Scottish Common Sense Realism

Status
Not open for further replies.
For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right?

That is asking it to do something it isn't meant to do, though. I take it as a given that Christian ethics is about following the will of God and is therefore always and only revealed ethics that will only sometimes overlap with secular ethics.

CSR, in other words is not, nor is it meant to be, good for everything. It's one of many analytical tools in the intellectual toolkit.

How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method?

What sort of beliefs did you have in mind?

Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs?

What you call presuppositional beliefs I would categorize as prephilosophical commitments that only manifest propositionally post hoc and on an ad hoc basis.


Than we agree that CSR has limitations. But I would say only Christian ethics can account for right or wrong, never secular ethics. Even if they can identify moral norms they do so in contradiction to common sense, since in the end common sense is God's revealed sense. I admit that I'm stretching the definitions of these terms a bit but I'm only theologically qualifying them. By complex beliefs I mean ones like the abortion debate. I think we mean the same thing by presuppositions roughly.

Who says CSR was originally a secular ethic? Thomas Reid is very clear in identifying God as the one who creates us the way we are.

Of course it has limitations (but so does every methodology; Try using TAG against Roman Catholics, for example). There are always defeaters (which is what we would employ against the pro-choice advocate) that can undermine belief. Until we see a defeater for the belief in Christian Theism, we are warranted (per CSR) in belief in God.
You will either have no Ethick or
A Christian one.

I think you mean to say "no consistent ethic." Anyway, it doesn't touch Reid's position, since Reid began his epistemology with God.

Well that assumes a neutral space that is not Christian in principle. Since nothing can be nonchristian in principle at all we assume that either Reid was a Vantillian or something else.
 
well I think the criticism is more aimed at those beliefs that both sides disagree on but both have warrant for. For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right? Don't get me wrong Plantinga and Wolterstorff are amazing thinkers but their CSR, In my humble opinion, break down at this point. Where does one appeal to to decide this sort of situation?

Notice how subjective common sense beliefs become in this model. They are only obvious to me, they may not be obvious to anyone else. This works fine when most people agree on stuff. But as we all know that's not the case. In this model it seems to me that both the pro-lifers and the pro-choices are on their own ground being "rational", within their own model of rationality, and have warrant for their beliefs but common sense alone could never resolve the conflict without giving some over arching definition of "common sense" to apply, which of course is impossible to get everyone to agree on.

It seems to me that this model is useful in disputes over immediate beliefs but in more complex beliefs it may hit a brick wall so to speak. If I have over extended the scope of this model than I am wrong and that's fine. You see I use Plantinga and Wolterstorff as far as they go but I recognize that at some point, following Van Til, that we will reach an impasse of a pressupositional nature. And only there can the debate be decided. It seems to me that this model is a wonderful supplement to Van Til's and has much to offer us.

But also it seems a bit weak to me that warrant is the prized goal of epistemology. How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method? Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs? Again don't take me wrong I love Plantinga and Wolterstorff but I find their work helpful but possibly incomplete.

I think what happens here is within a Christian thought. With that said I think if you link Free Will and Common Sense Realism with the saved only you get the correct response to most questions in life. I have been a Christian a long time and I really have not see CSR go in diff directions. Also to the Atheist that sounds so profound at times will usually have to go back and reaffirm what they have said with there CSR and change their position several times.


Well I think that CSR may at times allow too much neutrality to the unbeliever.
 
Well that assumes a neutral space that is not Christian in principle.

It depends on what one means. If the neutral space isn't really neutral, then what does one have to fear in using it? If reality really does reflect God's revelation and design, then such should be apparent to reason. When we say that reason is neutral ground, we merely acknowledge that it is mutually-agreed-upon ground. It is the ground from which one starts in the philosophical endeavour.
 
For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right?

That is asking it to do something it isn't meant to do, though. I take it as a given that Christian ethics is about following the will of God and is therefore always and only revealed ethics that will only sometimes overlap with secular ethics.

CSR, in other words is not, nor is it meant to be, good for everything. It's one of many analytical tools in the intellectual toolkit.

How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method?

What sort of beliefs did you have in mind?

Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs?

What you call presuppositional beliefs I would categorize as prephilosophical commitments that only manifest propositionally post hoc and on an ad hoc basis.


Than we agree that CSR has limitations. But I would say only Christian ethics can account for right or wrong, never secular ethics. Even if they can identify moral norms they do so in contradiction to common sense, since in the end common sense is God's revealed sense. I admit that I'm stretching the definitions of these terms a bit but I'm only theologically qualifying them. By complex beliefs I mean ones like the abortion debate. I think we mean the same thing by presuppositions roughly.

Who says CSR was originally a secular ethic? Thomas Reid is very clear in identifying God as the one who creates us the way we are.

Of course it has limitations (but so does every methodology; Try using TAG against Roman Catholics, for example). There are always defeaters (which is what we would employ against the pro-choice advocate) that can undermine belief. Until we see a defeater for the belief in Christian Theism, we are warranted (per CSR) in belief in God.
You will either have no Ethick or
A Christian one.

