Question on nominalism/realism and salvation

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Right, nothing but particulars exists in the nature of things. That's a qualifier. He doesn't say they don't exist; only that they don't exist in the nature of things.
The Stanford article is saying that, according to Ockham, they don't exist at all. A very different claim indeed.
Here is an actual quote from Ockham where he explains how he understands universals:
"Sic intentio animae dicitur universalis, quia est signum praedicabile de pluribus."
"In this way, the concept of the soul [i.e. mind] is called universal, because it is a sign that is predicable of many things."
And he backs this up with a quote from Avicenna: "Una forma apud intellectum est relata ad multitudinem, et secundum hunc respectum est universale..."
"A form in the intellect is related to a multitude, and according to this respect it is universal..."
See p. 48-49 of Summa Logicae, in vol. 1 of Ockham's Opera Philosophica.

I never denied that Ockham is a nominalist. I denied the he rejected the existence of universals, or that that is a tenet of nominalism.

The SEP article makes clear there are different kinds of nominalism. Do you agree that Ockham denied "metaphysical universals" and "was emphatically a nominalist in this sense"? I should think so, for the two quotes you cite reaffirm this, which is what the SEP article states:

Ockham: "In this way, the concept of the soul [i.e. mind] is called universal, because it is a sign that is predicable of many things."

SEP article: "Metaphysically, these “universal” concepts are singular entities like all others; they are “universal” only in the sense of being “predicable of many.”"

Your second quote makes this explicit, if read in the entire context in which it is found:

Ockham: Dicendum est igitur quod quodlibet universale est una res singularis, et ideo non est universale nisi per significationem, quia est signum plurium. Et hoc est quod dicit Avicenna, V Metaphysicae: "Una forma apud intellectum est relata ad multitudinem, et secundum hunc respectum est universale, quoniam ipsum est intentio in intellectu, cuius comparatio non variatur ad quodcumque acceperis".

Ockham: Therefore, it should be said that every universal is one singular thing and that it is not a universal except by signification, because it is a sign of several. And this is what Avicenna says in his commentary (Metaphysics V): “One form in the understanding is related to a multitude, and in this respect it is universal; for it is an intention in the understanding, whose comparison is not varied to whatever you accept”.

For Ockham, a universal concept is itself a singular thing, as is all else; hence, he rejects metaphysical universals.

If we can agree on this, then contrary to what you said at the beginning of post 18, I did give, in post 12, "examples of early modern Reformed writers getting into the different positions on universals as expressed by... Ockham." For the Reformed authors in post 12 were not merely positing universal concepts. They were not merely saying that human nature can be "predicated" of many particulars or individuals. That is, these Reformed authors affirmed metaphysical universals:

By individual, Wendelin comments, is meant a singular thing, res singularis, inasmuch as universals, such as indicate genus and species, cannot be persons. The term "subsistence" indicates, moreover, and independent individuum, inasmuch as it is distinct from an "accident," which has no independent subsistence, but inheres in something else. In short, a person must be an individual "substance" or "subsistence" insofar as "accidents are not persons" but "inhere in another thing: ... a person must subsist." Even so, "living" must be added to the definition, inasmuch as "inanimate individual," like a stone of a statue, is not a person - similarly, "intelligent," since brute creatures are not persons.

This "lively and intelligent substance endued with reason and will," must also be "determinate and singular, for mankind is not a person, but John and Peter." The attribute of incommunicability, thus, indicates that "a person is not an essence, which is capable of being communicated to many individuals," while the qualifier that a person is not part of another being sets persons apart from entities such as souls, which are part of a human being. Human nature, thus, is not a person insofar as it is "communicable to every particular man," while the individual or particular recipient of that nature is a person, incapable of communicating his nature as he has it in its particularized form to any other. A person is not directly or immediately sustained by another but is an independent subsistence - in scholastic terms, a suppositum: "The human nature of Christ is not a person, because it is sustained by his deity; nor is the soul in man a person, because it is a part of the whole."
 
It appears then that we have different definitions of nominalism. My understanding is that a nominalist (at least of the variety that emerged during the Middle Ages) does not believe that universals actually exist. What is your definition of nominalism?
Nominalism comes from the word nomen, 'name,' 'noun.'
Realism comes from the word res, 'thing.'
Nominalism teaches that the universal is in the name; realism teaches that it is in the thing.
Scotism is kind of an intermediate position, and it most closely resembles the view of Aristotle himself; for Scotus, and probably for Aristotle, the universal is an abstraction of the mind based on the common features it observes in various individuals.
 
