The Freedom of God: Theology Proper

[Theological Books]

Here is something I'm debating on another web-board forum, so I'd like to hear the imput from all the fine ladies and gentlemen on this fine web-board forum.

To what extent was God free to will another possible world? Was it metaphysically and/or logically possible for God to will any other possible world (or no world at all)?

 

[BlackCalvinist]

Daniel 4:34-35

God's free to will whatever world He wanted. In His wisdom according to His purpose and good pleasure, He chose this one. Whether or not we'll ever get a full answer on the other side of eternity is up in the air. God's not obligated to give us one.

 

[JohnV]

The question is a loaded one. God is free, but free to do something other than He has done? That is a question that implies limitations on God. It is like asking if God can make a rock too big for Him to lift.

There are parameters to creation that are founded upon His character. We live in a world of good and bad, of beauty and ugliness, of right and wrong. These are either shadows of His goodness, beauty, and righteousness, or they show the want ( the need due to lacking ) of these. Such things as show His divinity and power cannot be different. We cannot even speculate whether Melchizedek and Abraham could have traded places, because God ordained what was ultimately right.

Your question asks the ontological or logical possibility of such other worlds. But the question does not deal with the limitations of this world, but of God. I think that the answer to your question is that God saw all that He had made and saw that it was very good. He was not admiring His handiwork, as if it were in question whether it would be good, but saying this to teach us concerning creation, and that He made it.

That's my

[Edited on 7-4-2005 by JohnV]

 

[Theological Books]

OS_X, thanks for that quote, but maybe you can elaborate on the extent of that quote as I narrow down the topic so as to not have such a loaded question (as pointed out by JohnV).

What I'm asking, JohnV, is the category of whether or not God wills some things necessarily (i.e. himself) and other things freely (i.e. ad extra, or those things without of himself). For instance, Turretin speaks on this issue in 3:3:14. To what extent was God able/free to will another world? This issues goes hand-in-hand with the logical priority and order and God's necessary knowledge (God's knowledge of himself and all possible worlds) and God's free knowledge (God's knowledge of that which he willed to actualize based upon his determination). And, while God is immutable and eternal, as is his decree/will, reformed orthodoxy spoke of a distinction between God asboluste (a priori) in the logical state of necessary knowledge and God hypothetical/contingent (a posteriori) in the logical state of free knowledge. So, as Turretin states, we can speak of God's will/volition in an absolute sense, apart from what is actualized, and in a hypothetical/contingent sense, or with that which is actualized in mind. I also direct you to Muller's Post Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, Volume 3, beginning on page 432 for more clarification or background reading on such distinctions.

From God's necessary knowledge he had a choice of what world to actualize by willing/decreeing (in an absolute sense, though once willed, due to God's nature necessitating his will be immutable and eternal, being unable to unwill or not will that which he determined to will) from all possible worlds. We can say, I think (and this is the question), God was free (including spontaneity and indifference properly understood) and able, meaning he could have possibly (logically and/or metaphysically) chosen to will any other possible world. Now, all possible worlds existing in God's necessary knowledge, in order to be logically possible, must coincide with God's nature and operate upon the parameters of God's nature. God cannot know a possible world where God is not God, or God is lacking an eternal attribute/perfection (i.e. omniscience, sovereignty, justice, mercy, etc), or a world where God's nature does not create categorical limitations, because such a world cannot be logically possible. This world, which God willed and actualized, was one of an infinite amount of logically possible worlds known by God necessarily in his natural knowledge, and every possible world was bound by God's nature and operated accordingly.

My question is regarding God's ability and freedom to will/decree any of the other logically possible worlds. For instance, in one possible world Adam sinned and God did not exercise mercy, but strict justice, condemning all men to hell. Was God free to will that possible world and actualize it? Or, would you say something in his nature determined He must necessarily will/decree this world? I ask this question in light of Edwards' small treatise in Freedom of the Will, namely "On the Necessity of the Divine Will" (page 260 in my Soli Deo Gloria copy). Given God's nature, was he free to will, according to his nature, contrary to what he willed? Was it possible (logically or metaphysically) for him to will otherwise than what is now actualized?

