Split Thread: Evidence not Criterion of Truth and Scientific Facts

[Afterthought]

This is a split thread from http://www.puritanboard.com/f49/should-reformed-christians-support-ken-ham-82888/ because the topic I was discussing seemed sufficiently different, and I got tired of bumping the other thread with increasingly different questions from what was given by the thread topic. So this thread is a continuation of a conversation I had with Rev. Winzer on the thread because I finally found the quotation I was looking for.


I got the book again and found the quotation, Mr. Winzer:

"In this context he [De Moor] does not further explain his reservations toward Cartesian thought, but most Reformed scholastics deny that evidence is a criterion for truth. By situating truth in perception and charging judgment only to assent to it, when it is evident, Descartes is far too optimistic about epistemology. According to the Reformed, the task of judgment to judge about the truth of perceptions is far more problematic, because evident perceptions need not be true and uncertain perceptions can yet be true." (Willem J. van Asselt, et. al, Refomed Thought on Freedom Chapter 7 footnote 45, p. 214)

To remind you of the conversation, we were discussing two topics. You recommended finding the quotation here, and you also asked why I was confused about the nature of scientific facts. My latest response (which gave why I was confused about the nature of scientific facts) was here (a long post, but I think I managed to summarize the difficulty I was having in two paragraphs at the end of the post).

 

[MW]

Raymond, my volume has gone missing, so I am not able to look up the full context. The Cartesian reference is helpful.

In the previous thread you stated, "This conclusion is problematic because we should be able to trust our senses and reasoning ability to some degree because of basic beliefs."

What were these senses and reasoning ability designed to do in the first place? A microscope is only going to magnify so far. To follow it further than it is able is going to lead to foolish conclusions. So we are back with the "limitations" of empirical knowledge. Yes? It can never lead to an ultimate explanation but must always be regarded as functional. This is suggested by your phrase, "to some degree."

 

[ZackF]

I was hoping you gents would get going on this again.....keep it going. Happy to be freeloader on this topic as I often don't know what or even how to think about it.

 

[Afterthought]

What were these senses and reasoning ability designed to do in the first place? A microscope is only going to magnify so far. To follow it further than it is able is going to lead to foolish conclusions. So we are back with the "limitations" of empirical knowledge. Yes? It can never lead to an ultimate explanation but must always be regarded as functional. This is suggested by your phrase, "to some degree."

Thanks to another recent thread, I may be getting closer to understanding. Before asking another question (although your answer is quite helpful as it is), I should probably ask for clarification on your use of the terms "functional" and "ultimate explanation" because those are terms I seem to have just assumed I knew what they meant and so didn't think to ask about them. By "functional," do you mean to suggest a position of scientific anti-realism or maybe instrumentalism or operationalism? Does the content of scientific facts have no necessary relationship to reality, whether in ontology, mathematics, law, or suggested history (e.g., climate changes recorded in ice cores)?

Presumably, since "functional" suggests "working," scientific facts and theories at least have a relationship to reality that allows for man to use them in taking dominion over Creation and bringing comfort in this life. I guess that could be classified as "predictive power;" the rest of the content could be a mere ideal with no relationship to reality, but the "predictive power" allows for real effects in Creation according to the ideal given by the scientific fact or theory.

By "ultimate explanation," do you mean "what is actually true" (and so "functional" facts are strictly speaking false)? Or "what is true according to an absolute perspective," and so by contrast, science is true according to a relative perspective (you rejected the latter before when I asked a similar question, but I don't recall if I asked the former; I ask the latter again here to show the connection between the two questions in my own mind)? Do you mean "what is necessary for life and salvation"? Or do you mean "true in every sense of the word" (and by contrast, "functional" might mean there is some truth to it, but not all parts of it are true)? Or do you mean something else?

Raymond, my volume has gone missing, so I am not able to look up the full context. The Cartesian reference is helpful.

Ah, that's a shame. We might have to put off that part of the discussion until later. I could try to give you the full context if you would like (it's at the beginning of a section of a chapter, so the footnote belongs to the first 2-3 paragraphs of that section), but I know that such is just simply not the same as looking at the volume for oneself when one is looking for context.

