The Presbyterian Philosopher: The Authorized Biography of Gordon Clark

I just can't state state how God in Himself knows this in a way that I can describe (or even should do so).

Agreed. That is why we've been trying to make a distinction between mode and content. As to the mode of God's knowledge, I have no idea. Well, actually, the dogmatics text say God knows everything in his essence by one single act of knowing.

But if the content isn't the same, then communication and even thought itself will break down.
 
Agreed. That is why we've been trying to make a distinction between mode and content. As to the mode of God's knowledge, I have no idea. Well, actually, the dogmatics text say God knows everything in his essence by one single act of knowing.

But if the content isn't the same, then communication and even thought itself will break down.
That seems to me to be an unnecessary statement to make theologically. It scratches a metaphysical itch, but I don't know how we can say anything more if we want to stick with the AE distinction. It's not that I doubt God knows, but the only thing I can possibly know about His knowledge (even of the content) would have to be creaturely knowledge. If we maintain the AE distinction, how can we say anything about what is or isn't in God's mind? Maybe there is a way to formulate the statement that says: "As a creature, I know God knows this because He has revealed that He does but that's all I can definitively say bout what He knows."
 
Van Til "Introduction to Systematic Theology" pg 203 (quoted from the Van Til reader pg 228) "God's knowledge is archetypal and ours ectypal......God is the original and man is the derivative." Published (?)1949, 1952. He was at least aware of the distinction by 1949.
 
Van Til "Introduction to Systematic Theology" pg 203 (quoted from the Van Til reader pg 228) "God's knowledge is archetypal and ours ectypal......God is the original and man is the derivative." Published (?)1949, 1952. He was at least aware of the distinction by 1949.
I grant that, but he didn't seem to think it was an issue during the Complaint, and there is a good reason for it: he specifically said the mode of knowledge wasn't the perceived problem with Clark.
 
Agreed. That is why we've been trying to make a distinction between mode and content. As to the mode of God's knowledge, I have no idea. Well, actually, the dogmatics text say God knows everything in his essence by one single act of knowing.

But if the content isn't the same, then communication and even thought itself will break down.
I've been thinking about this, I know you are no theological mutualist, does supposing a third third thing in the knowledge process not suppose an epistemological mutualism of sorts? I'm not accusing anyone of anything here but we're all quick to deny an ontological mutualism because it contradicts the Creator/creature distinction, only (it seems) to turn around and introduce an epistemological mutualism.
Is there a significant difference that makes one ok but not the other? Now I don't know what God's thought content is but I know that my ectypal theology is correct as it goes. The complaint was a very poorly worded document but below the horrible language they may have had a point.
Clark should have, it seems, been more adept at orthodoxy on this point instead of letting philosophy drive the bus into misunderstanding analogy as really equivocal language (if I understand him). Food for thought.
 
Van Til "Introduction to Systematic Theology" pg 203 (quoted from the Van Til reader pg 228) "God's knowledge is archetypal and ours ectypal......God is the original and man is the derivative." Published (?)1949, 1952. He was at least aware of the distinction by 1949.

If this is how Van Til defines archetype and ectype, that all the more proves what I have been saying: the archetype-ectype distinction wasn't what was at issue in the early 1940s debate. The complainants themselves (Van Til included) acknowledged that Clark believed God's knowledge was original and that man's was derivative. Read The Complaint itself acknowledge that Clark distinguishes original-archetype from derivative-ectype in the sense you are discussing:

Another possible objection to the foregoing might take the form that he does not draw a qualitative distinction between the knowledge of God and the knowledge possible for men since he freely recognizes a fundamental difference between the mode of God's knowledge and that of man's knowledge. God's knowledge is intuitive while man's is discursive (Cf. 18:5f., 18ff.). Man is dependent upon God for his knowledge. We gladly concede this point, and have reckoned with it in what has been said above. However, this admission does not affect the whole point at issue here since the doctrine of the mode of the divine knowledge is not a part of the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of his knowledge. The latter is concerned only with the contents of the divine knowledge. Dr. Clark distinguishes between the knowledge of God and of man so far as mode of knowledge is concerned, but it is a tragic fact that his dialectic has led him to obliterate the qualitative distinction between the contents of the divine mind and the knowledge which is possible to the creature, and thus to impinge in a most serious fashion upon the transcendence of the divine knowledge which is expressed by the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God.