For Ockham, a universal concept is itself a singular thing, as is all else; hence, he rejects metaphysical universals.
It is your inference that he rejects universals, not his own conclusion. According to Ockham, they exist.
Now, if you think that a rejection of universals would follow from his principles, consistently applied, you are certainly within your rights to think that way, but that conclusion should not be attributed to Ockham. As I stated, Thomists, Scotists, and Ockhamists all believe in universals. The Thomists by no means have the market on universals cornered.
 
It is your inference that he rejects universals, not his own conclusion. According to Ockham, they exist.
Now, if you think that a rejection of universals would follow from his principles, consistently applied, you are certainly within your rights to think that way, but that conclusion should not be attributed to Ockham. As I stated, Thomists, Scotists, and Ockhamists all believe in universals. The Thomists by no means have the market on universals cornered.

Ockham denied metaphysical universals.

Polanus, Amyraut, Ridgley, Leigh, and Wendelin affirmed metaphysical universals.

Therefore, there are examples of early modern Reformed writers getting into different positions on universals than those as expressed by Ockham.

I take it that you do not dispute these points now, so we can move on. If you have anything else you would like to say that does not include such a dispute, feel free to have the last word.
 
Ockham denied metaphysical universals.

Polanus, Amyraut, Ridgley, Leigh, and Wendelin affirmed metaphysical universals.

Therefore, there are examples of early modern Reformed writers getting into different positions on universals than those as expressed by Ockham.

I take it that you do not dispute these points now, so we can move on. If you have anything else you would like to say that does not include such a dispute, feel free to have the last word.
You can't be serious.
 
@Knight a lot of this is going over my head so I charitably ask for a summary. Is the realist conception slightly leaning towards the federal and imputative forensic categories of Reformed theology because we can partake of the universal (righteousness of Christ); we do not depend then on the nominalist's "we investigate objects and not universals" i.e we do not look at inherent subjective righteousness ala RCC.
I'll summarize what the main bone of contention is between Roman Catholics and the Reformed and that is the charge of the "legal fiction" they claim for imputed righteousness. They say that God cannot declare that someone is just in His sight unless they are really righteous. For someone to still be a sinner and for God to pronounce him just is to say that God is just calling him just (nominalism).

Thus, the Roman Catholics claim that they have real righteousness and accuse Protestants of nominalism.

Yet, the Roman Catholics have a system in which righteousness is sacramentally infused into a person and God considers their acts of righteousness as more righteous than they really are. They are not so righteous as they demand reward (condign merit like Christ's) but God considers it fitting that He reward their obedience (congruent merit). In other words, they are not "really" righteous but God nominally considers them righteous.

In contrast, even though we are still sinners when united to Christ, we are really righteous because we are united to our Head, Who is righteous. It is not a fiction that, in Christ, righteous. Imputation is not a bare thing where we stand apart from God in Christ and that an exchange takes place where each of us individually has sin taken from us and are given righteousness, but we are in Christ positionally and spiritually. We are really sanctified even while sin remains in us and is being modified.

Now, there are systems of Protestant theology that are guilty of a nominalist view. The idea that God treats our faith as righteousness in the Arminian schema is an example. Our faith is not righteousness, but this is the price that all semi-Pelagian schemes have to pay in order to protect themselves from having to consider the full import of the bondage and guilt of sin in Adam.
 
Yet, the Roman Catholics have a system in which righteousness is sacramentally infused into a person and God considers their acts of righteousness as more righteous than they really are. They are not so righteous as they demand reward (condign merit like Christ's) but God considers it fitting that He reward their obedience (congruent merit). In other words, they are not "really" righteous but God nominally considers them righteous.
I don't know how accurate a summary of Roman Catholic dogma this is.
Thomas Aquinas says, "man merits everlasting life condignly," in ST.I-II.Q114.A3.
In some Roman Catholic systems, the place of congruent merit is before baptism. One has not been regenerated in order to do truly good works and merit condignly, so one must merit one's conversion or grace congruently up until baptism. But from that point on it's all condign.
 