 

[MW]

By "functional," do you mean to suggest a position of scientific anti-realism or maybe instrumentalism or operationalism?

No, I would stress it is realist. What is conveyed by the senses is real. There is no disjunction between the phenomenal and noumenal. It is simply that our perception cannot take a transcendental view. It is bound to the time and space context in which the perception takes place.

Presumably, since "functional" suggests "working," scientific facts and theories at least have a relationship to reality that allows for man to use them in taking dominion over Creation and bringing comfort in this life. I guess that could be classified as "predictive power;" the rest of the content could be a mere ideal with no relationship to reality, but the "predictive power" allows for real effects in Creation according to the ideal given by the scientific fact or theory.

That is a safe presumption. Such "knowledge" was intended to be used subserviently to the Creator-creature relationship. Once that relationship is destroyed, and the creature seeks to assume the perspective or the prerogative of the Creator, he destroys the reality in which empirical facts are meaningful.

Or "what is true according to an absolute perspective," and so by contrast, science is true according to a relative perspective (you rejected the latter before when I asked a similar question,

It requires an ultimate perspective to validate the relative. If we try to cut the frog apart to see how it leaps we take away its ability to leap. That is the destructiveness of analytical philosophy. The part only works within a fully functioning system but analysis likes to separate the part and see how it functions by itself.

 

[Afterthought]

Thanks. I'm not entirely aware of "analytical" philosophy, although from a Wiki search, it appears I might have learned within its tradition. A couple more clarifying questions, and then I should be ready to ask my main questions from your initial response to the OP.

No, I would stress it is realist. What is conveyed by the senses is real. There is no disjunction between the phenomenal and noumenal. It is simply that our perception cannot take a transcendental view. It is bound to the time and space context in which the perception takes place.

By "realist," I understand you to mean precisely and no more than what you have explained, i.e., common sense realism. But this isn't necessarily scientific realism, although some philosophers have argued common sense realism gives us scientific realism. Scientific realism holds that unobservables in scientific theories are real, or are at least approximately real (i.e., they approximate the true objects that really exist). One reason usually given is that one cannot explain the success of our theories' predictions without those unobservables being real or approximately real. So you hold our perceptions are bound and convey only relative (but real) data, and that what is real in scientific theories is what we can see with our senses. You also hold that the "predictive power" of scientific facts are real. Is there anything else within scientific theories or facts that are real, or are you saying that the remainder of scientific theories or facts are not necessarily real? If the ontology is not real, it looks like scientific instrumentalism to me.

(Your answer to the above may be repeating yourself; my apologies for the tediousness if so. I'm just trying to put things together one bit at a time before asking my next question. In fact, I wonder if I already put it together; if the relative, though relative, is real, then the philosophy of science I expressed in the previous thread as a form of instrumentalism, though one could also call it a form of realism, seems to be what is being advocated.)

It requires an ultimate perspective to validate the relative. If we try to cut the frog apart to see how it leaps we take away its ability to leap. That is the destructiveness of analytical philosophy. The part only works within a fully functioning system but analysis likes to separate the part and see how it functions by itself.

This is an interesting thought, and it isn't something I've quite grasped the reasons for why it is true, although we've discussed it on a few occasions and seems to make sense. But to get to the use made of the thought, basically, the relative cannot give any absolute information without looking at it from an ultimate perspective? And that's why it might be incorrect to refer to science as true according to a relative perspective? Or that the relative is meaningless and so doesn't function on its own without the absolute perspective?

 

[MW]

Raymond, we might need to explore realism in its personal nature. This might help show a contrast in relation to instrumentalism.

Let's take the hand. I suppose it could superficially be regarded as an instrument, but in reality it is biologically and organically one with the person. If a person punches another person, the hand is not merely the instrument, but is the person himself performing the action so that the person is responsible for what the hand does. Likewise the senses are biologically and organically ours. They convey information by which we perceive things and they do so in a way that we personally feel responsible for that information. This is not done without reason, but the process is so unified and whole that it is impossible to separate the two.

Does that help to show the realism involved in the process?

 

[Afterthought]

Does that help to show the realism involved in the process?

