Presuppositionalism Q&A

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Dear Ben,

Is evidential apologetics easier for the average person to understand and so more useful in many cases? Given that the Holy Spirit uses imperfect arguments, sermons and evangelism, surely it's important in a good argument that the individual you are talking to understands it.

First off, if there's a method that we know is wrong, then using it for pragmatic reasons is wrong too. The Spirit uses imperfect arguments, sermons, and evangelism, to be sure; but it doesn't follow that someone who intentionally uses what he thinks is a false school of apologetics is thereby justified. The imperfection of those three things arises from human finitude and unintended sinfulness, not from an intentional use of a falsity.

Also, regarding clarity, I would say presuppositionalism can very easily be stated in a clearer way. (Certainly Van Til did not help with that.) I don't think a presuppositionalist apologetic is by definition less clear than an evidentialist one, especially when one considers arguments such as William Lane Craig's three-point resurrection argument. Both presup and evidentialism can go in-depth, and both can be clear and simple, depending on the audience.

What is your view of the use of evidences alongside presuppositional arguments?

What about arguments that compare Scripture with Scripture e.g. unfulfilled prophecy with fulfilled prophecy? They are appealing to nothing higher than Scripture. I suppose they'd have to be backed up by a presuppositional argument if they were rejected, to show the individual that human reason can't sit in judgment on God's Word.

Is there a hierarchy of evidentialist arguments from more sound to less sound, depending on how close they stay to Scripture?

Typical arguments from prophecy and from the resurrection are used in the offensive sense and generally assume, "If the Bible is correct on prophecy, then the Bible is authoritative." And this failure to have the Bible be authoritative on its own authority is what is destructive in such an apologetic. That is, arguments from fulfilled prophecy to support Biblical authority are not appealing to "nothing higher than Scripture."

However, this does not make such arguments worthless, for (1) they can strengthen the faith of believers who understand prophecies and the resurrection in the context of a presupposed Christian worldview, and more importantly (2) they can be used defensively to counter claims against the Christian worldview; e.g. if a critic were to say that the prophecy "Out of Egypt I called my son" was never fulfilled, an apologist could defensively show how this prophecy is interpreted Biblically and fulfilled in Jesus. In other words, the second function of evidential apologetics is to show how specific evidences are interpreted within the Christian worldview as a defensive apologetic.

I see this error regarding the apologetic use of evidences as analogous to the error I saw when I discussed baptism with Campbellites (who generally believe that baptism by immersion is necessary unto salvation). After I told them that I did not believe baptism was salvifically necessary, they thought I was being insane and asked, "Well then, what can it be for?" -- implying that baptism must be what they thought it was, simply because that's always how they have viewed it. Essentially these Campbellites were begging the question and making a false dichotomy: either baptism is useful and salvifically necessary, or it is useless. Likewise, some people can think the same of prophecy: according to them, either prophecy is useful and utilized in offensive, constructive apologetics to prove Biblical authority, or it is useless.

And lastly, no, I would not say there is a hierarchy or continuum of evidentialist arguments. They either take the presupposition of theonomy or they don't. And if they're evidentialist, then they don't, and they should therefore be rejected.

-----Added 6/20/2009 at 06:46:46 EST-----

Things in this paragraph are not entirely clear to me, so I will respond with the disclaimer that it is possible I missed the point or misunderstood you.

Sorry about that. I'll try to be clear in addressing this last paragraph you wrote:

The presuppositionalist's claim is that Christianity is true because its denial entails absurdity, and so it is necessary. If the denial of Christianity does not entail absurdity, if it is possible, then Christianity is not necessarily true.

Realize that the presuppositionalist does not just start autonomously and say, "Okay, here are the conditions; let's see what worldview meets them." If he were to do that and then argue that non-Christian worldviews necessarily entail skepticism, then he would have to inductively disprove all possible ones, which is impossible. (He would also have to deal with the problem of presupposing autonomy in the first place.)

But the presupper does not start "neutrally" and ask for various worldviews to be presented to see if they match the real world. That is an autonomous approach, and it assumes man stands as ultimate judge. Rather, the presupper starts with the self-evident authority of Scripture and sees that he now has a non-contradictory basis for intelligibly speaking about "possibility." Otherwise he cannot even ask the question in the first place.

In other words, the presupper realizes that even possibility as a concept relies on God, and therefore God is necessary. To speak abstractly about possibility, as if some non-Christian worldview could possibly be true, is to posit that man autonomously interprets the world. And when that is posited, it follows that the universe is generally "open" to unlimited possibilities (a metaphysics of Chance). That is the basis from which you ask your question. Your objection therefore begs the question.
 
Steven, this quote might be helpful (Bahnsen, Van Til's Apologetic, pp. 487-488, n. 41):
John W. Montgomery trips himself up with this misconception of presuppositional apologetics when he writes: "And even if it were possible in some fashion to destroy all existent alternative world-views but that of orthodox Christianity, the end result would still not be the necessary truth of Christianity; for in a contingent universe, there are an infinite number of possible philosophical positions, and even the fallaciousness of infinity-minus-one positions would not establish the validity of the one that remained (unless we were to introduce the gratuitous assumption that at least one had to be right!)" ("Once upon an A Priori... ," 387-88).

But if that "gratuitous assumption" were not made, then the entire argument between the believer and unbeliever would make no sense. [...]