I don't know how accurate a summary of Roman Catholic dogma this is.
Thomas Aquinas says, "man merits everlasting life condignly," in ST.I-II.Q114.A3.
In some Roman Catholic systems, the place of congruent merit is before baptism. One has not been regenerated in order to do truly good works and merit condignly, so one must merit one's conversion or grace congruently up until baptism. But from that point on it's all condign.
The Catechism of the Catholic Church on Merit is quoted below. Man's cooperation in sanctification is a form of congruent merit.

III. MERIT

You are glorified in the assembly of your Holy Ones, for in crowning their merits you are crowning your own gifts. 59

2006 The term "merit" refers in general to the recompense owed by a community or a society for the action of one of its members, experienced either as beneficial or harmful, deserving reward or punishment. Merit is relative to the virtue of justice, in conformity with the principle of equality which governs it.

2007 With regard to God, there is no strict right to any merit on the part of man. Between God and us there is an immeasurable inequality, for we have received everything from him, our Creator.

2008 The merit of man before God in the Christian life arises from the fact that God has freely chosen to associate man with the work of his grace. The fatherly action of God is first on his own initiative, and then follows man's free acting through his collaboration, so that the merit of good works is to be attributed in the first place to the grace of God, then to the faithful. Man's merit, moreover, itself is due to God, for his good actions proceed in Christ, from the predispositions and assistance given by the Holy Spirit.

2009 Filial adoption, in making us partakers by grace in the divine nature, can bestow true merit on us as a result of God's gratuitous justice. This is our right by grace, the full right of love, making us "co-heirs" with Christ and worthy of obtaining "the promised inheritance of eternal life." 60 The merits of our good works are gifts of the divine goodness. 61 "Grace has gone before us; now we are given what is due.... Our merits are God's gifts." 62

2010 Since the initiative belongs to God in the order of grace, no one can merit the initial grace of forgiveness and justification, at the beginning of conversion. Moved by the Holy Spirit and by charity, we can then merit for ourselves and for others the graces needed for our sanctification, for the increase of grace and charity, and for the attainment of eternal life. Even temporal goods like health and friendship can be merited in accordance with God's wisdom. These graces and goods are the object of Christian prayer. Prayer attends to the grace we need for meritorious actions.

2011 The charity of Christ is the source in us of all our merits before God. Grace, by uniting us to Christ in active love, ensures the supernatural quality of our acts and consequently their merit before God and before men. The saints have always had a lively awareness that their merits were pure grace.

After earth's exile, I hope to go and enjoy you in the fatherland, but I do not want to lay up merits for heaven. I want to work for your love alone.... In the evening of this life, I shall appear before you with empty hands, for I do not ask you, Lord, to count my works. All our justice is blemished in your eyes. I wish, then, to be clothed in your own justice and to receive from your love the eternal possession of yourself. 63

Notes:​

60 Council of Trent (1547): DS 1546.
61 Cf. Council of Trent (1547): DS 1548.
62 St. Augustine, Sermo 298, 4-5: PL 38, 1367.
63 St. Therese of Lisieux, "Act of Offering" in Story of a Soul, tr. John Clarke (Washington Dc: ICS, 1981), 277.

English Translation of the Cathechism of the Catholic Church for the United States of America © 1997, United States Catholic Conference, Inc.
 
The Catechism of the Catholic Church on Merit is quoted below. Man's cooperation in sanctification is a form of congruent merit.
It seems to me that the catechism doesn't specify what kind of merit is active in sanctification. Which, since there are different schemes from different scholastics on the topic of merit (Migne summarizes them in Cursus Theologiae vol. 20), they can't really be more specific without alienating a significant portion of their theologians and scholastics. The Dominicans and the Franciscans, for example, are bound to have different views.
But my main point is that you stated "They are not so righteous as they demand reward (condign merit like Christ's)," but they actually do teach that one is so righteous as to demand reward, as Thomas says above. So I'm not sure this argument works.
 
It seems to me that the catechism doesn't specify what kind of merit is active in sanctification. Which, since there are different schemes from different scholastics on the topic of merit (Migne summarizes them in Cursus Theologiae vol. 20), they can't really be more specific without alienating a significant portion of their theologians and scholastics. The Dominicans and the Franciscans, for example, are bound to have different views.
But my main point is that you stated "They are not so righteous as they demand reward (condign merit like Christ's)," but they actually do teach that one is so righteous as to demand reward, as Thomas says above. So I'm not sure this argument works.
Interesting. I referred to that portion of Aquinas and earlier he writes: "If, however, we speak of a meritorious work, inasmuch as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit moving us to life everlasting, it is meritorious of life everlasting condignly. For thus the value of its merit depends upon the power of the Holy Spirit moving us to life everlasting according to Jn. 4:14: Shall become in him a fount of water springing up into life everlasting. And the worth of the work depends on the dignity of grace, whereby a man, being made a partaker of the Divine Nature, is adopted as a Son of God, to whom the inheritance is due by right of adoption, according to Rm. 8:17: If sons, heirs also."

