Presuppositional Critique of Open Theism?

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unlearnedlearner

Puritan Board Freshman
All,

Is there a presuppositional critique of open theism? For example, in my reading of Van Til he says, "As we shall see later, it is upon the identity of knowledge and being in God that we pin our hopes and convictions that human predication is possible."

Any Van Tillian experts know where he develops this? Anyone know of a place where this is developed?

Thanks, ul
 
Hello UL,

As a presuppositionalist, I would simply approach the open theist on exegetical and hermeneutical grounds.

Sincerely,

Brian
 
On my website (a German website), you can find an academic paper I have written which is essentially a presuppositional critique of Open Theism.

Here you can find the paper (in English). It's called "Open Theism and the Problem of Evil." Hope that will prime your pump.
 
On my website (a German website), you can find an academic paper I have written which is essentially a presuppositional critique of Open Theism.

Here you can find the paper (in English). It's called "Open Theism and the Problem of Evil." Hope that will prime your pump.

Looks like you have some interesting papers besides just this one that one. Thanks for sharing :up:

CT
 
Hello Sebastian,

On my website (a German website), you can find an academic paper I have written which is essentially a presuppositional critique of Open Theism.

I quickly surveyed your paper. It looks very thorough. However, I did not get the sense that you approached Open Theism with a presuppositional argument. My understanding of the Van Tillian presuppositional argument is that it argues for the God of Christian Theism on the following basis:

1 It demonstrates how the Christian worldview can account for rational inquiry.
2 It demonstrates how the competing worldview (in this case Open Theism) fails to provide such an account.

Your argument did not seem to be in this form. Rather, I saw your argument as more of a traditional critique of Open Theism - perhaps a very good one. So, I would not say your paper is a presuppostional critique in the Van Tillian presuppositional apologetic tradition. Of course, this all may be nit-picking.

Sincerely,

Brian
 
Hello Sebastian,



I quickly surveyed your paper. It looks very thorough. However, I did not get the sense that you approached Open Theism with a presuppositional argument. My understanding of the Van Tillian presuppositional argument is that it argues for the God of Christian Theism on the following basis:

1 It demonstrates how the Christian worldview can account for rational inquiry.
2 It demonstrates how the competing worldview (in this case Open Theism) fails to provide such an account.

Your argument did not seem to be in this form. Rather, I saw your argument as more of a traditional critique of Open Theism - perhaps a very good one. So, I would not say your paper is a presuppostional critique in the Van Tillian presuppositional apologetic tradition. Of course, this all may be nit-picking.

Sincerely,

Brian

Brian,
you are right. My paper is not explicitly presuppositional. But presuppositional apologetics is not eaxctly a technical term. It basically means turning the non-Christian view in on it self (reductio ad absurdum) and demonstrating the validity of the Christian position - but not about the possibility of "rational enqriry" exclusively, but about anything at all! So, what I did in my paper is perform a reductio of the Open theism position, critiquing some of its presuppositons and then showing how the Reformed position (with its biblical presuppositions) does provide a valid answer to the problem of evil.

I realize I could have been more explicit in appropriating the transcendental argument, which is what the presuppositional method is. Someone else can and should do a better job, if he desires.
 
Hello Sebastian,

Thank you for the clarification. I do appreciate all the work and effort that went into your paper.

Sincerely,

Brian
 
On my website (a German website), you can find an academic paper I have written which is essentially a presuppositional critique of Open Theism.

Here you can find the paper (in English). It's called "Open Theism and the Problem of Evil." Hope that will prime your pump.

Excellent! I will give it a read and may come back with some questions, if that is alright.
 
John Frame wrote a critique of open theism several years ago, called "No Other God". I don't recall whether or not it was explicitly presuppositional, but it was a great book.
 
John Frame wrote a critique of open theism several years ago, called "No Other God". I don't recall whether or not it was explicitly presuppositional, but it was a great book.

It was great indeed! It used some reductio ad absurdum, etc., however, it wasn't anything explicitly presuppositional. In fact, nothing you will get from Frame will be explicitly presuppositional. Maybe I should rephrase that: of course, Frame would consider his apologetic to be presuppositional. Problem is, he has branded his own kind of presuppositionalism, in which the transcendental argument is not different in kind from any other form of argumentation, but only in degree. In fact, Frame thinks one can start his apologetic non-transcendentally and yet end up with a kind of "transcendental conclusion", whatever that might be.
If you read Frame's chapter(s) in "Five Views of Apologetics", Cowan (ed.), you will see how he agrees with most anything that the other approaches offer and gets busted by the other authors for not being consistent. He presents presuppositionalism at its worst there.

All of this to say that: don't expect a clear case for presuppositionalism or transcendentalism or a covenantal apologetic from Frame! Bahnsen's the man!
 
This is what Scott Oliphint, presuppositionalist-in-residence, WTS apologetics prof, wrote to me concerning the discussion on Open Theism and presuppopsitionalism:

Just FYI, I think there is sometimes a confusion or misunderstanding re: a transcendental approach. The questioner seems to want something in a response that is "formally" transcendental, rather than deeply Van Tilian. A Van Tilian response to O.T. would seek to show the necessity of revelation (in its fullest sense) for any true or biblical understanding of who God is. It is not relevant, in this kind of argument, to set forth some kind of formal "impossibility of the contrary" since the existence of God per se is not up for debate. There may be a less relevant response - i.e., that a God subject to chance destroys any possibility of predication - but the discussions are more sophisticated and complex than that.

I'm only responding here because the danger in Bahnsen's approach (in my opinion) is that it gives the indication that unless one goes for the "impossibility of the contrary" in every argument, one is not Van Tilian. That is false. Arguments against O.T. can more effectively take the form of, e.g., Machen's argument for the Virgin Birth.

For what it's worth, my discussions on metaphysics in Reasons for Faith, wherein I try to show that God's taking on covenantal properties without in any way compromising or changing who he essentially is (as he has done climactically in Christ) answers the O.T. concerns about taking passages of God's repentance (et al.) seriously, all the while maintaining the necessity of grounding everything in who God essentially is, i.e., the ontological Trinity.

This is all in the "for what it's worth" department.​
 
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