Presuppositionalism and Islam

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Brian Kooshian

Puritan Board Freshman
How would one go about using presuppositional methods (either Clarkian or VanTillian) to address Islam? TAG obviously isn't very useful with Muslims, since they already believe in a transcendent being that provides the basis for reason (at least the more informed ones would).

So what would a presuppositional approach to Islam look like?

Brian
 
Hello Brian,

I will expound on this a little later, but the apologist could use two approaches: show the internal incoherence of Islam in regards to its views of Jesus and the Bible, and use the problem of the one and the many to show how Islam is unable to account for intelligibility. I will expound on this latter point in another post.

Brian
 
In his response to the Muslim scholar, Dr. Bahnsen argued that the Koran claims to be the inscription of an eternal book in heaven, and yet later portions of the Koran "abrogate" earlier ones. He argued that the Bible - which Muslims say they accept - teaches that later revelations from God must conform with previous revelations. Moreover, the Koran claims to be continuous with the Bible and a confirmation of it. Yet there are clearly contradictions between the two books (for instance, regarding Christ's deity, His dying on the cross, etc.). Likewise, there are numerous conflicts between Biblical stories and the Koranic versions of them.

There are also embarrassing historical errors in the Koran (for instance, the mother of Jesus is called the sister of Aaron: "Mary" becomes "Miriam"). Further, there are contradictions right within the Koran itself (for instance, all of Noah's family is said to be saved through the flood, but one of Noah's sons is elsewhere said to have drowned in the flood).

Dr. Bahnsen argued that the Islamic doctrine of "tanzih" (or transcendence) - which says that no human language can positively describe Allah because he is allegedly "incomparable" (Surah 42:11) - would render it logically impossible for the Koran to be what it claims to be, a positive revelation and description of Allah.

The following text comes from the concluding section of Dr. Bahnsen's major presentation delivered during the first evening of dialogue:


The following is a link to a good Bahnsen summary.
 
Hello Brian,

Jacob pointed out the internal inconsistencies I referred to in my earlier post. Let me briefly explain the argument from the one and the many problem. You will see its immediate applicability to Islam. We observe reality both as a unity and a plurality. For instance, both Max and Lucy are dogs (unity); yet, they are two distinct dogs (plurality). For me to know Max, I at least have to have some conception of "dog-hood-ness" and at the same time know what makes Max different from all other dogs and objects for that matter. So, I should be able to grasp both what unifies Max with other dogs, and what distingushies Max from other dogs. The point being that knowledge requires unity and plurality.

The Greeks asked which of these two aspects of reality was ultimate. If plurality is ultimate, then reality consists at its ultimate base as a collection of things (a collection of things is even improper to speak of here) that are ultimately dissimilar (dualism +). Now, if unity is ultimate, then at the bottom we find one indivisible thing (monism). On either situation, nothing can be know because on the first hand, there is nothing that joins these dissimilar things, and on the second hand there is nothing to differentiate from the one.

Now, the Trinity provides and ontological basis to bring the two together. Neither unity not plurality is ulitmate over each other. Rather, they are two sides of the same coin - that coin being the ontological reality of the Christian God. Only on this type of conception where neither plurality or unity is ultimate can there be knowledge in principle. Since Islam does not provide such an ontological reality, then it is unable to account for this distinction that is a precondition for knowledge.

I would like to point out that any worldview that posits some ***inity (trinity, quadrinity, quintinity, etc...) would provide the same justification for this problem as the Trinity does. At least, I cannot think of a good reason why a god that is quadrinity fails to bring unity and plurality together.

Sincerely,

Brian
P.S. One thing that is interesting is that anything pressed hard enough and going back far enough like ethics, our universe, knowledge, etc...fails to be explained by simply nature. A supernatural ontological reality is necessary. But again, not any entity will do. This entity must be personal, must be able to bring the one and the many together, must be omni---, etc...When this point is made, only the Christian God fulfills all of these requirements. It is a good argument, but not necessarily an easy argument to make. To be a good presuppositionlist you must know your stuff cold. I disgaree with Bahnsen when he itimates that this is an easy apologetic. If you are unprepaired and come against an informed atheist (i.e., non-Christian whether thiest or not), you can find yourself in difficult waters.
 
Hello Brian,


P.S. One thing that is interesting is that anything pressed hard enough and going back far enough like ethics, our universe, knowledge, etc...fails to be explained by simply nature. A supernatural ontological reality is necessary. But again, not any entity will do. This entity must be personal, must be able to bring the one and the many together, must be omni---, etc...When this point is made, only the Christian God fulfills all of these requirements. It is a good argument, but not necessarily an easy argument to make. To be a good presuppositionlist you must know your stuff cold. I disgaree with Bahnsen when he itimates that this is an easy apologetic. If you are unprepaired and come against an informed atheist (i.e., non-Christian whether thiest or not), you can find yourself in difficult waters.

That is true, but...

It is tempting indeed for young Bahnsen warriors to parrot Bahnsen. Bahnsen could get away with it because he was awesome and just could, but most people don't have his mind. And if called on it by a clever secularist, they can flounder.

However, the same thing is generally true of any school of apologetics. I think most schools--and as a Van Tillian I was guilty of this--advertise a "kill-shot" apologetic. "Just do our method and your enemies will fall before you with relatively little training on your part." I think every school advertises that. And I think no school can deliver.

Transcendental argumentation is fun, but mind-dizzying. And Bahnsen warned about this. See his tapes on analyis of the Steind debate. It is one thing to lay waste to your opponent using the TAG, it is another thing to explain to him what that means.

Ok, I picked on myself in the above. I maintain the same thing is true of evidentialism/classicalism. Do you think Sophie the washwoman will understand the Kalaam Cosmological Argument (she might)? Do you think the man on the streets will be impressed by Bayes Theorem --> Christian Theism?