I think you mean to say "no consistent ethic." Anyway, it doesn't touch Reid's position, since Reid began his epistemology with God.

Well that assumes a neutral space that is not Christian in principle. Since nothing can be nonchristian in principle at all we assume that either Reid was a Vantillian or something else.

What does this actually mean? I've bent over backwards to prove that Reid didn't hold to an autonomous ethics. I've long had the suspicion that Van Tillians really don't want to know what Reid taught (see the dearth of quotations by Van Tillians of Reid).

Ironically, in Survey of Christian Epistemology (pp. 132-134) Van Til grudglingly conceded that Reid was in fact right.
 
well I think the criticism is more aimed at those beliefs that both sides disagree on but both have warrant for. For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right? Don't get me wrong Plantinga and Wolterstorff are amazing thinkers but their CSR, In my humble opinion, break down at this point. Where does one appeal to to decide this sort of situation?

Notice how subjective common sense beliefs become in this model. They are only obvious to me, they may not be obvious to anyone else. This works fine when most people agree on stuff. But as we all know that's not the case. In this model it seems to me that both the pro-lifers and the pro-choices are on their own ground being "rational", within their own model of rationality, and have warrant for their beliefs but common sense alone could never resolve the conflict without giving some over arching definition of "common sense" to apply, which of course is impossible to get everyone to agree on.

It seems to me that this model is useful in disputes over immediate beliefs but in more complex beliefs it may hit a brick wall so to speak. If I have over extended the scope of this model than I am wrong and that's fine. You see I use Plantinga and Wolterstorff as far as they go but I recognize that at some point, following Van Til, that we will reach an impasse of a pressupositional nature. And only there can the debate be decided. It seems to me that this model is a wonderful supplement to Van Til's and has much to offer us.

But also it seems a bit weak to me that warrant is the prized goal of epistemology. How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method? Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs? Again don't take me wrong I love Plantinga and Wolterstorff but I find their work helpful but possibly incomplete.

I think what happens here is within a Christian thought. With that said I think if you link Free Will and Common Sense Realism with the saved only you get the correct response to most questions in life. I have been a Christian a long time and I really have not see CSR go in diff directions. Also to the Atheist that sounds so profound at times will usually have to go back and reaffirm what they have said with there CSR and change their position several times.


Well I think that CSR may at times allow too much neutrality to the unbeliever.

Prove it from Reid's writings.
 
Ironically, in Survey of Christian Epistemology (pp. 132-134) Van Til grudglingly conceded that Reid was in fact right.

I don't think that is a legitimate reading of Van Til at this point. He was arguing that God is the ultimate subject of knowledge and was accusing Scottish realism of making man the ultimate subject of knowing. I don't agree with Van Til's unrealistic requirements for the justification of human knowing, but he was clearly faulting realism, and that with some degree of conviction.
 
:popcorn:

I have an OPC minister friend who wrote a paper called, Presuppositional Realism. Wherein he argues that a presuppositional approach to apologetics is compatible with a realist epistemology. I think he's right. He addresses each and shows them to be on separate planes. I might see if I can get his permission to share it here.
 
Sorry I got so behind with my posts I got in a bad car accident last week and totaled my car. My only vehicle is dead but I'm happy to report the deer I swerved away from lived another day.

My comments on neutrality it seems need some explanation. Neutrality can "creep" into someone's thinking whether they realize it or not. I don't, nor do I believe Vantil did, think any Christian thinker sets out to be "autonomous" in their thinking. No Christian disagrees with us that ethics is ultimately founded in God. It is when we sometimes attempt to base ethics on say something other than God's will that we cannot get from whatever bases it is, say common sense, to God. The attempt, however noble, must logically assume neutrality of some form whether or not the person sets out to do so.

And since neutrality is ultimately unbiblical we must avoid as much as possible. To base ethics on common sense works fine when everyone agrees but it breaks down when people disagree on ethics or anything else. Our theology demands we know this when go into the discussion. I believe that Reid fully believed common sense ethics could only come from God and the people of his time would have agreed in general. But how well would work today?
 
Last edited:
Sorry I got so behind with my posts I got in a bad car accident last week and totaled my car. My only vehicle is dead but I'm happy to report the deer I swerved away from lived another day.

My comments on neutrality it seems need some explanation. Neutrality can "creep"

"Neutral" and "common" aren't the same thing. My vocation is "common" because I am not a clergyman; yet I don't think it is neutral or autonomous. The Reformed has always said the "common" is a good arena and doesn't need "grace" added on to it. Anyway, I haven't really seen Reid's critics state what Reid believes. I'll help:

Common Sense Realism is the understanding that certain belief-formations are warranted because of how God created me, and as a result do not need an infinite number of justifications of first principles.
 
By nonchristian space I mean, and I should have explained that better my apologies, two things.

