Presuppositionalism Q&A

[Confessor]

The transcendental argument (which is, In my humble opinion, the ontological argument used in reverse) cannot hope to prove God's existence for one reason: no human can critique every worldview under the sun.

Yes, this is a common objection. As long as the presuppositional apologist can deconstruct whatever worldview the unbeliever has, the unbeliever will be forced to accept Christianity or accept another worldview. If he accepts another worldview, the apologist can tear that down as well. Obviously not every possible worldview can be disproved, but that doesn't really matter anyway -- the apologist's job is to simply leave the unbeliever without a choice. (The unbeliever doesn't have the option of "waiting out" for a worldview in the future to make sense, as he would have to "wait out" on an intelligible presupposition.)

How does an unbeliever know that you're not lying. The trouble here is that what is self-evident for one person is not self-evident to another.

First, it's fairly obvious when someone is trying to posit a childish objection to presuppositionalism by saying, "Well, what if I presuppose Santa Clause? har har"

And second, I never said the conversation ended at self-evidence. Once the two sides have their presuppositions established, transcendental warfare begins. If someone sincerely takes Qur'anic authority as his presupposition (or for all intents and purposes appears to sincerely take it), then you explode that presupposition.

Therefore I will only employ the terms actual and espoused common ground

These are just as confusing. Descartes espoused the laws of logic, mathematics, and the necessary existence of God, yet Descartes was not (I think) a Christian. Here's common ground aplenty, and all espoused.

Not at all. At the beginning of his philosophy he did not assume Biblical doctrines. He assumed autonomy. At the outset his entire worldview was tinted in an anti-Christian flavor. Sure, he may have claimed to reach the conclusion that God necessarily exists, but unless he's referring to the God of the Bible, he will still have provided a completely different lens.

Here Elijah is saying, "look at the evidence and see who is really God here. Choose whichever God can back it up." He's calling the prophets of Baal on their bluff, challenging them to actually back up their claims. He's proving God empirically, in a sense.

Noticed you said, "in a sense" -- I would presume it's because the God of the Bible cannot be proven empirically. The only reason fire from heaven would cause people to turn to God is because they realize that is intelligible only on Biblical presuppositions, not because they can actually reason from fire==>Biblical authority. It's not logically possible.

A presupposition is, to my mind, any sort of unprovable or tautologous preconceived notion. Materialism is a presupposition. The laws of logic are presuppositions. Every language is a whole set of presuppositions. Supernaturalism is a presupposition.

Yes, the word "presupposition" can mean more than just the way that presuppositionalists are employing it when it comes to apologetics. But when we use we are denoting the choice between autonomy and theonomy.

Okay, but since neither of us can call down fire from heaven, we might have a better model for our approach in Acts 17, where Paul’s approach is presuppositional.

Quoting pagan poets and using pagan practices to make his point? You call that presuppositional?

Paul was not a pagan.

-----Added 6/15/2009 at 10:32:28 EST-----

They don't believe they are made in the image of God with the full Biblical ramifications of it

Here is the problem -- who does? Must one have all-knowledge in order to know anything truly? Surely not. If the unbeliever is inexcusable it is because of what he knows but suppresses; if he is credited with knowing then he obviously possesses the epistemic equipment necessary to know. It is that point of irrepressible rationality which forms the common ground on which apologetics is carried out. If one denies that common ground then there can be no apologetics -- rational defence of Christianity.

I did not imply an exhaustive knowledge and a fully, 100% correct Biblical worldview when I spoke of placing the imago Dei within the confines of a Biblical worldview. The contrast I was trying to note was that unbelievers might claim to believe they are made in the image of God, but they mean something different from the Christian conception.

And lastly, I am not denying common ground. I am denying an espoused common ground but not an actual common ground. Atheists deny the imago Dei in principle but are actually made in God's image; therefore, because of the actual common ground, apologetics can take place.

 

[MW]

Atheists deny the imago Dei in principle but are actually made in God's image; therefore, because of the actual common ground, apologetics can take place.

Then the thesis submitted in a previous thread requires amendment.

