Science as a Human Construct, Truth, Realism, and Relativism

[Afterthought]

Thread spawned from the sidetrail that started approximately here: http://www.puritanboard.com/f60/geocentrism-81871/index4.html#post1031539

I joined in shortly thereafter and asked Matthew Winzer a question concerning what precise way science can be said to arrive at truth, and if it doesn't arrive at truth, what does it arrive at and how can it have been so successful? The exchange took place as follows.

I don't think science (actual science) has the ability to contradict Scripture.

Science would say our brethren who have fallen asleep in Christ are dead and gone. Scripture provides an extensive view which enables us to say they live. Science can neither validate or invalidate that view. If the problem is with the word "contradict" you can supplement it with a word you feel comfortable with. But it shouldn't be surprising to a philosophical mind that "working," "functional" human constructs can contradict Scripture when it is obvious those constructs are not absolute. The desire to harmonise will only serve to create an environment in which neither are able to function according to their full scope.

In an effort to understand how "functional" science might relate to arriving at truth (if it actually does), I replied:

If the problem is with the word "contradict" you can supplement it with a word you feel comfortable with. But it shouldn't be surprising to a philosophical mind that "working," "functional" human constructs can contradict Scripture when it is obvious those constructs are not absolute.

I may be misunderstanding here, but the word "functional" suggests to me that the science isn't actually arriving at truth. Surely it must have some connection to reality though, or we would not expect the models to work as well as they do? So I guess my question is: Would it be accurate to say that what science finds is (provisionally) true with respect to its own domain and perspective? And so a sort of scientific realism can still be maintained (maybe it could be called "restricted" or "limited" realism)? It finds truth relative to its own perspective and deals with relative reality--relative to the limits science has placed on itself and carries with itself.

So for example, one could actually hold as provisionally true that the earth goes around the sun with respect to observation, appearances, experimentation, human thought forms, but that in absolute reality, geocentrism is the case? (Of course, as noted, it could be someday that geocentrism is what is held as provisionally true in the sciences) So then, holding geocentrism and heliocentrism only contradict if we do not qualify their propositions with respect to their perspectives on reality that they speak to, but when those qualifications are made, no real contradiction forms since the two statements are affirmed in different senses (one with respect to one perspective, the other with respect to another perspective, which perspective is ultimate reality)?

I know we have discussed this before, but I'm trying to wrap my mind around how science can be described as merely "functional" yet still be said to arrive at provisionally held truths. I certainly appreciate something Mr. Bottomly said in a previous thread about how heliocentrism is a shortcut we have found to describe God's providential governing of the universe, and it makes me wonder whether we might be able to hold a sort of scientific realism still, instead of being forced into instrumentalism, anti-realism, or other non-realist views, e.g., that heliocentrism is nothing but a model that works and has nothing to say about reality--whether that be absolute reality (which is rightfully denied to science, it seems to me) or relative reality.

To which I received a response:

So for example, one could actually hold as provisionally true that the earth goes around the sun with respect to observation, appearances, experimentation, human thought forms, but that in absolute reality, geocentrism is the case?

This seems to require dual realities, which I would steer away from because we would end up existentialist. There is only one reality; that is the one God created and reveals to us. Within this one reality there are diverse relationships, and these diversities are complicated by the fall. It will be impossible to go any further without writing a thesis on the worldview of Scripture, but reformed people in general accept that sinful human beings with all their follies are permitted to exercise dominion in this world under a restraining and forbearing Providence, and that this is subservient to the higher redemptive purpose whereby God saves, gathers, and builds up His elect in the world. This worldview should allow reformed people to work in the world and to accredit "scientific observation" according to a temporal perspective without granting ultimate epistemic validity to a fallen worldview.

I then asked the following question, which in order to focus on and answer, this thread was started. For Matthew Winzer suggested in response to my question:

I almost made my own thread on the matter for that reason

If you do perhaps we could explore science as an human construct, particularly with a book like Hawking's Grand Design as a foil. I would be interested to learn the current philosophic feeling on it. My own view is that Hawking has inadvertently done a service to Christian theism in outlining the relativism involved with "natural" science and the presuppositions which drive it.

