Rene Descartes' Doctrine of Providence in His Third Meditation

[Justified]

"...and this from the fact that I was in existence a short time ago it does not follow that I must be in existence now, unless some cause at this instant, so to speak, produces me anew, that is to say, conserves me. It is as a matter of fact perfectly clear and evident to all those who consider with attention the nature of time, that, in order to be conserved in each moment in which it endures, a substance has need of the same power and action as would be necessary to produce and create it anew..." (Mediatation III, Descartes).

Seems that Descartes holds to a very orthodox view of God's Providence and Sovereignty.

Additional interesting quote:

2. I have always been of the opinion that the two questions respecting God and the Soul were the chief of those that ought to be determined by help of Philosophy rather than of Theology; for although to us, the faithful, it be sufficient to hold as matters of faith, that the human soul does not perish with the body, and that God exists, it yet assuredly seems impossible ever to persuade infidels of the reality of any religion, or almost even any moral virtue, unless, first of all, those two things be proved to them by natural reason. And since in this life there are frequently greater rewards held out to vice than to virtue, few would prefer the right to the useful, if they were restrained neither by the fear of God nor the expectation of another life; and although it is quite true that the existence of God is to be believed since it is taught in the sacred Scriptures, and that, on the other hand, the sacred Scriptures are to be believed because they come from God (for since faith is a gift of God, the same Being who bestows grace to enable us to believe other things, can likewise impart of it to enable us to believe his own existence), nevertheless, this cannot be submitted to infidels, who would consider that the reasoning proceeded in a circle. And, indeed, I have observed that you, with all the other theologians, not only affirmed the sufficiency of natural reason for the proof of the existence of God, but also, that it may be inferred from sacred Scripture, that the knowledge of God is much clearer than of many created things, and that it is really so easy of acquisition as to leave those who do not possess it blameworthy. This is manifest from these words of the Book of Wisdom, chap. xiii., where it is said, Howbeit they are not to be excused; for if their understanding was so great that they could discern the world and the creatures, why did they not rather find out the Lord thereof? And in Romans, chap. i., it is said that they are without excuse; and again, in the same place, by these words,--That which may be known of God is manifest in them-- we seem to be admonished that all which can be known of God may be made manifest by reasons obtained from no other source than the inspection of our own minds. I have, therefore, thought that it would not be unbecoming in me to inquire how and by what way, without going out of ourselves, God may be more easily and certainly known than the things of the world. (Letter of Dedication to the Dean and Doctors of the Faculty of Sacred Theology of Paris)

I just thought some of Descartes' thoughts regarding the inexcusability of man were interesting. He accurately describes the thinking of the natural man. For a moment, he sounds almost like a presuppostionalist.

 

[RamistThomist]

"...and this from the fact that I was in existence a short time ago it does not follow that I must be in existence now, unless some cause at this instant, so to speak, produces me anew, that is to say, conserves me. It is as a matter of fact perfectly clear and evident to all those who consider with attention the nature of time, that, in order to be conserved in each moment in which it endures, a substance has need of the same power and action as would be necessary to produce and create it anew..." (Mediatation III, Descartes).

Seems that Descartes holds to a very orthodox view of God's Providence and Sovereignty.

Additional interesting quote:

2. I have always been of the opinion that the two questions respecting God and the Soul were the chief of those that ought to be determined by help of Philosophy rather than of Theology; for although to us, the faithful, it be sufficient to hold as matters of faith, that the human soul does not perish with the body, and that God exists, it yet assuredly seems impossible ever to persuade infidels of the reality of any religion, or almost even any moral virtue, unless, first of all, those two things be proved to them by natural reason. And since in this life there are frequently greater rewards held out to vice than to virtue, few would prefer the right to the useful, if they were restrained neither by the fear of God nor the expectation of another life; and although it is quite true that the existence of God is to be believed since it is taught in the sacred Scriptures, and that, on the other hand, the sacred Scriptures are to be believed because they come from God (for since faith is a gift of God, the same Being who bestows grace to enable us to believe other things, can likewise impart of it to enable us to believe his own existence), nevertheless, this cannot be submitted to infidels, who would consider that the reasoning proceeded in a circle. And, indeed, I have observed that you, with all the other theologians, not only affirmed the sufficiency of natural reason for the proof of the existence of God, but also, that it may be inferred from sacred Scripture, that the knowledge of God is much clearer than of many created things, and that it is really so easy of acquisition as to leave those who do not possess it blameworthy. This is manifest from these words of the Book of Wisdom, chap. xiii., where it is said, Howbeit they are not to be excused; for if their understanding was so great that they could discern the world and the creatures, why did they not rather find out the Lord thereof? And in Romans, chap. i., it is said that they are without excuse; and again, in the same place, by these words,--That which may be known of God is manifest in them-- we seem to be admonished that all which can be known of God may be made manifest by reasons obtained from no other source than the inspection of our own minds. I have, therefore, thought that it would not be unbecoming in me to inquire how and by what way, without going out of ourselves, God may be more easily and certainly known than the things of the world. (Letter of Dedication to the Dean and Doctors of the Faculty of Sacred Theology of Paris)

I just thought some of Descartes' thoughts regarding the inexcusability of man were interesting. He accurately describes the thinking of the natural man. For a moment, he sounds almost like a presuppostionalist.