 

[Craig]

Part of the reason that I don't like presuppositionalism as a method for proving Christianity is because, ultimately, it cannot. The transcendental argument (which is, In my humble opinion, the ontological argument used in reverse) cannot hope to prove God's existence for one reason: no human can critique every worldview under the sun. It's like trying to prove that there's no gold in China: success takes nearly forever. I would submit that only God Himself is capable of validating the TAG and when God enters the room, there is no more need of any other argument.

I'm not 100% sold on TAG as irrefutable proof...but I don't think you're really understanding it. TAG does not rest in destroying other worldviews...though it does that quite well. It does demonstrate that the "common ground" enjoyed by belivers, and unbelievers alike, comports with the Christian worldview, and conversely, cannot be supported by an unbelieving worldview. There's no need to disprove all other views.

A presupposition is, to my mind, any sort of unprovable or tautologous preconceived notion. Materialism is a presupposition. The laws of logic are presuppositions. Every language is a whole set of presuppositions. Supernaturalism is a presupposition.

There are many kinds of presuppositions, but when Presuppers talk about Christian presuppositions, he doesn't mean "unproveable notions". Language is not itself a set of presuppositions as language is used to convey propositions.

When I talk of Richard Dawkins sharing presuppositions with myself, what I mean is that both of us are speaking the same language and both of us interpret reality similarly enough to allow communication. In other words, a presupposition is any proposition that is a) assumed (or proved tautologously) rather than proved b) acted upon, either intellectually or practically. That is, to think is to presuppose. To speak is to presuppose. To act is to presuppose.

I don't believe presuppers would limit a presupposition to conscious intellectual thought. Dawkins, for example, touts materialism then acts as if logic and morality exist even though his very worldview denies their existence...and even consciously he downplays morality by reducing it to a result of memetics, yet castigates religion for the "evil" it wreaks.

I would argue not necessarily. Arminians and Calvinists both presuppose the truth of the Bible and yet they derive quite different concepts from it. Your presuppositions do not determine the outcome any more than the battleground determines the course of the battle. There are too many other factors at play (individual temperaments and emphases, cultural background, upbringing, etc).

Even though Arminians and Calvinists may agree that the Bible is inerrant, that is not necessarily a controlling presupposition. It may be a peripheral presupposition submitting to something else.

 

[Confessor]

Atheists deny the imago Dei in principle but are actually made in God's image; therefore, because of the actual common ground, apologetics can take place.

Then the thesis submitted in a previous thread requires amendment.

In that thread I explicitly stated that no common ground existed "in principle," not in actuality.

 

[MW]

In that thread I explicitly stated that no common ground existed "in principle," not in actuality.

But you have set forth a "principle" in which common ground exists -- the imago Dei. A better distinction would be subjective and objective. The subject knowing may not actively recognise that his rationality depends on the imago Dei, but it remains an objective criterion for rationality which govers all discussion.

 

[Confessor]

In that thread I explicitly stated that no common ground existed "in principle," not in actuality.

But you have set forth a "principle" in which common ground exists -- the imago Dei. A better distinction would be subjective and objective. The subject knowing may not actively recognise that his rationality depends on the imago Dei, but it remains an objective criterion for rationality which govers all discussion.

Rev. Winzer, my distinction would be unclear only if you equivocate on "principle" as you have here. When I say "in principle" I am referring to (the lack of) espoused common ground, not actual common ground, and of course the imago Dei is the latter.

 

[MW]

Rev. Winzer, my distinction would be unclear only if you equivocate on "principle" as you have here. When I say "in principle" I am referring to (the lack of) espoused common ground, not actual common ground, and of course the imago Dei is the latter.

I think you are using "principle" in an unusual way, but it is your thesis, and if you desire to use words in an unusual way that is your prerogative, but don't be surprised if people misunderstand you.

 

[cih1355]

If the unbeliever were to ask, "How do you know that the Koran or some other book other than the Bible is not inspired by God?", how would you answer?

In the very first place, it lacks all the indicia divinitatis (marks of divinity) that the Bible has. But seeing as this is a type of knowledge that cannot be shown discursively, since it is necessarily non-inferential, the presuppositionalist would show inconsistencies within the Islamic worldview, or whatever worldview results from the book they ask about.

What are the marks of divinity and do they authenticate the Bible?

 

[Confessor]

What are the marks of divinity and do they authenticate the Bible?

If you read the Bible and ever just "know" that it's God's Word, then you have recognized some marks of divinity.

