Scripturalism Revisited

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Brian Bosse

"The Brain"
Hello Civbert and the Puritan Board,

What is the basis for being able to claim to have any knowledge whatsoever? Just today, Civbert answered this question in the following manner…

A Christian need not adopt the subjectivistic presuppositions of modern epistemology. We have the objective Word of God as the foundation of knowledge.

Scriptuarlists trumpet the idea that Scripture alone is the foundation for knowledge, and point to the axiomatic system of Gordon Clark as the practical development of this. Gordon Clark says that his axiomatic system has one axiom, and that from this one axiom propositions can be derived that are rightly called knowledge. Clark’s axiom (the Axiom) is as follows…

Axiom: The Bible alone is the Word of God.

Essentially, a proposition is rightly called justified knowledge if and only if the proposition is derived via deduction from the one Axiom. (Induction invalidates any argument, and thereby disqualifies any conclusion as being justified knowledge.) Scripturalists mean to be able to draw such conclusions as ‘Jesus is Messiah’ from the one axiom alone. However, it is my contention that when pressed they are unable to draw any conclusions from the one axiom that can be rightly called justified knowledge. That is to say, given their own criteria, they cannot justify any proposition as being knowledge. At this point this is just mere assertion on my part. But before going further, I want to allow the Scripturalist to comment in case I have not been accurate in my representations.

Sincerely,

Brian
 
Can I add one other axiom that seems to be unstated. Clark also presupposed that God thinks using Aristotalean logic. Thus it is not only the single Axiom that the Bible alone is the Word of God but the second axiom that all logical deductions from that axiom must use Aristotalean logic because both God and man univocally reason that way.
 
Hello Rich,

Clark also presupposed that God thinks using Aristotalean logic. Thus it is not only the single Axiom that the Bible alone is the Word of God but the second axiom that all logical deductions from that axiom must use Aristotalean logic because both God and man univocally reason that way.

I have a couple of thought regarding this. (1) When Clark says that one can go from the one axiom to a particular proposition of Scripture via deduction he has in mind the syllogistic deductive form that Aristotle expounded on. However, I do not believe that either Clark or other Scripturalists would insist that the deductive argument be via syllogism for it to be considered justified. Their beef is that it must be deductive. So, Reductio Ad Absurdum, Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens, etc...would be considered acceptable forms of deductive argumentation. (2) You are correct in pointing out that there must be more than the one axiom to derive a proposition from Scripture. The deductive apparatus itself must be axiomatic. This is one major flaw in Scripturalism.

With that said, I really appreciate what Clark was trying to do. In principle, I agree with him. However, it does not appear that Clark was sophisticated enough in his understanding of formal axiomatic systems. These types of systems are very explicit, and Clark was not very explicit. Clark resisted this type of explictness referring to it as "clanking machinery." The problem with this is that "the devil is in the details." When one begins to drill down on the axiomatic system, Scripturalism fails to deliver.

Sincerely,

Brian
 
Brian,

The reason I'm saying that is that I was listening to an MP3 lecture by Frame recently and he recounted a conversation he heard with Clark one time at a conference.

Clark had argued that God's logic and our logic are the same so somebody asked him: "Which logic?" Without hesitation Clark answered: Aristotalean logic. When asked how he knew that, Clark replied that he had written a paper defending that idea.

Thus, the interesting thing is that one must not only accept Scripture as the one axiom but must also reason like God does using Aristotalean logic on the basis of Clark's paper.
 
Hello Rich,

Thank you for the backgound information.

Clark had argued that God's logic and our logic are the same so somebody asked him: "Which logic?" Without hesitation Clark answered: Aristotalean logic. When asked how he knew that, Clark replied that he had written a paper defending that idea.

I am unfamilar with the paper, and I would say Clark's answer is a little vague. Aristotle's logic was not strictly syllogistic. Aristotle used all of the argument forms I mentioned in my previous post. If Clark meant what you think he meant, then that is a shame. It will be another mark against Scripturalism.

Sincerely,

Brian
 
Hello Rich,

Thank you for the backgound information.

Clark had argued that God's logic and our logic are the same so somebody asked him: "Which logic?" Without hesitation Clark answered: Aristotalean logic. When asked how he knew that, Clark replied that he had written a paper defending that idea.

I am unfamilar with the paper, and I would say Clark's answer is a little vague. Aristotle's logic was not strictly syllogistic. Aristotle used all of the argument forms I mentioned in my previous post. If Clark meant what you think he meant, then that is a shame. It will be another mark against Scripturalism.

Sincerely,

Brian

I would be interested in looking into this more. As I understand Clark, he would agree with Brian's understanding about what is known as traditional logic (deductive in nature) and not narrowly Aristotelian.
 
.. The deductive apparatus itself must be axiomatic. This is one major flaw in Scripturalism.

With that said, I really appreciate what Clark was trying to do. In principle, I agree with him. However, it does not appear that Clark was sophisticated enough in his understanding of formal axiomatic systems. These types of systems are very explicit, and Clark was not very explicit. Clark resisted this type of explictness referring to it as "clanking machinery." The problem with this is that "the devil is in the details." When one begins to drill down on the axiomatic system, Scripturalism fails to deliver.