Hm. This is tough. Here is what I've got so far. The realism seems to be that our scientific theories and facts ultimately reduce to things we view by sense perception, which are real. In trying to explain and systematize our sense perception, we do so in a personal manner, caring about the information that we have received. The instrumentalist views theories as merely computational devices (albeit, the devices themselves would be seen as corresponding to reality), which separates the depersonalized end product from the personal process of obtaining the theory. Is that where the contrast is? You too would say that scientific theories and facts are computational devices, just not the depersonalized ones of the instrumentalist?

Or am I still separating the initial sensory perception from the theory made to explain it? But I'm not sure that's where the contrast lies because there are forms of instrumentalism that view the unobservables as corresponding to real entities observed in the laboratory, although the unobservables themselves are not necessarily real.

Edit: Actually, I may have figured it out. One difference between realist and instrumentalist views of science is that of purpose. The instrumentalist views the theories as intended for being "merely conceptual tools for classifying, systematizing and predicting observational statements, so that the genuine content of science is not to be found on the level of theories (Duhem 1954)" whereas the realist attempts to make theories "to describe reality even beyond the realm of observable things and regularities, so that theories can be regarded as statements having a truth value." http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-progress/#ReaIns Perhaps you might disagree that the statements necessarily have a truth value (?), but the main contrast between instrumentalism and what you are advocating is in terms of purpose; on your view, the person feels responsible for the information given by the senses and attempts to make a theory to describe the reality the senses convey, rather than to not care about reality beyond computational devices.

 

[MW]

Scientific Progress (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Many of the positions discussed in this article go beyond my reading exposure. Popper and Kuhn are familiar. I haven't read Duhem so I can't critique the view, but the idea of science as merely being a conceptual tool undermines the moral value of the knowledge. It would make moral choices a virtual reality. If I know putting two chemicals together will create an explosion there has to be a genuine reality which affects the way I act towards those two chemicals. That is more than a conceptual tool.

One of the problems connected with this kind of empiricism is its failure to validate the "naive" which enters into every person's experience. Once that is done the human construct takes on a virtual form which ceases to have relevance to the reality we all know. On a philosophical level such a theory ceases to be descriptive, and should not be regarded as genuinely philosophical.

 

[Afterthought]

I haven't read Duhem so I can't critique the view, but the idea of science as merely being a conceptual tool undermines the moral value of the knowledge. It would make moral choices a virtual reality. If I know putting two chemicals together will create an explosion there has to be a genuine reality which affects the way I act towards those two chemicals. That is more than a conceptual tool.

I think the response would be that the conceptual tool is meant for predicting what we observe in reality, and so the genuine reality would be on the level of "predictive power," but nothing more. The unobservables postulated by a theory are seen as not necessarily being real, and the form of the mathematical laws are also not seen as necessarily the "real" and "correct" mathematical laws. One realist response is the "no miracles" argument, which is similar to one of your responses: it would take a miracle to explain the success of scientific theories if the unobservables were not connected to reality in some manner.

Duhem is rather interesting. He is usually seen as the paradigmatic instrumentalist version of scientific anti-realism, but as the article noted, his view on "natural classifications" sometimes gets him listed with realists. Some things he held that are connected to conversations we have had on philosophy of science include the following. (1) He believed physics should be independent of metaphysics, in part because metaphysics provided no unification power due to all the disagreements on it. (2) He believed physical theories should not aim to explain but to describe or represent. I don't know if he was influenced by Kant in his views, but he does use terminology reminiscent of Kant. He says that to "explain" is to "lay bare reality;" explanatory theories would give us reality bare, stripped of all appearances. Description or representation would deal with the appearances and are what theories should aim for. (3) He believed more than one representation of reality was possible because an infinite number of empirically-indistinguishable theories fits a finite data set. Hence, scientific theories represent reality with their mathematics.

At any rate, that background knowledge is one reason why when I hear "functional" or "human construct," or one advocating "description" rather than "explanation," I think of scientific instrumentalism. However, I might now understand what you mean by "human construct." Are you referring to the process of construction being human and so limited in all the ways we are limited? The construction is built on reality and so is real, rather than imaginative or ideal--in contrast to an instrumentalist take on the phrase. A building is real, even though it too is constructed by humans. Indeed, a building is "functional" too, being built for that end.