There has to be some sense in which the Bible is non-inferentially known by everyone (believers and unbelievers); otherwise, unbelievers could not be held responsible for denying the voice of their Creator, nor could the Early Church have actually recognized the canonical books.

 

[Philip]

Again, my trouble here is that presuppositionalism seems to be taking the longest route possible to come to the conclusion that Christianity is true. Whereas, if one can only prove Christianity to be true, then all other worldviews are proved false by default.

the apologist's job is to simply leave the unbeliever without a choice.

Then he will fail. There's always a choice. For one, he might find fault with your reasoning.

First, it's fairly obvious when someone is trying to posit a childish objection to presuppositionalism by saying, "Well, what if I presuppose Santa Clause?

The objection isn't so childish, actually. What if a person does presuppose Santa Clause? It sounds ridiculous, but it's actually valid.

If someone sincerely takes Qur'anic authority as his presupposition (or for all intents and purposes appears to sincerely take it), then you explode that presupposition.

You can't do that unless there is common ground: ie, you must both agree to certain terms of the debate. You can't defeat an enemy if he's on another battleground (assuming medieval warfare here). What you're really battling over is, which one adequately explains the truth that both of us acknowledge.

The only reason fire from heaven would cause people to turn to God is because they realize that is intelligible only on Biblical presuppositions, not because they can actually reason from fire==>Biblical authority. It's not logically possible.

Well, seeing as there (probably) wasn't a Torah in the house, I have to agree that they couldn't reason to biblical authority.

However, what Elijah is doing here is calling the prophets of Baal on their bluff, so as to point out to the observers, "Look, Baal can't deliver the goods here. Either he's weak or he doesn't exist. Now I'll show you what Jahveh can do." Elijah is actually playing off of common cultural presuppositions here.

Yes, the word "presupposition" can mean more than just the way that presuppositionalists are employing it when it comes to apologetics. But when we use we are denoting the choice between autonomy and theonomy.

And when I am using it, I refer to any sort of preconceived notion. Autonomy and theonomy are not actually presuppositions in this sense because they are ways of thinking, not starting points for thought.

Paul was not a pagan.

No, but he quoted pagan poets to prove Christianity true (you notice that he doesn't directly attack paganism--his apologetic is completely positive).

And lastly, I am not denying common ground. I am denying an espoused common ground but not an actual common ground.

And I say that they do espouse common ground. I have given several examples (Descartes, Dawkins, etc) which you have done logical somersaults to get around. Basically, what you are denying is that we speak the same language. It is my contention that we do both espouse some of the same things:

I went out and got coffee yesterday at lunch. My coworkers are not Christians, but they will agree that I did. We have differing metaphysical views to account for that coffee, but we both acknowledge that it's there (unless one of them is a Cartesian/Gordon Clark).

There has to be some sense in which the Bible is non-inferentially known by everyone

I am going to make a statement here that some will deem heretical: the Bible is not inherently true. The Bible itself rests on God's authority. Unless one acknowledges God's authority, there is no rational reason to accept the truth of the Bible. Fallen humanity is not held responsible for not accepting the Bible, but for rebellion against the creator.

It does demonstrate that the "common ground" enjoyed by belivers, and unbelievers alike, comports with the Christian worldview, and conversely, cannot be supported by an unbelieving worldview. There's no need to disprove all other views.

Hmm, that's what I was about to say about Classical Apologetics.

Language is not itself a set of presuppositions as language is used to convey propositions.

Actually it is, because language shapes thinking. I friends who are multilingual who will acknowledge that their thinking changes when they are thinking in another language.

I don't believe presuppers would limit a presupposition to conscious intellectual thought. Dawkins, for example, touts materialism then acts as if logic and morality exist even though his very worldview denies their existence

That's because he is also presupposing logic and morality (logic is necessarily true, regardless--morality, though, is a problem, I agree). They are both part and parcel of his set of presuppositions.

I would like to ask at this point that all terms used be taken at face value. That is, presuppositions include all presuppositions, not just autonomy and theonomy. If we can't speak in plain language to one another, then we certainly can't speak in plain language to an unbeliever.

 

[Confessor]

Again, my trouble here is that presuppositionalism seems to be taking the longest route possible to come to the conclusion that Christianity is true. Whereas, if one can only prove Christianity to be true, then all other worldviews are proved false by default.