I think you are hitting on the answer - Clark was not interested in developing a formal axiomatic system. However, this does not mean that Scripturalism fails to deliver - only that Clark did not strictly formalize his epistemology.

The laws of logic are assumed valid as they are necessary for any rational system of thought. If not the law of contradiction (LC), we would not be able to speak to each other in any meaningful manner. So the LC is much a part of language and thought that to say it is an axiom of the system is redundant. Clark said basically that the laws of logic are so embedded into Scripture, that simply making Scripture the logical starting point of his epistemology is entirely sufficient.
 
...
Axiom: The Bible alone is the Word of God.

Essentially, a proposition is rightly called justified knowledge if and only if the proposition is derived via deduction from the one Axiom. (Induction invalidates any argument, and thereby disqualifies any conclusion as being justified knowledge.) Scripturalists mean to be able to draw such conclusions as ‘Jesus is Messiah’ from the one axiom alone. However, it is my contention that when pressed they are unable to draw any conclusions from the one axiom that can be rightly called justified knowledge. That is to say, given their own criteria, they cannot justify any proposition as being knowledge. At this point this is just mere assertion on my part. But before going further, I want to allow the Scripturalist to comment in case I have not been accurate in my representations.

As you noted, Clark did not formalize his system into a mathematically precise system. But if he were going to do so, he would have started by noting that in traditional Aristotelian logic, the A form implies the I form.

That is: All (a is b) [the A form] implies Some (a is b) [the I form].

An example would be that all men in Italy are Italian (the A form), therefore some men, those that live in Rome, are Italian (the I form).

The application of this to the Axiom of Scripturalism is: All Scripture is the Word of God implies that some Scripture ("Jesus is the Christ") is also the Word of God. Basically, when Clark says that Scripture is the axiom of Christian knowledge, he means that every proposition of Scripture is true. We can trust God's Word for true knowledge.
 
While we at this, I would like to challenge anyone to provide a reasonable alternative to Scripturalism. What would it be, and how would you formulate it?

One thing I have noticed in my interactions with critics of Scripturalism is a complete absence of any alternatives to it. So I wonder, if not Scripturalism, then what?
 
Modified Van Tilianism. By modified, I mean not in 100% agreement w/ Van Til on everything. I'm off to go camping for the weekend, so I won't be able to respond to anything, but others can defend that claim anyways.
 
While we at this, I would like to challenge anyone to provide a reasonable alternative to Scripturalism. What would it be, and how would you formulate it?

One thing I have noticed in my interactions with critics of Scripturalism is a complete absence of any alternatives to it. So I wonder, if not Scripturalism, then what?

Realism is the biblical alternative. See Ronald Nash's "Life's Ultimate Questions."
 
That's interesting that this question should come up.

I've been reading The Sensualistic Philosophy by Dabney (see http://www.naphtali.com). While reading it, I'm struck by how much Dabney critiques in a way that is "pre-suppositional". By that I mean that, on the surface, he has the very same critiques of materialistic worldviews that you'll hear from a modern pre-suppositionalist.

I was actually thinking about a thread on this subject and don't want to sidetrack this discussion. I do know that Bahnsen in his History of Western Philosophy audio series and Frame too in his Apologetics audio both critique Common Sense Realism for being simplistic and not really very good philosophy.

Part of me is left thinking this after studying the history of philosophy: Why are we constantly trying to construct a philosophical system that is all encompassing? By that I mean an epistemology, metaphysic, and ethic. I've heard both Van Til and Clark criticized because it's not a full-orbed philosophical treatment.

But then (it seems to me) the way that a valid view of the world is judged is by academia and whether you've gotten everything to fit into the categories they've built over the last few thousand years.

My gut reaction is to say: Why do we need another system? The tools are useful to critique our thinking but one thing I do like about realism as opposed to some more insistent view is that it still insists on reasonable thinking but doesn't insist that all our thinking be shoehorned into a system external to the Word. My criticism of Clarkianism is primarily that it turns everything in the world into propositions but life is more than that. Philosophy has then become less a tool than a controlling influence.
 
Rich, all realists were presuppositionalists before the term became trendy. There are two ways to combat Kant's wall. Deny sense perception altogether, as idealists do; or insist that man's capacity to think is itself a rational category, as realists do. A rational capacity prior to the thought process is what we now call a presupposition. This is what Dabney was arguing for. Nash puts it is more modern terms that we would be familiar with.
 
Hello Civbert,

An example would be that all men in Italy are Italian (the A form), therefore some men, those that live in Rome, are Italian (the I form).

Civbert, your example is not valid. The A proposition, “All men in Italy are Italian,” leads to the I proposition, “Some men in Italy are Italian.” No more and no less. You have added additional information to your I statement. Not only did you do this here, but you made the very same mistake in the next more pertinent example.

The application of this to the Axiom of Scripturalism is: All Scripture is the Word of God implies that some Scripture ("Jesus is the Christ") is also the Word of God.

The A proposition, “All Scripture is the Word of God,” leads to the I proposition, “Some Scripture is the Word of God.” No more and no less. There is no parenthetical “Jesus is the Christ.” My contention is that when everything is laid bare, Scripturalism fails. It cannot give us any knowledge that we can call justified.