[Edited on 7-4-2005 by Theological Books]

 

[Contra_Mundum]

I think I understand the knot at the base of the question. However we answer, it seems we shall rob God of something: either some measure of freedom (if we decide that his Nature so directs him as to turn his Will into a determined adjunct); or some measure of his glory (if we decide that his choice is so free as to defy logical perception).

Perhaps the necessary ingredient is a dash of his wisdom?...

 

[Theological Books]

Originally posted by Contra_Mundum
I think I understand the knot at the base of the question. However we answer, it seems we shall rob God of something: either some measure of freedom (if we decide that his Nature so directs him as to turn his Will into a determined adjunct); or some measure of his glory (if we decide that his choice is so free as to defy logical perception).

Perhaps the necessary ingredient is a dash of his wisdom?...

Sure, wisdom is involved. However, Edwards says God chooses what is most wise, holy, and happy to his nature, because that is what he nature necessitates. However, that would mean if God willed not to create, but to be self-existent perfectly within the Triune Godhead, that would not have been the most wise, holy, and happy will. So, God's self-existence apart from ad extra (willing freely that which isn't necessary) would not be most holy, wise, and happy according to his nature. Then, therefore, is not God dependent upon creation (something from without himself) in order for his nature to be most wise, holy, and happy?

 

[Contra_Mundum]

Maybe you have another instance here of "equal ultimacy." In attempting priority, we are forcing God into a mold he doesn't quite fit into?

 

[Theological Books]

Originally posted by Contra_Mundum
Maybe you have another instance here of "equal ultimacy." In attempting priority, we are forcing God into a mold he doesn't quite fit into?

Equal ultimacy? Or spontaneity and/or indifference (properly defined as seen in Muller)? If it is equally ultimate, then all possibilities (either volition or nolition) are equally ultimate? So, what is the deciding factor? And the priority/order is merely logical. For instance, we make a logical distinction between the order/priority of God's necessary knowledge and his free knowledge, yet both are eternal. It seems as if Reformed orthodoxy is simply making this distinction with God's necessary and free will. It is similar to the logical order of the divine decree. The mold doesn't really "fit," but we order it logically to understand it and talk about it. Cannot this be the same with God's will?

I simply think Edwards' notion of the necessity of the divine decree is seriously problematic, if this actualized world (this will) is necessitated by his nature to be most wise, holy, and happy. Does that not seem problematic?

 

[Contra_Mundum]

You have better access to some of these other minds than do I (e.g. Muller). And a better grasp on this problem, having wrestled with it for much longer. And I also don't have the philosopher's vocabulary, or specialized terms or definitions.

I agree that on the face of it, I have reservations about claiming (with certainty) that this kosmos is the "best" possible tableau for the display of all God's attributes (most wise, holy, happy, etc.). I think if we decide that God must have chosen the ideal universe for the total-picture concept simply because that's the one we have, and we don't think (a priori, even if based on biblical premises) that God would choose anything less based on his Nature, that we indeed are forcing him into a divine-naturalistic determinism--i.e. in that mode he does not merely act on the basis of his will in harmony with his Nature, but could not have arrived at another conclusion (all things being equal). This, I submit, impinges in some way on his freedom

But here's another thought--even though we admit infinity into the deliberation, acknowledging a virtually limitless variety and permutation of possibilities in the mind of God--when we claim a "best" exists (which God must have perfectly prioritized) we have (it seems to me just now) asserted a limitation, a cap, an end. What if we are claiming too much? The infinite Nature of God does not allow for limitations on his knowledge. It is not sufficient to acknowledge that God's rational mind never outstrips his imagination, or vice-versa, if we then decide that that infinite conception must then be conceived of as a list, an infinite catena with fixed positions for every possibility. Such a list assumes another list--a set of criteria by which to order and arrange them. Even if we assume the adequacy of such conceptions to describe the infinite workings of the infinite Mind at one point (and I seriously doubt this), we still could not tell if God's rule of selecting any one of those hypotheticals entailed choosing the one in the First position!