1. All space is God's space and can only realistically be understood as Christian but unbelievers in rebellion try in vain to undermine this. Even when they "know" true things they refuse to acknowledge the only source of all truth.

2. No space is religiously neutral. Yes we all inhabit aa common world and do the same common things but all perspectives all ultimately religious in nature. The idea of secularism, which I suspect may have developed from CSR in some way, is philosophically bankrupt and unbiblical.

I hope I explained that better. If not than please point it out to me and I will try better.
 
Sorry I got so behind with my posts I got in a bad car accident last week and totaled my car. My only vehicle is dead but I'm happy to report the deer I swerved away from lived another day.

My comments on neutrality it seems need some explanation. Neutrality can "creep"

"Neutral" and "common" aren't the same thing. My vocation is "common" because I am not a clergyman; yet I don't think it is neutral or autonomous. The Reformed has always said the "common" is a good arena and doesn't need "grace" added on to it. Anyway, I haven't really seen Reid's critics state what Reid believes. I'll help:

Common Sense Realism is the understanding that certain belief-formations are warranted because of how God created me, and as a result do not need an infinite number of justifications of first principles.

I agree with that but where do we go from here? Beyond perceptual beliefs what beliefs can really said to be "common sense" based? How does this contradict what Vantil said? How is it even possible in the first place to form common sense beliefs?
If you you say because of how God made us than fine but the unbeliever doesn't believe that, so now what? Where's the grand apologetic value in that? I like CSR and is useful but at some point must be supplemented with something more.
 
Beyond perceptual beliefs what beliefs can really said to be "common sense" based?

Do you exist? How do you account for self-consciousness? Do you exist as a being who thinks his own thoughts and makes his own decisions? How do you account for this individuality and "autonomy?" Without certain foundational beliefs it is impossible to connect what we do with ourselves. Transcendental approaches are good for examining the pre-conditions of knowledge and morality in the abstract, but they cannot ground that knowledge and morality in the person. There must be something within the person as an individual which enables us to say that his thoughts and choices are authentically his.
 
Sorry I got so behind with my posts I got in a bad car accident last week and totaled my car. My only vehicle is dead but I'm happy to report the deer I swerved away from lived another day.

My comments on neutrality it seems need some explanation. Neutrality can "creep"

"Neutral" and "common" aren't the same thing. My vocation is "common" because I am not a clergyman; yet I don't think it is neutral or autonomous. The Reformed has always said the "common" is a good arena and doesn't need "grace" added on to it. Anyway, I haven't really seen Reid's critics state what Reid believes. I'll help:

Common Sense Realism is the understanding that certain belief-formations are warranted because of how God created me, and as a result do not need an infinite number of justifications of first principles.

I agree with that but where do we go from here? Beyond perceptual beliefs what beliefs can really said to be "common sense" based? How does this contradict what Vantil said? How is it even possible in the first place to form common sense beliefs?
If you you say because of how God made us than fine but the unbeliever doesn't believe that, so now what? Where's the grand apologetic value in that? I like CSR and is useful but at some point must be supplemented with something more.

As I and others have repeatedly said, CSR isn't meant to be a silver-bullet argument.

If you you say because of how God made us than fine but the unbeliever doesn't believe that, so now what?
CSR, at least Plantinga's version, was developed in response to the Cliffordian challenge on evidential belief. As such, it has met that challenge.

Where's the grand apologetic value in that?
Who says CSR's goal was a grand apologetic value? Why should I judge a certain epistemological system simply on whether it can provide an architectonic apologetic value?

Beyond perceptual beliefs what beliefs can really said to be "common sense" based?
William Alston's the only CSR guy I know that really delved into perceptual knowledge. Most of Reid's "First Principles" aren't perceptual at all. Again, a quick survey of Reid would demonstrate this.

You have used language to get your point across. You assumed I know what you are talking about, yet neither of us felt the need to give an infinute number of epistemic justifications for an infinite regress. Hence, CSR.
 
Please don't get me wrong though. I like CSR and Plantinga and Wolterstorff. I also don't buy into the notion that all apologetic approachs other than Van Til's are in fact guilty of every criticism that he leveled against them. But I think denying Van Til's basic insights and method can lead one into those problems he pointed out. I also think that Vantillianism is far more affective than other methods and gets more to the heart of the problem. There are reasons I prefer Van Til but I do like other apologists.
 
Please don't get me wrong though. I like CSR and Plantinga and Wolterstorff. I also don't buy into the notion that all apologetic approachs other than Van Til's are in fact guilty of every criticism that he leveled against them. But I think denying Van Til's basic insights and method can lead one into those problems he pointed out. I also think that Vantillianism is far more affective than other methods and gets more to the heart of the problem. There are reasons I prefer Van Til but I do like other apologists.

Okay. My problems with VT is that I reject defining knowledge as justified, true belief (see Bahnsen, CVT: R&A, p. 182). I also don't buy the Transcendental Argument (or, I don't see how it doesn't also prove Fristianity).