The question that prompted this response was:

This worldview should allow reformed people to work in the world and to accredit "scientific observation" according to a temporal perspective without granting ultimate epistemic validity to a fallen worldview.

It is this part that I am having difficulty understanding: What does it mean to "accredit "scientific observation" according to a temporal perspective"? That this means we can accredit it as provisionally true or as a relative reality has been denied. Would "perspective on reality" be a better term? Could there be multiple perspectives for a single reality? Basically, if this does allow a type of scientific realism, what sort of realism is it, and if it does not allow for realism what is it allowing for? It seems impossible to deny a scientific realism and not hold science to be (provisionally, given its probabilistic nature) true in some manner (if truth corresponds with reality), so this question implicitly also asks: if this allows science to be true, precisely in what way is it true? If no realism is being held to, then is science giving nothing but convenient fictions? If so, then why do the models work so well; even well enough that the assumption of their truth allows them to predict things theoretically that are not confirmed experimentally until later; even well enough to sometimes begrudgingly convince even hardened skeptics of their "truth"? (I realize I am stretching terminology a bit; "realism" or "anti-realism" in the philosophy of science is referring to unobservables, not observables)

I remember when we discussed Turretin speaking of how seemingly contradictory statements between philosophy and theology could be resolved because philosophy was speaking according to natural causes while theology supernatural. While that is limited to understanding the difference between ordinary Providence and the miraculous, perhaps it can be extended to include our observations of ordinary Providence, and the resolution of the miraculous with ordinary Providence could be understood as a special case? If so, how does this resolution differ from saying heliocentrism is provisionally, observationally true while geocentrism is true according to absolute reality?

As another question, is there something special going on with the heliocentrism vs geocentrism debate? Because in this particular case "location" and "movement" actually are relative notions (and I'm guessing you mean philosophically relative; not necessarily scientifically relative), can we actually say both are true in different senses, though we could not say that in general with similar situations?

Finally, your mention of "worldview" reminded me of another geocentrist who claimed that we can trust science to deliver us truth when it is dealing with observation, while we can be suspicious when it is dealing with theory. So like some YECs distinguish between operational and origins science, the former being trustworthy and must be non-contradictory to Scripture while the latter not (but since not trustworthy, we must bring origins science into non-contradiction with a Scriptural worldview; hence the use of Creation science); this fellow distinguished between observation and theory, the former being trustworthy and must be non-contradictory to Scripture while the latter not (but since not trustworthy, we must bring theories into non-contradiction with a Scriptural worldview; hence the use of scientific geocentrist models).

Would this be one of the ideas you have in mind (without having you to write out a thesis!)? While observations are theory-laden, sure, there is still a distinction between observation and a theory to explain them, and as that geocentrist attempted to demonstrate, coming up with a theory involves the processes of the mind in such a way that they can be worldview dependent, and so subject to the noetic effects of sin (edit: I might as well link to it: http://www.csc.twu.ca/byl/physdraft.doc).

So what is the answer to this question? Does empirical science arrive at truth? Is it necessarily relative? How and what can we hold to be ultimate reality while "accredit[ing] "scientific observation" according to a temporal perspective"? Taking Hawking's book as an example of empirical science driven to a particular position, what shall we make of science as a human construct? Is Hawking consistent? Is that where empirical science otherwise leads? Is his reasoning sound? And what relation might this have to Christianity?

Is there a way to hold a sort of scientific realism, given the limitations of empirical science? And if so what realism might it be, and what relation does it have to ultimate realiy?

(Turretin was discussed in this previous thread: http://www.puritanboard.com/f15/turretin-solves-creation-evolution-debate-72265/)

 

[MW]

Now that we have a thread on science as an human construct I think it is safe to introduce the following quotation from Stephen Hawking (The Grand Design, 2010, pp. 41, 42):

“So which is real, the Ptolemaic or the Copernican system? Although it is not uncommon for people to say that Copernicus proved Ptolemy wrong, that is not true. As in the case of our normal view versus that of the goldfish, one can use either picture as a model of the universe, for our observations of the heavens can be explained by assuming either the earth or the sun to be at rest. Despite its role in philosophical debates over the nature of our universe, the real advantage of the Copernican system is simply that the equations of motion are much simpler in the frame of reference in which the sun is at rest.”