I haven't read him enough so I'll ask whether Aquinas envisions that every work done by the grace of the Holy Spirit is of this character. The reason I ask is that he seems to be speaking of merit that deserves eternal life. This is "non-transferrable" from a treasurty of merits perspective so how does this merit function in the Treasury of Merits if all merit is condign?
 
Interesting. I referred to that portion of Aquinas and earlier he writes: "If, however, we speak of a meritorious work, inasmuch as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit moving us to life everlasting, it is meritorious of life everlasting condignly. For thus the value of its merit depends upon the power of the Holy Spirit moving us to life everlasting according to Jn. 4:14: Shall become in him a fount of water springing up into life everlasting. And the worth of the work depends on the dignity of grace, whereby a man, being made a partaker of the Divine Nature, is adopted as a Son of God, to whom the inheritance is due by right of adoption, according to Rm. 8:17: If sons, heirs also."

I haven't read him enough so I'll ask whether Aquinas envisions that every work done by the grace of the Holy Spirit is of this character. The reason I ask is that he seems to be speaking of merit that deserves eternal life. This is "non-transferrable" from a treasurty of merits perspective so how does this merit function in the Treasury of Merits if all merit is condign?
I think the treasury of merits idea is specifically connected to the concept of works of supererogation, where one does more than was required of them, something that goes beyond the ordinary condign merits required for salvation.
For Thomas, the treasury of merits is connected to indulgences (Sent.IV.D20.Q1.A4.Q2), where the church covers for the imperfections of one's labors with its merits. He answers the objection, "Moreover, it seems that not even a bishop can establish an indulgence. For the Church’s treasury is shared by the whole Church. But what is common to the whole Church can only be dispensed by the one who is in charge of the whole Church. Therefore, only the pope can establish indulgences."
He (or at least his disciples) explicitly connects indulgences to works of supererogation and the treasury of merits in ST.IIISup.Q25.A1.C.2, saying,
"Hence we must say on the contrary that indulgences hold good both in the Church’s court and in the judgment of God, for the remission of the punishment which remains after contrition, absolution, and confession, whether this punishment be enjoined or not. The reason why they so avail is the oneness of the mystical body in which many have performed works of satisfaction exceeding the requirements of their debts; in which, too, many have patiently borne unjust tribulations whereby a multitude of punishments would have been paid, had they been incurred. So great is the quantity of such merits that it exceeds the entire debt of punishment due to those who are living at this moment: and this is especially due to the merits of Christ: for though he acts through the sacraments, yet his efficacy is in no way restricted to them, but infinitely surpasses their efficacy. Now one man can satisfy for another, as we have explained above (Q. 13, A. 2). And the saints in whom this superabundance of satisfactions is found did not perform their good works for this or that particular person who needs the remission of his punishment (else he would have received this remission without any indulgence at all), but they performed them for the whole Church in general, even as the Apostle declares that he fills up those things that are wanting of the sufferings of Christ . . . for his body, which is the Church, to whom he wrote (Col 1:24)."
 
1. I understand both concepts but why is one more disposed to prevenient grace (nominalism per Ockham as I have read)? Is it because virtue is more of a real entity in an individual?
2. How does Reformed theology assess both concepts?

As I've continued thinking about this subject, allow me to highlight a point (originally made in post 12 that could easily be lost in everything else that has been written. Nominalism about metaphysical universals has serious Christological implications.

That is, if a person and his nature or essence are not, per Ockham, metaphysically distinct, then in the context of Christology, either metaphysical monophysitism (Christ is one real person; therefore, Christ has/is one real nature) or metaphysical Nestorianism (Christ has/is two real natures; therefore, Christ is two real persons) would follow.

It is not orthodox to say that "the one person of Christ has two natures in name only" as opposed to metaphysically or really so. Hence, Marcus Wendelin, in his Christian Theology (1634, link), avoids nominalism to maintain an orthodox Christology:

////THESIS II: A divine Person is wont to be described as an incommunicable subsistence of the divine essence.

