The Proper Domain of (Natural) Science

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Justified

Puritan Board Sophomore
I have a couple questions with regard to the proper domain of science. First, is "creation science" a contradiction in terms? Once we allow the supernatural into the natural sciences, doesn't it cease to be what it is?

The next question is, are the historical sciences a valid endeavor? It's difficult to know, despite their usefulness, how well certain models comport with reality.

One last thought, though I haven't worked it out myself: does creation science and intelligent design arise from a conflation of the distinct categories of creation and providence?

Disclaimer: This thread isn't necessarily about the various exegetical merits of various positions on the interpretation of Genesis; this is merely about science as such.
 
Justified said:
First, is "creation science" a contradiction in terms? Once we allow the supernatural into the natural sciences, doesn't it cease to be what it is?
I think it is a contradiction in terms because I understand science to be an empirical, natural discipline. However, there is no contradiction if one uses the term "science" the way practitioners of "creation science" use the term. For them, special revelation provides extra data for the natural discipline to work with; hence, their "creation" models are superior to "evolution" models (which gets its historical data from fallible human reasoning). Sometimes, this can get a bit odd, e.g., I have seen a Flood model where they set bounds on particular, possible miracles in order to get the model to work. I don't have a problem with using special revelation to make an hypothesis provided the model is tested in a strictly, empirical fashion and not held to dogmatically if the data simply does not support it. It seems backwards to simply assume the data must support Creation ex nihilo in the space of six days, since really anything could happen in a miracle (and natural science assumes ex nihilo nihil fit, anyway).

Justified said:
The next question is, are the historical sciences a valid endeavor? It's difficult to know, despite their usefulness, how well certain models comport with reality.
If a divide is made between science and special revelation--accepting all the limitations that come to the science from doing that (including its ability to uncover "truth"), as I would favor doing, then the historical sciences must be judged by their empirical usefulness or their moral end (ultimately, the glory of God). It seems to me some uses are (a) showing how much effort and complexity the universe would need to get to its current state if God fashioned it according to ordinary providence, (b) advancing the wonder of how God could have created all this in the space of six days, (c) providing a counter to evolutionary naturalistic theories, and (d) probing to some degree the miracle of creation.

Allow me to elaborate on (d) for a bit. Having made a separation between empirical science as a discipline and special revelation as historical truth, we have no idea what facts we might miss in the explanation of a phenomenon if we simply assume God performed a miracle. Furthermore, we have no idea what natural processes God may or may not have used while creating. Further still, there is the possibility of the universe being created in a mature state that naturally coheres (not intentionally using Poythress's vocabulary) with itself; it is possible that the universe supernaturally made is consistent with itself that probing possible historical reconstructions could allow for finding new physics or testing current theories. The fact is though: we simply don't know, which is why the empirical discipline continues to press onward. The thing that is known though is that the "historical sciences" do not necessarily give literal historical truth, and we must acknowledge that limitation in our historical reconstructions (unlike with the evolutionary historical reconstructions).

I think the above could justify a Christian development of the historical sciences. The scientist, at the end of the day, is interested in making a model that fits the data. This doesn't change just because the data is thought to be from the past and an historical reconstruction is required to explain the data. However, I do grant that the historical sciences are much more speculative than their present day counterparts. I'm not sure that funding to these sciences is ideally as important as developing our other sciences, but I do see some potential value coming from their study.

Justified said:
does creation science and intelligent design arise from a conflation of the distinct categories of creation and providence?
I'm not as familiar with ID to know whether they are simply using a more sophisticated version of the teleological argument. So far as "creation science" goes, I think it is more of a combination of creation and empirical observation (a subcategory of providence) believing that they both give the same truth and so that combining both will give us more knowledge overall.
 
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I don't know where it is but a while back Pastor Winzer and some others had a very helpful thread related to this.
 
I'll go point by point. Full disclosure: I have a biology degree and am sufficiently educated on the subject of evolutionary biology, genetics and molecular biology to be quite immune to any charge that I'm "ignorant" or "uneducated" on the subject matter. Don't take my word as if my authority makes it true. Take my word because I am truthful and that there is no reason to doubt that I know what I'm talking about.

"First, is "creation science" a contradiction in terms?"

Nope. Not unless you define them in opposition to each other. As I define them,
creation: the subject matter of the origin of the universe or some part thereof
science: the procedure by which competing hypotheses are analyzed by replicable experiments and evaluated with statistical confidence.

There is no contradiction if these definitions are accepted. Generally, atheists will define "creation" as "supernatural intervention at all times everywhere" and "science" as "study of the natural mechanisms which operate at all times everywhere," and only if defined this way, is there a contradiction.

2. "are the historical sciences a valid endeavor?"