There are moments where he sounds like a riff on Anselm. But even parts of Romism technically can be very pro-sovereignty of God (see Aquinas). I wonder if the Ontological argument necessitates a view of providence.

 

[Justified]

"...and this from the fact that I was in existence a short time ago it does not follow that I must be in existence now, unless some cause at this instant, so to speak, produces me anew, that is to say, conserves me. It is as a matter of fact perfectly clear and evident to all those who consider with attention the nature of time, that, in order to be conserved in each moment in which it endures, a substance has need of the same power and action as would be necessary to produce and create it anew..." (Mediatation III, Descartes).

Seems that Descartes holds to a very orthodox view of God's Providence and Sovereignty.

Additional interesting quote:

2. I have always been of the opinion that the two questions respecting God and the Soul were the chief of those that ought to be determined by help of Philosophy rather than of Theology; for although to us, the faithful, it be sufficient to hold as matters of faith, that the human soul does not perish with the body, and that God exists, it yet assuredly seems impossible ever to persuade infidels of the reality of any religion, or almost even any moral virtue, unless, first of all, those two things be proved to them by natural reason. And since in this life there are frequently greater rewards held out to vice than to virtue, few would prefer the right to the useful, if they were restrained neither by the fear of God nor the expectation of another life; and although it is quite true that the existence of God is to be believed since it is taught in the sacred Scriptures, and that, on the other hand, the sacred Scriptures are to be believed because they come from God (for since faith is a gift of God, the same Being who bestows grace to enable us to believe other things, can likewise impart of it to enable us to believe his own existence), nevertheless, this cannot be submitted to infidels, who would consider that the reasoning proceeded in a circle. And, indeed, I have observed that you, with all the other theologians, not only affirmed the sufficiency of natural reason for the proof of the existence of God, but also, that it may be inferred from sacred Scripture, that the knowledge of God is much clearer than of many created things, and that it is really so easy of acquisition as to leave those who do not possess it blameworthy. This is manifest from these words of the Book of Wisdom, chap. xiii., where it is said, Howbeit they are not to be excused; for if their understanding was so great that they could discern the world and the creatures, why did they not rather find out the Lord thereof? And in Romans, chap. i., it is said that they are without excuse; and again, in the same place, by these words,--That which may be known of God is manifest in them-- we seem to be admonished that all which can be known of God may be made manifest by reasons obtained from no other source than the inspection of our own minds. I have, therefore, thought that it would not be unbecoming in me to inquire how and by what way, without going out of ourselves, God may be more easily and certainly known than the things of the world. (Letter of Dedication to the Dean and Doctors of the Faculty of Sacred Theology of Paris)

I just thought some of Descartes' thoughts regarding the inexcusability of man were interesting. He accurately describes the thinking of the natural man. For a moment, he sounds almost like a presuppostionalist.

There are moments where he sounds like a riff on Anselm. But even parts of Romism technically can be very pro-sovereignty of God (see Aquinas). I wonder if the Ontological argument necessitates a view of providence.

Jacob, interesting thought you have about the correlation between affirming the Ontological argument and providence.

Although Rene was a Romanist, it appears, on the surface, that he has a lot of orthodox views. I certainly haven't delved very far into him. Only our Lord knows what his heart was like. Anyone who knows more about Descartes want to chime in here, either about his philosophy or his theology?

 

[RamistThomist]

"...and this from the fact that I was in existence a short time ago it does not follow that I must be in existence now, unless some cause at this instant, so to speak, produces me anew, that is to say, conserves me. It is as a matter of fact perfectly clear and evident to all those who consider with attention the nature of time, that, in order to be conserved in each moment in which it endures, a substance has need of the same power and action as would be necessary to produce and create it anew..." (Mediatation III, Descartes).

Seems that Descartes holds to a very orthodox view of God's Providence and Sovereignty.