In this work Hawking brings to light some interesting presuppositions relating to empirical science. First, the relativism he introduces serves to deconstruct "science" as a final authority on the nature of reality. Secondly, his "determinism" shows that the non-theist can provide no moral value to his truth-claims. Thirdly (and this is more an observation from the history of ideas perspective), his radical empiricism inadvertently demonstrates that without Christian theistic presuppositions there could not have been the development of natural science as we know it. Christian maintenance of intelligent design enabled the development of an orderly and rational framework which cannot be accounted for on the basis of any other presupposition.

 

[Philip]

Science, so far as I can see, is concerned with repeatable physical phenomena and the relationship of cause to effect. Insofar as it stays within these limits, its findings may be said to represent truth, but not ultimate reality.

 

[Afterthought]

In this work Hawking brings to light some interesting presuppositions relating to empirical science. First, the relativism he introduces serves to deconstruct "science" as a final authority on the nature of reality. Secondly, his "determinism" shows that the non-theist can provide no moral value to his truth-claims. Thirdly (and this is more an observation from the history of ideas perspective), his radical empiricism inadvertently demonstrates that without Christian theistic presuppositions there could not have been the development of natural science as we know it. Christian maintenance of intelligent design enabled the development of an orderly and rational framework which cannot be accounted for on the basis of any other presupposition.

Very interesting! I found this overview of his work too. I have ordered the book from my university library. It seems that Hawking's view on geocentrism in particular and science in general is motivated by his view on models, but if it isn't, then I'm sure he knows and understands more of relativity theory than I may ever in my lifetime.


I'm not entirely sure what question to ask next. Perhaps I should mull on things a little more first, but just to try to move things forward....

So now, we have agreed that science cannot be the final authority on the nature of reality. What then, is left? Are we left with convenient fictions? Are we left with mathematics only (since stripped of theory, physics becomes mathematical models of observational data)? If science can legitimately represent truth when dealing with physical phenomena (as Philip has suggested above), wouldn't that automatically let it represent truth on geocentrism vs heliocentrism (This would seem to be the YEC position on what they call operations science)? But that can't seem to be the case if Hawking is correct on the relativity of empiricism? His view actually seems to come closer to what I linked to from Dr. Byl, that science deals with observations, but many theories could explain them, and we must (do?) choose a theory that fits our views of the world (presumably, a geocentric model to match what Scripture says). I don't see how one can escape a non-realist or anti-realist position while holding to that, especially since such arguments tend to be part of the anti-realist arguments.

 

[Philip]

I might recommend Michael Polanyi as a counterpoint to Hawking (and sadly I don't have Personal Knowledge beside me at the moment). At any rate, he argues that science is a tradition of methods and theories which are passed from generation to generation and build on one another, as any tradition will, but also free to question itself if need be.

 

[au5t1n]

Sent from my XT557 using Tapatalk 2

 

[JimmyH]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GiPe1OiKQuk

 

[Afterthought]

^

I might recommend Michael Polanyi as a counterpoint to Hawking (and sadly I don't have Personal Knowledge beside me at the moment). At any rate, he argues that science is a tradition of methods and theories which are passed from generation to generation and build on one another, as any tradition will, but also free to question itself if need be.

Found him in my library. Unusual when my school library has all the books I'm looking for (it's relatively small)!

 

[VictorBravo]

Science, so far as I can see, is concerned with repeatable physical phenomena and the relationship of cause to effect. Insofar as it stays within these limits, its findings may be said to represent truth, but not ultimate reality.

I'd modify this a bit to say that a good scientist always knows that he cannot demonstrate with full confidence any kind of causality. There are always actual or potential confounding variables. That acknowledgment ought to temper the empiricist's assertion that he has arrived at "truth."

 

[Loopie]

If I may jump in here, I think that there is a way that we can have a balanced view between Scripture and Science. First of all, it is important to recognize that the same God who gave us His Word is the same God who created the universe. In this 'objective' sense, there is NO real contradiction between what Scripture speaks about ultimate reality, and what ultimate reality really is. All contradictions between the two are merely 'apparent' or 'seemingly'.