What if God's method of choice, his reason for selecting this one (buried as it is within himself) does not acomodate itself to easy identifications like "best"? I think that "best" is only useful in a kind of comparitive sense. As in "best for the purposes which he intends," not every which may be revealed to us.

Back to you...

 

[Theological Books]

Originally posted by Contra_Mundum
You have better access to some of these other minds than do I (e.g. Muller). And a better grasp on this problem, having wrestled with it for much longer. And I also don't have the philosopher's vocabulary, or specialized terms or definitions.

Well, you could have fooled me with your interactions, but I appreciate your modesty and humility on the issue. It is *extremely* difficult, I must admit.

I agree that on the face of it, I have reservations about claiming (with certainty) that this kosmos is the "best" possible tableau for the display of all God's attributes (most wise, holy, happy, etc.). I think if we decide that God must have chosen the ideal universe for the total-picture concept simply because that's the one we have, and we don't think (a priori, even if based on biblical premises) that God would choose anything less based on his Nature, that we indeed are forcing him into a divine-naturalistic determinism--i.e. in that mode he does not merely act on the basis of his will in harmony with his Nature, but could not have arrived at another conclusion (all things being equal). This, I submit, impinges in some way on his freedom.

Yes, this does not allow he would be able to will another possible world, for his nature would not allow it, let alone the possibility of willing otherwise.

But here's another thought--even though we admit infinity into the deliberation, acknowledging a virtually limitless variety and permutation of possibilities in the mind of God--when we claim a "best" exists (which God must have perfectly prioritized) we have (it seems to me just now) asserted a limitation, a cap, an end. What if we are claiming too much? The infinite Nature of God does not allow for limitations on his knowledge. It is not sufficient to acknowledge that God's rational mind never outstrips his imagination, or vice-versa, if we then decide that that infinite conception must then be conceived of as a list, an infinite catena with fixed positions for every possibility. Such a list assumes another list--a set of criteria by which to order and arrange them. Even if we assume the adequacy of such conceptions to describe the infinite workings of the infinite Mind at one point (and I seriously doubt this), we still could not tell if God's rule of selecting any one of those hypotheticals entailed choosing the one in the First position!

Well, I would say there are limited possibilities regarding the possible worlds within necessary knowledge. For instance, a possible world cannot exist where God is not God. God's nature does limit the possible worlds in that sense, for surely a world where God is not omniscient is no possible world at all. As long as God does not contradict Himself, or his nature, all things are possible. Another instance is the impossibility of world existing where sin exists and God's justice is not satisfied. Thise frees us from strict voluntarism, or arbitrariness. Right? So, all worlds are possible within the logical parameters of God's being and essence.

Follow me on this. Edwards posits God's holiness, or that perfection/attribute of his nature, is that which dictates his wisdom and happiness, so that "the knowledge and holiness of God as prior, in the order of nature, to his happiness; the perfection of his understanding, as the foundation of his wise purposes and decrees; the holiness of his nature, as the cause and reason of his holy determination" (262). So, perfect holiness, in order of the nature of such divine necessity, gives him perfect understanding, which dictates his perfect wisdom, which will dictate his choice that produces his perfect happiness. So, according to Edwards, isn't there something in God's nature which necessarily means God must will this possible world if this world is the necessary decree/determination that is most holy, wise, and happy? And does this not mean God had no ability to will any other possible world or no possible world at all, since his desires can never conflict? I have problems with this regarding divine simplicity, too. And given this, how can a logically possible world exist in God's necessary knowledge if God's perfect holiness, wisdom, and happiness is not ultimate in that possibility? And does this not mean God's perfection of his nature is somehow contingent upon His decree of this possible world? Why wouldn't God be most holy, wise, and happy merely willing himself necessarily and not willing any thing outside of himself? Does His nature demand the existence of creation?

And, I agree, it is a huge assertion to assume this world was actualized it was "first" on a list, or the best possible choice. If the best possible choice is the only choice according to his nature, then how could another choice exist even in possibility when God's best choice is necessary for any possible existence? Can God choose lesser than the most holy, wise, and happy decree? If not, then no other possible world could logically exist, for God would not be God in that world (i.e. he would not be most holy, wise, and happy, which is dictated as necessary by his nature).