This is not a matter of preference over shorter or longer paths, but whether we are using a Biblical form of apologetics. If the Bible is to be taken on its own authority -- as Christianity has historically understood -- then any apologetic which denies that in practice must be rejected. If classical apologetics adopts autonomy at the outset, then it cannot possibly prove that the Bible should be taken on its own authority.

Also, since the Bible is to be taken on its own authority, it follows that Biblical authority cannot be established upon some other basis; therefore it is the case that one cannot "only prove Christianity to be true." It can't happen.

Then he will fail. There's always a choice. For one, he might find fault with your reasoning.

Not always a rational choice. He cannot legitimately find fault with my reasoning if it is good reasoning.

The objection isn't so childish, actually. What if a person does presuppose Santa Clause? It sounds ridiculous, but it's actually valid.

Did you happen to see my response to it immediately after I pointed out that it's childish? Really, Philip, I'm getting the impression that you're trying to defeat "those silly presuppositionalists" rather than actually understand the system.

You can't do that unless there is common ground: ie, you must both agree to certain terms of the debate. You can't defeat an enemy if he's on another battleground (assuming medieval warfare here). What you're really battling over is, which one adequately explains the truth that both of us acknowledge.

There is where you show the opponent's inconsistency, namely how the actual common ground you have does not align with his consistently espoused worldview. You draw out the implications of his worldview and show that it cannot be reconciled with the ineradicable actual common ground that exists.

Well, seeing as there (probably) wasn't a Torah in the house, I have to agree that they couldn't reason to biblical authority.

However, what Elijah is doing here is calling the prophets of Baal on their bluff, so as to point out to the observers, "Look, Baal can't deliver the goods here. Either he's weak or he doesn't exist. Now I'll show you what Jahveh can do." Elijah is actually playing off of common cultural presuppositions here.

I knew you were going to get worked up over the word "Biblical." Do you really not know what I was referring to? Those people, after seeing the fire, would be drawn to change their allegiance from Baal to Jehovah -- but not because the fire somehow "proved" Jehovah's authority, but rather because Baal's authority was inconsistent with the clearly perceived event whereas Jehovah's was not.

I'm telling you, this is not a problem at all for presuppositionalism. Are you familiar at all with "immutable facts," or have I not mentioned those to you?

And when I am using it, I refer to any sort of preconceived notion. Autonomy and theonomy are not actually presuppositions in this sense because they are ways of thinking, not starting points for thought.

Well, when you're asking a presuppositionalist questions about his own system, I think it would be best to allow him to define what he means rather than assume that I cannot use a word because you choose to use it differently in your non-presuppositional apologetic.

And autonomy and theonomy in the sense I am using them are preconceived notions about how to think -- the former is the notion that man has the prerogative to self-consciously construct a worldview, and the latter is the notion that God alone has that prerogative and we are to submit to it. These are the very bases of a worldview; if you wanted to restrict the definition of "presupposition" at all, you would only remove other notions, leaving autonomy and theonomy to remain.

No, but he quoted pagan poets to prove Christianity true (you notice that he doesn't directly attack paganism--his apologetic is completely positive).

Notice that he assumes God's existence. He doesn't prove it from anything.

And I say that they do espouse common ground. I have given several examples (Descartes, Dawkins, etc) which you have done logical somersaults to get around. Basically, what you are denying is that we speak the same language. It is my contention that we do both espouse some of the same things:

I went out and got coffee yesterday at lunch. My coworkers are not Christians, but they will agree that I did. We have differing metaphysical views to account for that coffee, but we both acknowledge that it's there (unless one of them is a Cartesian/Gordon Clark).

The perceived common ground would be superficial and coincidental. An atheist might say he knows he drank a cup of coffee with you, but he would do that only because he believes his memory is reliable as a "thing-in-itself," rather than because the faithful God of the Bible created his memory faculties. At root, his entire worldview is different and in rebellion towards God, and (importantly to the apologist) his more basic views do not support the other views -- e.g. his "root" atheistic views contradict his belief in a reliable memory faculty. In other words, the only reason that you can converse with atheists is because they are borrowing Christian concepts. It is not because of, but despite their atheism, that they can converse with you. This is an act of kindness on God's part to restrain them from consistent rebellion.