One thing I have noticed in my interactions with critics of Scripturalism is a complete absence of any alternatives to it.

This is beside the point. You claim that Scripturalism solves epistemological problems. Whether or not a challenger can present a better alternative is irrelevant. So here is my challenge to you: Present one valid argument from the axiom to a particular proposition of Scripture such that the conclusion would be considered justified knowledge. Be a good logician by being very precise. Remember, I claim that a Scripturalist cannot be precise and deliver the goods. Show me that I am wrong.

Sincerely,

Brian
 
Hello Rich,

Thank you for the backgound information.

Clark had argued that God's logic and our logic are the same so somebody asked him: "Which logic?" Without hesitation Clark answered: Aristotalean logic. When asked how he knew that, Clark replied that he had written a paper defending that idea.

I am unfamilar with the paper, and I would say Clark's answer is a little vague. Aristotle's logic was not strictly syllogistic. Aristotle used all of the argument forms I mentioned in my previous post. If Clark meant what you think he meant, then that is a shame. It will be another mark against Scripturalism.

Sincerely,

Brian

I would be interested in looking into this more. As I understand Clark, he would agree with Brian's understanding about what is known as traditional logic (deductive in nature) and not narrowly Aristotelian.

If you go to http://itunes.rts.edu and then click to launch iTunes, you'll be taken to the RTS store inside of iTunes where you can download tons of audio files for free. Under Theology you'll find Christian Apologetics. I think his statements are in lesson 16. He's definitely talking about Clark in that lecture. I'm not saying you have to agree with Frame but rather than third hand reporting you might as well listen to what Frame says.
 
Hello Rich,

Thank you for the backgound information.



I am unfamilar with the paper, and I would say Clark's answer is a little vague. Aristotle's logic was not strictly syllogistic. Aristotle used all of the argument forms I mentioned in my previous post. If Clark meant what you think he meant, then that is a shame. It will be another mark against Scripturalism.

Sincerely,

Brian

I would be interested in looking into this more. As I understand Clark, he would agree with Brian's understanding about what is known as traditional logic (deductive in nature) and not narrowly Aristotelian.

If you go to http://itunes.rts.edu and then click to launch iTunes, you'll be taken to the RTS store inside of iTunes where you can download tons of audio files for free. Under Theology you'll find Christian Apologetics. I think his statements are in lesson 16. He's definitely talking about Clark in that lecture. I'm not saying you have to agree with Frame but rather than third hand reporting you might as well listen to what Frame says.

This is very subjective, Rich, but I listened to that lecture too, and I've also listened to some of Clark's lectures. I have a suspicion that he was being a bit facetious on the question. I know Frame remembers it as being a serious answser, but listening to Clark, he often says something outlandish and you can almost hear a wink.
 
Fair enough Vic. I provided the link so that listeners can get a better sense of the truth of the matter than my reporting what Frame said that Clark said.
 
Hello Civbert,

An example would be that all men in Italy are Italian (the A form), therefore some men, those that live in Rome, are Italian (the I form).

Civbert, your example is not valid. The A proposition, “All men in Italy are Italian,” leads to the I proposition, “Some men in Italy are Italian.” No more and no less. You have added additional information to your I statement. Not only did you do this here, but you made the very same mistake in the next more pertinent example.

The application of this to the Axiom of Scripturalism is: All Scripture is the Word of God implies that some Scripture ("Jesus is the Christ") is also the Word of God.

The A proposition, “All Scripture is the Word of God,” leads to the I proposition, “Some Scripture is the Word of God.” No more and no less.

Much more, much much more. When you say the Bible is true, the world "Bible" in not merely a sound. The term itself implies it's definition. Your restriction "no more and no less" is incorrect. Every term in a sentence logically implies it's definition. And it's definition is both connotative and denotative.

So "Jesus is the Christ" is a valid deduction of "Scripture is true" because Scripture implies the denotative definition that includes the proposition "Jesus is the Christ". It is valid and sound by definition of Scripture.

One thing I have noticed in my interactions with critics of Scripturalism is a complete absence of any alternatives to it.

This is beside the point. You claim that Scripturalism solves epistemological problems. Whether or not a challenger can present a better alternative is irrelevant. So here is my challenge to you: Present one valid argument from the axiom to a particular proposition of Scripture such that the conclusion would be considered justified knowledge. Be a good logician by being very precise. Remember, I claim that a Scripturalist cannot be precise and deliver the goods. Show me that I am wrong.

Done. See above.
 
Rich, all realists were presuppositionalists before the term became trendy. There are two ways to combat Kant's wall. Deny sense perception altogether, as idealists do; or insist that man's capacity to think is itself a rational category, as realists do. A rational capacity prior to the thought process is what we now call a presupposition. This is what Dabney was arguing for. Nash puts it is more modern terms that we would be familiar with.

Interesting. But "deny sense perception altogether, as idealists do; or insist that man's capacity to think is itself a rational category, as realists do." are not mutually exclusive.

Since you keep bringing up realism and idealism - perhaps you would care to define and contrast them. I've read that materialism is the contrary of idealism.