What if God's method of choice, his reason for selecting this one (buried as it is within himself) does not acomodate itself to easy identifications like "best"? I think that "best" is only useful in a kind of comparitive sense. As in "best for the purposes which he intends," not every which may be revealed to us.

Hmmm... I have to think about this last paragraph. There appears to be something there that is catching my attention, but I'm not sure how. Hey, I really appreciate this dialogue. Please, feel free to opine, ramble, or postulate/speculate on possibilities. This "brainstorming" exchange is helpful.

 

[JKLeoPCA]

Been a while for me to be here, but I think i'll add just a bit here.

whether it is another world or whatever, I find it helpful to recall some of the basics.

B. The Freedom of the Divine Will.

"The will of God is free in the highest sense of the word. An agent is said to be free, (1.) When he is at liberty to act or not to act, according to his good pleasure. This is liberty in acting. (2.) He is free as to his volitions, when they are determined by his own sense of what is wise, right, or desirable.
Freedom is more than spontaneity. The affections are spontaneous, but are not free. Loving and hating, delighting in and abhorring, do not depend upon the will.
God is free in acting, as in creating and preserving, becuase these acts to not arise from the necessity of his nature. He was free to create or not create; to continue the universe in existence or to cause it to cease to be. He is free also in keeping his promises, because his purpose so to do is determined by his own infinite goodness. But this only proves that moral certainty may be as inexorable as necessity."

-Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Volume I Theology, Page 403, Hendricksons publishing.

The following pages of Hodge are helpful I think too, as his discussion goes into not confusing the will of God with the power of God.


"It was a shrewd saying of a good old man, who when some one pertly asked in derision what God did before the world was created, answered 'he made a hell for the inquisitive', (August. Confess., lib. 11 c. 12.)"

A quote I find to be helpful in focus but offensive to the imaginations of my mind.

[Edited on 7-5-2005 by JKLeoPCA]

 

[biblelighthouse]

Originally posted by Theological Books
Here is something I'm debating on another web-board forum, so I'd like to hear the imput from all the fine ladies and gentlemen on this fine web-board forum.

To what extent was God free to will another possible world? Was it metaphysically and/or logically possible for God to will any other possible world (or no world at all)?

Let's break this question down into some component questions:

1) Is it conceivable that God would do anything to bring Himself less than maximum glory?

2) Would He be glorified as highly had He never created at all?

3) Could He have glorified Himself more by creating the universe differently than He has?


I believe the answer to each question is "NO".


God always seeks His highest glory. And to that end, He created the world just as He has done. I believe any other route would have brought Him less glory, not more (otherwise, He would have chosen the "other" route to bring Himself more glory).


Of course, in this discussion, I am way over my creaturely head. God may reveal to me in eternity that I had no business even having an opinion on so high of a topic.

 

[Theological Books]

Let's break this question down into some component questions:

1) Is it conceivable that God would do anything to bring Himself less than maximum glory?

2) Would He be glorified as highly had He never created at all?

3) Could He have glorified Himself more by creating the universe differently than He has?


I believe the answer to each question is "NO".


God always seeks His highest glory. And to that end, He created the world just as He has done. I believe any other route would have brought Him less glory, not more (otherwise, He would have chosen the "other" route to bring Himself more glory).


Of course, in this discussion, I am way over my creaturely head. God may reveal to me in eternity that I had no business even having an opinion on so high of a topic.

You are saying God, according to his nature, was bound to will this world, and was not free to will or not will another world. Correct? What, then, in his nature, dictates his desire for his glory? Aren't you now saying, though, that God needs something outside of himself to perfect himself (i.e. bring most glory to himself)?

 

[biblelighthouse]

Originally posted by Theological Books
You are saying God, according to his nature, was bound to will this world, and was not free to will or not will another world. Correct? What, then, in his nature, dictates his desire for his glory? Aren't you now saying, though, that God needs something outside of himself to perfect himself (i.e. bring most glory to himself)?