This is not doing logical somersaults. This is retaining the historic doctrine of Total Depravity rather than positing the Romanist nature/grace distinction. When you say that men can be right about natural things and simply need to have their knowledge supplemented by "divine" knowledge, you are adhering to a Romanist view of unbelievers.

I am going to make a statement here that some will deem heretical: the Bible is not inherently true. The Bible itself rests on God's authority. Unless one acknowledges God's authority, there is no rational reason to accept the truth of the Bible. Fallen humanity is not held responsible for not accepting the Bible, but for rebellion against the creator.

First, it's hard to make a distinction between God and the Bible, seeing as we know God only as He reveals Himself. (And then you'd be in dire straits to say that "God=knowledge from natural revelation" while the Bible is simply an historical document with some words in it.)

Second, there's no way to hold your view if you at all believe that men are punished for not accepting the Gospel.

Third, you are absolutely right when you say, "Unless one acknowledges God's authority, there is no rational reason to accept the truth of the Bible." Keep that in mind.

 

[chbrooking]

Philip,
You might be interested in Van Til's Paul at Athens, or My Credo, which is published in Jerusalem and Athens, and may be found here: Reformed Apologetics

In the latter he says,

In his address on the Areopagus Paul proclaims the name of the resurrected Christ to the Gentile covenant-breakers, would- be fugitives from divine judgment. Paul does not place himself on their level in order with them to investigate the nature of being and knowledge in general, to discover whether the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob might possibly exist. He tells them straight out that what they claim not to know, he knows. He tells them that their so-called ignorance is culpable, for God is as near to them as their own selves. He tells them, therefore, to repent of their worship of idols, to turn to the living God, lest they stand without the robes of righteousness before the resurrected Lord Christ on the day of judgment.

You may also be interested in
PA045-- Ó Covenant Media Foundation – 1-800/553-3938
or
Paul'S PURPOSE AT ATHENS AND THE PROBLEM OF COMMON GROUND
or even
The Areopagus Address

It would be good to understand what your opponents maintain before arguing against them. And on that note, I can appreciate your frustration with the indirect approach of presuppositional apologetics. It is true that our approach requires more of us than yours. The CA method only requires understanding or memorizing a handful of arguments. The PA method requires listening carefully to recognize where your opponent grounds his position in order to find the discrepancy between what he claims is the case and what he knows to be true. But, as we have been trying to maintain, CA overlooks the real gulf between us, permitting -- even condoning -- his sinful autonomous thought. The PA method, on the other hand, calls the unbeliever to wholesale repentance.

 

[steven-nemes]

What is your response to the "Father, Son, Spirit, and Dog" objection?

 

[Confessor]

What is your response to the "Father, Son, Spirit, and Dog" objection?

I addressed an objection having the same structure in a separate thread. This quote is regarding someone who wants to presuppose a Santa Clause worldview:

Third, even if Santa Clause were formulated somehow to be a presupposition -- e.g. a presuppositional Santanian wrote out a "Book of Santa" and claimed that the deity known as Santa Clause had the prerogative to interpret reality -- it would be a presupposition only if the followers were sincere. For if no one would actually hold to such a worldview, then the foundational tenet (presupposition) of that worldview is worthless from the start. To invoke a worldview that no one would ever hold and pretend you are arguing presuppositionaly is a category error.

For whatever reason, presuppositionalist TAGsters such as Michael Butler have not picked up on the fact that a presupposition must be sincerely held (or more accurately, sincerely hold-able) for it to be a presupposition in the first place.

If you want to see your exact objection answered, imagine that the Santanian worldview has a "quadrune" God in it.

 

[steven-nemes]

Thank you for the reply, and I have just a small quibble to make. It seems as if you are missing the point of the objection. If there is another worldview X that can account for the essential phenomena of reality and make human experience meaningful, then Christianity is not necessarily true.

 

[chbrooking]

What is your response to the "Father, Son, Spirit, and Dog" objection?

I'm not familiar with the objection, but I can take a guess at what it is.

My objection is the same as those who would posit a great big bubble-gum machine God in the sky. You know, a beneficent grand-daddy figure who has no requirements or expectations. One who just loves everybody (without loving himself, by the way). One for whom the very notion of hell would be anathema ...