Now, I hold to the view that real science is the act of seeking to understand and discover the reality that God designed. I recognize that real science is empirical in nature, and that when it goes beyond its bounds it no longer becomes science (but instead delves into the realm of history, philosophy, theology, etc.).

So when I 'empirically' (through my senses) see and feel a chair in front of me, I believe that I really exist and that there really is a chair. Now, there certainly is some room by which I can try to figure out how the chair functions, how it supports weight, how it resists various forces. Once I try to figure out how the chair came to exist in the first place, I am starting to delve into the realm of history, which has its own principles and methods by which it seeks truth. There might be various presuppositions, assumptions, and attitudes that cloud my thinking. Certainly, as a human my sin nature interferes immeasurably.

This brings me to my next point. I argued earlier that Scripture (what God has actually spoken) and Creation (what the universe actually is) will not ever contradict each other. But, there may be two ways in which an 'apparent' contradiction appears. First, me as a sinful and finite human being could have an improper interpretation of Scripture. God does not promise us that as soon as we become Christians we will have a perfect hermeneutic. Certainly the Holy Spirit guides us into all truth, but it seems this is part of a lifelong sanctification. So if I bring certain unwarranted presuppositions, traditions, and assumptions to my reading of Scripture, it might lead me to see an 'apparent contradiction' with the universe around me.

The second way in which 'apparent' contradictions appear is that I might be misinterpreting the 'empirical' evidence that I am seeing. All facts are interpreted facts, and I might be wrongly interpreting the facts of the universe that I see. I might be bringing unwarranted presuppositions and assumptions to my study of the universe, and so this might lead me to see 'apparent' contradictions.

Now, I understand that many people would argue that 'Scripture trumps Science'. But what exactly does that mean? I would argue that it does not mean we should ALWAYS assume that our hermeneutic is correct, and that our fault must ALWAYS be with our study of the universe. To me, what it means is that if we are going to bring unwarranted assumptions to something, it is more likely that we will do so in our study of the universe than our study of Scripture. There are several reasons why I make this point.

1) God's special revelation is direct, and it is the most clear form of communication (words). The truth of the universe has to be discovered, and it is not as clear or direct as actual words. It is more likely therefore that one will wrongly interpret the universe than wrongly interpret the Scripture (as a general rule).

2) Humans view the universe through the lens of sin from the moment they are born. In fact, it may be many years, or even decades, before a person is even exposed to Scripture. Furthermore, even if a person is exposed to Scripture at a very young age, they spend every waking moment viewing the universe through the lens of sin, and only hear or read the Word of God for short periods of time. It therefore seems reasonable to suggest that whenever a person becomes a Christian, there is much more 'baggage' that needs to be dealt with regarding their understanding of the universe than there is regarding their study of Scripture. This might be different based on how many theological traditions a person brings to the table, but in general, a person who has never seen or heard Scripture until their salvation is going to have less theological presuppositions to work through regarding God's Word than scientific/materialistic presuppositions to work through regarding their view of the universe. Again, this does not mean that hermeneutics is easy for a new believer. All I mean to suggest is that we are so entrenched in viewing the universe through the lens of sin for our entire lives that there is much work that needs to be done to 'correct' our previously incorrect (and perhaps unseen) assumptions.

It is because of those two reasons that I would suggest that 'Scripture trumps Science'. But again, this does not mean that I always assume my interpretation of one is ALWAYS correct. No matter what, if I come across an 'apparent' contradiction, I must ask myself if I am bringing unwarranted assumptions, traditions, or presuppositions to my understanding of Scripture or to my understanding of the universe. My FIRST move will be to do a self-assessment of my view of the universe, since that is more likely to be the area that is causing problems due to my lack of knowledge, my history of viewing the universe through the lens of sin, and the fact that the universe is not as explicit or direct as God's Word.