Montgomery imagines that this opponent [a defeated unbeliever] could now argue that "this is a contingent universe, so the philosophical options are infinite." But in a completely contingent universe, in which there would be no logic, causality, or morality, this very declaration would not be intelligible. The finite and fallible unbeliever has no intellectual authority to make declarations about a range of possibility (much less about what is "infinite"!). He cannot continue to argue against Christianity in any meaningful way (even by placing his trust in hypothetical possibilities) without assuming the Christian worldview.​
 
Hello Gentlemen,

Confessor said:
Christianity must be true for someone to ask if it can possibly be false; therefore it is a necessary truth.

Confessor's argument is essentially along the lines of:

Premise 1: Only Christianity provides the necessary preconditions for rational inquiry. (“It must be true for someone to ask if it is possibly false.”)
Premise 2 (assumed): Rational inquiry is necessary.
Conclusion: Therefore, Christianity is necessary. (“Therefore, it is a necessary truth.”)

Premise 2, even though not stated by Confessor is necessary for the argument to go through. Playing the skeptic, I ask the Christian to prove premise 1 to me based on his worldview. Namely, I ask that he prove: (1) Christianity provides the sufficient preconditions for rational inquiry, and (2) that there are no other possible worldviews that can do so.

Clark said:
Do you think that you can add a fourth member of the godhead without radically changing other doctrines? As soon as you disrupt the system, you have no guarantee of meeting those preconditions…and since a quadrinian worldview is a figment -- unless spelled out and examined, I don't see the objection's merit.

If a Christian is making the absolute claim of necessity, then the burden falls to him to demonstrate that the metaphysical reality of a quadrinity is such that it is unable to provide the necessary preconditions for rational inquiry. All of the metaphysical realities I might appeal to in order to account for things like, induction, identity over time, the laws of logic, the problem of the one and the many, etc…(all preconditions to rational inquiry) seem to be met equally as well with a quadrine God as with a triune God. So, if the Christian wants to make a claim to necessity, then he must have an answer why a quadrine God fails to account for the necessary preconditions whereas the trinity does not fail. If the Christian does not have an answer, then his claim to necessity is undermined.

In the end, TAG does not provide an answer. It simply asserts that it is so. Again, the objection is based firmly within the Christian worldview. Given the Christian worldview, can it demonstrate both (1) and (2)? I do not believe it can.

Sincerely,

Brian
 
Brian,

Your critique is valid only if "possibility" can be conceived of on autonomous terms, which I have already explained is question-begging. As long as the presuppositionalist disproves all present options, he has proved the necessity of Christianity. And I have already demonstrated that positing the quadrinity (or Fristianity, etc.) as a presupposed worldview is a category mistake.
 
Hello Confessor,

Your critique is valid only if "possibility" can be conceived of on autonomous terms, which I have already explained is question-begging.

Good. You do not want to allow "question-begging." Then prove without assuming your position, that the Christian worldview is the only worldview that can provide the necessary preconditions for intelligibility. Here is a layout of what the proof would need to cover:

(1) Prove the necessity of a particular theory of knowledge that makes explicit all preconditions for rational inquiry. (If you do not know what these preconditions are, then how can you determine whether or not a particular worldview can account for them? Also, if this theory of knowledge is not demonstrated to be necessary, then claims concerning this theory of knowledge - like Christianity is the necessary precondition for rational inquiry - are not necessary. So, not only do you have to posit a theory on knowledge, you must prove that it is necessary. Using your rule above, please do all of this without begging the question.)

By the way, if you really do get this far, kudos to you. You have done something that no philosopher in history has done.

(2) Prove that the Christian worldview can justifiably account for each of the preconditions identified in the proof of (1).

At this point you have only demonstrated that Christianity is a sufficient condition for knowledge. Let's look at the last thing that needs to be demonstrated.

(3) Prove that there are no other conceivable worldviews (like the quadrinity worldview) that can justify the necessary preconditions indentified in the proof of (1).

Note: Actually, there is one more piece required to make this argument go through. That piece is to establish the necessity of rational inquiry. I'll grant this being that you already have a lot on your plate! :)

Only at this point is your claim that the Christian worldview is necessary established. Dr. Bahnsen knew this quite well. If you carefully read the section in Van Til's Apologetic that you yourself referenced you can see that he was trying very hard to establish (3). (If you doubt this, then we can take what he wrote point-by-point and discuss it, or you can read my paper that I referenced earlier.) In the end, when you clear the smoke away, all Bahnsen did was to assert his position. To quote Bahnsen himself, "Assertion is not proof."

As long as the presuppositionalist disproves all present options, he has proved the necessity of Christianity.

I agree that the demonstration of the failure of present options is a strong argument for Christianity. Unfortunately, it is not sufficient to establish in any certain manner the necessity of Christianity.

And I have already demonstrated that positing the quadrinity (or Fristianity, etc.) as a presupposed worldview is a category mistake.

A category mistake? :um: Are forms of naturalistic materialism as worldviews category mistakes? Is Islam or Judiaism as worldviews category mistakes? If not, then why is a worldview where there is a quadrinity instead of a trinity a category mistake? Also, how do you know that the God of Christianity isn't a quadrinity? My guess is that twenty-five hundered years ago all of the presuppositionalists argued that God was one in being and one in person - they didn't have to deal with Islam nor did they understand the problem of the one and the many. Just kidding. ;)

Brian
 
prove without assuming your position, that the Christian worldview is the only worldview that can provide the necessary preconditions for intelligibility. Here is a layout of what the proof would need to cover:

Brian, I think you misunderstand presuppositionalism -- or, more accurately, I think you're critiquing an error of presup that I do not myself hold. It does not entail "accounting for" every possible precondition of knowledge. Rather, I would say that any person is justified in accepting autonomy or theonomy as self-evident in their worldview, and then the apologist points out contradictions between an unbeliever's commitment to autonomy and other aspects of his worldview.