Also, are you speaking of "common sense realism", "Platonic realism", "epistemological realism", what?

Was not Jonathan Edwards an idealist?

Also interesting that Ronald Nash was a student of and heavily influenced by Gordon Clark. Maybe he was a realist, but it makes me wonder if realism vs idealism is actually a critical point of contention.
 
Another interesting observation:

I believe Clark may have been an idealist, but he was also an "epistemological realist." He believed that knowledge consists of propositional truths and these truths define reality (idealism), but also these truths exist independently of human minds (epistemological realism). That is, two people can know A in the same sense because the proposition A exists independent of any one person. I suppose Clark was a metaphysical idealist and an epistemological realist.
 
Hello Civbert and Board,

Much more, much much more. When you say the Bible is true, the world "Bible" in not merely a sound. The term itself implies it's definition. Your restriction "no more and no less" is incorrect. Every term in a sentence logically implies it's definition. And it's definition is both connotative and denotative.

There is a distinction between Material Logic, and Formal Logic. Material logic is concerned with the truth of propositions and the meaning of terms. Formal logic is concerned strictly with the form. The validity of arguments is strictly a formal concern; whereas, the soundness of an argument is both a formal and material matter. My criticism is strictly a formal criticism. The logical law called the rule of subalternation is as follows:

If “All S is P” is true, then “Some S is P” is true.

Notice, this law applies no matter what S and P stand for. That is to say, the inference from the A statement to the I statement is independent of the meaning of the terms. You violate this law when you go from “All S is P” to something other than “Some S is P” as you did twice in previous posts.

So "Jesus is the Christ" is a valid deduction of "Scripture is true" because Scripture implies the denotative definition that includes the proposition "Jesus is the Christ".

This is an informal argument. My criticism is that when push comes to shove, the Scripturalist cannot present a valid formal argument from the one axiom to any proposition that can be justifiably called knowledge. In fact, your one axiom is not even mentioned in the argument you gave. You make my point for me.

Civbert, allow me to take your informal argument and make it formal.

Argument A

Premise A1: All the Bible is the word of God.
Premise A2: All the word of God is that which is true.
Conclusion A: All the Bible is that which is true.

Argument B

Premise B1: Jesus is the Christ is the Bible
Premise B2: All the Bible is that which is true.
Conclusion B: Jesus is the Christ is that which is true.


Ok, these arguments are valid and take one from the one axiom to the assertion of the truth of a particular Biblical proposition. Here are the problems with this:

(1) Premise A2 does not come from premise A1. Its truth is determined in some other manner. Therefore, premise A2 is cannot be properly called knowledge according to your definition of what is properly called knowledge.

(2) Premise B1 does not come from premise A1. Its truth is determined in some other manner. Therefore, premise B1 is cannot be properly called knowledge according to your definition of what is properly called knowledge.

(3) A consequence of (1) and (2) is that conclusion A, premise B2 and conclusion B cannot be properly called knowledge.

(4) Even at a more fundamental level, the argument form (Barbara) being used has not been justified.

Civbert, it really does not matter how your S and P’s are defined (denotative or connotative)*, you cannot go from the one axiom to the thousands of propositions Clark wishes to be able to derive. By the way, all denotative definitions ultimately rely on connotative definitions. I even think Clark makes this observation in his book on logic.

In conclusion, you have yet to present one valid argument from the axiom to a particular proposition of Scripture such that the conclusion would be considered justified knowledge. Remember, I claim that a Scripturalist cannot be precise and deliver the goods. The goods still have not been delivered.

Sincerely,

Brian

*The distinction between denotative and connotative definition can be simply stated as follows: a denotative definition is a definition made up of the conjunction of all members making up the term. For instance, if the term was ‘residents of Arizona’, then the denotative definition would simply be all those members who are residents of Arizona: Brian Bosse, Kathleen Gelardi, Bill Terry, John Elam, etc… The denotative definition of the Scriptures might be the individual sentences that make up the Scriptures. For example, (1) In the beginning…, (2) You cannot serve both God and mammon…, (3) For I am not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ…, etc… However, what actually determines what members actually belong to these various groups is the connotative definition. This is a description of the qualities or properties necessarily for a particular to be considered part of the term. For instance, the connotative definition for ‘residents of Arizona’ might be those members who currently live within the boundaries of the State of Arizona. This means that Brian Bosse, Kathleen Gelardi, Bill Terry, John Elam, etc… all have the property of currently living within the boundaries of the State of Arizona. It really is quite simple. Scripturalists often appeal to this, but it does not help their position, but simply obfuscates matters. It does not matter in what manner terms are defined. Scripturalists cannot get from the one axiom to any particular proposition of Scripture without bringing in additional information that is not properly justified. Again, they hang themselves by their own requirements.
 
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Brian,

Not sure how to go with this because you have already confirmed with you post what I've already said. The main thing you have done it try to force a artificial restriction on Scripturalism that the Scripturalist does not.

Hello Civbert and Board,

Much more, much much more. When you say the Bible is true, the world "Bible" in not merely a sound. The term itself implies it's definition. Your restriction "no more and no less" is incorrect. Every term in a sentence logically implies it's definition. And it's definition is both connotative and denotative.

