Reformed Epistemology & Foundationalism

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WrittenFromUtopia

Puritan Board Graduate
Anyone have comments or thoughts on this viewpoint?

Reformed epistemology maintains that beliefs about God can be rational even if not supported by evidence or argument because ... they are properly basic.

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Foundationalism argues as follows: suppose that a person holds a belief that p. This belief may be derived from another belief--namely, the belief that q. The belief that q may be derived from another belief--namely, the belief that r. And the belief that r, in turn, may be derived from the belief that s. But, says the foundationalist, this cannot go on infinitely; the chain of justification must eventually come to a stop. There must be a belief that is accepted without reasons. A belief system thus requires foundations or basic beliefs. Let us suppose a theist accepts this foundationalist position. The theist could hold theistic beliefs such as God exists not because the theist infers that God exists from other beliefs ... Rather, God exists is a foundation of belief--other beliefs are derived from it, not it from them. In this way, we can understand how a belief based on faith might be regarded as rational. A belief based on faith is a foundational, or basic, belief. Critics like Clifford have no good case for excluding this belief from the foundations, [Alvin] Plantinga maintains.

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Unfortunately, as stated so far, Reformed epistemology meets up with an obvious problem. Any belief, no matter how bizarre, could be defended just by saying that it is properly basic. In addition, even if a person is rational in holding a certain basic belief, this does not itself show that the belief is true. A belief can be rational without being true. People who once believed the earth was flat held a belief that was false, but, nonetheless, was rational relative to their other beliefs.

Shatz, David. Philosophy and Faith. pp. 424-5
 
I think presuppositionalism (Clark variety) may be classified as foundationalism. But "God exists" would be a terrible starting point. Nothing can be inferred from the statement. That's why Clark (and Van Til in his way) took Scripture as the starting point. The Scriptures, and whatever can be inferred from the Scriptures by good and necessary consequences - are justified true beliefs.

There's a fair article on fondationalism on wikipedia that's worth a read.
 
Originally posted by Civbert
I think presuppositionalism (Clark variety) may be classified as foundationalism. But "God exists" would be a terrible starting point. Nothing can be inferred from the statement. That's why Clark (and Van Til in his way) took Scripture as the starting point. The Scriptures, and whatever can be inferred from the Scriptures by good and necessary consequences - are justified true beliefs.

There's a fair article on fondationalism on wikipedia that's worth a read.

I'm reading Plantinga on it at the moment. Interesting.
 
Seems like the reformed epistemology is on the right track, although without more (which there may be, as it is just a quote) Shatz's arguments are telling I think. You will have allot better understanding of philosophy than I will, but a couple observations:

[1] Presuppositionalism teaches that the basic beliefs come as a package deal, such as divine revelation. The basic beliefs are not idolsated, like a simple "God exists."
[2] I have not read much Plantiga, but as I recall he does not argue that there are an reasons of any sort for accepting basic beliefs. In contrast presuppositionalism would see indirect reasons. I use the analogy of mathematical axioms. The axioms of arithemtic are not proved by anything direct (else they would not be axioms). But rejecting them means one cannot do arithmetic. Similarly, Christian reveation is not proved by anything higher than it. It is properly basic, or a starting point. Yet, rejection leads to problems (the unintelligibility of human experience).

I have been wanting to get this but just have not yet. Butler discusses Plantiga and reformed epistemology during parts.

Scott

[Edited on 3-14-2006 by Scott]
 
Unfortunately, as stated so far, Reformed epistemology meets up with an obvious problem. Any belief, no matter how bizarre, could be defended just by saying that it is properly basic. In addition, even if a person is rational in holding a certain basic belief, this does not itself show that the belief is true. A belief can be rational without being true. People who once believed the earth was flat held a belief that was false, but, nonetheless, was rational relative to their other beliefs.

I think Plantinga's main goal was to defeat the evidentialist challenge to Christianity and to provide positive epistemic status for Christianity not based on argument, which I think that he did. So saying that any belief could be defended as rational kinda misses the point. Nevertheless, Dr. Sudduth has an article "CAN RELIGIOUS UNBELIEF BE PROPER FUNCTION RATIONAL? He has also addressed this type of critique on the Reformed Epistemology yahoo group here and here. I know there are some other posts where he addresses this kind of critique, but I'm short on time.

Don

[Edited on 3-14-2006 by Don]
 
I see the presuppositionalism connection in the thought that one does not look to X to prove God exists, but X is only possible or only makes sense if God exists. X doesn't prove God, but God makes X possible. This even goes back to Calvin's epistemology in Chapter One, Book One of Institutes. Even further back, it smacks of Anselm of Canterbury, and his (right) thoughts that one must rely on faith and the Spirit of God in order to be rational (as he demonstrates by prefacing his ontological argument with a prayer for God's aid in thought).
 
Here is another link on the RE group that talks about RE and foudationalism. Sudduth also links his dissertation on this post.

Don
 
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