In other words, presup does not involve the apologist telling the unbeliever to account for a huge amount of information, but rather that the unbeliever's worldview is contradictory -- i.e. the unbeliever's presupposition contradicts other aspects of his unbelieving worldview.

As a result, the presuppositional apologist is not obliged at all to account for everything in his own worldview.

As long as the presuppositionalist disproves all present options, he has proved the necessity of Christianity.

I agree that the demonstration of the failure of present options is a strong argument for Christianity. Unfortunately, it is not sufficient to establish in any certain manner the necessity of Christianity.

You're not understanding what I'm saying.

If an unbeliever has had his presupposition defeated by the apologist, and then he tries to "hold out" for a worldview in the future, claiming that Christianity has not been proven to be necessary, I would ask him what he means by "necessary." If he said that he meant "necessary" in some autonomous way (i.e. on an autonomous presupposition), then I'd show him that that would make his worldview a contradiction. He can't argue that there is a "possible" presupposition that could exist in the future except on a Christian standard of possibility, in which case there would no possible worldview in the future. Therefore, if the unbeliever can't hold out for a possible worldview in the future now, then there is no possibility at all, period.

Brian, when you ask Christianity to "prove" that it provides the preconditions for intelligibility, you are arguing autonomously. That is what I said about begging the question. I wasn't just bringing up that the fallacy is a pet peeve of mine.

A category mistake? :um: Are forms of naturalistic materialism as worldviews category mistakes? Is Islam or Judiaism as worldviews category mistakes? If not, then why is a worldview where there is a quadrinity instead of a trinity a category mistake?

Because there's no presupposition to state it. See what I said about sincerity above. Any purported presupposition that would entail a presupposition is not an actual presupposition, because it's not "commit-able."

Also, how do you know that the God of Christianity isn't a quadrinity? My guess is that twenty-five hundered years ago all of the presuppositionalists argued that God was one in being and one in person - they didn't have to deal with Islam nor did they understand the problem of the one and the many. Just kidding. ;)

Because He's revealed to be a Trinity.
 
Quote from Brian Bosse
(3)Prove that there are no other conceivable worldviews (like the quadrinity worldview) that can justify the necessary preconditions indentified in the proof of (1).

I suggest you present your "quadrinity" riddle to Vern Poythress at his page. He is a presuppositionalist and mathematician.

Things like Flying Spaghetti Monsters and Quadrinity's are known to be made up by the proponents. What evidence do you have for a quadrinity?

We have evidence from the creation for the One yet Plural Personal Absolute. Only revealed religion and those religions associated with it posit a Personal Absolute i.e. Christianity, Judaism and Islam. Only Christianity posits a Plurality within Unity. The Plurality within Unity of Christianity is a Trinity. If I can't philosophically prove a Triunity rather than a Quadriunity, it can be proved from the only revealed religion that posits a Personal Absolute One-in-Many.

If your Quadriunity can't be shown to exist in his four-in-oneness from creation and philosophy (i.e. presuppositionalism) and has given us no special revelation of his four-in-oneness there is no evidence for his existence, whereas special revelation associated with the Personal Absolute One-and Many - at least special revelation - proves the existence of the Three-in-Oneness of the God that has been shown to exist by presuppositionalism.

Unless you posit that God wants us to believe things without any evidence whatsoever e.g. quadrinity/quadriunity then your case is scuppered.
 
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Is it possible that Brian Bosse, AKA 'The Brain', has emerged from the sea of mind-bending contemplation to contribute to the edification of his ol' PB buds? Kewl!

Good to see you're still steamin' along Brian. Miss your brain teasers. Hope all is well with you and yours. As you know, I have nothing to add to this discussion, it flies right over my head, but I accidentally clicked on it and saw your name and wanted to say hello.

Now back to your regularly scheduled program.
 
Ben, I would like to ask whether, in presenting the choice of autonomy or theonomy, you are failing to provide a basis for the decision? Take a hypothetical atheist and suppose that (somehow) you have torn his worldview apart. Now, he has a choice, he can start from square one with autonomy (Descartes-style), or he can accept theonomy. On what basis will he make that decision? I think you are, in fact, assuming a scale of some kind here that both you and the unbeliever will agree on.
 
Ben, I would like to ask whether, in presenting the choice of autonomy or theonomy, you are failing to provide a basis for the decision? Take a hypothetical atheist and suppose that (somehow) you have torn his worldview apart. Now, he has a choice, he can start from square one with autonomy (Descartes-style), or he can accept theonomy. On what basis will he make that decision? I think you are, in fact, assuming a scale of some kind here that both you and the unbeliever will agree on.

The choice of who has the prerogative to interpret reality is itself the basis of an espoused system. Sure, people must be able to think, perceive, reason, etc. in order to make the decision, but that doesn't mean they have to have a common espoused basis.
 
Confessor said:
The choice of who has the prerogative to interpret reality is itself the basis of an espoused system. Sure, people must be able to think, perceive, reason, etc. in order to make the decision, but that doesn't mean they have to have a common espoused basis.

But isn't this just saying that you don't know what basis they will use to make that decision? In other words, you have given them a choice, but without a common espoused ground for choice, there is no real decision: they will stay with the default. You have given them no reason to make that switch from autonomy to theonomy because you have denied any espoused common ground.