There is a distinction between Material Logic, and Formal Logic. Material logic is concerned with the truth of propositions and the meaning of terms. Formal logic is concerned strictly with the form. The validity of arguments is strictly a formal concern; whereas, the soundness of an argument is both a formal and material matter. My criticism is strictly a formal criticism.
Does not matter if it's formal of material. The problem with the criticism is the same.

The logical law called the rule of subalternation is as follows:

If “All S is P” is true, then “Some S is P” is true.

Notice, this law applies no matter what S and P stand for. That is to say, the inference from the A statement to the I statement is independent of the meaning of the terms.
This is almost correct. The implication is valid only as long at the definition of S and P retain the same meaning in each proposition. If the meaning changes in any sense, it invalidates the implication.

You violate this law when you go from “All S is P” to something other than “Some S is P” as you did twice in previous posts.
I can only violate the law of inference if I changes the meaning of the terms.

And again I repeat, all terms imply their own definitions. So the Bible means all the propositions of Scripture. So if something is true for all the Scripture, it is true from some of Scripture - even the 'true/false' state of the propositions.

Recall that Clark said a proposition is the meaning of a declarative sentence. This assumes that the words actually have meaning and are not just names. He was not a nominalist. So when he used terms, the definitions of the terms are implied logically. So I did not add any information to show the the Bible is true implies that Jesus is Christ.


So "Jesus is the Christ" is a valid deduction of "Scripture is true" because Scripture implies the denotative definition that includes the proposition "Jesus is the Christ".

This is an informal argument. My criticism is that when push comes to shove, the Scripturalist cannot present a valid formal argument from the one axiom to any proposition that can be justifiably called knowledge. In fact, your one axiom is not even mentioned in the argument you gave. You make my point for me.
The axiom can be said various ways because the meaning is essentially the same: 'The Bible is the Word of God', 'All Scripture is God's revealed truth', 'The Scriptures are God's Word and therefore true'. My argument is formally valid and sound. What part of "The Bible is the Word of God" do you disagree with?


Civbert, allow me to take your informal argument and make it formal.

Argument A

Premise A1: All the Bible is the word of God.
Premise A2: All the word of God is that which is true.
Conclusion A: All the Bible is that which is true.

Argument B

Premise B1: Jesus is the Christ is the Bible
Premise B2: All the Bible is that which is true.
Conclusion B: Jesus is the Christ is that which is true.


Ok, these arguments are valid and take one from the one axiom to the assertion of the truth of a particular Biblical proposition. Here are the problems with this:

(1) Premise A2 does not come from premise A1. Its truth is determined in some other manner.
See that's where you are missing the point. The meaning of "the Word of God" is implied by A1 simply by being stated. And in premise A2, you have simple expressed the definition of the second term. "the word of God is that which is true". True by definition.

Therefore, premise A2 is cannot be properly called knowledge according to your definition of what is properly called knowledge.
I call knowledge the Scriptures and that which can be deduced therefrom. A2 is true because "All the word of God is that which is true." "the Word of God" is equivalent to Scripture (therefore knowledge) and "All the word of God is that which is true" is nothing more than the definition of "the word of God".

(2) Premise B1 does not come from premise A1. Its truth is determined in some other manner. Therefore, premise B1 is cannot be properly called knowledge according to your definition of what is properly called knowledge.

Is "Jesus is the Christ" part of Scripture? If yes, then it is knowledge. It's that simple.

(3) A consequence of (1) and (2) is that conclusion A, premise B2 and conclusion B cannot be properly called knowledge.
I believe terms have meaning, and are not just "names" without content.

(4) Even at a more fundamental level, the argument form (Barbara) being used has not been justified.

Civbert, it really does not matter how your S and P’s are defined (denotative or connotative)*, you cannot go from the one axiom to the thousands of propositions Clark wishes to be able to derive. By the way, all denotative definitions ultimately rely on connotative definitions. I even think Clark makes this observation in his book on logic.
Not true. You can define a term denotatively without giving any connotative definition. In essence, the denotative definition would be dependent on the connotative definition.

I can define X as (x1, x2, x3, x4, x9, x17, y3, and z). That is a denotative definition. The connotative definition would be 'X is the elements of the list given'.


In conclusion, you have yet to present one valid argument from the axiom to a particular proposition of Scripture such that the conclusion would be considered justified knowledge. Remember, I claim that a Scripturalist cannot be precise and deliver the goods. The goods still have not been delivered.
This is an informal criticism. I have delivered the good several times. You have even supported my arguments simply by acknowledging the definition of denotative and connotative.