In sum:

1. The idea that God's knowledge is "original" (intuitive) and man's is "derivative" (discursive, dependent) is something the complainants themselves acknowledged was an area of agreement between themselves and Clark. This is something the complainants categorize under the mode of knowledge that is a "fundamental difference" between God and man. The Answer by Clark confirms this.

2. The OPC debate was not about the mode of God's knowledge being different from that of men, as the complainants themselves say: "the doctrine of the mode of the divine knowledge is not a part of the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of his knowledge."

3. Van Til's definition of the archetype-ectype distinction in 1949 demonstrates he categorized said distinction under what the complainants regarded as God's mode of knowledge. Again, then, this distinction cannot be what the "content" of the debate was about (sorry - couldn't resist the pun!).
 
If this is how Van Til defines archetype and ectype, that all the more proves what I have been saying: the archetype-ectype distinction wasn't what was at issue in the early 1940s debate. The complainants themselves (Van Til included) acknowledged that Clark believed God's knowledge was original and that man's was derivative. Read The Complaint itself acknowledge that Clark distinguishes original-archetype from derivative-ectype in the sense you are discussing:



In sum:

1. The idea that God's knowledge is "original" (intuitive) and man's is "derivative" (discursive, dependent) is something the complainants themselves acknowledged was an area of agreement between themselves and Clark. This is something the complainants categorize under the mode of knowledge that is a "fundamental difference" between God and man. The Answer by Clark confirms this.
Well I've always read it's a difference in kind also. Google archetypal/ectypal distinction and you'll see this.
2. The OPC debate was not about the mode of God's knowledge being different from that of men, as the complainants themselves say: "the doctrine of the mode of the divine knowledge is not a part of the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of his knowledge."
Right it's a difference in kind. Muller, Berkof, Bavink, Tuuriten, and Junius all acknowledge it. Mode isn't the main point of it. Horton is great on this as well and it's link to analogical knowledge.
3. Van Til's definition of the archetype-ectype distinction in 1949 demonstrates he categorized said distinction under what the complainants regarded as God's mode of knowledge. Again, then, this distinction cannot be what the "content" of the debate was about (sorry - couldn't resist the pun!).
Well are you saying Clark did affirm it as the previous list understood it and Van Til etc was wrong and therefore led to skepticism?
 
Well I've always read it's a difference in kind also. Google archetypal/ectypal distinction and you'll see this.

Right it's a difference in kind. Muller, Berkof, Bavink, Tuuriten, and Junius all acknowledge it. Mode isn't the main point of it. Horton is great on this as well and it's link to analogical knowledge.

Well are you saying Clark did affirm it as the previous list understood it and Van Til etc was wrong and therefore led to skepticism?

I'm not sure what you're looking for. Why do I need to google a distinction when I just responded to a direct quote about it by Van Til? Please explain which point below you disagree with:

P1. The 1940s OPC debate was not about modes of knowledge.
P2. The archetypal/ectypal distinction is about modes of knowledge.
C. Therefore, the 1940s OPC debate was not about the archetypal/ectypal distinction.

If we agree on the above, at this point, I have no other interest in pursuing the conversation any further.
 
I'm not sure what you're looking for. Why do I need to google a distinction when I just responded to a direct quote about it by Van Til? Please explain which point below you disagree with:

P1. The 1940s OPC debate was not about modes of knowledge.
P2. The archetypal/ectypal distinction is about modes of knowledge.
C. Therefore, the 1940s OPC debate was not about the archetypal/ectypal distinction.

If we agree on the above, at this point, I have no other interest in pursuing the conversation any further.
P2. I hate to put it this way , I'm not trying to be rude or anything but you have no idea what the archetypal/ectypal distinction is. It's about the qualitative difference between God (including his knowledge) and man (including his/her knowledge). Greenbaggins on his blog states explicitly the debate was in kind about the a/e distinction. I recommend you pour as much time studying that distinction as you have the debate. Rich and myself have tried to show you this but it seems you're so stuck in Clark's way of thinking you can't see it.
 
I'm not sure what you're looking for. Why do I need to google a distinction when I just responded to a direct quote about it by Van Til? Please explain which point below you disagree with:

P1. The 1940s OPC debate was not about modes of knowledge.
P2. The archetypal/ectypal distinction is about modes of knowledge.
C. Therefore, the 1940s OPC debate was not about the archetypal/ectypal distinction.