However, I will continue to maintain that we do, in fact, have espoused common ground with the nonbeliever. If I am debating a Cartesian, I am going to do my best to argue logically. Why? Because we both espouse a belief that logical thought is a) possible b) can lead to true conclusions.

In fact, there are certain philosophies that, I would argue, could lead to Christianity, if it could be proven. As an example, Camus argued that, given that God does not exist, life is absurd. However, if it could be proved that life is not absurd, the existence of God would be proved. In other words, a logical critique may not be necessary to disproving a worldview.
 
But isn't this just saying that you don't know what basis they will use to make that decision? In other words, you have given them a choice, but without a common espoused ground for choice, there is no real decision: they will stay with the default. You have given them no reason to make that switch from autonomy to theonomy because you have denied any espoused common ground.

What the apologist points out is that unbelieers are using a theonomous presupposition all along, because their autonomous presupposition if carried out consistently would destroy knowledge, meaning that they must be holding to some presupposition without overtly recognizing it. The point is then whether they want to accept that fact or not, which is purely ethical.

However, you do make a good point that reinforces the actual/espoused common ground distinction: if unbelievers were consistent in their autonomy, then they would not be able to "move" to a theonomous presupposition.

However, I will continue to maintain that we do, in fact, have espoused common ground with the nonbeliever. If I am debating a Cartesian, I am going to do my best to argue logically. Why? Because we both espouse a belief that logical thought is a) possible b) can lead to true conclusions.

This would not be espoused common ground unless you believe that the unbeliever can hold a belief in logic consistently with his unbelieving presupposition.

In fact, there are certain philosophies that, I would argue, could lead to Christianity, if it could be proven. As an example, Camus argued that, given that God does not exist, life is absurd. However, if it could be proved that life is not absurd, the existence of God would be proved. In other words, a logical critique may not be necessary to disproving a worldview.

If Camus were arguing for a generic god, then it wouldn't prove Biblical authority. But if Biblical authority were implicit in the proposition "If ~God, then absurd," then he wouldn't be able to prove that proposition anyway.
 
Hello Ben,

Confessor said:
…presuppositionalism…does not entail "accounting for" every possible precondition of knowledge. Rather, I would say that any person is justified in accepting autonomy or theonomy as self-evident in their worldview, and then the apologist points out contradictions between an unbeliever's commitment to autonomy and other aspects of his worldview.

Fine. But what you described in the above quote does not establish Christianity as necessary for rational inquiry. On a side note it appears you are assuming that all non-Christian worldviews are committed to autonomy. This is just asserted, and is not at all self-evident.

Confessor said:
Brian, when you ask Christianity to "prove" that it provides the preconditions for intelligibility, you are arguing autonomously.

Ben, I am not asking Christianity to prove anything at all. In fact, I believe that the God of Christianity is ontologically necessary for there to be rational inquiry. I am simply asking you to provide proof for the claims you are making. Now, if asking for this is too much, then I am not sure what to say other than “assertion is not proof.”

Confessor said: And I have already demonstrated that positing the quadrinity (or Fristianity, etc.) as a presupposed worldview is a category mistake.

Brian asked: Why is a worldview where there is a quadrinity instead of a trinity a category mistake?

Confessor responded: Because there's no presupposition to state it.

I do not understand this. A category mistake would be the claim that Tucson, Arizona is a worldview. Tucson, Arizona is a place – not a worldview. A worldview that posits a quadrinity as an ontological necessary being is a worldview by its very definition! It may be a flawed worldview, but nevertheless it is a worldview. So, what catagory mistake is being made? :think:

Brian asked: Also, how do you know that the God of Christianity isn't a quadrinity?

Confessor answered: Because He's revealed to be a Trinity.

I agree that the Scriptural evidence that we have points in this direction. Yet, Scripture does not contain all truths about the nature and being of God. So, we cannot say with certainty that God is a trinity, any more than Israel 2500 years ago could have claimed with certainty that God is a unity. The point is that your appeal to the Scriptures does not eliminate the possibility of a quadrinity.

Sincerely,

Brian
 
Your critique is valid only if "possibility" can be conceived of on autonomous terms, which I have already explained is question-begging.

Good. You do not want to allow "question-begging." Then prove without assuming your position, that the Christian worldview is the only worldview that can provide the necessary preconditions for intelligibility. Here is a layout of what the proof would need to cover:

First, all reasoning is circular. The real question has to do with whether the circle is vicious.

(1) Prove the necessity of a particular theory of knowledge that makes explicit all preconditions for rational inquiry.

There are only two alternatives: an autonomous epistemology and a theonomous epistemology. After about 2500 years, I think it’s fair to conclude that the autonomous approach is bankrupt. But there is a reason for this -- we don’t have to rely on history alone.

You are quite right that no *anti-theistic* philosopher has been able to meet this challenge.

I would suggest that the preconditions include a solution to the one and many problem, a means for man to participate intellectually in that unity, a worldview in which change (and so chance) is not ultimate, and a reason to believe that we are not deceived.

(2) Prove that the Christian worldview can justifiably account for each of the preconditions identified in the proof of (1).

Christian theism, and Christian theism alone has a God who contains unity and plurality. Christian theism alone has man created in God’s image. Only the sovereignty and providence of the Christian God eliminate mystery and chance, allowing for logic and science. And the goodness of the Christian God permits us to conclude that we are not self-deceived.