Dr. McMahon has dealt with this question better than I have (I believe it was in his teaching series on the Covenant of Redemption).

Matt, please feel free to jump into this discussion at any time . . . you are far better equipped to argue this point than I.

I would not say that God "needs something outside of himself to perfect himself".

On the contrary, God cannot change, and God is infinitely glorious . . . and because He is infintely glorious, He created the world in the way He has, in order to maximally display His glory, and because He cannot change, it is inconceivable that He would have done differently than He has done.

Our language just ends up getting wrapped around itself in circles, because our language is built in the mold of time, whereas God inhabits eternity, which transcends time. So even our whole "would have" / "could have" language fails to appreciate God's timelessness, unchangeableness, and eternal nature.

So, if I may be permitted to over-use the beautiful sort of "bad grammar" Jesus so eloquently used in John 8 . . .

God did not "was" or "could have been". God "IS". That's why He said "I AM". The "AM" that God is includes all of what you and I call "past, present, and future". The "AM" that God is cannot change, or be different than it is. The "AM" that God is cannot change. For God to "could have" something other than what He actually "did", His timeless "AM" would have to be different than it is, which is impossible.

Therefore it is inconceivable that God "could have" done anything different than that which He actually HAS done . . . because all He has done is a perfect expression of who He unchangably IS.

Clear as mud?

 

[Theological Books]

I would not say that God "needs something outside of himself to perfect himself".

So, God has all the glory he needs prior to his volition of this world? Therefore, it isn't that God gets "more" glory from this world, but, as you noted below, his glory is displayed "more" in this world? And you still haven't answered my question regarding the role of God's nature in making this decision. What, in God's nature, necessitates he must display his glory (or even his glory in this manner)? Is it necessary God must display his glory in this volition? Is he bound by his nature and being to display his nature in this volition?

On the contrary, God cannot change, and God is infinitely glorious . . . and because He is infintely glorious, He created the world in the way He has, in order to maximally display His glory, and because He cannot change, it is inconceivable that He would have done differently than He has done.

Please, read the previous posts. This is addressed. Also, please read Turretin, Volume Three, specifically the question regarding God willing some things necessarily and other things freely. I do not think you are "caught up" on the conversation in this thread.

Our language just ends up getting wrapped around itself in circles, because our language is built in the mold of time, whereas God inhabits eternity, which transcends time. So even our whole "would have" / "could have" language fails to appreciate God's timelessness, unchangeableness, and eternal nature.

Again, I do not think you are "caught up" on the conversation. These are valid "objections," but they are addressed by systematic theology proper in order to discuss this issue, much like we discuss the order of God's eternal decree, or the logical priority of necessary and free knowledge.

So, if I may be permitted to over-use the beautiful sort of "bad grammar" Jesus so eloquently used in John 8 . . .

God did not "was" or "could have been". God "IS". That's why He said "I AM". The "AM" that God is includes all of what you and I call "past, present, and future". The "AM" that God is cannot change, or be different than it is. The "AM" that God is cannot change. For God to "could have" something other than what He actually "did", His timeless "AM" would have to be different than it is, which is impossible.

This, again, is a valid point, but one that does not consider the foundation of theology proper. Again, please read the previous posts.

Therefore it is inconceivable that God "could have" done anything different than that which He actually HAS done . . . because all He has done is a perfect expression of who He unchangably IS.

Clear as mud?

Actually, it is conceivable when we consider God a prior of his volition, just as we consider God's knowledge a prior of that which is actualized. Joseph, please, read the previous posts and let me know if these allow you to suspend your objections. Frankly, all of these objections are suspended by reformed orthodoxy for the sake of this conversation.

 

[JKLeoPCA]

Therefore it is inconceivable that God "could have" done anything different than that which He actually HAS done . . . because all He has done is a perfect expression of who He unchangably IS.

If there were a better way to do what's already been done, then the conclusion must be that God erred, or is not good.

 

[Theological Books]

Originally posted by JKLeoPCA

Therefore it is inconceivable that God "could have" done anything different than that which He actually HAS done . . . because all He has done is a perfect expression of who He unchangably IS.