If we agree on the above, at this point, I have no other interest in pursuing the conversation any further.
What am I looking for? Step outside the debate and quote Berkhof, Bavink, Junius, Turriten expound on how our great Reformed forbears expounded this doctrine so that it's clear you have some understanding of it. Again I don't want to be rude. But nothing in what you have said indicates you have any idea what your talking about. You know the documents involved in the case sure. You know Clark's position, sure. But because Clark was deficient in this area unfortunately so are you.
 
P2. I hate to put it this way , I'm not trying to be rude or anything but you have no idea what the archetypal/ectypal distinction is. It's about the qualitative difference between God (including his knowledge) and man (including his/her knowledge). Greenbaggins on his blog states explicitly the debate was in kind about the a/e distinction. I recommend you pour as much time studying that distinction as you have the debate. Rich and myself have tried to show you this but it seems you're so stuck in Clark's way of thinking you can't see it.

Are you talking about this post? If so, see my own comment there in which I agree with Ron Digiacomo and Josh (Brandom Adams too, in his later comment) by saying the exact same thing I have said here:

“I’m surprised to hear that anybody thinks that the mode of knowing was a point of disagreement.”

You and Josh are correct, this has never been an issue, and I would love to see an example to the contrary.

Pastor Keister (whom I highly respect) wrote:

If we cannot know in the same manner as God knows, then we can know nothing at all, say the Clarkians.

Please read Josh's initial reply to this. I could not have said it better myself. This is a simple matter of history as to what Clark believed. Literally every commentator in that post rightly disagreed with Pastor Keister on precisely this issue.
 
Are you talking about this post? If so, see my own comment there in which I agree with Ron Digiacomo and Josh (Brandom Adams too, in his later comment) by saying the exact same thing I have said here:



Pastor Keister (whom I highly respect) wrote:



Please read Josh's initial reply to this. I could not have said it better myself. This is a simple matter of history as to what Clark believed. Literally every commentator in that post rightly disagreed with Pastor Keister on precisely this issue.
Yes that's the post. I liked the stuff on Junius at the end. Let's move on to Josh's post after this. First when you asked over and over again for a definition of the a/e distinction I finally gave it from the Lutheran Geerhard, whom the author says the Lutheran's got from the Reformed. That quote I gave says that essentially archetypal theology is completely different from ectypal theology.
Now you quoted some definition from earlier in the book 94 I believe, the quote I gave was from starting at 112, what was the purpose of that quote? The context of your quote was actually Preus laying the history of the development of Post-Reformation Lutheranism and Chemnitz was before the development of a prolegomena (which archetypal/ectypal distinction is a part of). He basically wrote a commentary on Melanchthon's Loci communes, neither of which had a prolegomena to speak of. Now to Josh.
He (Josh says) "the manner in which God knows is different but God can reveal anything to man". Amen, but how does he know that? How does he know there's not a qualitative distinction between our knowledge and God's, how does he know there's not an analogical difference? If it was so obvious to later Reformed and Lutheran scholastics that such a distinction is basic to any discussion of knowledge? Why should that distinction not be front and center?
You see the argument that the a/e distinction has nothing to do with the debate simply indicates a misunderstanding of it. On top of that I've read no one from Bavink, to Berkhof, to Geerhard, to Muller who equate a difference in mode as synonymous with what the Reformed meant by the a/e distinction. Since it would seem the difference in manner is irrelevant to the issue of the a/e distinction. Again I'll stick with the Orthodox on this point, you've given much food for thought though.
 
How does he know there's not a qualitative distinction between our knowledge and God's, how does he know there's not an analogical difference?

Since no one here disagrees on the mode of God's knowledge, I guess I would ask "What is the qualitative difference between the two equations?

1) 2+2 = 4

2) 2+2 =4
 
Since no one here disagrees on the mode of God's knowledge, I guess I would ask "What is the qualitative difference between the two equations?

1) 2+2 = 4

2) 2+2 =4
I'm not sure what this is intended to demonstrate as creatures try to wrestle with how we understand theology.

Let's say that one of us arrives at a perfect creaturely theology and we can convince one another through special and natural revelation that the other is wrong.

At best, we'll have creaturely knowledge. There's no point at which we have a better vantage of God's knowledge in Himself.

