Originally posted by Contra_Mundum
You have better access to some of these other minds than do I (e.g. Muller). And a better grasp on this problem, having wrestled with it for much longer. And I also don't have the philosopher's vocabulary, or specialized terms or definitions.
Well, you could have fooled me with your interactions, but I appreciate your modesty and humility on the issue. It is *extremely* difficult, I must admit.
I agree that on the face of it, I have reservations about claiming (with certainty) that this kosmos is the "best" possible tableau for the display of all God's attributes (most wise, holy, happy, etc.). I think if we decide that God must have chosen the ideal universe for the total-picture concept simply because that's the one we have, and we don't think (a priori, even if based on biblical premises) that God would choose anything less based on his Nature, that we indeed are forcing him into a divine-naturalistic determinism--i.e. in that mode he does not merely act on the basis of his will in harmony with his Nature, but could not have arrived at another conclusion (all things being equal). This, I submit, impinges in some way on his freedom.
Yes, this does not allow he would be able to will another possible world, for his nature would not allow it, let alone the possibility of willing otherwise.
But here's another thought--even though we admit infinity into the deliberation, acknowledging a virtually limitless variety and permutation of possibilities in the mind of God--when we claim a "best" exists (which God must have perfectly prioritized) we have (it seems to me just now) asserted a limitation, a cap, an end. What if we are claiming too much? The infinite Nature of God does not allow for limitations on his knowledge. It is not sufficient to acknowledge that God's rational mind never outstrips his imagination, or vice-versa, if we then decide that that infinite conception must then be conceived of as a list, an infinite catena with fixed positions for every possibility. Such a list assumes another list--a set of criteria by which to order and arrange them. Even if we assume the adequacy of such conceptions to describe the infinite workings of the infinite Mind at one point (and I seriously doubt this), we still could not tell if God's rule of selecting any one of those hypotheticals entailed choosing the one in the First position!
Well, I would say there are limited possibilities regarding the possible worlds within necessary knowledge. For instance, a possible world cannot exist where God is not God. God's nature does limit the possible worlds in that sense, for surely a world where God is not omniscient is no possible world at all. As long as God does not contradict Himself, or his nature, all things are possible. Another instance is the impossibility of world existing where sin exists and God's justice is not satisfied. Thise frees us from strict voluntarism, or arbitrariness. Right? So, all worlds are possible within the logical parameters of God's being and essence.
Follow me on this. Edwards posits God's holiness, or that perfection/attribute of his nature, is that which dictates his wisdom and happiness, so that "the knowledge and holiness of God as prior, in the order of nature, to his happiness; the perfection of his understanding, as the foundation of his wise purposes and decrees; the holiness of his nature, as the cause and reason of his holy determination" (262). So, perfect holiness, in order of the nature of such divine necessity, gives him perfect understanding, which dictates his perfect wisdom, which will dictate his choice that produces his perfect happiness. So, according to Edwards, isn't there something in God's nature which necessarily means God must will this possible world if this world is the necessary decree/determination that is most holy, wise, and happy? And does this not mean God had no ability to will any other possible world or no possible world at all, since his desires can never conflict? I have problems with this regarding divine simplicity, too. And given this, how can a logically possible world exist in God's necessary knowledge if God's perfect holiness, wisdom, and happiness is not ultimate in that possibility? And does this not mean God's perfection of his nature is somehow contingent upon His decree of this possible world? Why wouldn't God be most holy, wise, and happy merely willing himself necessarily and not willing any thing outside of himself? Does His nature demand the existence of creation?
And, I agree, it is a huge assertion to assume this world was actualized it was "first" on a list, or the best possible choice. If the best possible choice is the only choice according to his nature, then how could another choice exist even in possibility when God's best choice is necessary for any possible existence? Can God choose lesser than the most holy, wise, and happy decree? If not, then no other possible world could logically exist, for God would not be God in that world (i.e. he would not be most holy, wise, and happy, which is dictated as necessary by his nature).
What if God's method of choice, his reason for selecting this one (buried as it is within himself) does not acomodate itself to easy identifications like "best"? I think that "best" is only useful in a kind of comparitive sense. As in "best for the purposes which he intends," not every which may be revealed to us.
Hmmm... I have to think about this last paragraph. There appears to be something there that is catching my attention, but I'm not sure how.
Hey, I really appreciate this dialogue. Please, feel free to opine, ramble, or postulate/speculate on possibilities. This "brainstorming" exchange is helpful.