Additional interesting quote:

2. I have always been of the opinion that the two questions respecting God and the Soul were the chief of those that ought to be determined by help of Philosophy rather than of Theology; for although to us, the faithful, it be sufficient to hold as matters of faith, that the human soul does not perish with the body, and that God exists, it yet assuredly seems impossible ever to persuade infidels of the reality of any religion, or almost even any moral virtue, unless, first of all, those two things be proved to them by natural reason. And since in this life there are frequently greater rewards held out to vice than to virtue, few would prefer the right to the useful, if they were restrained neither by the fear of God nor the expectation of another life; and although it is quite true that the existence of God is to be believed since it is taught in the sacred Scriptures, and that, on the other hand, the sacred Scriptures are to be believed because they come from God (for since faith is a gift of God, the same Being who bestows grace to enable us to believe other things, can likewise impart of it to enable us to believe his own existence), nevertheless, this cannot be submitted to infidels, who would consider that the reasoning proceeded in a circle. And, indeed, I have observed that you, with all the other theologians, not only affirmed the sufficiency of natural reason for the proof of the existence of God, but also, that it may be inferred from sacred Scripture, that the knowledge of God is much clearer than of many created things, and that it is really so easy of acquisition as to leave those who do not possess it blameworthy. This is manifest from these words of the Book of Wisdom, chap. xiii., where it is said, Howbeit they are not to be excused; for if their understanding was so great that they could discern the world and the creatures, why did they not rather find out the Lord thereof? And in Romans, chap. i., it is said that they are without excuse; and again, in the same place, by these words,--That which may be known of God is manifest in them-- we seem to be admonished that all which can be known of God may be made manifest by reasons obtained from no other source than the inspection of our own minds. I have, therefore, thought that it would not be unbecoming in me to inquire how and by what way, without going out of ourselves, God may be more easily and certainly known than the things of the world. (Letter of Dedication to the Dean and Doctors of the Faculty of Sacred Theology of Paris)

I just thought some of Descartes' thoughts regarding the inexcusability of man were interesting. He accurately describes the thinking of the natural man. For a moment, he sounds almost like a presuppostionalist.

There are moments where he sounds like a riff on Anselm. But even parts of Romism technically can be very pro-sovereignty of God (see Aquinas). I wonder if the Ontological argument necessitates a view of providence.

Jacob, interesting thought you have about the correlation between affirming the Ontological argument and providence.

Although Rene was a Romanist, it appears, on the surface, that he has a lot of orthodox views. I certainly haven't delved very far into him. Only our Lord knows what his heart was like. Anyone who knows more about Descartes want to chime in here, either about his philosophy or his theology?

Well, not everything he said was wrong, though I firmly disagree with his dualism and approach to rationalism. And even though he gave bad answers to the mind-body problem, he did shed light on it and helped me see why answering it is important for theology (though not for reasons Descartes himself thought).

 

[Afterthought]

Anyone who knows more about Descartes want to chime in here, either about his philosophy or his theology?

It's been a while, so here are some things you can look for to confirm or deny as you read, but I seem to recall that he viewed the human will as being as free as God's will, and the relation between intellect and will didn't seem quite "orthodox." It is also worth noting that in the quotation snippet you posted, that is not the full doctrine of Providence but the preserving of all God's creatures and all their actions; so far as I am aware, this part of divine Providence is not controversial (the controversial parts have to do with the governing of the specifics of the Creation). However, the way it is worded, it sounds a bit like continuous creation, although it is probably just the wording. (edit: After Rev. Winzer's clarification below, I think the quotation's wording is much better.) Nevertheless, my memory seems to be the same as what Jacob has mentioned, that Descartes did hold to some stronger form of Providence than might be expected.


Descartes' view of philosophical doubt was seen by Turretin as a possible method in philosophy, but definitely not something to be done in theology. Descartes had an interesting view on the relation between science and theology; it reminds me of Turretin's view, but I don't want to equate the two since I don't have enough clarity yet to see whether there are subtle differences. Here's a quotation from Descartes on the matter:

"There is no doubt that the world was created right from the start with all the perfection which it now has. The sun and the earth existed in the beginning and... Adam and Eve were born not as babies but as fully grown people. This is the doctrine of the Christian faith and our natural reason convinces us that it was so.... Nevertheless, if we want to understand the nature of plants or of men, it is much better to consider how they can gradually grow from seeds than to consider how they were created by God in the beginning.... Thus we may be able to think up certain very simple and easily known principles which can serve, as it were, as the seeds from which we can demonstrate that the stars, the earth and indeed everything we observe in this visible world could have sprung (Principles of Philosophy III 45)."

I don't recall Descartes holding to total depravity, which might harm his account of human error and will. He also believed that God's goodness required that all human error was due to a misuse of man's faculties, and so a correct use of them would result in finding truth.

Descartes' reformulation of the ontological argument requires an "ideal causal principle:" (very roughly) described as all ideas must be caused by something that has as at least as much reality as the idea represents. This may be the most controversial part of the argument, but some (like Hobbes, If I recall correctly) disagreed that Descartes could have an idea of God. I've noticed in some later theological works (I think Shedd's was one of them), the argument tends to be criticized, the authors preferring Anselm's formulation.

 

[MW]

The issue on providential conservation comes down to whether it is a positive act and therefore a continued (not continuous) creation, which Theism teaches, or a negative act, which supposes God has endowed creation with its own sustainability, as in Deism.

 

[Justified]

Thank you all for shedding light on this.