For starters, my response is: On what basis do you posit such a being? If you are just making it up, then it's radically subjective, and so has no applicability to the objective world. This position misses the whole point. The question of epistemology is, "How do we know?" I'm claiming that we can only know if we accept what God has said about the nature of things and how we can know. To add in the dog is to begin with a scriptural presentation and then add to it. But if we have the scriptural presentation, adding to it is impossible. And if we don't have the scriptural presentation, we're right back where we started -- in skepticism.

 

[Confessor]

Thank you for the reply, and I have just a small quibble to make. It seems as if you are missing the point of the objection. If there is another worldview X that can account for the essential phenomena of reality and make human experience meaningful, then Christianity is not necessarily true.

My point is that if there is no actual presupposition which allows for that, then there actually is no such worldview. The quadrune god did not reveal himself.

 

[steven-nemes]

It still seems to me irrelevant if anyone holds to it or no. It seems to me that so long as another worldview besides Christianity can account for human experience, then Christianity is not necessarily true--the main purpose of presuppositional argument being to prove this.

 

[Confessor]

It still seems to me irrelevant if anyone holds to it or no. It seems to me that so long as another worldview besides Christianity can account for human experience, then Christianity is not necessarily true--the main purpose of presuppositional argument being to prove this.

Okay, in order for a worldview for to be a worldview, it has to have a presupposition. Usually this involves an autonomous presupposition, but as with Christianity, it can involve submission to a particular revelation. That is, a presupposition is not merely some hypothetical proposal, it is an actual core commitment to a particular view of the world.

Therefore, if something is not "commit-able," then it follows that it's not a presupposition, and if something is not a presupposition, then it doesn't yield a worldview at all, and if it doesn't yield a worldview, then it doesn't account for human experience. The quadrune worldview is not possible until its presupposition is commit-able. There's no other definition of presupposition. We're talking about this actual world that we're in; therefore we will not deal with things that are not presuppositions for this actual world.

 

[steven-nemes]

Let's say someone writes a book detailing an entire epistemology, metaphysic, etc., and this system accounts for human experience and phenomena common to everyone everywhere. Now, let's say that the final lines of this book (no doubt a long and tiresome one to read) are along the lines of, "The presupposition of this here system I have so carefully and critically designed, that thing which is assumed to be true and is the guide of interpretation under this system, is this book here which you the reader have in your hands." Now in that case it is an actual worldview with a presupposition that can make human experience meaningful and so on--and no doubt this seems possible. If that is the case, then Christianity is not necessarily true.

 

[Confessor]

Let's say someone writes a book detailing an entire epistemology, metaphysic, etc., and this system accounts for human experience and phenomena common to everyone everywhere. Now, let's say that the final lines of this book (no doubt a long and tiresome one to read) are along the lines of, "The presupposition of this here system I have so carefully and critically designed, that thing which is assumed to be true and is the guide of interpretation under this system, is this book here which you the reader have in your hands." Now in that case it is an actual worldview with a presupposition that can make human experience meaningful and so on--and no doubt this seems possible. If that is the case, then Christianity is not necessarily true.

Well, here's the thing. If that book is atheistic or otherwise immanentistic, i.e. if that book is autonomous and assumes that man has the prerogative to interpret reality, then it falls under the same criticisms as the rest of autonomous thought. (Speaking of which, the scenario you outline is not that weird; if one were to conjoin all the writings of one philosophical school of thought he'd have basically one book.)

If the book is more explicitly religious and attempts to posit that a universal mind, a deity, has given that interpretation of reality authoritatively, i.e. if the book is a purported divine revelation, then the sincerity issue arises again.

Still, you might claim that such a book (a philosophically rigorous divine revelation) is conceivable and therefore possible; and Christianity is therefore not absolutely necessary. In that case, though, we would have to make distinctions involving how each worldview views necessity, etc., and I'm not sure I'm ready to dive into that right now. In other words we'd have to ask if "necessity" can be viewed in an abstract way apart from Christian presuppositions.

 

[steven-nemes]

Well when I say that Christianity is necessarily true, I mean it is true in every possible world; the denial of it leads to absurdity. That's what I mean. If the denial of it does not lead to absurdity--as in the case I have described in that paragraph--then it is possibly not true in a possible world, potentially this one, and so is not necessarily true.

