RC Sproul on presuppositionalism

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tommyb

Puritan Board Freshman
Thought some may find this interesting. The following link is to a short (26 min) recent lecture by RC Sproul giving his take on presuppositionalism and explaining why he is not a presuppositionalist. Sproul also explains that he does not consider himself an evidentialist either, rather, he claims to be a classical apologist.

SermonAudio.com - The Case for God
 
I used to be a classicist in apologetics and I learned it through Sproul. I have his' and Lndsey'snd Grtsner's book Classical Apologetics. I did come to see that Sproul was wrong and/or confused about Van Til in many areas. The one major confusion that Sproul made in this sermon is he treated Van Til's arguments as though they are direct deductive arguments. Now this issue has been discussed at length in other posts so I don't wish to open that can of worms, but if Van Til's argument was a direct deductive argument than Sproul would be correct in saying that Van Til was guilty of circuler reasoning. The response he gave by Van Til in defending himself was not even the only response he gave to this critique, it is not even the best.

Also Sproul gives a highly simplicistic view of Van Til here, as well as in his book. Van Til's thinking was a little more complex than I have heard and read Sproul make it out to be. Now I am all for simplifying things but when your simplefication is not even related to the original but is a straw man of sorts than you have not accomplished anything. Van Til did agree with starting with the self except he called this the proximate starting point and God was the ultimate starting point. But again from here Van Til's thought moves into very complex waters so it may not be that easy to simplify him.

I also don't think that Sproul's arguments for the existance of God hold as much weight as he thinks they do. So he seems, in my opinion, to be right were he claims the evidentialist is.
 
if Van Til's argument was a direct deductive argument than Sproul would be correct in saying that Van Til was guilty of circuler reasoning.

Van Til himself considered all reasoning to be circular, so Sproul is correct on this point. Transcendental argumentation (as Van Til uses it) assumes a coherentist view of knowledge, so this is hardly surprising.
 
if Van Til's argument was a direct deductive argument than Sproul would be correct in saying that Van Til was guilty of circuler reasoning.

Van Til himself considered all reasoning to be circular, so Sproul is correct on this point. Transcendental argumentation (as Van Til uses it) assumes a coherentist view of knowledge, so this is hardly surprising.

He also used the term spiral, so he is if anything guilty of misapplying a term. Since he denied meaning the actual fallacy of circuler reasoning and used other terms to describe a more complex epistomological situation than the critic here must show that despite all this he is still guilty of the crime in question. He was taking into account the fact that no one reasons in a vaccum. If I am going to argue for tthe truth of a beleif of mine than methodologically I start with the assumption that my beleif, and entire worldview, is true. This assumption is always there in every bit of reasoning I do.
 
rather, he claims to be a classical apologist.

There is an irony here -- classical apologetics presupposed the Christian world and life view before the advent of an "a priori" rejection of Christianity.
 
Sproul (with Gerstner & Lindsley) make an astonishing blunder in Classical Apologetics where on page 337 they say
[Carl F. H.] Henry objects to presuppositionalist theology because, he says, it "exaggerates the noetic consequences of the fall of man."
The passage in Henry's GRA vol. I p,226 reads
John H. Gerstner objects to presuppositionalist theology because, he says, (1) it exaggerates the noetic consequences of the fall of man; (2) it denies the existence of any "common ground" getween believers and nonbelievers; and (3) it bows to the demands of a coherence theory of truth.
 
I remember listening to one of Bahnsen's lectures and he said that there has to be a self-authenticating authority because the process of justifying one's beliefs cannot go on forever. If X is the ultimate authority, then X would have to prove X. A lesser authority cannot authenticate a greater authority. If Y proves X, then X is not really the ultimate authority. How would Sproul respond to this? I listened to Sproul's lecture, but he does not address this.
 
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If something were to verify that the Bible is God's word other than the Bible itself, then would this mean that there is something that has more authority than the Bible? If X is the ultimate authority, but Y authenticates X, would this mean that X is not really the ultimate authority? How would Sproul respond to these questions?

Your point is a good one. This was Bahnsen's criticism of anti-presupps.
 
If something were to verify that the Bible is God's word other than the Bible itself, then would this mean that there is something that has more authority than the Bible? If X is the ultimate authority, but Y authenticates X, would this mean that X is not really the ultimate authority? How would Sproul respond to these questions?

Your point is a good one. This was Bahnsen's criticism of anti-presupps.

A similar argument is made by Reformed epistimologists (Plantinga, etc.) who argue, therefore, that belief in God is properly basic - that is, part of our noetic structure and not dependent upon external proofs or justifications.
 
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