In the end, I think having a balanced view is important. A PROPER interpretation of Scripture and TRUE Science do not contradict each other. They compliment and harmonize together. I remember hearing a sermon once where the Pastor (and I paraphrase here) said that if the Bible said that humans had three arms, then we must conclude without hesitation that it was so, even if there were not an ounce of evidence outside of the Bible to verify it. My response to that statement is this: If the Bible said that humans had three arms, then it would mean that this was how God created the universe (specifically mankind). If this were the universe that God created, we WOULD likely see evidence of that. It is a matter of evidence-inference. IF the Bible is God's word, then we SHOULD see perfect harmony between what is spoken of in Scripture and what is seen in the universe. Of course, this assumes that the person studying both the Bible and the Universe is interpreting BOTH perfectly, and not bringing unwarranted assumptions to the table.

 

[au5t1n]

In the geocentrism thread, Rev. Ruddell made a reference to "operationalism," which I believe is the philosophy of science proposed by Dr. Gordon Clark. I have read one work by Dr. Clark - Religion, Reason, and Revelation - and it did not include a treatment of this principle explicitly, so I am unfamiliar with it except by way of summary. How does that philosophy relate to this discussion?

Rev. Winzer, is Dr. Clark's operationalism basically the same thing you are advocating? Are there differences you would highlight? Also, what reading has helped shape your own view on this or what would you recommend reading?

 

[Philip]

I'd modify this a bit to say that a good scientist always knows that he cannot demonstrate with full confidence any kind of causality. There are always actual or potential confounding variables. That acknowledgment ought to temper the empiricist's assertion that he has arrived at "truth."

I suppose it depends on the kind of certainty that science is interested in. Is science interested in absolute certainty? Or in the ordinary everyday kind of certainty?

 

[MW]

Rev. Winzer, is Dr. Clark's operationalism basically the same thing you are advocating? Are there differences you would highlight? Also, what reading has helped shape your own view on this or what would you recommend reading?

I think it is important to validate sense perception from a common sense realist perspective while limiting its functionality in accord with presuppositionalism. Dr. Clark's Scripturalism and axiomatic approach would probably not allow for sense perception and observation as providing genuine knowledge. If I remember correctly such observations would be categorised as "opinion," in keeping with Plato's idealism. Clark's Philosophy of Science and Belief in God is a suggestive little book which I would recommend for the purpose of casting down the imaginations and pretensions of modern empiricism.

Van Til's Survey of Epistemology was formative for me, in connection with the Free Church apologetics of Hetherington and Buchanan, and reading those works in the common sense tradition which moved in a presuppositional direction, e.g. McCosh and Orr. More recent authors like Plantinga and Nash have helped to shape my views of presuppositional realism. Reading people like McGrath and Lennox on one side and the new atheists on the other has helped me to see the need of deconstructing the claims of empiricists. Supplemented by reading in the history of Christianity and noting its service to the inductive sciences it is apparent that Christian theism alone provides the necessary presuppositions for "design" which is fundamental to the scientific enterprise.

 

[Afterthought]

I have read one work by Dr. Clark - Religion, Reason, and Revelation - and it did not include a treatment of this principle explicitly, so I am unfamiliar with it except by way of summary. How does that philosophy relate to this discussion?

It relates to it as a form of instrumentalism. I don't recall the precise form that operationalism takes (I think it might construe meaning of scientific theories in terms of the operations that the scientist performs?), but the instrumentalist philosophy of science claims that theories are merely tools, instruments for understanding and explaining the world. Theories then should be evaluated based on how well they explain and predict the data rather than how closely they approximate or represent reality. Unlike realism, it does not claim that scientific theories accurately represent objective reality (even in a provisional sense). Instead, it makes no claim about their reality or not; the only concern is whether the theory can explain the data (that is, effectively describe and predict it). So it relates to this discussion as one view of how science connects to reality: that there is no claim about the truth value of a scientific theory one way or the other, often because the claim is said to be meaningless and can't be assigned a truth value. However, instrumentalism is often classified as a form of anti-realism, which makes some sense since it denies some of the claims of scientific realism.