EXPLANATION: Person is wont elsewhere to be defined in general: A subsisting Individual, living, intelligent, incommunicable, not sustained by another, nor part of another.

The Genus of the definition is Individual, which is a singular thing: Therefore, by its Genus person is distinguished from universal natures, which we call genera and species, which are not persons.

The specific difference of the definition distinguishes person from other individuals, with six limitations: For a person is an individual.
(1.) Subsisting: Therefore, a person is not this or that accidental property: because an accidental property does not subsist, but inheres in another.
(2.) Living: Therefore, a person is not this or that inanimate individual: this or that stone, statue, etc.
(3.) Intelligent: Therefore, a person is not this or that brute.
(4.) Incommunicable: Therefore, person is not essence, which is communicable to many.
(5.) Not sustained by another: Therefore, the human nature of Christ is not a person, which is sustained by the person of τοῦ Λόγου, the Logos.
(6.) Not a part of another: Therefore, a rational soul, which is part of man, is not a person.////

This exhibits just yet one more danger of Ockham's metaphysical nominalism, his defense that "nothing but particulars exist in the nature of things."
 
As I've continued thinking about this subject, allow me to highlight a point (originally made in post 12 that could easily be lost in everything else that has been written. Nominalism about metaphysical universals has serious Christological implications.

That is, if a person and his nature or essence are not, per Ockham, metaphysically distinct, then in the context of Christology, either metaphysical monophysitism (Christ is one real person; therefore, Christ has/is one real nature) or metaphysical Nestorianism (Christ has/is two real natures; therefore, Christ is two real persons) would follow.

It is not orthodox to say that "the one person of Christ has two natures in name only" as opposed to metaphysically or really so. Hence, Marcus Wendelin, in his Christian Theology (1634, link), avoids nominalism to maintain an orthodox Christology:

////THESIS II: A divine Person is wont to be described as an incommunicable subsistence of the divine essence.

EXPLANATION: Person is wont elsewhere to be defined in general: A subsisting Individual, living, intelligent, incommunicable, not sustained by another, nor part of another.

The Genus of the definition is Individual, which is a singular thing: Therefore, by its Genus person is distinguished from universal natures, which we call genera and species, which are not persons.

The specific difference of the definition distinguishes person from other individuals, with six limitations: For a person is an individual.
(1.) Subsisting: Therefore, a person is not this or that accidental property: because an accidental property does not subsist, but inheres in another.
(2.) Living: Therefore, a person is not this or that inanimate individual: this or that stone, statue, etc.
(3.) Intelligent: Therefore, a person is not this or that brute.
(4.) Incommunicable: Therefore, person is not essence, which is communicable to many.
(5.) Not sustained by another: Therefore, the human nature of Christ is not a person, which is sustained by the person of τοῦ Λόγου, the Logos.
(6.) Not a part of another: Therefore, a rational soul, which is part of man, is not a person.////

This exhibits just yet one more danger of Ockham's metaphysical nominalism, his defense that "nothing but particulars exist in the nature of things."
What did Ockham himself have to say about the two natures of Christ?
 
What did Ockham himself have to say about the two natures of Christ?

Richard Cross, "Nominalism and the Christology of William of Ockham" (Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, Vol. 58, pg. 155):

It has been shown that, for Ockham, in Christ alone is there held to be a real - and not merely a nominal - distinction between nature and person, such that the proposition 'homo est homo humanitate' is true if and only if it is said of Christ...

Scotus and Ockham agree on the theologically based conclusion that there is no real distinction between an individual nature and its personation except in the case of Christ.

I'm glad Ockham abandoned nominalism on this point.

EDIT: on the other hand, this qualification Ockham makes does beg the question as to whether Christ and I are consubstantial which, in turn, would have implications for his theology of redemption. Do you have thoughts on that?
 
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Richard Cross, "Nominalism and the Christology of William of Ockham" (Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale, Vol. 58, pg. 155):



I'm glad Ockham abandoned nominalism on this point.

EDIT: on the other hand, this qualification Ockham makes does beg the question as to whether Christ and I are consubstantial which, in turn, would have implications for his theology of redemption. Do you have thoughts on that?
He would say you are both men. Ockham had no problem saying things like that. In in the reality of doing theology, thinking that universals are in things (Thomas), abstracted from things and in the mind (Scotus), or are signs based upon one's abstraction (Ockham) doesn't affect one's ability to talk about reality. All three agree that one predicate can be truly ascribed to multiple individuals.
Ockham might say that your humanity and Christ's humanity are not identical in concreto, i.e. they are not the same individual, because yours is in you, and his is in him, but abstractly, they can both truly be called human natures of the same species.
Ockham does have some theological problems, as a Scotist, on some things, like divine simplicity, but I'm not sure one can draw a straight line from his theory of universals to those positions. It's kind of a different can of worms.
 