If there were a better way to do what's already been done, then the conclusion must be that God erred, or is not good.

So, God would have erred by simply existing within his own perfection and communion of the holy Trinity? God would not have been good existing eternally with nothing outside of himself? God, in order to be good, must have something outside of himself existing? You are then, denying the metaphysical possibility of God willing another world from this actualized world? What do you make of reformed orthodoxy saying otherwise? And I point you to Richard Muller's Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, and I'm sure Heinrich Heppe addresses this as well.

 

[JKLeoPCA]

Not at all,

I'm not addresing the self existence of God alone, but of the possibility of God to will any other worlds, given we exist within the one He has already created.

in addressing the question of God self existence. I would attribute our existence to the good pleasure of His will.

God in taking action to create must do so within the bounds of his nature, which makes all that he does the best possible means for the end in which he is seeking to achieve.

 

[biblelighthouse]

Originally posted by JKLeoPCA
Not at all,

I'm not addresing the self existence of God alone, but of the possibility of God to will any other worlds, given we exist within the one He has already created.

in addressing the question of God self existence. I would attribute our existence to the good pleasure of His will.

God in taking action to create must do so within the bounds of his nature, which makes all that he does the best possible means for the end in which he is seeking to achieve.

Furthermore, it is erroneous to presume to seperate God Himself from "the good pleasure of His will" . . . as if His will were not an integral and inseperable part of Himself.

To assume God's will could have been different is the same as assuming that God Himself could be different. But God cannot be other than He is. We should pay super-close attention to the awesome edifice of immovability inherent in the Great "I AM".

 

[Theological Books]

Originally posted by JKLeoPCA
Not at all,

I'm not addresing the self existence of God alone, but of the possibility of God to will any other worlds, given we exist within the one He has already created.

in addressing the question of God self existence. I would attribute our existence to the good pleasure of His will.

God in taking action to create must do so within the bounds of his nature, which makes all that he does the best possible means for the end in which he is seeking to achieve.

Well, in this discussion, we must also address the question of God's self-existence, that which he wills necessarily, and that which he wills freely. The reformed have always stated God was free not to and able not to will this particular world because of who God is in his self-existence and a prior to the volition.

What do you make of spontaneity and indifference regarding God's will? While I agree God's nature is the boundary for making all decisions, I disagree his nature necessitates creation. And if his nature does *NOT* necessitate creation, then the his decision to will this world could have been otherwise (a priori), or it is metaphysically possible for God to have willed another world or no world at all.

 

[JKLeoPCA]

I agree with you that He could have not created anything, and just existed.

As to spontaneity and indifference regarding God's will. I see that these are human terms that do not do the will of God justice. From Hodge (see the references mentioned earlier) I do not picture God as having any mental spontaneity and indifference towards anything. Being God I understand Him to have perfect knowledge of where, when, and how to do precisely what he deems pleasurable to do. to me when we say spontaneity, i think of doing something that just popped to mind to do, that i had not thought of before, in my imperfect state that is attributed to my lack of knowledge, and my inability to remember and recall everything i have learned, and that i still have more to learn. As to indifference i see myself indifferent to mostly only things i care little to know about, whereas God knows all the smallest details of everything (hairs of our heads and so forth).

 

[Theological Books]

Originally posted by JKLeoPCA
I agree with you that He could have not created anything, and just existed.

As to spontaneity and indifference regarding God's will. I see that these are human terms that do not do the will of God justice. From Hodge (see the references mentioned earlier) I do not picture God as having any mental spontaneity and indifference towards anything. Being God I understand Him to have perfect knowledge of where, when, and how to do precisely what he deems pleasurable to do. to me when we say spontaneity, i think of doing something that just popped to mind to do, that i had not thought of before, in my imperfect state that is attributed to my lack of knowledge, and my inability to remember and recall everything i have learned, and that i still have more to learn. As to indifference i see myself indifferent to mostly only things i care little to know about, whereas God knows all the smallest details of everything (hairs of our heads and so forth).

fair 'nough. Thanks for your interaction.

 

[JKLeoPCA]

Your very welcome!

I love good discusions.

God Bless