I do mostly agree with CVT's reading of the history of philosophy. I think Van Tillians have always been on stronger grounds when they run genealogical critiques. And I still listen to Van Til on this point. I think his One/Many critique of Greek Philosophy is grand. I don't think Presuppositionalism is as effective an apologetical methodology as listening to the Stein Debate leads one to believe. It's weak on defining and defending the canon, for example.
 
Please don't get me wrong though. I like CSR and Plantinga and Wolterstorff. I also don't buy into the notion that all apologetic approachs other than Van Til's are in fact guilty of every criticism that he leveled against them. But I think denying Van Til's basic insights and method can lead one into those problems he pointed out. I also think that Vantillianism is far more affective than other methods and gets more to the heart of the problem. There are reasons I prefer Van Til but I do like other apologists.

Yeah I was reflecting on this thread and I wonder if the difference between CSR and Vantillianism is that one side, us, believe that the other is autonomous, which may be asking more apologetically than CSR was designed for. And the other side believes that we are just rehashing the evidential idea, which I don't think is entirely correct. We shouldn't expect more from CSR than it was designed for but it doesn't seem to me preclude using Van Til's method. But the transcendental challenge goes deeper than just "justified true belief" or evidence or even "common sense" it seeks to reveal how even if we grant CSR to a point it can never explain the very possibility of forming such beliefs to begin with.

I would say that the guys at WTS Philadelphia are much better In my humble opinion than Bahnsen, but I'm not sure if even wrote about Plantinga's work (or was even aware of it). But in fairness to him he did have a P.hd in epistemology. Lane Tipton, William Edgar, and most importantly K. Scott Oliphint are better "Vantillians" in some ways than Bahnsen or Frame, but all have something to offer. In Bahnsens defense in his Van Til reader he seems to admit and understand different conditions for different types of beleifs as being "justified true beliefs". So not every belief is held to the same standard of what JTB means for each type of beliefs. Bahnsen's followers have not always followed the same insight.
 
Please don't get me wrong though. I like CSR and Plantinga and Wolterstorff. I also don't buy into the notion that all apologetic approachs other than Van Til's are in fact guilty of every criticism that he leveled against them. But I think denying Van Til's basic insights and method can lead one into those problems he pointed out. I also think that Vantillianism is far more affective than other methods and gets more to the heart of the problem. There are reasons I prefer Van Til but I do like other apologists.

Yeah I was reflecting on this thread and I wonder if the difference between CSR and Vantillianism is that one side, us, believe that the other is autonomous, which may be asking more apologetically than CSR was designed for. And the other side believes that we are just rehashing the evidential idea, which I don't think is entirely correct. We shouldn't expect more from CSR than it was designed for but it doesn't seem to me preclude using Van Til's method. But the transcendental challenge goes deeper than just "justified true belief" or evidence or even "common sense" it seeks to reveal how even if we grant CSR to a point it can never explain the very possibility of forming such beliefs to begin with.

I would say that the guys at WTS Philadelphia are much better In my humble opinion than Bahnsen, but I'm not sure if even wrote about Plantinga's work (or was even aware of it). But in fairness to him he did have a P.hd in epistemology. Lane Tipton, William Edgar, and most importantly K. Scott Oliphint are better "Vantillians" in some ways than Bahnsen or Frame, but all have something to offer. In Bahnsens defense in his Van Til reader he seems to admit and understand different conditions for different types of beleifs as being "justified true beliefs". So not every belief is held to the same standard of what JTB means for each type of beliefs. Bahnsen's followers have not always followed the same insight.

Bahnsen was aware of Plantinga (he mentioned him in his Phil. of Christianit lectures) but Plantinga's main works weren't published until 1993. Soon after Bahnsen was dying. Bahnsen supposedly dealt with the Gettier problem in some unpublished mss.
 
Please don't get me wrong though. I like CSR and Plantinga and Wolterstorff. I also don't buy into the notion that all apologetic approachs other than Van Til's are in fact guilty of every criticism that he leveled against them. But I think denying Van Til's basic insights and method can lead one into those problems he pointed out. I also think that Vantillianism is far more affective than other methods and gets more to the heart of the problem. There are reasons I prefer Van Til but I do like other apologists.

Yeah I was reflecting on this thread and I wonder if the difference between CSR and Vantillianism is that one side, us, believe that the other is autonomous, which may be asking more apologetically than CSR was designed for. And the other side believes that we are just rehashing the evidential idea, which I don't think is entirely correct. We shouldn't expect more from CSR than it was designed for but it doesn't seem to me preclude using Van Til's method. But the transcendental challenge goes deeper than just "justified true belief" or evidence or even "common sense" it seeks to reveal how even if we grant CSR to a point it can never explain the very possibility of forming such beliefs to begin with.