Here is some brief discussion on realism vs instrumentalism: Scientific Progress (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) Here is some longer discussion: http://www.units.muohio.edu/eduleadership/faculty/quantz/courses/beebee3.pdf and REalism2 Scientific Realism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Dr. Byl referenced above advocates instrumentalism: Theological Perspective on Science 08 | Reformation International College


Edit: "According to the idea of model-dependent realism...our brains interpret the input from our sensory organs by making a model of the outside world. We form mental concepts of our home, trees, other people, the electricity that flows from wall sockets, atoms, molecules, and other universes. These mental concepts are the only reality we can know. There is no model-independent test of reality. It follows that a well-constructed model creates a reality of its own." The Grand Design, p.172

 

[Afterthought]

Interesting essay on the subject, arguing for a Kuhnian sort of view and ending with instrumentalism:
http://www.angelfire.com/falcon/ddd_chc82/Papers/ScienceAsParadigmatic.pdf

I'd love to hear your thoughts on it, Mr. Winzer, but since it is perhaps longer than you may currently have time for (though only about 10 pages), I guess my main question would be:

To what degree does empirical science unveil truth, if at all, given the capability of genuine sensory knowledge?

The subsidiary questions would be: (1) Would man, even before the Fall, be able to construct a science that does align with God's Word without contradicting it?

(2) Is there an ultimate resolution between our observational science and Scripture, perhaps only accessible to God, so that in ultimate reality, they do not contradict?

(3) If so, would it be good to call that hypothetically non-conflicting science "true science" and any science that does conflict "false science"?

(4) Does conflict merely arise from interpreting the data incorrectly? That is, if the data was interpreted correctly, would there then be no conflict between science and Scripture? If so, it seems that if the Creation scientist is incorrect, it would seem to me that the incorrect view is only incorrect as a matter of degree. Maybe there should be a distinction between observational science and science that deals with the miraculous? The former having an ultimate resolution with Scripture, while the latter having none, since the data could only be interpreted incorrectly if interpreted empirically?

Additionally, I have gone through Hawking's work, but I'm still not done thinking about what questions to ask/comments to add on it yet. I guess as a preliminary comment, I can confirm that his view on geocentrism expressed above does arise from a philosophical position. However, whether he would acknowledge that or not, I am not yet sure, since he proclaims the death of philosophy in the first chapter with empirical science taking its room.

 

[MW]

We must recognise the validity of sensory perception, otherwise we will fall into the occasionalist trap. For us to know particulars there must be a legitimate identification of things. Sensory perception, however, depends on a priori rationality. By affirming both sensory perception and a priori rationality we avoid idealism on the one hand and radical empiricism on the other. As far as I can see, the only school to provide a solid basis for affirming both is common sense realism with its foundational approach to basic beliefs.

The limitation of scientific constructs ultimately rests on the limitation of human knowledge. Whatever epistemology one adopts, the thing known is neither qualitatively not quantitatively absolute. One thing is only known in relation to another, which is itself known in relation to another, etc. This infinte egress can only be overcome by a commitment to basic beliefs, and basic beliefs can only be substantiated by an ultimate Source of truth which absolutely and unchangeably knows all things, and those things can only be known in this way because they are the works of His hands and fulfil His eternal purpose.

 

[Afterthought]

I can see better why you claim that only the Christian perspective allows for empirical science to function. However, if I am understanding correctly, basic beliefs allow one to overcome the problem of knowing things only in relation to each other? If so, then would basic beliefs allow science to find absolutes and universals? And hence any conflict between science and Scripture can be ultimately resolved by doing science better or interpreting the data in a different manner (i.e., in either case, doing "true science" alleviates the conflict), instead of there being an irreducible element of conflict between the two due to human epistemic limitations?

As another question: Since God does not have these epistemic limits, would God have the ultimate resolution between these conflicts we find? And so there is hypothetically a human interpretation of the data or a methodology of science that resolves the conflict, though only God may know that resolution (perhaps it may even never be possible for humans to know the resolution?)? And that is what we can call "true science"?

 

[Afterthought]

Bumping.

 

[Afterthought]

However, if I am understanding correctly, basic beliefs allow one to overcome the problem of knowing things only in relation to each other? If so, then would basic beliefs allow science to find absolutes and universals? And hence any conflict between science and Scripture can be ultimately resolved by doing science better or interpreting the data in a different manner (i.e., in either case, doing "true science" alleviates the conflict), instead of there being an irreducible element of conflict between the two due to human epistemic limitations?