I suppose that's why I'm uncomfortable with stating that archetypal and ectypal knowledge reduces to mode. Somehow we can define all the "content" that God must agree with (because we know its true) and then just say: "Well, how He knows it we can't know because He's God."

My reading of this is that the discussion goes far beyond us trying to convince ourselves of some metaphysical (or mathematical) solution. All the language is trying to get at the fact that the creature is receiving revelation from God and he knows and depends wholly upon what he knows based on what God has revealed. He cannot then turn the revelation "around" and use it to say what He now knows about God beyond that revealed knowledge.

For example, I don't "know" that God loves the world based on the idea that I have that content in my mind and then I reason that God and I share the same concept but differ in mode of understanding. I know what I know about it because God has revealed that truth to me and assures me that I can plumb its depts and, by the use of study and the illumination of the Spirit, come to a knowledge that is true. I can even arrive, someday, at a more and more perfect creaturely understanding of that condescended truth. What I say about God at that point doesn't break down into a distinction between content and mode so that I may know that I can trust it. It simply avails that God has revealed to and toward His creatures.

I guess I'm simply not understanding what we think we are "proving" with respect to our understanding of God to break up revelation into content and mode and turn them into propositions that are ultimately limited to creaturely apprehension.
 
I suppose that's why I'm uncomfortable with stating that archetypal and ectypal knowledge reduces to mode. Somehow we can define all the "content" that God must agree with (because we know its true) and then just say: "Well, how He knows it we can't know because He's God."

You aren't drawing the conclusion Van Til would go on to draw : because the content is necessarily different, all of the Bible is paradoxical and apparently contradictory. That is what we are avoiding.
I know what I know about it because God has revealed that truth to me and assures me that I can plumb its depts and, by the use of study and the illumination of the Spirit, come to a knowledge that is true. I can even arrive, someday, at a more and more perfect creaturely understanding of that condescended truth

Would you have any problem with the following proposition: because God so hated the world he sent his only Son to destroy it? Let's limit that to archetypal knowledge. Obviously, that is incorrect but if we can't know anything about the content of God's knowledge, we can't know for sure that it is incorrect.
 
I feel like there's a regression at work here, if not a complete collapse of our ability to know anything to be true about God.

Here's an example that highlights the problem: is the proposition 'At best all that humans have is creaturely knowledge' itself an example of creaturely knowledge? If so, then God cannot know it, as it is creaturely knowledge, and God is not a creature. But if God does know that this proposition is true, then we cannot call it merely creaturely knowledge as God also knows that it is true and God is not a creature.

As such, the proposition 'At best all that we have is creaturely knowledge' appears to be false, without leaving us with complete agnosticism regarding what God knows (and what we know about God). In fact it appears that we cannot verify this proposition at all.
 
You aren't drawing the conclusion Van Til would go on to draw : because the content is necessarily different, all of the Bible is paradoxical and apparently contradictory. That is what we are avoiding.
I don't care what CVT might have proposed. I'm discussing the Creator/creature distinction. If he said or wrote things that are wrong then he was a creature as well. Only Christ has a perfect ectypal theology.
Would you have any problem with the following proposition: because God so hated the world he sent his only Son to destroy it? Let's limit that to archetypal knowledge. Obviously, that is incorrect but if we can't know anything about the content of God's knowledge, we can't know for sure that it is incorrect.
Your questions is nonsensical. Are you asking me to define what is in God's archetypal knowledge?

It seems to me you are being rather obtuse here. As a trinitarian, you are willing to grant that the only ectypal knowledge we have of the Trinity's ad intra relations is that the Father is neither begotten nor proceeding, the Son is eternally begotten of the Son, and the Spirit proceeds from the Father, and the Son. Try as I might to determine some other aspect of God's being, as a Creature, I can proceed no further than what has been revealed. I can say some things about the Tirnity ad extra because they are revealed and accommodated.

All the knowledge that we have is communicable knowledge, accommodated to the Creature. I am willing to grant that we know that any contradictions proposed in communicable knowledge from the Creator are false because they are revealed from the Creator. I don't have to know the archetype of the ectype to describe its content to know it's true. I only have the ectype and have to limit my understanding to that.
 
I feel like there's a regression at work here, if not a complete collapse of our ability to know anything to be true about God.