*The distinction between denotative and connotative definition can be simply stated as follows: a denotative definition is a definition made up of the conjunction of all members making up the term. For instance, if the term was ‘residents of Arizona’, then the denotative definition would simply be all those members who are residents of Arizona: Brian Bosse, Kathleen Gelardi, Bill Terry, John Elam, etc… The denotative definition of the Scriptures might be the individual sentences that make up the Scriptures. For example, (1) In the beginning…, (2) You cannot serve both God and mammon…, (3) For I am not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ…, etc… However, what actually determines what members actually belong to these various groups is the connotative definition.
That's easy. The members of that belong the the term Scripture are found in the first chapter of the Westminster Confession of Faith:
1:2 Under the name of Holy Scripture, or the Word of God written, are now contained all the books of the Old and New Testament, which are these:


Books of the Old Testament
Genesis 1 Kings Ecclesiastes Obadiah
Exodus 2 Kings Song of Songs Jonah
Leviticus 1 Chronicles Isaiah Micah
Numbers 2 Chronicles Jeremiah Nahum
Deuteronomy Ezra Lamentations Habakkuk
Joshua Nehemiah Ezekiel Zephaniah
Judges Esther Daniel Haggai
Ruth Job Hosea Zechariah
1 Samuel Psalms Joel Malachi
2 Samuel Proverbs Amos


Books of the New Testament
Matthew 2 Corinthians 1 Timothy 2 Peter
Mark Galatians 2 Timothy 1 John
Luke Ephesians Titus 2 John
John Philippians Philemon 3 John
Acts Colossians Hebrews Jude
Romans 1 Thessalonians James Revelation
1 Corinthians 2 Thessalonians 1 Peter

Notice clearly that this is a denotative definition and does not depend on any connotative definition. It's simply a list.

It does not matter in what manner terms are defined. Scripturalists cannot get from the one axiom to any particular proposition of Scripture without bringing in additional information that is not properly justified. Again, they hang themselves by their own requirements.

The definition of Scripture matters very much, because that is the meaning of the term 'Scripture'. Every proposition of Scripture is part of the meaning of the term. So what ever is predicated of Scripture is predicated of each proposition of Scripture by direct formal implication.

In summary, I see to critical flaws in you argument.
  1. that stating the definition of terms is adding information
  2. that denotative definitions depend on connotative definitions

Terms imply their definitions. And definitions can be simply denotative. You do not have to "prove" or deduce the definitions of the terms in the Scripturalist Axiom, because it they are implied in the axiom itself. Each term has meaning.

There appears to be some nominalist constraints being pushed in your criticism. But Clark was not a nominalist. He believed terms have meaning, and are not just "names". You can see this because Clark rejected "existential implication" simply by asserting the validity of the A to I form of implication. (I know this last part is rather condensed and I can try to unpack it for anyone who has questions about it. Brian understands what I am saying because we have debated "existential implication" in the past.)

Now if you want me to very strictly to formally deduce 'Jesus is the Christ' from the axiom of Scripturalism - it would take the following form:

Knowledge is the meaning of: (In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form, and void; and darkness was on the face of the deep. ... The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all. Amen. (Gen 1:1-Rev 22:21)) and what can be deduced therefrom.

Therefore, Jesus is the Christ is knowledge.​
 
Hello Civbert,

Does not matter if it's formal of material. The problem with the criticism is the same.

You stated explicitly that my problem had to do with a misunderstanding of the meaning of the terms. That is strictly a material matter. My criticism was a formal criticism. Let me spell it out for you:

Civbert’s Invalid Inference

A: All Scripture is the Word of God.
I: "Jesus is the Christ" is the Word of God.

The Valid Inference

A: All Scripture is the Word of God.
I: Some Scripture is the Word of God.

The problem with your inference, Civbert, is that you are missing a necessary premise to go from the one axiom to the proposition you want to infer; namely, you are missing the premise: ‘“Jesus is the Christ’ is Scripture.” However, this premise does not come from the one axiom. It is determined some other way. Here is the proper argument…

Premise 1: All Scripture is the Word of God.
Premise 2: ‘Jesus is the Christ’ is Scripture.
Conclusion: ‘Jesus is the Christ’ is the Word of God.

Now, what I just presented is the most famous of all argument forms (Barbara). As such, I think it is safe to say that the argument I presented above is the proper valid argument that allows one to go from the one axiom to the conclusion: ‘“Jesus is the Christ’ is the Word of God.” The problem for Scripturalists is that they cannot account for premise 2. That is to say, they want it to be true, but they cannot justify it. There is no inference allowing the Scripturalist to go immediately from the one axiom to the premise. Therefore, the conclusion of this argument is not justified.

Now if you want me to very strictly to formally deduce 'Jesus is the Christ' from the axiom of Scripturalism - it would take the following form:
Knowledge is the meaning of: (In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form, and void; and darkness was on the face of the deep. ... The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all. Amen. (Gen 1:1-Rev 22:21)) and what can be deduced therefrom.

Therefore, Jesus is the Christ is knowledge.

The conclusion you want to draw is: “‘Jesus is the Christ’ is knowledge.” So, your subject term is ‘Jesus is the Christ’ and your predicate term is ‘knowledge.’ What is the middle term and what are the missing premises?

Sincerely,

Brian
 
There appears to be some nominalist constraints being pushed in your criticism. But Clark was not a nominalist. He believed terms have meaning, and are not just "names". You can see this because Clark rejected "existential implication" simply by asserting the validity of the A to I form of implication. (I know this last part is rather condensed and I can try to unpack it for anyone who has questions about it. Brian understands what I am saying because we have debated "existential implication" in the past.)