I would say that the guys at WTS Philadelphia are much better In my humble opinion than Bahnsen, but I'm not sure if even wrote about Plantinga's work (or was even aware of it). But in fairness to him he did have a P.hd in epistemology. Lane Tipton, William Edgar, and most importantly K. Scott Oliphint are better "Vantillians" in some ways than Bahnsen or Frame, but all have something to offer. In Bahnsens defense in his Van Til reader he seems to admit and understand different conditions for different types of beleifs as being "justified true beliefs". So not every belief is held to the same standard of what JTB means for each type of beliefs. Bahnsen's followers have not always followed the same insight.

Bahnsen was aware of Plantinga (he mentioned him in his Phil. of Christianit lectures) but Plantinga's main works weren't published until 1993. Soon after Bahnsen was dying. Bahnsen supposedly dealt with the Gettier problem in some unpublished mss.

Dont you wish they could have interacted together. Dr. Oliphint studyed under Plantinga directly. He has massive respect for him but is none the less critical. You would probabally enjoy his stuff on Plantinga.
 
well I think the criticism is more aimed at those beliefs that both sides disagree on but both have warrant for. For instance the abortion debate it must be admitted that both sides have warrant for their belief. But how could CSR ever on its own be able to decide who is right? Don't get me wrong Plantinga and Wolterstorff are amazing thinkers but their CSR, In my humble opinion, break down at this point. Where does one appeal to to decide this sort of situation?

Notice how subjective common sense beliefs become in this model. They are only obvious to me, they may not be obvious to anyone else. This works fine when most people agree on stuff. But as we all know that's not the case. In this model it seems to me that both the pro-lifers and the pro-choices are on their own ground being "rational", within their own model of rationality, and have warrant for their beliefs but common sense alone could never resolve the conflict without giving some over arching definition of "common sense" to apply, which of course is impossible to get everyone to agree on.

It seems to me that this model is useful in disputes over immediate beliefs but in more complex beliefs it may hit a brick wall so to speak. If I have over extended the scope of this model than I am wrong and that's fine. You see I use Plantinga and Wolterstorff as far as they go but I recognize that at some point, following Van Til, that we will reach an impasse of a pressupositional nature. And only there can the debate be decided. It seems to me that this model is a wonderful supplement to Van Til's and has much to offer us.

But also it seems a bit weak to me that warrant is the prized goal of epistemology. How could this model ever attain something more than warrant in more complex beliefs without say supplementing some Vantillian method? Also does properly basic in this model exclude any prior more pressupositional beliefs being influential in the formation of properly basic beliefs? Again don't take me wrong I love Plantinga and Wolterstorff but I find their work helpful but possibly incomplete.

I think what happens here is within a Christian thought. With that said I think if you link Free Will and Common Sense Realism with the saved only you get the correct response to most questions in life. I have been a Christian a long time and I really have not see CSR go in diff directions. Also to the Atheist that sounds so profound at times will usually have to go back and reaffirm what they have said with there CSR and change their position several times.


Well I think that CSR may at times allow too much neutrality to the unbeliever.

Prove it from Reid's writings.

there is nothing i really have to prove it was just a common sense post........... i think in earlier post in this thread you guys covered most of it ........
 
Please don't get me wrong though. I like CSR and Plantinga and Wolterstorff. I also don't buy into the notion that all apologetic approachs other than Van Til's are in fact guilty of every criticism that he leveled against them. But I think denying Van Til's basic insights and method can lead one into those problems he pointed out. I also think that Vantillianism is far more affective than other methods and gets more to the heart of the problem. There are reasons I prefer Van Til but I do like other apologists.

Yeah I was reflecting on this thread and I wonder if the difference between CSR and Vantillianism is that one side, us, believe that the other is autonomous, which may be asking more apologetically than CSR was designed for. And the other side believes that we are just rehashing the evidential idea, which I don't think is entirely correct. We shouldn't expect more from CSR than it was designed for but it doesn't seem to me preclude using Van Til's method. But the transcendental challenge goes deeper than just "justified true belief" or evidence or even "common sense" it seeks to reveal how even if we grant CSR to a point it can never explain the very possibility of forming such beliefs to begin with.

I would say that the guys at WTS Philadelphia are much better In my humble opinion than Bahnsen, but I'm not sure if even wrote about Plantinga's work (or was even aware of it). But in fairness to him he did have a P.hd in epistemology. Lane Tipton, William Edgar, and most importantly K. Scott Oliphint are better "Vantillians" in some ways than Bahnsen or Frame, but all have something to offer. In Bahnsens defense in his Van Til reader he seems to admit and understand different conditions for different types of beleifs as being "justified true beliefs". So not every belief is held to the same standard of what JTB means for each type of beliefs. Bahnsen's followers have not always followed the same insight.

Bahnsen was aware of Plantinga (he mentioned him in his Phil. of Christianit lectures) but Plantinga's main works weren't published until 1993. Soon after Bahnsen was dying. Bahnsen supposedly dealt with the Gettier problem in some unpublished mss.