Could you explain? At base, your question is simply, "is it worthwhile, or possible, to attempt to understand what happened in the past?" It must be, because the Message of the Gospel comes through a record of events that took place in the past, so no Christian can really deny this. That is why I wonder if you don't mean something else, but haven't clarified your question yet.

3. "does creation science and intelligent design arise from a conflation of the distinct categories of creation and providence?"

Does Mercy and Grace arise from a conflation of the distinct categories of Love and Justice?

Those are not meant to be 1-to-1 substitutions. The question is simply to illustrate that the fact that we can identify two major disciplines of study re: theology does not mean that they are mutually exclusive to each other, any more than God's love and justice are. His love for us is expressed through His use of Himself as a substitute to bear our just punishment.

Why should creation and providence be mutually exclusive? To be fair, I can't understand the background reasoning that would result in this being a question that causes problems for someone. You're evidently incorporating assumptions into those definitions which I don't recognize. I can answer better if you clarify and make those assumptions explicit.
 
Justified said:
First, is "creation science" a contradiction in terms? Once we allow the supernatural into the natural sciences, doesn't it cease to be what it is?
I think it is a contradiction in terms because I understand science to be an empirical, natural discipline. However, there is no contradiction if one uses the term "science" the way practitioners of "creation science" use the term. For them, special revelation provides extra data for the natural discipline to work with; hence, their "creation" models are superior to "evolution" models (which gets its historical data from fallible human reasoning). Sometimes, this can get a bit odd, e.g., I have seen a Flood model where they set bounds on particular, possible miracles in order to get the model to work. I don't have a problem with using special revelation to make an hypothesis provided the model is tested in a strictly, empirical fashion and not held to dogmatically if the data simply does not support it. It seems backwards to simply assume the data must support Creation ex nihilo in the space of six days, since really anything could happen in a miracle (and natural science assumes ex nihilo nihil fit, anyway).

Justified said:
The next question is, are the historical sciences a valid endeavor? It's difficult to know, despite their usefulness, how well certain models comport with reality.
If a divide is made between science and special revelation--accepting all the limitations that come to the science from doing that (including its ability to uncover "truth"), as I would favor doing, then the historical sciences must be judged by their empirical usefulness or their moral end (ultimately, the glory of God). It seems to me some uses are (a) showing how much effort and complexity the universe would need to get to its current state if God fashioned it according to ordinary providence, (b) advancing the wonder of how God could have created all this in the space of six days, (c) providing a counter to evolutionary naturalistic theories, and (d) probing to some degree the miracle of creation.

Allow me to elaborate on (d) for a bit. Having made a separation between empirical science as a discipline and special revelation as historical truth, we have no idea what facts we might miss in the explanation of a phenomenon if we simply assume God performed a miracle. Furthermore, we have no idea what natural processes God may or may not have used while creating. Further still, there is the possibility of the universe being created in a mature state that naturally coheres (not intentionally using Poythress's vocabulary) with itself; it is possible that the universe supernaturally made is consistent with itself that probing possible historical reconstructions could allow for finding new physics or testing current theories. The fact is though: we simply don't know, which is why the empirical discipline continues to press onward. The thing that is known though is that the "historical sciences" do not necessarily give literal historical truth, and we must acknowledge that limitation in our historical reconstructions (unlike with the evolutionary historical reconstructions).

I think the above could justify a Christian development of the historical sciences. The scientist, at the end of the day, is interested in making a model that fits the data. This doesn't change just because the data is thought to be from the past and an historical reconstruction is required to explain the data. However, I do grant that the historical sciences are much more speculative than their present day counterparts. I'm not sure that funding to these sciences is ideally as important as developing our other sciences, but I do see some potential value coming from their study.

Justified said:
does creation science and intelligent design arise from a conflation of the distinct categories of creation and providence?
I'm not as familiar with ID to know whether they are simply using a more sophisticated version of the teleological argument. So far as "creation science" goes, I think it is more of a combination of creation and empirical observation (a subcategory of providence) believing that they both give the same truth and so that combining both will give us more knowledge overall.
Thanks. What do you think about instrumentalism (anti-realism) and scientific realism? I know Gordon Clark was an instrumentalist.
 
2. "are the historical sciences a valid endeavor?"

Could you explain? At base, your question is simply, "is it worthwhile, or possible, to attempt to understand what happened in the past?" It must be, because the Message of the Gospel comes through a record of events that took place in the past, so no Christian can really deny this. That is why I wonder if you don't mean something else, but haven't clarified your question yet.
My concern is that creation as such is an article of faith (cf. Heb. 11:3). Science, as an empirical endeavor, has tentative conclusions that cannot yield for us an absolute certainty-- which is not necessarily bad. In science we make and construct models to fit the data; we don't create models to fit our pre-conceived-- although perhaps correct-- notions about what is the case. The second our models are not based on the empirical data we are no longer doing science, for it ceases to be an empirical science.