I would like to know what you mean when you write "existential implication". Is this the same as "existential import"? Paul Manata used that term thinking I knew what that I meant. I had to bluff him at that point. Also, I asked my Math Prof at one time and he said if you are given All A is B you can then write Some A is B. It seems logical to me. Is this controversial?
 
The problem with your inference, Civbert, is that you are missing a necessary premise to go from the one axiom to the proposition you want to infer; namely, you are missing the premise: ‘“Jesus is the Christ’ is Scripture.” However, this premise does not come from the one axiom. It is determined some other way. Here is the proper argument…

Would you care to share your opinion on how this premise IS obtained?
 
There appears to be some nominalist constraints being pushed in your criticism. But Clark was not a nominalist. He believed terms have meaning, and are not just "names". You can see this because Clark rejected "existential implication" simply by asserting the validity of the A to I form of implication. (I know this last part is rather condensed and I can try to unpack it for anyone who has questions about it. Brian understands what I am saying because we have debated "existential implication" in the past.)

I would like to know what you mean when you write "existential implication". Is this the same as "existential import"? Paul Manata used that term thinking I knew what that I meant. I had to bluff him at that point. Also, I asked my Math Prof at one time and he said if you are given All A is B you can then write Some A is B. It seems logical to me. Is this controversial?


Oop! Your are correct. I thought that didn't sound right. I meant "existential import".

The idea of existential import according to modern logic is that when one says "all a is b", we are not really asserting or assuming that there are any "a"s existing. "a" can be an empty set. So one can not assert the implication that some a is b - because when we say some a is b, we are assert the existence of at least some a (it has existential import). I think that is roughly how it works.

An example Brian used in our debate was: "All trespassers will be shot." This does not imply some trespassers will be shot. (That's not the exact way he put it, but you can see how this raises some issues that should be considered.
 
Hello Civbert,

Does not matter if it's formal of material. The problem with the criticism is the same.

You stated explicitly that my problem had to do with a misunderstanding of the meaning of the terms. That is strictly a material matter. My criticism was a formal criticism. Let me spell it out for you:

Civbert’s Invalid Inference

A: All Scripture is the Word of God.
I: "Jesus is the Christ" is the Word of God.

The implication is valid. I have shown this repeatedly.

The Valid Inference

A: All Scripture is the Word of God.
I: Some Scripture is the Word of God.

The problem with your inference, Civbert, is that you are missing a necessary premise to go from the one axiom to the proposition you want to infer; namely, you are missing the premise: ‘“Jesus is the Christ’ is Scripture.” However, this premise does not come from the one axiom. It is determined some other way. Here is the proper argument…

Premise 1: All Scripture is the Word of God.
Premise 2: ‘Jesus is the Christ’ is Scripture.
Conclusion: ‘Jesus is the Christ’ is the Word of God.

Now, what I just presented is the most famous of all argument forms (Barbara). As such, I think it is safe to say that the argument I presented above is the proper valid argument that allows one to go from the one axiom to the conclusion: ‘“Jesus is the Christ’ is the Word of God.” The problem for Scripturalists is that they cannot account for premise 2.
You don't need a syllogism. The conclusion follows by direct implication from Premise 1. The construction of the syllogism is just machinery clanging as Clark might say.

That is to say, they want it to be true, but they cannot justify it. There is no inference allowing the Scripturalist to go immediately from the one axiom to the premise. Therefore, the conclusion of this argument is not justified.

Now if you want me to very strictly to formally deduce 'Jesus is the Christ' from the axiom of Scripturalism - it would take the following form:
Knowledge is the meaning of: (In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form, and void; and darkness was on the face of the deep. ... The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all. Amen. (Gen 1:1-Rev 22:21)) and what can be deduced therefrom.

Therefore, Jesus is the Christ is knowledge.

The conclusion you want to draw is: “‘Jesus is the Christ’ is knowledge.” So, your subject term is ‘Jesus is the Christ’ and your predicate term is ‘knowledge.’ What is the middle term and what are the missing premises?

Sincerely,

Brian

It's an immediate implication. No middle term is required. All A is B implies Some A is B. That was the form of the argument. "Jesus is the Christ" is a member of "A" which is "Scripture".

I tried to make that more explicite when I wrote:
Knowledge is the meaning of: (In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form, and void; and darkness was on the face of the deep. ... The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all. Amen. (Gen 1:1-Rev 22:21)) and what can be deduced therefrom.

Therefore, Jesus is the Christ is knowledge.

Premise 1: Knowledge is the meaning of: (In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form, and void; and darkness was on the face of the deep. ... The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all. Amen. (Gen 1:1-Rev 22:21)) and what can be deduced therefrom.

This is in the form of "All A is B".

Conclusion: Jesus is the Christ is knowledge.

This is in the form of "Some A is B".
 
Since you keep bringing up realism and idealism - perhaps you would care to define and contrast them.

I'm not sure what you're asking for here, since every time I bring up realism and idealism I have been defining and contrasting them. The idealist thinks every time he sees something in this world he is looking at a shadow on the wall. The realist sees the world as itself possessing a reality which can be known.
 
Since you keep bringing up realism and idealism - perhaps you would care to define and contrast them.

I'm not sure what you're asking for here, since every time I bring up realism and idealism I have been defining and contrasting them. The idealist thinks every time he sees something in this world he is looking at a shadow on the wall. The realist sees the world as itself possessing a reality which can be known.