At this point you have only demonstrated that Christianity is a sufficient condition for knowledge. Let's look at the last thing that needs to be demonstrated.

(3) Prove that there are no other conceivable worldviews (like the quadrinity worldview) that can justify the necessary preconditions indentified in the proof of (1).

I do not have to meet this challenge. All autonomous systems fail to account for intelligibility. As for other systems, which claim to be theonomous,
1. They must be revealed religions, or they are autonomous.
2. They must, themselves, be shown to account for intelligibility. Islam, for instance, cannot. It’s monism prohibits a solution to the one and many problem, and its radical transcendence would prohibit man’s ability to know, even if it could solve the one and many problem in the mind of its god.
3. Fristianity is not a revealed religion, and can, therefore, not claim to be theonomous.
4. Once the Christian theistic system is altered, it is no longer Christian theism, and must, therefore, be reassessed for its ability to meet the preconditions for intelligibility. You will recall, that everything from creation to fall to redemption to consummation is part of a system that accounts for intelligibility. Remove any component of that system, and you have ruined the whole.
5. The moment you suggest a possibility, you borrow from the Christian system. Evidence of this is not far away. The fact that you want to make only a slight alteration of the system, to see if you can confound the argument, shows that you recognize the strength of the system for answering the question. But, as there is, nor can there ever be, another system ‘like’ Christianity, all other systems fail.

Brian asked: Also, how do you know that the God of Christianity isn't a quadrinity?

Confessor answered: Because He's revealed to be a Trinity.

I agree that the Scriptural evidence that we have points in this direction. Yet, Scripture does not contain all truths about the nature and being of God. So, we cannot say with certainty that God is a trinity, any more than Israel 2500 years ago could have claimed with certainty that God is a unity. The point is that your appeal to the Scriptures does not eliminate the possibility of a quadrinity.

Scripture does tell us all that it is necessary for us to know about God. It also makes clear that God is incomprehensible. But, as special revelation is complete, we know with certainty that God is not quadrinian.

If you want to posit a Fristian God, you will have to present revelation to support that view -- complete, of course, with a full historical outworking of the redemption portrayed in it--since it is not just a development or adjustment of Christianity, but a whole new system. And, of course, you may not disrupt the system in any way. That is manifestly impossible.

Besides, the preconditions of intelligibility require us to know a good God, to ensure that we are not deceived. As the Fristian God has not revealed himself, it seems you're still borrowing from the only system that works -- the one you know is right (Rom. 1) to assert that there may be another system to overthrow it.
 
Fine. But what you described in the above quote does not establish Christianity as necessary for rational inquiry. On a side note it appears you are assuming that all non-Christian worldviews are committed to autonomy. This is just asserted, and is not at all self-evident.

First, I don't believe all non-Christian worldviews must be consigned to autonomy, for some could essentially be submitting to (e.g.) Allah's interpretation of reality. But generally, autonomy vs. theonomy is a very useful distinction because (1) the intellectual enemy of Christianity is almost always secularism, and (2) when the intellectual enemy is some other religion, they usually try arguing autonomously too (e.g. a Muslim "classical apologetic").

Second, I ask you: What do you mean by the fact that Christianity is necessary for rational inquiry? Do you mean that there are no other possible worldviews that can satisfyingly accomplish some criterion X? If so, you're operating off a metaphysic of Chance which is concomitant with an autonomous presupposition, and manifold problems arise with that.

See my responses to Steven above regarding what the presuppositionalist means when he says something is necessary. Presup does not involve finding the criteria for rational inquiry and then testing out several presuppositions to see if any of them "match." That's a misconstrual. Rather, presup involves understanding that people have different presuppositions which affect their entire belief-structure and then testing the consistency of people's worldviews by comparing their presuppositional beliefs with other beliefs that person has.

It's all this language of some presuppositions being "necessary" and some being "possible" apart from a Christian presupposition that is bothersome. When claims like that are made, they must be made on autonomous presuppositions and therefore beg the question.

I do not understand this. A category mistake would be the claim that Tucson, Arizona is a worldview. Tucson, Arizona is a place – not a worldview. A worldview that posits a quadrinity as an ontological necessary being is a worldview by its very definition! It may be a flawed worldview, but nevertheless it is a worldview. So, what catagory mistake is being made? :think:

Did you see what I said about sincerity and a presupposition having to be commit-able?

I agree that the Scriptural evidence that we have points in this direction. Yet, Scripture does not contain all truths about the nature and being of God. So, we cannot say with certainty that God is a trinity, any more than Israel 2500 years ago could have claimed with certainty that God is a unity. The point is that your appeal to the Scriptures does not eliminate the possibility of a quadrinity.

The point of presup is that we go off of what God says about reality as the only reliable means of understanding the universe. So if there is some truth that we do not know about God -- which is guaranteed, seeing as He is incomprehensible -- then it doesn't really make a problem for the presuppositionalist.

Brian, the two main points here are the sincerity aspect of a presupposition and the fact that possibility and necessity cannot be spoken of apart from a presupposed worldview. Please look at the above posts (you won't have to go past this one) to understand my position.

EDIT - I realize a problem. One of the places where I addressed this issue, perhaps more explicitly than here, is in a separate thread (look at the third point near the bottom of that post). Sorry about that.
 
Dear Brian,

If there is no evidence for a god/God we can safely ignore him/it/her.

(a)There is no evidence from general revelation for a quadrinity i.e. for the specific fourness of the subsistences.

(b)There is no special/revealed evidence for a quadrinity i.e. for the specific fourness of the subsistences.