Dont you wish they could have interacted together. Dr. Oliphint studyed under Plantinga directly. He has massive respect for him but is none the less critical. You would probabally enjoy his stuff on Plantinga.

I've been meaning to reread Oliphint. I read him a decade ago and much has changed with me. It would be interesting to read him again.

And I am not a blind Plantinga follower. I actually agree with you that his "warrant" doesn't answer all the questions in apologetics (and I am not fully convinced of his reply to the Great Pumpkin objection). As something along the lines of principia or first principles, I can call myself a Plantingian.
 
Please don't get me wrong though. I like CSR and Plantinga and Wolterstorff. I also don't buy into the notion that all apologetic approachs other than Van Til's are in fact guilty of every criticism that he leveled against them. But I think denying Van Til's basic insights and method can lead one into those problems he pointed out. I also think that Vantillianism is far more affective than other methods and gets more to the heart of the problem. There are reasons I prefer Van Til but I do like other apologists.

Yeah I was reflecting on this thread and I wonder if the difference between CSR and Vantillianism is that one side, us, believe that the other is autonomous, which may be asking more apologetically than CSR was designed for. And the other side believes that we are just rehashing the evidential idea, which I don't think is entirely correct. We shouldn't expect more from CSR than it was designed for but it doesn't seem to me preclude using Van Til's method. But the transcendental challenge goes deeper than just "justified true belief" or evidence or even "common sense" it seeks to reveal how even if we grant CSR to a point it can never explain the very possibility of forming such beliefs to begin with.

I would say that the guys at WTS Philadelphia are much better In my humble opinion than Bahnsen, but I'm not sure if even wrote about Plantinga's work (or was even aware of it). But in fairness to him he did have a P.hd in epistemology. Lane Tipton, William Edgar, and most importantly K. Scott Oliphint are better "Vantillians" in some ways than Bahnsen or Frame, but all have something to offer. In Bahnsens defense in his Van Til reader he seems to admit and understand different conditions for different types of beleifs as being "justified true beliefs". So not every belief is held to the same standard of what JTB means for each type of beliefs. Bahnsen's followers have not always followed the same insight.

Bahnsen was aware of Plantinga (he mentioned him in his Phil. of Christianit lectures) but Plantinga's main works weren't published until 1993. Soon after Bahnsen was dying. Bahnsen supposedly dealt with the Gettier problem in some unpublished mss.

Dont you wish they could have interacted together. Dr. Oliphint studyed under Plantinga directly. He has massive respect for him but is none the less critical. You would probabally enjoy his stuff on Plantinga.

I've been meaning to reread Oliphint. I read him a decade ago and much has changed with me. It would be interesting to read him again.

And I am not a blind Plantinga follower. I actually agree with you that his "warrant" doesn't answer all the questions in apologetics (and I am not fully convinced of his reply to the Great Pumpkin objection). As something along the lines of principia or first principles, I can call myself a Plantingian.

reformedreidian,

wow that's great stuff you know your subject well. this is a great tread amen to that........
 
Please don't get me wrong though. I like CSR and Plantinga and Wolterstorff. I also don't buy into the notion that all apologetic approachs other than Van Til's are in fact guilty of every criticism that he leveled against them. But I think denying Van Til's basic insights and method can lead one into those problems he pointed out. I also think that Vantillianism is far more affective than other methods and gets more to the heart of the problem. There are reasons I prefer Van Til but I do like other apologists.

Yeah I was reflecting on this thread and I wonder if the difference between CSR and Vantillianism is that one side, us, believe that the other is autonomous, which may be asking more apologetically than CSR was designed for. And the other side believes that we are just rehashing the evidential idea, which I don't think is entirely correct. We shouldn't expect more from CSR than it was designed for but it doesn't seem to me preclude using Van Til's method. But the transcendental challenge goes deeper than just "justified true belief" or evidence or even "common sense" it seeks to reveal how even if we grant CSR to a point it can never explain the very possibility of forming such beliefs to begin with.

I would say that the guys at WTS Philadelphia are much better In my humble opinion than Bahnsen, but I'm not sure if even wrote about Plantinga's work (or was even aware of it). But in fairness to him he did have a P.hd in epistemology. Lane Tipton, William Edgar, and most importantly K. Scott Oliphint are better "Vantillians" in some ways than Bahnsen or Frame, but all have something to offer. In Bahnsens defense in his Van Til reader he seems to admit and understand different conditions for different types of beleifs as being "justified true beliefs". So not every belief is held to the same standard of what JTB means for each type of beliefs. Bahnsen's followers have not always followed the same insight.

Bahnsen was aware of Plantinga (he mentioned him in his Phil. of Christianit lectures) but Plantinga's main works weren't published until 1993. Soon after Bahnsen was dying. Bahnsen supposedly dealt with the Gettier problem in some unpublished mss.

Dont you wish they could have interacted together. Dr. Oliphint studyed under Plantinga directly. He has massive respect for him but is none the less critical. You would probabally enjoy his stuff on Plantinga.