 

[Brian Bosse]

Hello Gentlemen,

I believe steven-nemes is making a very good observation concerning the strong modal claim of presuppositionalism. The strong modal claim is simply the claim that the Christian worldview is necessary for human intelligibility - or something along these lines. The claim to neccessity is a very strong claim indeed. It really is the conjunction of two claims...

(1) The Chrisitian worldview is a sufficient condition for intelligibility.
(2) There is no other worldview sufficient for intelligibility.

In order for the Christian worldview to be necessary for intelligibility, then both (1) and (2) must be true. I accept both (1) and (2) as true, and ultimately the basis for my acceptance is faith. On the other hand, there are those presuppositionalists who hold to the strong modal claim that believe they have a certain proof of this. Their obligation is to demonstrate (1) and (2) in a certain manner. In practice, they are undable to demonstrate either (1) or (2) in a certain manner. I argue for this here...

Van Tillian Presuppositional Apologetics – A Critique Concerning Certainty

With that said, I believe the argument is a strong argument if you drop the strong modal claim to certainty. One last point regarding this is that I am unable to put forth an argument that would disqualify a worldview that in all things is essentially the same wordview as the Christian worldview, but rather than a trinity there is a quadrinity. In fact, as to what the Christian worldview entails, we are limited to God's revelation and our epistemic inabilities to understand this revelation. Because of these limits (the scope of revelation and our epistemic challenges) strong modal claims to certainty feel arrogant to me.

Sincerely,

Brian

 

[Peairtach]

Dear Ben,

Is evidential apologetics easier for the average person to understand and so more useful in many cases? Given that the Holy Spirit uses imperfect arguments, sermons and evangelism, surely it's important in a good argument that the individual you are talking to understands it.

What is your view of the use of evidences alongside presuppositional arguments?

What about arguments that compare Scripture with Scripture e.g. unfulfilled prophecy with fulfilled prophecy? They are appealing to nothing higher than Scripture. I suppose they'd have to be backed up by a presuppositional argument if they were rejected, to show the individual that human reason can't sit in judgment on God's Word.

Is there a hierarchy of evidentialist arguments from more sound to less sound, depending on how close they stay to Scripture?

-----Added 6/20/2009 at 03:47:00 EST-----

Quote from Brian
One last point regarding this is that I am unable to put forth an argument that would disqualify a worldview that in all things is essentially the same wordview as the Christian worldview, but rather than a trinity there is a quadrinity

But is there any even moderately plausible revelation/religion out there that advocates this?

The Vestigia Trinitatis may be of use here; I'm not philosophically sophisticated enough to know. See no.2 on this John Frame page:-

Trinitarian Analogies

 

[steven-nemes]

The question of whether or not there is some quadrinarian worldview out there is irrelevant; the possibility of there being such a worldview makes the claim to Christianity's necessity false.

 

[Brian Bosse]

Hello Richard,

But is there any even moderately plausible revelation/religion out there that advocates this?

No. However, this is not a legitimate argument for someone who holds to a strong modal version of TAG. As Steven implied, in Possible World Theory (modal logic) the claim of necessity goes beyond the actual state of affairs. It is a claim encompassing all possible states of affairs. So, the elimination of the actual state of affairs where there is no quadrinity worldview says nothing about the remaining possible worlds where there may be one with a quadrinity. Our actual world is one of a large number of possible worlds. The TAG proponent must be able to say a quadrinity cannot exist in any possible world to establish the claim that a quadrinity is impossible. If he cannot eliminate all of these possibilities, then he has no logical (epistemic) right to claim to have provided the proof for the necessity of Christianity.

Brian

 

[Confessor]

Well when I say that Christianity is necessarily true, I mean it is true in every possible world; the denial of it leads to absurdity. That's what I mean. If the denial of it does not lead to absurdity--as in the case I have described in that paragraph--then it is possibly not true in a possible world, potentially this one, and so is not necessarily true.

Now, we're addressing a different topic than what you originally brought up, or at least that's what it appears. You first were asking about the legitimacy of a "quadrune god" presupposition, and now you're asking about necessity.