A "human construct" built to understand the reality of the natural world would stand in contrast to (what things do we have for understanding the world that are not human constructs? Something constructed with Divine direction?)....? And the construct is "functional" because it is made not only to understand the natural world but to be useful (this last part doesn't seem quite right given your explanation of "functional" earlier as "not a transcendental view on reality")?

 

[Afterthought]

Bumping. Is my understanding above correct, or am I still misunderstanding? If I am understanding correctly, I'm ready to move on to my next question, which explores the limitations of our senses and reasoning.

 

[ZackF]

 

[MW]

Bumping. Is my understanding above correct, or am I still misunderstanding?

I think you have represented the point very well, and I especially like the building illustration: "A building is real, even though it too is constructed by humans. Indeed, a building is "functional" too, being built for that end."

Like the building, a believer can receive it as a covenant blessing, though it is temporal and constructed with human labour and might have various faults, Ps. 127; 1 Cor. 3:21-23.

 

[Afterthought]

Thanks, Mr. Winzer. That last thought about receiving these things as a covenant blessing is a very useful one. Now that I've got "functional" and "human construct" sorted out, on to the question I had since your first reply.

What were these senses and reasoning ability designed to do in the first place? A microscope is only going to magnify so far. To follow it further than it is able is going to lead to foolish conclusions. So we are back with the "limitations" of empirical knowledge. Yes? It can never lead to an ultimate explanation but must always be regarded as functional. This is suggested by your phrase, "to some degree."

To what degree are the senses and reason limited? A vague question, but I'll attempt to clarify. I am not talking about the limitations of the senses themselves. I think Turretin does an excellent job explaining in what circumstances they can be trusted and in what circumstances they cannot (e.g., our senses might give us illusory information if we view something from an improper angle or if we are ill). I am also not talking about the limitations of mere reason either. It is less clear to me what its limitations are exactly, but I'm mostly interested in the combination of the senses and reason. Scientific theories and facts do not always directly involve the senses, nor do they involve reason alone, but both are used together in the form of induction or in the form of inferences to the best explanation.

In some circumstances, it seems that our abilities work well enough that we claim we "know" something, e.g., we claim to know (not merely opine) that the one who claims to be our mother actually is our mother. Yet this information can only be sure to a probabilistic degree? In other circumstances, we claim that something is merely a working hypothesis, e.g., that the earth goes around the sun or vice versa, or that gravity follows Einstein's theory. What is it about the earth going around the sun that is different from (a) that touching fire will burn or (b) that someone is our mother or (c) that stepping in front of a quickly moving vehicle will result in injury or (d) that the sun rises and sets in the particular manner that it does or (e) that all humans are constructed in the same way, e.g., cells and organs or (f) the theory of evolution or (g) evidence for historical events (like information from star explosions) that took place longer than 6,000 years ago?

Are all these things working hypotheses, with the differences between these things (and maybe some of them reduce to each other?) being merely the amount of evidence available? Or does their classification as knowledge or opinion depend on how directly connected they are to our senses (since our reason needs "stuff" in order to come to conclusions and frequently needs sensible stuff to come to conclusions about the world)? Or are some of them inherently relative in nature while others could only be absolute (e.g., regardless of perspective, either some event occurred in history or it did not, so historical events are "absolute" not "relative")? Or maybe we are bound to space and time but by comparing the objects of sense and reason with other areas of space and time, we can claim to "know" things?

 

[MW]

Or does their classification as knowledge or opinion depend on how directly connected they are to our senses (since our reason needs "stuff" in order to come to conclusions and frequently needs sensible stuff to come to conclusions about the world)?

Are we venturing away from the scope of empirical science at this point? Science as "human construct" presumes empirical science is the object of discussion.

Direct sensory perception would be more trustworthy where the information is directly related to the senses. Where the knowledge requires other information then the reliability of the information depends on the source. I would also say that "testimony" becomes fundamental to the interpretation of the "evidence" in the case of things like identifying one's "mother." Of course one's mother might not be one's biological mother, and so a sociological definition might be required.

 

[Afterthought]

Are we venturing away from the scope of empirical science at this point? Science as "human construct" presumes empirical science is the object of discussion.