Re the Trinity

(1) There is evidence from general revelation that God is Personal.

(2) There is evidence from general revelation that God is Absolute.

(3) There is evidence from general revelation that God is One.

(4) There is evidence from general revelation that God is Plural.

(5) You dispute that there is evidence from general revelation for the exact number of subsistences in God. Lets assume for the time being that this isn't revealed by general revelation.

(6) But there is special revelation for the God that has qualities (1) to (4), and only one special revelation - the Bible. Therefore this must be the God that Man has been "searching for" and feeling after, while at the same time hiding from, because Man is both made in God's image and knows God and is also a sinner at the same time.

(7) When we go to the Bible we find that this Personal, Absolute, One and Plural God that we have always known - revealed for instance in our use of logic, morality and science - is a Triunity.

(8) There is no possibility of God being a Quadrinity because there is no evidence for such and in the special revelation that speaks of a Personal, Absolute, One and Plural God, He is a Trinity. Therefore He must of necessity be a Trinity.

Richard.
 
Hello Gentlemen,

Confessor said:
First, I don't believe all non-Christian worldviews must be consigned to autonomy, for some could essentially be submitting to (e.g.) Allah's interpretation of reality.

Fair enough.

Confessor said:
What do you mean by the fact that Christianity is necessary for rational inquiry?

In an effort to be very clear: When you make the claim that the Christian worldview is necessary for rational inquiry, then I take you to mean that the contrary is impossible.

Confessor said:
Presup does not involve…Rather, presup involves…

Fine. Taking your definition of what it is that TAG does, it ceases to be an objective, certain proof for the necessity of the Christian worldview.

Confessor said:
Did you see what I said about sincerity and a presupposition having to be commit-able?

Yes. If you want to limit the domain of possible worldviews to those worldviews that are “sincerely held,” then you cannot sincerely ;) claim to have a proof for the necessity of the Christian worldview.

Richard said:
(8) There is no possibility of God being a Quadrinity because there is no evidence for such and in the special revelation that speaks of a Personal, Absolute, One and Plural God, He is a Trinity. Therefore He must of necessity be a Trinity.

Let’s flesh this argument out a little. Your conclusion is…

Conclusion: There is no possibility of God being a quadrinity.

Your reasoning for this (indicated by ‘because’) is:

Premise 1: There is no evidence for a quadrinity.
Premise 2: The Church infers from special revelation based on certain exegetical rules of hermeneutics that God is a trinity.

I grant both premises 1 and 2. Please explain to me how God being a quadrinity entails a logical contradiction with premises 1 and 2. In actuality, your argument against a quadrinity is an inductive argument, and therefore loses all logical necessity.

Warm Regards,

Brian
 
You're on the ball at logic and argumentation, Brian.

I would try Vern Poythress or John Frame. They may have something up their sleeves to surprise you.
 
Fine. Taking your definition of what it is that TAG does, it ceases to be an objective, certain proof for the necessity of the Christian worldview.

No, I just reject the autonomous concepts of certainty and necessity that view "possibility" as an abstract notion that is more ultimate than God Himself.And the autonomous notion is what your entire argument depends on. You're attacking a straw man.

As it stands, as long as a person cannot offer a contrary presupposition to even state that it is "possible" that another presupposition could offer a notion of possibility, then Christianity is necessary. It's really not that complicated.
 
Hello Gentlemen,

Richard said:
I would try Vern Poythress or John Frame. They may have something up their sleeves to surprise you.

I am familiar with both of these scholars. In fact, John Frame and I have personally corresponded concerning Van Til’s understanding of apparent contradiction. I have never corresponded with either of them regarding the topic at hand. Perhaps, one day I will.

Confessor said:
I just reject the autonomous concepts of certainty and necessity that view "possibility" as an abstract notion that is more ultimate than God Himself. And the autonomous notion is what your entire argument depends on. You're attacking a straw man.

I will grant you that the laws of logic are not more ultimate than God Himself. Yet, the laws of logic are a very real part of the Christian worldview you are presupposing. As such, asking you to provide support for your assertions according to these very laws is completely consistent with the Christian worldview. Ben, you seem to be trying very hard to convince me and others that you do not have to comport with these laws of logic. Why is it again that these laws originating with God do not apply to your assertions?

Confessor said:
As it stands, as long as a person cannot offer a contrary presupposition to even state that it is "possible" that another presupposition could offer a notion of possibility, then Christianity is necessary. It's really not that complicated.

The conclusion to your “non-complicated” argument is…

Conclusion: Christianity is necessary.

Your reasoning for this is…

Premise 1: No person can articulate a possible contrary worldview.

The missing premise to make your argument go through (again, these are the Christian worldview laws of logic and are therefore applicatory) is…

Premise 2 (assumed): If no person can articulate a possible contrary worldview, then Christianity is necessary.

Now, the argument form here is Modus Ponens. It is a valid argument, and as such, if the premises are true, then the conclusion necessarily is true. Here are the problems with the truth of the premises…

(1) Premise 1 is false. I have articulated the quadrinity worldview. You have no answer to this other than to disqualify it on the basis that it is not “sincerely held.” However, this requirement of yours is not a logical requirement. It is subjective and arbitrary.

(2) Premise 2 is not logical in the sense of being part of the laws of logic. Again, it is subjective and arbitrary. Ironically, it smacks of autonomy. What makes Christianity necessary is the impossibility of it being otherwise (the impossibility of the contrary). To make this “standard of impossibility” man’s ability to articulate something is absurd, and appears to be the epitomy of human autonomy. Based on this, I reject premise 2.