My thoughts above are predicated on the premise that science is not always about finding out about absolute reality. Much of science is about utility. Are heliocentric models of the solar system more useful for constructing functions that help us predict orbits? Then let's use them, regardless if they are correct. In science we often adopt models because they are easier to use or simpler, but it does not follow from this that we are closer to reality.

I hope that helped clarify my thoughts. Again, I'm not attacking the young earth/mature creation view; in fact, I'm thinking about adopting it in place of my current OEC views. However, I've always been leary of creation science so-called.
 
I've always been leary of creation science so-called.

I agree. Are not those two words together an oxymoron? I think so. Even if a scientist was witness to the dividing of the loaves and fishes, all he could do with the scientific method is make scientific assumptions. E.g., The fish, was spawned, and say, four years old, caught and then cooked over a man-made fire. And he would be right as far as science is concerned. Creation just doesn't reveal itself to the scientific method. I think creation scientists try to prove too much.
 
I've always been leary of creation science so-called.

I agree. Are not those two words together an oxymoron? I think so. Even if a scientist was witness to the dividing of the loaves and fishes, all he could do with the scientific method is make scientific assumptions. E.g., The fish, was spawned, and say, four years old, caught and then cooked over a man-made fire. And he would be right as far as science is concerned. Creation just doesn't reveal itself to the scientific method. I think creation scientists try to prove too much.
I concur with your concurrence. Once we begin to allow the supernatural in our study of natural sciences, we are no longer doing either theology or science, but rather some tertium quid.

Personal question: What is you're position, Ed, on the creation day?
 
I've always been leary of creation science so-called.

I agree. Are not those two words together an oxymoron? I think so. Even if a scientist was witness to the dividing of the loaves and fishes, all he could do with the scientific method is make scientific assumptions. E.g., The fish, was spawned, and say, four years old, caught and then cooked over a man-made fire. And he would be right as far as science is concerned. Creation just doesn't reveal itself to the scientific method. I think creation scientists try to prove too much.

I think this is a bit simplistic. Even things which occur through non-natural means leave behind evidence. The Resurrection was decidedly non-natural, yet we employ historical scrutiny to evaluate the facts and determine that this did indeed happen. Likewise, Creation was supernaturally originated but it still has the consequence of leaving evidence which can be scientifically assessed.

It is ultimately not the means by which something occurred that determines whether it's scientifically assessable. It is what our hypothesis predicts the results should be that is the focus of scientific investigation.
 
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Personal question: What is you're position, Ed, on the creation day?

I am a 6/24 young earther for sure. But, I don't know exactly how young. Genesis 5 does not read like there are gaps in the genealogy. Still, I am not a full blown Ussherite, but I don't know why not. I guess science has made it hard for me to believe that the earth is only 6,000 years old. Maybe twice that old. But then again, I find it hard to trust modern scientists, since they can not, and will not, even consider the possibility of a young earth. It is ruled out from the start.

Imagine that Adam died the day after he was created, and a scientist wants to estimate his age at death. There are certain things he knows in advance. He knows, by simple observation, that the body is around 30 years old. That much he is sure of beyond all question. He can't believe (is unable) to believe anything else. In his study, the scientist might observe certain anomalies like the absence of any sign of tooth decay, scars, basic wear-and-tear, etc. But that would not in the least shake his faith in the powers of his observation. But he would be wrong--dead wrong!

Modern science is sure at the deepest presuppositional level that the earth is very old. He can believe no other. I just find it difficult to trust men that can only arive at one conclusion. See what I mean?
 
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2. "are the historical sciences a valid endeavor?"

Could you explain? At base, your question is simply, "is it worthwhile, or possible, to attempt to understand what happened in the past?" It must be, because the Message of the Gospel comes through a record of events that took place in the past, so no Christian can really deny this. That is why I wonder if you don't mean something else, but haven't clarified your question yet.
My concern is that creation as such is an article of faith (cf. Heb. 11:3). Science, as an empirical endeavor, has tentative conclusions that cannot yield for us an absolute certainty-- which is not necessarily bad. In science we make and construct models to fit the data; we don't create models to fit our pre-conceived-- although perhaps correct-- notions about what is the case. The second our models are not based on the empirical data we are no longer doing science, for it ceases to be an empirical science.

My thoughts above are predicated on the premise that science is not always about finding out about absolute reality. Much of science is about utility. Are heliocentric models of the solar system more useful for constructing functions that help us predict orbits? Then let's use them, regardless if they are correct. In science we often adopt models because they are easier to use or simpler, but it does not follow from this that we are closer to reality.

I hope that helped clarify my thoughts. Again, I'm not attacking the young earth/mature creation view; in fact, I'm thinking about adopting it in place of my current OEC views. However, I've always been leary of creation science so-called.