I might have unintentionally done so. The idea was that the kinds of inferences made in empirical science are the kinds of inferences we make in everyday life (namely, induction and inferences to the best explanation). So I was wondering why in these other cases, when the exact same type of inference is drawn and frequently on the exact same type of evidence (observational), can we consider the information we gain as knowledge and have certainty (such as sticking ones hand in a fire will cause it to be burned), while in the cases of some parts of empirical science (earth moving around the sun or apparent historical information) is the knowledge only considered probable and a working hypothesis? I would think the limitations of the senses and reason apply the same in each case, so I thought the contrast between these things might help clarify the limitations of inductive inferences and inferences to the best explanation.

Perhaps a better everyday example would be one who puts an item down somewhere and then returns to find it moved from its original position. A working hypothesis is built as to the cause. Things that don't happen in everyday observational experience are immediately eliminated (e.g., that the cup moved on its own; or extraterrestrial beings moved it). Things that do happen in everyday observational experience are immediately made the first working hypothesis: some other person must have moved the cup. Evidence is then built for whether some other person moved the cup or not, and the hypothesis might be revised to something else (e.g., maybe one forgot that he or she had moved it).

I hadn't considered that testimony would cause some of my examples to differ. Testimony is a different kind of evidence that is not available to empirical science. Testimony has its own limitations, but they aren't the same as the limitations of the senses and reason. I suppose the evidence of testimony kind of hurts the example I provided above too, but just watching the littlest of children interact with the world about them shows that they seem to follow the scientific process of observation, hypothesis, experiment, and we seem to do so whenever we encounter something new in the world that we don't understand (e.g., learning to use some technical gadget that we have no instruction manual for). These last two could provide better examples. Investigations made by detectives or the everyday person reconstructing an event based on observation (e.g., the location and kinds of objects in a room) could provide examples of empirical science uncovering the past, insofar as those investigations do not rely on personal testimony.

 

[MW]

Raymond, I wonder what happens if the question, Who moved the cup, becomes, Who moved the stone? This highlights that the discussion must choose to deal with knowledge on a specific level. What we say concerning empirical knowledge is not going to work when we move to the level of the supernatural. So far as this level is concerned, testimony is of vital importance.

It may be that the person himself moved the cup and simply can't remember doing so.

It is interesting that you bring up children because it is debated to what degree their environment encourages and nurtures trust in the senses. Let's take the question you pose as to identifying one's mother. It is taught to the child. These days dad and mum are likely telling the child, Mama, and will reward the child with a great deal of reassurance when the child first says the word. It is also reaffirmed by various motherly actions towards the child. In all of this there is an implicit acceptance of testimony and one usually does not stop to question or doubt it in Cartesian fashion.

We might transfer this to trust in one's senses. There is a development that has taken place long before a person can stop to analyse the process. Here again it must be admitted that testimony has played a vital part.

 

[Afterthought]

I'm still thinking about my next response but a few quick questions for now!

It is interesting that you bring up children because it is debated to what degree their environment encourages and nurtures trust in the senses.

Thanks. I wasn't aware of that. I wonder if the debate similarly applies to their trust in scientific reasoning (induction, inference to best explanation)? When watching children interact with some new object, they tend to "play" with it as though they are testing it. Or as a real example, I remember a child first discovering magnetism by attaching a toy that had a magnetic foot to something metal. The child subsequently tried attaching the toy to something wooden, but of course, the toy fell off. The child then tried attaching the toy to something metal again, but the toy fell off because the magnetic foot did not come in contact with the metal.

Is this a scientific process, or was this purely unintentional on the child's part? It seems at the least, the child had assumed the toy could stick to objects and so tried putting it on another object. The child definitely trusted without a doubt the subsequent explanation as to what happened, but where did those who gave the explanation to the child learn such a thing? It seems this might lead to the regress I mention below.

We might transfer this to trust in one's senses. There is a development that has taken place long before a person can stop to analyse the process. Here again it must be admitted that testimony has played a vital part.

Interesting. I hadn't considered the role of testimony in bringing one to trust one's senses. Do you have any examples? I can only think of examples like an adult telling a child, "Don't touch the hot stove!" But how did the adult learn that? It would seem that this would regress back to a first person in connection to the family line who had discovered that by an empirical process, so I'm not sure if that's what you had in mind by testimony being part of one's development in trusting one's senses.