Sincerely,

Brian
 
I will grant you that the laws of logic are not more ultimate than God Himself. Yet, the laws of logic are a very real part of the Christian worldview you are presupposing. As such, asking you to provide support for your assertions according to these very laws is completely consistent with the Christian worldview. Ben, you seem to be trying very hard to convince me and others that you do not have to comport with these laws of logic. Why is it again that these laws originating with God do not apply to your assertions?

I did not speak of the laws of logic at all, but of the notions of possibility and necessity.

(1) Premise 1 is false. I have articulated the quadrinity worldview. You have no answer to this other than to disqualify it on the basis that it is not “sincerely held.” However, this requirement of yours is not a logical requirement. It is subjective and arbitrary.

If no one would actually hold such a presupposition as applies to this world (i.e. if sincerity is absent), then it is not a viable presupposition.

(2) Premise 2 is not logical in the sense of being part of the laws of logic. Again, it is subjective and arbitrary. Ironically, it smacks of autonomy. What makes Christianity necessary is the impossibility of it being otherwise (the impossibility of the contrary). To make this “standard of impossibility” man’s ability to articulate something is absurd, and appears to be the epitomy of human autonomy.

I'll outline the argument briefly and post the objection that you would bring up:

The apologist's essential argument against the unbeliever is that if he wants to make a claim against Christianity, he must presuppose Christianity. You would probably object that the consequent of the previous statement ("he must presuppose Christianity") implies that all conceivable competing worldviews must be rejected, which the apologist can't demonstrate. But that is not true.

As long as the apologist defeats all presently existing presuppositions (which is comprised primarily of autonomy and secondarily of other revealed religions), then it is absolutely, 100% necessary for anyone to presuppose Christianity, and here's why: If someone wanted to claim (as you are doing) that there might be a possible presupposition in some possible world that could be held in non-contradictory fashion, they would have to use a notion of possibility that presupposes autonomy, in which case they would have to prove that autonomy is viable right now in order to even make such a claim. Therefore, if there are not other viable presuppositions in the present, then there are not any possible viable presuppositions apart from Christianity at any point in the future.

This is not just a matter of man's being able to articulate something, but of an actual proposition being itself intelligible. I'm not playing a word game.
 
(1) Premise 1 is false. I have articulated the quadrinity worldview.

No, you have not articulated the quadrinity worldview. You've articulated Christianity and then corrupted it, just enough that you think it won't affect the preconditions of intelligibility. But that's problematic for the reasons I posted above, but I'll remind you.

Revelation is completed (Heb. 1:1-2). God has revealed himself as trinity.
Therefore, if you want to posit a quadrinity, you will have to present revelation to that effect. Without revelation, quadrinity is autonomous.
To meet the preconditions of intelligibility, a quadrinian worldview would have to have all the elements of a Christian worldview that make intelligibility possible. But since you've altered God's nature, it is certainly impossible that you will be able to produce a Fristian 'revelation' identical with Christianity.

Even if you sit down and copy out the Bible, making whatever changes you think you can get away with to accomplish your ends, you still have the problem that revelation isn't merely words. The words interpret historical actions. So, you've got to provide an alternate history to go along with your alternate account of that history.

But you've overlooked the fact that trying to alter the Christian worldview so that you can account for intelligibility without it is itself proof of the position. You have to use what you KNOW to be true to try to prove that it isn't. THAT'S the point of the TAG!

-----Added 6/22/2009 at 05:16:08 EST-----

This is one thankless thread :)
Over a thousand views with only just over 100 posts, and no thanks being distributed. What an ungrateful bunch you lurkers are ... :p j/k

-----Added 6/22/2009 at 05:40:44 EST-----

Unless you posit that God wants us to believe things without any evidence whatsoever e.g. quadrinity/quadriunity then your case is scuppered.

Was reading back through the thread and caught this word: "Scuppered" -- Nice!

I'm going to have to remember that one. I love picking up new vocab.
 
Hello Ben,

I did not speak of the laws of logic at all, but of the notions of possibility and necessity.

Making assertions regarding ‘possibility’ and ‘necessity’ presupposes an underlying logic. In fact, it is called Modal Logic.

If no one would actually hold such a presupposition as applies to this world (i.e. if sincerity is absent), then it is not a viable presupposition.

Your conditional statement is not a logical statement in the sense of it being a law of logic. The concept that someone must actually hold to ‘X’ for ‘X’ to be viable is arbitrary, and as I intimated in my last post it is the epitome of human autonomy. From now on I will refer to your dubious assertion as :judge: Ben’s Law :judge:. (I like the symbolism. It captures the idea of autonomy quite nicely. ;)) The metaphysical viability of a worldview is independent of whether or not a human “sincerely” holds it.

The apologist's essential argument against the unbeliever is that if he wants to make a claim against Christianity, he must presuppose Christianity.

Yes, I understand this assertion. But let me make a subtle distinction that you seem to be missing. There is no one here making a claim against Christianity. You have claimed that Christianity is necessary for rational inquiry, and in addition to this you claim to have an objective certain proof for this. Now, I, a Christian who believes this claim, have simply asked you to show me this proof.

If someone wanted to claim (as you are doing) that there might be a possible presupposition in some possible world that could be held in non-contradictory fashion, they would have to use a notion of possibility that presupposes autonomy, in which case they would have to prove that autonomy is viable right now in order to even make such a claim. Therefore, if there are not other viable presuppositions in the present, then there are not any possible viable presuppositions apart from Christianity at any point in the future.