I wonder if a problem with this question is that once basic beliefs are invoked, one is no longer doing empirical science? Basic beliefs would be necessary to make sense of the empirical data, but they would not provide the content that empirical data provides and so could not be used by science to generate absolutes and universals?

 

[Afterthought]

Bumping for Rev. Winzer. My questions were on this post.

 

[MW]

Bumping for Rev. Winzer. My questions were on this post.

If I am understanding the question properly, it comes down to the age-old problem of universals and particulars. Empirical science is inductive. It seeks to move from particulars to universals. For that very reason it can never be complete until it has empirically examined the universe completely and complexly (which, on the basis of my knowledge, I predict will never happen). By its very nature its findings remain working solutions awaiting to be disproven. When they are alleged to be more than this it can only be on the basis of faith -- belief founded on testimony. At that point it becomes a battle of presupposition. As long as the presuppositions are brought out into the open they can be examined and discussed. When, however, so-called science raises itself above faith, and pretends to operate without faith, there is no basis for a fair and impartial examination.

 

[Afterthought]

Empirical science is inductive. It seeks to move from particulars to universals. For that very reason it can never be complete until it has empirically examined the universe completely and complexly (which, on the basis of my knowledge, I predict will never happen).

Some point out that induction does not always move from particulars to universals (I don't recall which logic textbook I found that in but might be able to find it later this month) and that empirical science doesn't truly use induction but abduction. If you happen to be aware of these possible defenses of empirical science's abilities, I'd love to hear a response, but from reading your post, my bigger questions are: (1) If science requires faith in order to hold its findings to be universals (i.e., more than just working solutions awaiting to be disproven), then (a) even Christian presuppositions or basic beliefs cannot be used to substantiate this faith and so the scientist who is a Christian cannot hold his results to be universals, and (b) even Christian presuppositions are not enough to solve the problem of induction and so we cannot say (for example) that we know who our mother is (or much of anything, since it seems much, if not all, of our knowledge comes from induction)?

And (2) (my bigger question) You have mentioned that there is a hypothetical stopping point for science in which it can finally generate universals (though man will probably never attain to it). Hence, do all conflicts between empirical science and what the Scriptures teach ultimately have some resolution in reality that man could hypothetically know? Or if it is impossible even for man to hypothetically find a resolution to the conflict, is it possible for God? Or is science such a human construct, such a category of thought, such a picture of reality, that there is no resolution possible by anyone, even hypothetically, because it speaks according to a distinct category and perspective from the category and perspective of ultimate reality?

This second question is important because it relates to the often repeated and presupposed, "True science never contradicts what the Scriptures teach because God is truth and the author of both." (For an example of how this statement is presupposed true, some say that the data of science is being misinterpreted, and so they get out their Creation Science magazines or will say the evidence actually shows what the Scriptures teach; or they will say the data isn't being misinterpreted but someday new data will come in to confirm what the Scriptures teach.) I sometimes wonder whether the answer to these questions depends on what area of empirical science is being investigated. Perhaps it is possible to break it into four areas, each having a different answer: theories about the past, theories about the present (geocentrism vs a-centrism), the appearance of age (old earth vs young earth), and the appearance of historical events (evolution vs Creationism or exploding stars vs created stars).

 

[MW]

I suggest that, if "deduction" is part of the process, it is not properly empirical. It is likely that the person who argues it is deductive is trying to give the science some kind of absolute value based on "absolute truths" it does not intrinsically possess.

My point is that empirical science never actually gets to universals. Whether Christian or secular it requires the universals of the system to give it this universality. Even 1+1=2 has no moral value without some moral system to support it.

Christian presuppositions give a basis for induction, and that more sure than non-Christian presuppositions. Modern science grew out of the belief in a personally and morally ordered universe, which was itself founded on the Christian doctrine of creation and providence. Naturalistic science may have denied the Christian heritage but it has not given anything like a credible basis for its aims.

As noted previously, science enables us to function in the here and now. Scripture picks up on this at various points. Red sky in the night sailor's delight is echoed in Scripture. But as our Lord teaches there are more important concerns which we must not overlook. Those concerns we might classify as ultimate truth. We do not need to be 100% certain on everything; we just need to be sure on the things that matter most.