As another possible difference between empirical things we consider as knowledge and other empirical facts of science, I wonder if the similarity of conditions plays a role? When we say we know that fire burns, we implicitly are saying that we know the fire burns under X conditions. In fact, when first learning about fire, we may be surprised at conditions in which fire does not seem to burn (e.g., it might be put out by water) because we have forgotten about the X conditions and applied the statement universally. We then subsequently add that to our knowledge of fire. We can claim knowledge and certainty because we are only claiming it for specific conditions. For other scientific facts, we might not be able to isolate or know the conditions well enough to say our scientific reasoning has given us knowledge?

 

[MW]

The hot stove example is cognitive. I was thinking more in terms of pre-cognitive development. Even before being able to analyse the environment the child has started to develop his awareness to it because of specific patterns and structures which have been exerting an influence on him. Hence the nature versus nurture debate. Some of this can be clarified by a rejection of the tabula rasa doctrine and an acceptance of a priori cognitive equipment, but specific forms of belief and behaviour are patently learned, including the interpretation of sensory data.

 

[Afterthought]

Thanks. The mention of a priori equipment reminds me that I sometimes have wondered why the a priori equipment could be considered knowledge if by itself it has no content. For my own part, it seems to me these tools of knowledge could be considered seeds, and so in the same sense that seeds of trees are trees, these tools and seeds of knowledge are knowledge.

Not being sure what to ask next, perhaps it may be best to eliminate the examples that definitely require testimony (since as you noted, we need to stick to empirical knowledge). What is the difference between knowing that fire burns, the sun rises and sets, getting hit by a bus hurts, on the one hand, and on the other hand, having only relative probability of it being true that the earth goes around the sun, the theory of evolution is correct, the earth is much older than 6,000 years, and ice cores/supernovas record ancient history?

For my own conjecture, might it be the possibility of direct and repeated testing in the case of fire burning? That is directly related to the senses, while the latter class of examples is not. However, being able to say that knowing that the sun rises or that getting hit by a bus hurts requires more theoretical knowledge (especially the last one). These two examples are more directly related to sensory perception than the latter class of examples, but what allows us to say we know in those two cases (if we indeed can?)?

A possibility for understanding the latter class of examples may have to do with the relativity of duration, extension, position, and motion? Because these things require a reference to be measured against, these things can only be probable because we have no absolute reference point. On the other hand, the sun rising, fire burning, or getting hit by a bus are absolutes: one either experiences those things or does not (or the sun either rises/sets or does not). Another possibility, at least, for the theory of evolution and other empirically-believed historical events might be that these are extrapolations of other data (which has already been pre-interpreted by other theories) in order to reconstruct the past. So although they deal with the absolute (historical events), they can only be probable?

Am I on the right track? Am I missing anything that distinguishes between these two classes of examples, such that we can say we know for one class but only have a probability of truth in the second class (or maybe the theory of evolution and possibly also historical events belong in a third class?)?


Edit: Actually, based on our above discussion, I just thought of another possible distinguishing mark. The theory of evolution and reconstruction of past events empirically assumes there was no supernatural activity involved. Hence, these things at best can only be considered probable (and the further back in time one goes, the less probable they are of being true) and at worst, false (as in the theory of evolution or the big bang theory explaining the origin of man and the rest of creation; although some of its other historical constructions might actually be true and so probable at best, rather than definitely false).

 

[ZackF]

 

[MW]

I wouldn't place evolution in the category of "empirically believed historical events." It is a faith-based theory. One must either believe this was the way the Divine created (for which there is no suggestion in Scripture) or that there is some Divinity in "nature" (for which there is no evidence in "nature").

I don't expect to find any examples which eliminate testimony. It is basic to human experience and knowledge.

Were the whole fabric of human knowledge turned on its head by scientific evidence it would require belief in scientific testimony for the change in understanding to take effect. Students have to accept a large body of scientific fact they have never tested in order to start testing.