I've been meaning to reread Oliphint. I read him a decade ago and much has changed with me. It would be interesting to read him again.

And I am not a blind Plantinga follower. I actually agree with you that his "warrant" doesn't answer all the questions in apologetics (and I am not fully convinced of his reply to the Great Pumpkin objection). As something along the lines of principia or first principles, I can call myself a Plantingian.

I love Plantinga as well as well James K.A. Smith but I always interpret them through Van Til, which is just shorthand for the Reformed tradition as I understand it. But I do think that Vantillianism has gone a bit overboard with distinguishing our view from others too critically without acknowledging the good in that view. But a careful reading of Vantillians will reveal acknowledgement just like a careful reading of Plantinga will reveal his strong points. In fact Oliphint in one essay, "the new reformed epistemology" I believe it is called, says that Plantinga's model can be "reformed" theologically speaking to be useful. One area of Vantillianism that I am fully convinced of of is that our theology should inform and direct our apologetics, along with every other human endeavor.
 
Please don't get me wrong though. I like CSR and Plantinga and Wolterstorff. I also don't buy into the notion that all apologetic approachs other than Van Til's are in fact guilty of every criticism that he leveled against them. But I think denying Van Til's basic insights and method can lead one into those problems he pointed out. I also think that Vantillianism is far more affective than other methods and gets more to the heart of the problem. There are reasons I prefer Van Til but I do like other apologists.

Yeah I was reflecting on this thread and I wonder if the difference between CSR and Vantillianism is that one side, us, believe that the other is autonomous, which may be asking more apologetically than CSR was designed for. And the other side believes that we are just rehashing the evidential idea, which I don't think is entirely correct. We shouldn't expect more from CSR than it was designed for but it doesn't seem to me preclude using Van Til's method. But the transcendental challenge goes deeper than just "justified true belief" or evidence or even "common sense" it seeks to reveal how even if we grant CSR to a point it can never explain the very possibility of forming such beliefs to begin with.

I would say that the guys at WTS Philadelphia are much better In my humble opinion than Bahnsen, but I'm not sure if even wrote about Plantinga's work (or was even aware of it). But in fairness to him he did have a P.hd in epistemology. Lane Tipton, William Edgar, and most importantly K. Scott Oliphint are better "Vantillians" in some ways than Bahnsen or Frame, but all have something to offer. In Bahnsens defense in his Van Til reader he seems to admit and understand different conditions for different types of beleifs as being "justified true beliefs". So not every belief is held to the same standard of what JTB means for each type of beliefs. Bahnsen's followers have not always followed the same insight.

Bahnsen was aware of Plantinga (he mentioned him in his Phil. of Christianit lectures) but Plantinga's main works weren't published until 1993. Soon after Bahnsen was dying. Bahnsen supposedly dealt with the Gettier problem in some unpublished mss.

Dont you wish they could have interacted together. Dr. Oliphint studyed under Plantinga directly. He has massive respect for him but is none the less critical. You would probabally enjoy his stuff on Plantinga.

I've been meaning to reread Oliphint. I read him a decade ago and much has changed with me. It would be interesting to read him again.

And I am not a blind Plantinga follower. I actually agree with you that his "warrant" doesn't answer all the questions in apologetics (and I am not fully convinced of his reply to the Great Pumpkin objection). As something along the lines of principia or first principles, I can call myself a Plantingian.

I love Plantinga as well as well James K.A. Smith but I always interpret them through Van Til, which is just shorthand for the Reformed tradition as I understand it. But I do think that Vantillianism has gone a bit overboard with distinguishing our view from others too critically without acknowledging the good in that view. But a careful reading of Vantillians will reveal acknowledgement just like a careful reading of Plantinga will reveal his strong points. In fact Oliphint in one essay, "the new reformed epistemology" I believe it is called, says that Plantinga's model can be "reformed" theologically speaking to be useful. One area of Vantillianism that I am fully convinced of of is that our theology should inform and direct our apologetics, along with every other human endeavor.

I wonder how mainstream Van Til was in respect to the Reformed Tradition. When it comes to election and the doctrine of God, he was mainstream. When it comes to apologetic method, not so much (not saying he was wrong, per se).
 
I always interpret them through Van Til, which is just shorthand for the Reformed tradition as I understand it.

Yeah, that's part of the issue that I tend to have with Van Til's reading of history: he reinterprets Calvin and the reformed tradition to fit his own project, whereas, read on their own terms, the early reformers really aren't pushing all that hard against the prevailing philosophical epistemologies of the day. Calvin in particular fits in ery nicely with the kind of Northern Renaissance Humanism of his time, albeit with a slightly more pessimistic slant than his contemporaries.

One area of Vantillianism that I am fully convinced of of is that our theology should inform and direct our apologetics, along with every other human endeavor.

Sure, but Plantinga says that too.
 