Raymond, I hope that helps a little. The medium is very limiting and typing can be tiring. Please excuse me if I am unable to answer in the detail you desire.

 

[Afterthought]

It helps to some degree. Every time we discuss this subject I think I get a little closer to understanding. I wish I could just simply understand so that I would not have to continue spending mental energy from time to time on understanding science's relation to the teaching of Scripture, but some things probably just take time to grasp. I agree about the limitations of this medium. It is a good medium for looking at particular topics but not nearly so good for putting together the details in a systematic fashion. Maybe some day I'll have to find a way to Australia to discuss this in the detail I am looking for! Alternatively, maybe you can write a book on this once you finish that commentary on Revelation.

In the past when I've been unable to put together what you were saying, it has turned out that I was not assuming the same things as you or not defining something in the same way or not aware of some background knowledge. I'll give it a think, and maybe I'll respond tomorrow or next week, though I certainly understand that you cannot go into the detail that I am looking for. There are some other interesting directions available to take this thread, and maybe I could present my own understanding of science and see what you think.

 

[Alan D. Strange]

I think it is important to validate sense perception from a common sense realist perspective while limiting its functionality in accord with presuppositionalism. Dr. Clark's Scripturalism and axiomatic approach would probably not allow for sense perception and observation as providing genuine knowledge. If I remember correctly such observations would be categorised as "opinion," in keeping with Plato's idealism. Clark's Philosophy of Science and Belief in God is a suggestive little book which I would recommend for the purpose of casting down the imaginations and pretensions of modern empiricism.
Van Til's Survey of Epistemology was formative for me, in connection with the Free Church apologetics of Hetherington and Buchanan, and reading those works in the common sense tradition which moved in a presuppositional direction, e.g. McCosh and Orr. More recent authors like Plantinga and Nash have helped to shape my views of presuppositional realism. Reading people like McGrath and Lennox on one side and the new atheists on the other has helped me to see the need of deconstructing the claims of empiricists. Supplemented by reading in the history of Christianity and noting its service to the inductive sciences it is apparent that Christian theism alone provides the necessary presuppositions for "design" which is fundamental to the scientific enterprise.

Somehow or other, I missed this thread. I just read this little apologia of sorts of Matthew for his approach and find it, as a student of both Hodge and Van Til, quite close to my own. Plantinga's most recent work deconstructing naturalism (Where the Conflict Really Lies), while retaining all the apologetic deficiencies of his approach (he does not insist that Christianity is the necessary precondition for the intelligibility of all things), does a thorough job exposing the deficiencies of naturalism. Many can help us with the internal critique of unbelief as that comes to expression in its scientific theories while leaving to others the task of constructing the positive warrant for Christian (biblical) theism.

All this is to say that I appreciate this discussion and Matthew's approach here.

Peace,
Alan

 

[JimmyH]

For the educationally challenged amongst us, like myself ....... Inductive reasoning - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Since this discussion, while I think I basically understand it, is probably 'over my head', perhaps my 'inductive reasoning' is mistaken ? But I cannot help but think of our Lord and Thomas ;

26 And after eight days again his disciples were within, and Thomas with them: then came Jesus, the doors being shut, and stood in the midst, and said, Peace be unto you.

27 Then saith he to Thomas, Reach hither thy finger, and behold my hands; and reach hither thy hand, and thrust it into my side: and be not faithless, but believing.

28 And Thomas answered and said unto him, My Lord and my God.

29 Jesus saith unto him, Thomas, because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed: blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed.

 

[MW]

For the educationally challenged amongst us, like myself ....... Inductive reasoning - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jimmy, in this case Wikipedia provides an helpful definition. Note, it seeks "to supply strong evidence for (not absolute proof of) the truth of the conclusion." It simply cannot provide an universal, absolute view. Any universal, absolute claim must therefore be derived from some other universal, absolute framework.

Prof. Strange, thankyou for the word of support. We are blessed to have so many able defenders of the faith in our Reformed tradition from which we can draw. It is helpful to see others agree with the need to combine our realist and presuppositional apologetics.

Raymond, of making many books there is no end. I encourage you to be patient with these kinds of subjects. Slow and steady wins the race.