 

[Afterthought]

Some fair points, although I would think there is a difference between personal testimony and the "testimony" of science, due to the different reasoning processes required to accept them (all I need to be certain that some past event is true on the basis of personal testimony is that the testifier is reliable and was not deceived, while for scientific "testimony" the testifier has to go through wordless data to produce a proposition that explains present conditions through a supposed past event that produced them)? I might want to return to the point about evolution. But for now, it seems all my attempts at trying to understand the limitations of scientific reasoning by guessing at the differences between examples of beliefs have not worked. What would you say are the differences such that scientific reasoning produces knowledge and certainty in one class of examples (or at least we claim we know them) and something less than that in the other class of examples?

 

[MW]

What would you say are the differences such that scientific reasoning produces knowledge and certainty in one class of examples (or at least we claim we know them) and something less than that in the other class of examples?

In one class -- empiricism -- you have stated aims and methods which are limited in comparison with the way we intuitively (or naively, in the good philosophic sense of the term) know things. These limitations are self-imposed blindfolds. That being the case, I don't expect any "certainty" in the epistemic sense. In some cases the practitioners are aware of these limitations but in many cases they are not, and they claim too much for their "science."

 

[Afterthought]

In one class -- empiricism -- you have stated aims and methods which are limited in comparison with the way we intuitively (or naively, in the good philosophic sense of the term) know things. These limitations are self-imposed blindfolds. That being the case, I don't expect any "certainty" in the epistemic sense. In some cases the practitioners are aware of these limitations but in many cases they are not, and they claim too much for their "science."

So the difference is not in the reasoning (induction, inference to best explanation) and not in the data reasoned about (empirical objects) but the assumptions made when evaluating the data? I can know that fire burns and would burn me if I touched it because I only need to make assumptions related to the "naive," while for the earth going around the sun or historical events in ice core data, I need to make further assumptions that go beyond the "naive"?

Do you have any practitioners in mind who are aware of these limitations and might speak about them using specific examples? I think you might regard Hawking as being inadvertently one? Any others (since Hawking seems to take an approach that isn't realist, If I recall correctly; but I'd have to look at his work again since I was not looking for that when originally reading his work)?

 

[Afterthought]

Some fair points, although I would think there is a difference between personal testimony and the "testimony" of science

Dabney seems to agree (his comment come in the context of evolution; not the other sorts of things we have been discussing), although it is probably the case I did not distinguish properly between them. The difference may actually lie in the "source" or the "ground" of the testimony, but I am not sure.

"Circumstantial Evidence Refuted By Parole.

The worthlessness of mere plausibilities concerning the origin of the universe, is yet plainer when set in contrast with that inspired testimony upon the subject, to which Revealed Theology will soon introduce us. Hypothetical evidence, even at its best estate, comes under the class of circumstantial evidence. Judicial science, stimulated to accuracy and fidelity by the prime interests of society in the rights and the life of its members, has correctly ascertained the relation between circumstantial proof and competent parole testimony. In order to rebut the word of such a witness, the circumstantial evidence must be an exclusive demonstration: it must not only satisfy the reason that the criminal act might have been committed in the supposed way, by the supposed persons; but that it was impossible, it could have been committed in any other way. In the absence of parole testimony, every enlightened judge would instruct his jury, that the defence is entitled to try the hypothesis of the accuser by this test: If any other hypothesis can be invented that is even purely imaginary, to which the facts granted in the circumstantial evidence can be reconciled by the defence, that is proof of invalidity in the accusing hypothesis.

Let us suppose a crime committed without known eyewitnesses. The prosecutors examine every attendant circumstance minutely, and study them profoundly. They construct of them a supposition that the crime was committed in secret by A. They show that this supposition of his guilt satisfies every fact, so far as known. They reason with such ingenuity, that every mind tends to the conviction that A. must be verily guilty. But now there comes forward an honest man, who declares that he was eyewitness of the crime; and, that, of his certain knowledge, it was done by B., and not by A. On inquiry, it appears that B. was, at that time, naturally capable of the act. Then, unless the prosecutors can attack the credibility of this witness, before his word their case utterly breaks down. The ingenuity, the plausibility of their argument, is now naught. They had shown that, so far as known facts had gone, the act might have been done by A. But the witness proves that in fact it was done by B. The plausibility of the hypothesis and the ingenuity of the lawyers are no less: but they are utterly superseded by direct testimony of an eyewitness.