That's not true from what I've been able to find:
Realists tend to believe that whatever we believe now is only an approximation of reality and that every new observation brings us closer to understanding reality. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

This sounds more like your description of idealism.

Idealism is the doctrine that ideas, or thought, make up either the whole or an indispensable aspect of any full reality, so that a world of material objects containing no thought either could not exist as it is experienced, or would not be fully "real." Idealism is often contrasted with materialism, both belonging to the class of monist as opposed to dualist or pluralist ontologies.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Idealism

And then from: Miller, Alexander, "Realism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2005 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2005/entries/realism/
The nature and plausibility of realism is one of the most hotly debated issues in contemporary metaphysics, perhaps even the most hotly debated issue in contemporary philosophy. The question of the nature and plausibility of realism arises with respect to a large number of subject matters, including ethics, aesthetics, causation, modality, science, mathematics, semantics, and the everyday world of macroscopic material objects and their properties. Although it would be possible to accept (or reject) realism across the board, it is more common for philosophers to be selectively realist or non-realist about various topics: thus it would be perfectly possible to be a realist about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties, but a non-realist about aesthetic and moral value. In addition, it is misleading to think that there is a straightforward and clear-cut choice between being a realist and a non-realist about a particular subject matter. It is rather the case that one can be more-or-less realist about a particular subject matter. Also, there are many different forms that realism and non-realism can take.

And from the rest of the articles I've read, almost everyone is a realist in some sense, which makes generic realism somewhat pointless as a philosophical position. You'll need to be more specific. Realism is too broad a brush to paint with, it covers everyone.

And I'm sure the same could be said for idealism.

So from what I've read, there are both positive and negative aspects for both realism and idealism - but I would tend to find idealism better for supporting spiritual knowledge since it give strength to abstract concepts like propitiation, justice, mercy, knowledge, love, etc. You know, all those terms we use to describe the Christian faith. It seems these ideas are consider real if you are an idealist. In contrast, these terms seem to be less meaningful (or even unreal) when looked at within the paradigm of realism. But again, the brush is too broad to be meaningful. And all the debate about realism and idealism (and materialism) seems to be found among secular philosophers who want to either find or reject knowledge apart from the God of Scripture. So I suspect and criticism of Christian philosophy using the concepts of realism or even idealism may be tainted with secular presuppositions. I'm not sure they are truly problems for the Christian - just like "the one and the many" is a Greek worldview problem easily answered by/within the Christian worldview.
 
Hello Gentlemen,

Jeff said:
Would you care to share your opinion on how this premise IS obtained?

The premise is obtained through biblical exegesis, which is primarily an inductive exercise. Deduction plays a part as well, but induction's role is certainly much larger.

Civbert said:
The implication is valid…It's an immediate implication. No middle term is required.

Here is what you have said is a valid immediate implication:

A: All Scripture is the Word of God.
I: "Jesus is the Christ" is the Word of God.

In the universal affirmative statement, the subject term is ‘Scripture’ and the predicate term is ‘the Word of God’. We will substitute ‘Scripture’ for the symbol ‘S’ and ‘the word of God’ for the symbol ‘P’. Applying this to the two categorical propositions above we get…

A: All S is P.
I: “Jesus is the Christ” is P.

Notice, that “Jesus is the Christ” is neither ‘S’ nor ‘P’. It is a different term. Regarding this Gordon Clark says on page 32 of his book on logic…

Clark said:
Such a set of inferences is called immediate inference because there is no middle term…At any rate immediate inferences are composed of two propositions with two terms. They cannot have three terms…

At this point, I would charge not only are you disagreeing with me, but you are at odds with Gordon Clark. But it is not just Clark with whom you are odds. The Logic Classroom says:

Under what conditions are subalterns both true? Follow this reasoning: what is true of All will also be true of Some, assuming, of course that we use the identical subject and predicate terms.

Notice, the valid immediate inference called subalternation requires that the subject in the particular sentence be identical to the subject in the universal sentence. The subject in the universal sentence is ‘Scripture’. The subject in the particular sentence is ‘Jesus is the Christ’. These are not identical. So, you find yourself at odds even with the site you yourself maintain.

Premise 1: Knowledge is the meaning of: (In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The earth was without form, and void; and darkness was on the face of the deep. ... The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all. Amen. (Gen 1:1-Rev 22:21)) and what can be deduced therefrom.

This is in the form of "All A is B".

Conclusion: Jesus is the Christ is knowledge.

This is in the form of "Some A is B".

As I said and still maintain, Scripturalists are unable to be precise and derive one proposition that can be called justified knowledge from the one axiom. You should be able to put your argument precisely into the form All ___ is ____ and be able to explicitly tell us what goes in the spaces. Also, “‘Jesus is the Christ’ is knowledge” is not a particular statement. It is a universal affirmative statement. What you essentially are arguing for is that it is valid to go immediately from “All men are mortal” to “Socrates is mortal.” If this is the case, then exactly what was Aristotle doing by insisting one needed “Socrates is a man” to make the conclusion valid?

Sincerely,

Brian
 
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