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I actually think that looks cool, but am trying to see how it works.
 
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Would showing the internal incoherence of Islam demonstrate the truthfulness of Christianity, though? And would the problem of the "one and the many" be practical in a more informal evangelistic setting? Most Muslims that I've run into don't even know their own religion that well, and very few are philosophically trained enough to even understand the OAM problem.

Also, other than the OAM problem, how would showing the internal incoherence of Islam differ from the approach of the evidentialist who would do much the same thing?

I consider myself a presuppositionalist (I borrow from both VanTil and Clark at points), but much of what I have read from presuppositionalists is aimed at atheism or humanism. I have not come across any in-depth critiques of Islam from a presuppositionalist perspective (if anyone knows of any, please direct me to them), and so I am grateful to find a forum where those who are far better studied than I am, can help me work through these things.

Brian
 
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Would showing the internal incoherence of Islam demonstrate the truthfulness of Christianity, though?

To the militant Van Tillian, yes. To the non-militant van tillian, no. But on the other hand, you just reduced his worldview to incoherency. He doesn't have any ground to stand on to voice complaints to you.

And would the problem of the "one and the many" be practical in a more informal evangelistic setting? Most Muslims that I've run into don't even know their own religion that well, and very few are philosophically trained enough to even understand the OAM problem.

Try to make it practical. Tell the muslim that his god by definition cannot love. He is a monad. There is no one for him to love. That's why most muslim countries function on power, not love.

Also, other than the OAM problem, how would showing the internal incoherence of Islam differ from the approach of the evidentialist who would do much the same thing?

Sometimes and evidentialist acts like a presup. ;)

I consider myself a presuppositionalist (I borrow from both VanTil and Clark at points), but much of what I have read from presuppositionalists is aimed at atheism or humanism. I have not come across any in-depth critiques of Islam from a presuppositionalist perspective (if anyone knows of any, please direct me to them), and so I am grateful to find a forum where those who are far better studied than I am, can help me work through these things.

I don't know. I thought the Bahnsen critique did a good job.
 
I consider myself a presuppositionalist (I borrow from both VanTil and Clark at points), but much of what I have read from presuppositionalists is aimed at atheism or humanism. I have not come across any in-depth critiques of Islam from a presuppositionalist perspective (if anyone knows of any, please direct me to them), and so I am grateful to find a forum where those who are far better studied than I am, can help me work through these things.

Brian

True, most is aimed at humanism (that is what we see the most out there) but it works equally well against Islam. Here is a link by Paul Manata. You can read it in less than 20 minutes, I think. It answered all of my questions.
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2006/09/islam-muslim-message-menace-and.html
 
Hello Brian and Jacob,

You both made the great point that we must understand our audience, and we must understand what we are trying to accomplish. In an informal setting I may not use a presuppositional approach. In fact, at times depending on the setting I may only preach the gospel at a level the recipient can understand. The gospel is the power to save, and not some rational argument. When someone asks me why I am a Christian, I typically tell them that God sovereignly caused me to become one. This usually gets the ball rolling. My recommnedation is to read Van Til's Why I Believe in God. This is a very good illustration of the presuppositional apologetic in an informal setting. Very helpful.

Brian
 
Hello Brian and Jacob,

You both made the great point that we must understand our audience, and we must understand what we are trying to accomplish. In an informal setting I may not use a presuppositional approach. In fact, at times depending on the setting I may only preach the gospel at a level the recipient can understand. The gospel is the power to save, and not some rational argument. When someone asks me why I am a Christian, I typically tell them that God sovereignly caused me to become one. This usually gets the ball rolling. My recommnedation is to read Van Til's Why I Believe in God. This is a very good illustration of the presuppositional apologetic in an informal setting. Very helpful.

Brian
Agreed.
Frame told me just to ask questions. If they are of the mindset "does the bible really teach the resurrection, is there any evidence for it?" then I have no problem "marshalling" evidence. And I don't think I would be compromising my presuppositonalism at that point.
 
trevorjohnson said:
For what purpose are you seeking apologetical answers to Islam?

My wife and I were short-term missionaries in Jordan for 15 months a number of years ago. Due to Providential changes in our situation (and our theology) we have not returned to the Middle East, but someday perhaps the Lord will open the right doors for us to return. In the meantime, we still have desire to see Muslims saved.

For a while, now, I have been pondering the place of apologetics in reaching Muslims with the gospel. Since there are many objections that the average Muslim might (and usually does) raise, I have been thinking about how to address these objections, but from a distinctly presuppositional approach.

For me, the question has always come back to the reality that presuppositionalists use evidences, and evidentialists both work from and address presuppositions. So is there any real practical difference between the various approaches, when it comes to answering the objections of the average Muslim?

If so, then how are they different? If not, then why not (as presuppositionalists) use any and all helpful evidences that we come across? Why not use Jay Smith or Norman Geisler, or even Josh McDowell?

Brian
 
Three questions . . .

Okay, so I listened to Frame's lectures on apologetics. Towards the end, where he was dealing with Islam, he said that since Islam is a monotheistic religion, and Muslims would essentially agree with God's existence being the foundation of all predication, transcendental arguments are not of much use.

With the exception of the argument from "the one and the many" (which most Muslims wouldn't even understand), it seems that Frame believes we have to use other kinds of evidence and arguments in dealing with Islam, rather than strictly transcendental ones.

So three questions:

1. Is Frame right?

2. Is showing where Islam is self-contradictory a specifically presuppositionalist thing? Or is it what any apologist (even an evidentialist or classicist) would do?

3. Is the way in which a presuppositionalist would make use of evidences and arguments when dealing with Muslims different from the way that the evidentialist or classical apologist would use them?
 
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