I take this pains to illustrate to you this principle of evidence, because it is usually so utterly ignored by Naturalists, and so neglected even by Theologians. I assert that the analogy is perfect between the case supposed and the pretended evolution argument. Does Revelation bring in the testimony of the divine Eyewitness, because actual Agent, of the genesis of the universe? Is Revelation sustained as a credible witness by its literary, its internal, its moral, its prophetical, its miraculous evidences? Then even though the evolution hypothesis were scientifically probable, in the light of all known and physical facts and laws, it must yield before this competent witness. Does that theory claim that, naturally speaking, organisms might have been hence produced? God, the Agent, tells us that, in point of fact, they were otherwise produced. As Omnipotence is an agency confessedly competent to any effect whatsoever, if the witness is credible, the debate is ended." (Systematic Theology, Chapter 2: Evolution, p. 47-48 from here)

 

[MW]

Knowing fire burns is as simple as placing your hand over the fire. Of course science will want to know "how" rather than the fact "that" fire burns. That is where the complexity of a scientific framework and method is needed, and a great deal of this has been taken on trust.

I'm not sure about particular practitioners. I think the scientific world understands its limitations, and the fact there can be competing theories should suffice to bring it home, but the work tends to be over-valued when selling it to others.

 

[Afterthought]

Well, we usually say we know it without having actually experienced putting our hand in a flame. I suppose part of that may be based on testimony and part of that based on what we've seen fire do to other objects. The same goes for knowing that getting hit by a bus would hurt or that the sun will rise tomorrow. I'm trying to think of a counter-example of something that we say we "know" but is nevertheless of the same nature as a scientific theory, but I'm having difficulty. Perhaps the best I have now is knowing that a stick doesn't actually bend when it is put into water.

I think I understand the point: we can trust induction and inference to the best explanation when it is dealing with "that" sorts of knowledge, mere facts without the "how." Is this correct? It should be noted though that unless we believe all scientists have conspired against us, the part taken on "trust" we can certainly "trust" to be trustworthy? Perhaps then it might be objected that this "trust" may allow knowledge and more certainty when the trustworthy methods have been applied properly?

While there is certainly a valid distinction between knowing "that" and "how," what about historical reconstruction of events from present data, which seems to me to also fall under the domain of empirical science? I'm not referring to evolution yet (although the question certainly applies directly to it), but rather ice core data, information from supernovae, and big bang cosmology kinds of things. I suppose these things can rely on the "how" to some degree, but the main focus of interest is "what happened" or "when did it happen." I'm actually not entirely satisfied that I've classified ice core data and supernovae properly as belonging to the class of historical reconstruction of events, so if I have misclassified them, what would be a better category? Or if they belong also to the "how," how do they belong to it?

Not all historical reconstruction can be unreliable, but I guess the more reliable reconstructions rely on good personal testimony rather than mere "circumstantial evidence" (to use Dabney's phrase).

 

[MW]

Dabney's discussion is useful. But what happens when the fact of miracle becomes a reason for suspicion against Revelation. And the rise of forensic evidence as superior over testimony shows that empiricism now pervades life.

Obviously "that" and "how" are intertwined in evaluating historical claims. If a person believes something cannot happen in a certain way he will not allow that it has happened at all. This is evident in the rejection of miracle. On the other hand, if a person believes in miracles everywhere any explanation in terms of cause and effect will be irrelevant.

This brings us back to an earlier point, that there is a moral necessity for human constructs. If one cannot foresee consequences resulting from actions it will be impossible to make morally responsible decisions.

 

[Afterthought]

But what happens when the fact of miracle becomes a reason for suspicion against Revelation.

You clearly typed this very quickly (I'll have to try and keep our discussion points focused on small pieces); I'm not following your point. Clearly, if the reports of miracles raise suspicion against Revelation, then the one who is suspicious of it will not accept the Revelation as trustworthy, and the one who is suspicious has some other epistemology that is taken as ultimate and rules out all miracles (such as empiricism).

This brings us back to an earlier point, that there is a moral necessity for human constructs. If one cannot foresee consequences resulting from actions it will be impossible to make morally responsible decisions.

A good point brought up again. This is a much more satisfying reason than what was given me in philosophy class.