Here's an example that highlights the problem: is the proposition 'At best all that humans have is creaturely knowledge' itself an example of creaturely knowledge? If so, then God cannot know it, as it is creaturely knowledge, and God is not a creature. But if God does know that this proposition is true, then we cannot call it merely creaturely knowledge as God also knows that it is true and God is not a creature.

As such, the proposition 'At best all that we have is creaturely knowledge' appears to be false, without leaving us with complete agnosticism regarding what God knows (and what we know about God). In fact it appears that we cannot verify this proposition at all.
I don't agree. The definition of ectypal knowledge is not that it is a body of knowledge external to God but is revealed by Him. It is communicable knowledge. All I'm noting is that we can only investigate revealed knowledge and not God in Himself. We can't proceed from what is revealed and claim to say something about God in Himself.
 
I don't agree. The definition of ectypal knowledge is not that it is a body of knowledge external to God but is revealed by Him. It is communicable knowledge. All I'm noting is that we can only investigate revealed knowledge and not God in Himself. We can't proceed from what is revealed and claim to say something about God in Himself.
Does God know that the proposition 'At best all that humans have is creaturely knowledge' is true?
 
I don't care what CVT might have proposed. I'm discussing the Creator/creature distinction. If he said or wrote things that are wrong then he was a creature as well. Only Christ has a perfect ectypal theology.

To be fair, part of the review and a good part of this thread has been on what he thought.
Your questions is nonsensical.

No it isn't. If the law of non-contradiction, for one, doesn't apply to God, then there is nothing wrong with that opposite course of action.
It seems to me you are being rather obtuse here
If anything, I am striving for clarity, asking questions about ambiguities.
As a trinitarian, you are willing to grant that the only ectypal knowledge we have of the Trinity's ad intra relations is that the Father is neither begotten nor proceeding, the Son is eternally begotten of the Son, and the Spirit proceeds from the Father, and the Son. Try as I might to determine some other aspect of God's being, as a Creature, I can proceed no further than what has been revealed. I can say some things about the Tirnity ad extra because they are revealed and accommodated.

All of that is true, but it seems to say a good bit about God's internal being.
 
If anything, I am striving for clarity, asking questions about ambiguities.
No, you are making assertions.

I don't even think you're fairly representing what I'm writing.


I don't mind clarity but I do expect a fair representation of what I'm attempting to communicate. Perhaps, if you understand what the historic AE distinction is, you can show how it is related to content and mode so I can understand what I'm missing here.
 
Since no one here disagrees on the mode of God's knowledge, I guess I would ask "What is the qualitative difference between the two equations?

1) 2+2 = 4

2) 2+2 =4
No, no, no I see Rich's point and I agree with it. I'll even take it a step further, both sides are right and wrong. Why is there this debate, because it seems to me the Creator/creature distinction was violated by both sides, hear me out.
The Creator/creature distinction is there to fundamentally say no to speculation into God's archetypal mind and being.
That means it's unhealthy to say what can/must be in common and what must not/cannot be in common. This is just a restatement of analogical knowledge, similarities and disimilarities (which in principle we can't know).
Now that's just this part of the debate. How the other pieces fit in I don't know, though the larger Evangelical movement that attached itself to Clark's side didn't help.
So this is my final opinion on the matter, a pox on both their houses. That being said though Clark is definitely in the minority of orthodoxy on this issue, I do wish that question could be settled upfront because it may introduce some much needed humility into it.

I don't care what CVT might have proposed. I'm discussing the Creator/creature distinction. If he said or wrote things that are wrong then he was a creature as well. Only Christ has a perfect ectypal theology.

Your questions is nonsensical. Are you asking me to define what is in God's archetypal knowledge?

It seems to me you are being rather obtuse here. As a trinitarian, you are willing to grant that the only ectypal knowledge we have of the Trinity's ad intra relations is that the Father is neither begotten nor proceeding, the Son is eternally begotten of the Son, and the Spirit proceeds from the Father, and the Son. Try as I might to determine some other aspect of God's being, as a Creature, I can proceed no further than what has been revealed. I can say some things about the Tirnity ad extra because they are revealed and accommodated.

All the knowledge that we have is communicable knowledge, accommodated to the Creature. I am willing to grant that we know that any contradictions proposed in communicable knowledge from the Creator are false because they are revealed from the Creator. I don't have to know the archetype of the ectype to describe its content to know it's true. I only have the ectype and have to limit my understanding to that.
My thoughts exactly.
 