We cannot have conceptions of "possibility" or "necessity" apart from a presupposed worldview. We cannot talk about them autonomously without having to deal with all the contradictions of autonomous thoughts. We have to be standing on firm ground in order to discuss possibility in the first place. And therefore if someone asks about the possibility of an epistemologically cogent worldview (e.g. some purported divine revelation that does this), they would have to ask the question, "Possible by what standard?" Considering that's it certainly not possible on Christian standards ("I am the LORD, and there is no other; apart from me there is no God" (Isa. 45:5)), and that no other presupposition can be made to ask the question; it truly follows that Christianity is necessarily true. Christianity must be true for someone to ask if it can possibly be false; therefore it is a necessary truth.

In other words, the question about possible legitimate presuppositions is only permitted if a metaphysics of ultimate Chance is posited, and that can only be posited if man is granted autonomy. Therefore the objection, in presuming autonomy, begs the question.

 

[chbrooking]

The question of whether or not there is some quadrinarian worldview out there is irrelevant; the possibility of there being such a worldview makes the claim to Christianity's necessity false.

Not so fast. The Christian worldview provides the requisite preconditions. But a quadrinian worldview cannot be said to do so without examination. Do you think that you can add a fourth member of the godhead without radically changing other doctrines? As soon as you disrupt the system, you have no guarantee of meeting those preconditions. Since we are relying on a revealed system, which can be shown to work, any such hypothetical system that you want to suggest will have to be shown to meet those preconditions. We can't just assume that it does, as that's the matter under examination. Why bother trying to just change a point of Christian theism. Why not just say, "I posit the possibility of a worldview that does meet the requisite preconditions"? After all, that's essentially what you are doing when you suggest a quadrinian worldview. It's a worldview that doesn't exist unless spelled out. And I assure you that you will not be able to spell out a quadrinian worldview that is the same as a trinitarian one. So, since the trinitarian worldview works, and autonomous thought does not meet the preconditions of intelligibility, and since a quadrinian worldview is a figment -- unless spelled out and examined, I don't see the objection's merit.

 

[Peairtach]

It would mean that this hypothetical Quadrinity wasn't communicating with us by special revelation; whereas a Trinity is, by the self-attesting revelation of the Bible.

The choice is clear. If someone chooses a hypothetical Quadrinity over the One but Plural Trinity of the Bible Who is communicating to us by special revelation as well as general revelation - even though you are saying that the specific number of persons in the Godhead is not revealed in general revelation - they are rejecting a sound argument.

Besides we have the Vestigia Trinitatis. Maybe now we know from the salvific Bible that God is Triunity we can start to see how the Three-in-One and One-in-Three is after all revealed in the general revelation? Do the Quadrinians have anything like that?

 

[steven-nemes]

Now, we're addressing a different topic than what you originally brought up, or at least that's what it appears. You first were asking about the legitimacy of a "quadrune god" presupposition, and now you're asking about necessity.

My understanding of the Quadrinity Objection is that it argues against the claim to the necessity of Christianity.

We cannot have conceptions of "possibility" or "necessity" apart from a presupposed worldview. We cannot talk about them autonomously without having to deal with all the contradictions of autonomous thoughts. We have to be standing on firm ground in order to discuss possibility in the first place. And therefore if someone asks about the possibility of an epistemologically cogent worldview (e.g. some purported divine revelation that does this), they would have to ask the question, "Possible by what standard?" Considering that's it certainly not possible on Christian standards ("I am the LORD, and there is no other; apart from me there is no God" (Isa. 45:5)), and that no other presupposition can be made to ask the question; it truly follows that Christianity is necessarily true. Christianity must be true for someone to ask if it can possibly be false; therefore it is a necessary truth.

Things in this paragraph are not entirely clear to me, so I will respond with the disclaimer that it is possible I missed the point or misunderstood you.

The presuppositionalist's claim is that Christianity is true because its denial entails absurdity, and so it is necessary. If the denial of Christianity does not entail absurdity, if it is possible, then Christianity is not necessarily true. Now we are speaking of standards of truth and possibility and necessity that are of course transcendental of Christianity. To argue that Christianity is true by Christian standards is clearly fallacious and unconvincing. Your claim that I need to account for my standard of what is possible and necessary (though I think we are mixing things up here) is off the mark and irrelevant. What I am claiming is that if the denial of Christianity is possible, which seems to me to be by my intuition the case, also a thing which no Christian has ever proved to be false, then Christianity is not necessarily true.