding to the premise that material effects must have material causes. Now before moving on, what is there about this "inductively controversial point of view"?
 
You are right, I am not saying that it cannot be done. Only pointing out what he is refering to. So causality alone cannot provide any jump from abstract to concrete.

Actually I think I misunderstood him, because I see your point about how the principle of causality does not give anything concrete in and of itself. It has to be applied to something concrete, like an event we observe. Whereas in the case of the ontological argument the principle of noncontradiction is applied to existence.
 
It's not a big deal, but I think using the term "presuppositionalism" as an overarching term to describe biblical epistemology is a bit confusing.

Perhaps. Essentially what I am arguing is that presuppositionalism is built on revelational epsitemology; as such, revelational epsitemology directs the method of apologetics (since apologetics absolutely concerns the manner in which one should and does aquire the knowledge of God). In the end my suggestion is that if you follow the Bible's endorsement of revelational epistemology you cannot arrive at any other method besides presuppositionalism.

I was responding to the premise that material effects must have material causes. Now before moving on, what is there about this "inductively controversial point of view"?

I am not following what you mean by "what is there about this."
 
It is this principle that classical apologists like Gerstner would have used to prove a necessary being. And from that they could have considered another principle of reason, to prove that an infinite regress is logically impossible.

And isn't that the problem? It uses reason as it is found in rationalism.

But reason and rational thought in and of themselves are not contradictory to Christianity. Look at Paul's argument for the resurrection in I Cor 15; it relies on divine revelation, yes, but it's not devoid of rational thought or logic.
 
But reason and rational thought in and of themselves are not contradictory to Christianity. Look at Paul's argument for the resurrection in I Cor 15; it relies on divine revelation, yes, but it's not devoid of rational thought or logic.

That was qualifed by my statement "reason as it is found in rationalism."
 
Right, I think the existence of an immaterial mind and rationality is the best route to take. But, that is not the "cosmological" argument and results in a much more inductively controversial point of view when you are talking to materialists.

That is what I was referring to. I don't understand why it results in a much more inductively controversial point. Is it that materialists cannot see that they have the ability to freely act?
 
That is what I was referring to. I don't understand why it results in a much more inductively controversial point. Is it that materialists cannot see that they have the ability to freely act?

I don't know; but apparently not if they have a physicalist view of the brain/mind. What I meant by "more" controversial is that you could get a materialist to agree to the law of causality as a generally observable concept. So, as long as the traditional argument remains ambiguous regarding the nature of the cause, you can rightly flow from premise 1 to 3 without it being fallacious and the materialist would "track with you."

But, if you start off by saying "Everything that begins to exist has either a material or immaterial cause," then no, i don't think the argument from the mind is more controversial. In introducing an immaterial aspect to premise 1 it assumes the very thing it is trying to prove to the materialist, so the cosmological argument is beyond useless at that point.

I think it would be better to scrape the cosmos part of the entire thing. If the cause in P1 is material, then the conclusion cannot be immaterial; if the cause in P1 could be immaterial, then the question has been begged. Do an argument from the immaterial nature of rationality from the beginning, in my opinion.
 
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