He would say you are both men. Ockham had no problem saying things like that. In in the reality of doing theology, thinking that universals are in things (Thomas), abstracted from things and in the mind (Scotus), or are signs based upon one's abstraction (Ockham) doesn't affect one's ability to talk about reality. All three agree that one predicate can be truly ascribed to multiple individuals.
Ockham might say that your humanity and Christ's humanity are not identical in concreto, i.e. they are not the same individual, because yours is in you, and his is in him, but abstractly, they can both truly be called human natures of the same species.

Oughtn't it affect the way he talked about reality? What was Ockham's alethiology? It is one thing to have an ability to talk about reality. It is another thing to talk truly about reality. If there is no correspondence in reality to that about which we are talking, are we speaking truthfully?

EDIT: we can even use Ockham's Christology as a concrete example of what I am seeing as a problem. Ockham and I may have no problem in stating verbal agreement to the following (as you put it): "that one predicate (man) can be truly ascribed to multiple individuals." That is, we may both verbally agree that "Christ is man" and "I am man."

But if we do not mean the same thing when we verbally state these ascriptions, then our agreement is equivocal. We may say the same things, but we don't mean the same things. In the one case (me), Christ and man are consubstantial in reality. In the other case (Ockham), Christ and man are consubstantial in name only.
 
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Oughtn't it affect the way he talked about reality? What was Ockham's alethiology? It is one thing to have an ability to talk about reality. It is another thing to talk truly about reality. If there is no correspondence in reality to that about which we are talking, are we speaking truthfully?
There is a correspondence, because the universals correspond to individuals.
The word "horse," which for Ockham is a universal concept, corresponds to all the horses in the world, which possess the abstract quality of "horseness." (four legs, long snout, eats grass, you can ride it, etc). He's not a nihilist.
 
There is a correspondence, because the universals correspond to individuals.
The word "horse," which for Ockham is a universal concept, corresponds to all the horses in the world, which possess the abstract quality of "horseness." (four legs, long snout, eats grass, you can ride it, etc). He's not a nihilist.

I probably edited my post without you seeing it, so I will restate the edit here:

We can even use Ockham's Christology as a concrete example of what I am seeing as a problem. Ockham and I may have no problem in stating verbal agreement to the following (as you put it): "that one predicate (man) can be truly ascribed to multiple individuals." That is, we may both verbally agree that "Christ is man" and "I am man."

But if we do not mean the same thing when we verbally state these ascriptions, then our agreement is equivocal. We may say the same things, but we don't mean the same things. In the one case (me), Christ and man are consubstantial in reality. In the other case (Ockham), Christ and man are consubstantial in name only.
 
I probably edited my post without you seeing it, so I will restate the edit here:

We can even use Ockham's Christology as a concrete example of what I am seeing as a problem. Ockham and I may have no problem in stating verbal agreement to the following (as you put it): "that one predicate (man) can be truly ascribed to multiple individuals." That is, we may both verbally agree that "Christ is man" and "I am man."

But if we do not mean the same thing when we verbally state these ascriptions, then our agreement is equivocal. We may say the same things, but we don't mean the same things. In the one case (me), Christ and man are consubstantial in reality. In the other case (Ockham), Christ and man are consubstantial in name only.
Alright, let me ask a probing question. What does it mean that you are consubstantial with Christ? What is substance, how do you have it, and how does he have it, and why is the one you have the same as the one he has?
 
Alright, let me ask a probing question. What does it mean that you are consubstantial with Christ? What is substance, how do you have it, and how does he have it, and why is the one you have the same as the one he has?

Christ and I are of the same [human] nature. When Christ became man, what did Christ assume? "Christ the Son of God became man, by taking to himself a true body, and a reasonable soul." The mode by which I became man, Adam became man, and Christ became man may differ; nevertheless, each of us are of the same nature. Each of us have a true body and a reasonable soul.

Would you confess Christ and man as consubstantial in reality or in name only? Do you agree that this is a problem for Ockham or not?
 
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