Please don't get me wrong though. I like CSR and Plantinga and Wolterstorff. I also don't buy into the notion that all apologetic approachs other than Van Til's are in fact guilty of every criticism that he leveled against them. But I think denying Van Til's basic insights and method can lead one into those problems he pointed out. I also think that Vantillianism is far more affective than other methods and gets more to the heart of the problem. There are reasons I prefer Van Til but I do like other apologists.

Yeah I was reflecting on this thread and I wonder if the difference between CSR and Vantillianism is that one side, us, believe that the other is autonomous, which may be asking more apologetically than CSR was designed for. And the other side believes that we are just rehashing the evidential idea, which I don't think is entirely correct. We shouldn't expect more from CSR than it was designed for but it doesn't seem to me preclude using Van Til's method. But the transcendental challenge goes deeper than just "justified true belief" or evidence or even "common sense" it seeks to reveal how even if we grant CSR to a point it can never explain the very possibility of forming such beliefs to begin with.

I would say that the guys at WTS Philadelphia are much better In my humble opinion than Bahnsen, but I'm not sure if even wrote about Plantinga's work (or was even aware of it). But in fairness to him he did have a P.hd in epistemology. Lane Tipton, William Edgar, and most importantly K. Scott Oliphint are better "Vantillians" in some ways than Bahnsen or Frame, but all have something to offer. In Bahnsens defense in his Van Til reader he seems to admit and understand different conditions for different types of beleifs as being "justified true beliefs". So not every belief is held to the same standard of what JTB means for each type of beliefs. Bahnsen's followers have not always followed the same insight.

Bahnsen was aware of Plantinga (he mentioned him in his Phil. of Christianit lectures) but Plantinga's main works weren't published until 1993. Soon after Bahnsen was dying. Bahnsen supposedly dealt with the Gettier problem in some unpublished mss.

Dont you wish they could have interacted together. Dr. Oliphint studyed under Plantinga directly. He has massive respect for him but is none the less critical. You would probabally enjoy his stuff on Plantinga.

I've been meaning to reread Oliphint. I read him a decade ago and much has changed with me. It would be interesting to read him again.

And I am not a blind Plantinga follower. I actually agree with you that his "warrant" doesn't answer all the questions in apologetics (and I am not fully convinced of his reply to the Great Pumpkin objection). As something along the lines of principia or first principles, I can call myself a Plantingian.

I love Plantinga as well as well James K.A. Smith but I always interpret them through Van Til, which is just shorthand for the Reformed tradition as I understand it. But I do think that Vantillianism has gone a bit overboard with distinguishing our view from others too critically without acknowledging the good in that view. But a careful reading of Vantillians will reveal acknowledgement just like a careful reading of Plantinga will reveal his strong points. In fact Oliphint in one essay, "the new reformed epistemology" I believe it is called, says that Plantinga's model can be "reformed" theologically speaking to be useful. One area of Vantillianism that I am fully convinced of of is that our theology should inform and direct our apologetics, along with every other human endeavor.

I wonder how mainstream Van Til was in respect to the Reformed Tradition. When it comes to election and the doctrine of God, he was mainstream. When it comes to apologetic method, not so much (not saying he was wrong, per se).

Actually thanks to students of of Richard Muller and Van Til it would seem that he really was in line with the tradition. I recommend Reason and Revelation: new essays in Reformed Apologetics that not only show Van Til's agreement with tradition but also provide an exegetical foundation for his thought.
 
I always interpret them through Van Til, which is just shorthand for the Reformed tradition as I understand it.

Yeah, that's part of the issue that I tend to have with Van Til's reading of history: he reinterprets Calvin and the reformed tradition to fit his own project, whereas, read on their own terms, the early reformers really aren't pushing all that hard against the prevailing philosophical epistemologies of the day. Calvin in particular fits in ery nicely with the kind of Northern Renaissance Humanism of his time, albeit with a slightly more pessimistic slant than his contemporaries.

One area of Vantillianism that I am fully convinced of of is that our theology should inform and direct our apologetics, along with every other human endeavor.

Sure, but Plantinga says that too.


Well sure but Muller's work certainly shows how far Reformed thinkers were obligated to distance themselves from the prevailing philosophies of the day. In fact recent scholarship has shown Van Til's continuity with the Reformed tradition. Plantinga does say this but I think he is not even arguably Reformed so whatever theology informs his thought may not be so helpful.
 
Beyond perceptual beliefs what beliefs can really said to be "common sense" based?

Do you exist? How do you account for self-consciousness? Do you exist as a being who thinks his own thoughts and makes his own decisions? How do you account for this individuality and "autonomy?" Without certain foundational beliefs it is impossible to connect what we do with ourselves. Transcendental approaches are good for examining the pre-conditions of knowledge and morality in the abstract, but they cannot ground that knowledge and morality in the person. There must be something within the person as an individual which enables us to say that his thoughts and choices are authentically his.

The fact we are made in God's image and his common grace.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top