Let’s break this argument down.

Premise 1: For ‘X’ to assert a possible worldview, then ‘X’ would have to use a “notion of possibility” that presupposes autonomy.
Premise 2: For ‘X’ to be able to use a “notion of possibility,” then ‘X’ would have to prove right now that autonomy is viable.
Conclusion: If ‘X’ is not right now able to prove that autonomy is a viable worldview, then it is impossible for there to be a viable non-Christian worldview in the future.

There are a couple of problems with this argument. The first being that it is not valid - it is formally incorrect. The conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises. This judgment of mine is based on the laws of logic as founded upon a Christian worldview. Now, let’s look at your premises.

Premise 1 is a universal assertion. As such, it should apply to you. When you claim that the Christian worldview is necessary, at the very least you are asserting that the Christian worldview is possible. According to premise 1, you would have to use a “notion of possibility” that presupposes autonomy. Do you really think this, or are you exempt from this rule? Also, premise 1 is not logical in the sense that it is entailed by the laws of logic. It is simply an arbitrary assertion.

Premise 2 is a universal assertion. Once again, it should apply to you. Since your claim entails the possibility of the Christian worldview, then you would have to prove right now that autonomy is viable. My guess is you do not want to do this. ;) Premise 2, just like premise 1, is not a logical law. It is an arbitrary assertion.

Now, you may object to all of this by saying that I have not properly represented your argument. This is a real possibility. I was doing the best I could to understand your argument, but it was not easy to follow. So, if I misunderstood your argument, can you put it into a more explicit logical form so that we may be able to see it clearly?

Ben, TAG is a good argument, but you undermine your apologetic method when you insist it says more than is logically entailed.

Your Brother In Christ,

Brian
 
I am still a bit confused about things here. To say that an unbeliever cannot make a critique or an inquiry against Christianity without presupposing it is to say that Christianity is a necessary precondition of rational inquiry. But to say it is a necessary precondition is to say firstly that we even are making rational inquiries and not just uttering noises and sounds as machines (I mean, perhaps to us it seems as if we are making meaningful statements but perhaps that is all illusory, and we are just uttering noises and not actually communicating), and if we are making rational inquiry, it is saying that the contrary is absurd: which clearly it is not, because, as I outlined in a thought experiment above, and what I think the whole point of the Quadrinity objection even is that, it is possible that there be another worldview X which also allows for rational inquiry. If that is true, which seems clear enough for me, then to say that a critic of Christianity must presuppose it to make rational inquiry is clearly false.
 
Brian,

Before getting to the issue, let me just say that I really appreciate your putting things into syllogistic form. Otherwise...

1. You can't talk about modal logic on an autonomous presupposition, as you are.

2. "Ben's law" so-called is not arbitrary at all. As I said above when I responded to your assertion that I must list all the preconditions for knowledge and show how Christianity fulfills those, a presupposition is a self-evident proposition regarding who has the prerogative to interpret reality. Therefore, if something cannot be held sincerely, then it's not self-evident to anybody, and therefore it does not fit the definition of presupposition, and therefore it cannot yield a viable worldview. (You can put that in syllogistic form if you want. :))

3.
You have claimed that Christianity is necessary for rational inquiry

Claims like this are false, assuming that presuppositionalism entails "objectively" looking at what the preconditions for knowledge are and seeing which presuppositions "fit." I have already said that I reject that. You are not critiquing my position but a camp that you think I am in. And, admittedly, I should have revealed my disagreements.

4. I would construct my argument thusly:

Premise 1: If ‘X’ asserts that there is a possible worldview that might provide appropriate epistemic preconditions without already having a viable worldview, then ‘X’ would have to use a notion of possibility that presupposes autonomy. [Given]
Premise 2: If ‘X’ is able to use such a notion of possibility, then ‘X’ would have to prove right now that autonomy is viable. [Given]
Premise 3: If 'X' asserts such a possible worldview, then 'X' would have to prove right now that autonomy is viable. [hypothetical syllogism: 1,2]
Premise 4: If ‘X’ is not right now able to prove that autonomy is a viable worldview, then 'X' cannot assert a possible worldview. [contraposition: 3]
Premise 5: 'X' is not right now able to prove that autonomy is a viable worldview. [Given]
Premise 6: 'X' cannot assert a possible worldview. [modus ponens: 4,5]
Premise 7: If 'X' cannot assert a possible worldview, then there is no such possible worldview. [Given]
Conclusion: There is no such possible worldview. [modus ponens: 6,7]

This argument is valid unless you want to get antsy on the tenses and moods used in the various premises (e.g. "would have to" vs. "is able to" in premises 1 and 2), and therefore it's only a matter of soundness.

-I would say premise 1 is true, for such a claim presumes a basically "open" and contingent universe, i.e. a metaphysic of Chance. And such a metaphysic always accompanies autonomy and the supposedly "neutral" inquiry presumed by autonomists.
-Premise 2 is true, for the truthfulness of an autonomous concept certainly requires that autonomy itself be viable.
-Premise 5 would seem to be true, given the various fatal critiques by Van Til.
-Premise 7 seems true as well. 'X' basically represents any rational being, and therefore if 'X' cannot assert such a possible worldview, then it is objectively unintelligible for such a thing to be asserted.

I hope we're making progress. :detective:
 
Oh, I got that :cheers2:

Maybe I was just trying to simplify things for those who are evidently having trouble understanding our argument.
 
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