Does God know that the proposition 'At best all that humans have is creaturely knowledge' is true?
Yes, in the sense that I analogically understand what He has communicated in His Word. In other words, because He has revealed our limitations and told us that "my thoughts are not your thoughts", etc, we know this to be true because it is God's revelation to us. It is true of God in the sense that the creature can apprehend it.

Similarly, when we read anthropomorphic language about God, it is intended to communicate something that we can grasp as He "lisps" to us in a manner that is accommodated to our ability to understand.

If we were to limit our discussion to communicable knowledge by revelation (special or general), then that's fine. It's when we than say, in some sense, that we "know" something more than what is accommodated then we run into problems.

Maybe there is a better way to communicate it. Maybe it's a matter of "agreeing violently" but just using different concepts to express it.

I just can't see how we can call accommodated theology as identical in content to what is in the mind of God without the qualification that it is revealed theology. That, it seems to me, is distinct from talking about content and mode.
 
Does God know that the proposition 'At best all that humans have is creaturely knowledge' is true?
Because all we have is revealed ectypal theology I have no idea what God knows/doesn't know. I know he's omniscient and the Creator/creature distinction forbids me to go beyond it lest I get dangerously close to heresy (for the record I don't believe either side was committing heresy, just wasting their time when there could've been better ways to phrase it).
The Orthodox, to my knowledge, always posited ectypal theology as it is revealed and ectypal theology as God possess it. Notice a blanket statement on the kind of knowledge God has (His archetypal knowledge being primary and the source of all ectypal theology). We have faith in God's accommodated ectypal revelation to us because He is God.
 
Because all we have is revealed ectypal theology I have no idea what God knows/doesn't know.
Yes, I think this is the consistent position you end up with, and given that history has been brought up a lot, it's interesting that the negative theology movement has been glossed over, but I fundamentally disagree with it. But if we end up with complete scepticism about what God knows or does not know, then why even talk about it?

This is obviously the problem of conflating mode of knowledge with content of knowledge. Is this really what Van Til advocated? If so, oh dear. But I honestly am not sure he would agree with your statement either if pressed. For example, does God know that he sent his Son to save sinners? Obviously the answer is yes.
 
That means it's unhealthy to say what can/must be in common and what must not/cannot be in common. This is just a restatement of analogical knowledge, similarities and disimilarities (which in principle we can't know).

Does the law of non-contradiction apply to God?
I don't even think you're fairly representing what I'm writing.

If so, then that is why I am asking questions.
 
Yes, I think this is the consistent position you end up with, and given that history has been brought up a lot, it's interesting that the negative theology movement has been glossed over, but I fundamentally disagree with it. But if we end up with complete scepticism about what God knows or does not know, then why even talk about it?
The notion of "revealed theology" is not "negative theology". It includes ideas that we can only express by way of negation but starting that all our knowledge is creaturely and that we are limited in our apprehension is not all accomplished by negation.

Revealed knowledge is condescended knowledge. I'm not sure how you would express the Creator/creature distinction in a more satisfying manner.

How else can we know anything of the Creator other than what He has accommodated to us?
 
Yes, I think this is the consistent position you end up with, and given that history has been brought up a lot, it's interesting that the negative theology movement has been glossed over, but I fundamentally disagree with it. But if we end up with complete scepticism about what God knows or does not know, then why even talk about it?

This is obviously the problem of conflating mode of knowledge with content of knowledge. Is this really what Van Til advocated? If so, oh dear. But I honestly am not sure he would agree with your statement either if pressed. For example, does God know that he sent his Son to save sinners? Obviously the answer is yes.
I applaud you for asking the right questions. Why talk about what God knows or doesn't know, I have his creaturely, accommodated, ectypal theology and that is enough. To move beyond that in a rationalistic speculative fashion is to invite trouble. I think he would agree but go beyond to explain why it's a bad idea, Christian limiting concepts.
In these paradoxical portions of revelation you don't have one limiting concept hanging out there but it always has a complimentary limiting concept to check it.
For instance here, we have rational yet paradoxical revelation at times where reason and paradox are limiting concepts of one another. So we can't go into full blown rationalism/univocalism and we can't go into full blown contradictions/equivocation when studying certain aspects of revelation but must settle for analogical knowledge, similarities and disimilarities. That's how I think he would answer.
 
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