Theological Books
Puritan Board Freshman
How identical can possible worlds be to one another? In other words, can world W and world X be identical--that is all things fixed--up until point t and then become different?
For instance, let's say W consists of actualized (and yet to be actualized) properties (or states of affairs) 1, 2, 3, 4... 100. Let us then say at 23 a person turns left at a stop sign. Is it possible, then, that in X, consisting of the same [fixed] states of affairs from 1-23, can exist (yet not be actualized), but at 23 the person turns left at a stop sign?
Or, in other words, up this point in time in the actualized world I signed on the computer and typed this question. But, in X, everything was identically the same in the past, but instead of signing on this website I went to check my email, planing on signing on here later.
Can all things be equal in possible world X and actual world W and yet differences occur?
For instance, let's say W consists of actualized (and yet to be actualized) properties (or states of affairs) 1, 2, 3, 4... 100. Let us then say at 23 a person turns left at a stop sign. Is it possible, then, that in X, consisting of the same [fixed] states of affairs from 1-23, can exist (yet not be actualized), but at 23 the person turns left at a stop sign?
Or, in other words, up this point in time in the actualized world I signed on the computer and typed this question. But, in X, everything was identically the same in the past, but instead of signing on this website I went to check my email, planing on signing on here later.
Can all things be equal in possible world X and actual world W and yet differences occur?