I'm a little uncertain how best to respond to a portion of what you wrote (and so will desist rather than make an assumption) because you seem to at once treat 'science' as a method and then as a general word to refer to a broad field of contemporary research, in the same breath. Neither usage of the word is wrong, but it's difficult to offer a clear insight if you can't be sure which sense I'm addressing.

Creation as well as not(Creation) are articles of faith, and the belief that the world began a certain way should not be contrasted with a mechanism of inquiry into the way the world works; that is a false comparison. Creation should be contrasted with an alternative view on origins. Science should be contrasted with a different method of inquiry -- textual criticism, anecdote, etc (here using 'science' to refer to the empirical method).

Scientists have long had beliefs about what their experiments will yield, before performing the experiment (it is a large part of what drives the decision to make and pursue any specific experiment). Being confident of the answer before observing it empirically does not invalidate the method--provided the answer has not simply been assumed and that the method therefore suffered from it.

Both YECs, OECs, atheists etc have preconceived ideas about how the universe began, and they form hypotheses based on those views. That is not inherently fallacious. It is fallacious to think that a certain kind of belief is by nature disallowed from being referred to in the formation of hypotheses. It is fallacious to alter the method of inquiry to attempt to 'hedge one's bets' and ensure that a favorable result is achieved.

None of these positions does this by logical necessity. So there is no reason to treat any of them unequally.
 
I'll consider testing the waters here to see if linking is better received than it is with incorrigible atheists.

Here is a sampling from a reputable site (PhDs on staff in technical fields, including a certified genius) which lists a number of problematic evidences that make believing in an old earth difficult.

http://creation.com/age-of-the-earth
 
The technical term for Young-Earth Creationists used to be Scientific Creationists, I believe. Not without reason :)
 
I think this is a bit simplistic.

That's me all right. You got my number. :) See my post (#13) for a better idea of how I view the miracle of Creation and science.

Even things which occur through non-natural means leave behind evidence.

I would say sometimes Yes, and sometimes No. An example of "No" might be the coin in the fishes mouth. Evidence? Where? However, I think special Creation left some evidence. I don't believe God was dishonest and made Creation 100% void of evidence. My argument is that modern science is blinded by their own presuppositions. They know that the earth is old despite any evidence to the contrary. They can't explain everything they see, but they are positive of that.

It is ultimately not the means by which something occurred that determines whether it's scientifically assessable. It is what our hypothesis predicts the results should be that is the focus of scientific investigation.

I agree. Modern science "predicts" an old earth. But it is more than a prediction. They are certain of it. Below is one response from an e-mail discussion thread that had perhaps 300+ posts. It's a little dated and written in hast, so be kind. For some reason few interacted with my line of reasoning. Why was that? See what you think… It's called Creation as Miracle. (The URL says a lot. The file name is called: blind_fools.html)

 
Even things which occur through non-natural means leave behind evidence.

I would say sometimes Yes, and sometimes No. An example of "No" might be the coin in the fishes mouth. Evidence? Where?

I would define evidence as anything with tangible existence that can be used to assert a premise in a logical proof. In this case, the evidence is not scientific because it isn't present and it isn't repeatable. But it is a textual evidence. We can't know about it if it didn't leave behind any information. To whit, that comes in the form of the inspired writers of Scripture. It's not useful in a scientific setting, to learn about how fish or coins work, but it's knowable because it left behind traces of its occurrence in the form of witness testimony.

However, I think special Creation left some evidence. I don't believe God was dishonest and made Creation 100% void of evidence. My argument is that modern science is blinded by their own presuppositions. They know that the earth is old despite any evidence to the contrary. They can't explain everything they see, but they are positive of that.

No disagreement. :)

It is ultimately not the means by which something occurred that determines whether it's scientifically assessable. It is what our hypothesis predicts the results should be that is the focus of scientific investigation.

I agree. Modern science "predicts" an old earth. But it is more than a prediction. They are certain of it. Below is one response from an e-mail discussion thread that had perhaps 300+ posts. It's a little dated and written in hast, so be kind. For some reason few interacted with my line of reasoning. Why was that? See what you think… It's called Creation as Miracle. (The URL says a lot. The file name is called: blind_fools.html)

Phew; I'll have to return to that at a later date.
 
Young earth scientism is not plausible because the mass scale of creation defies evidential particularisation on a small scale. Old earth scientism is not plausible because the small scale evidence does not support the probability of mass scale developments.

God spake and it was done! I expect small scale experimentation to prove long periods of time would have been required for any act of creation to become a reality by natural processes. The evidence in fact suggests that natural processes would have required an infinite amount of time to produce what we see since natural processes could not have produced anything that we see.
 
Young earth scientism is not plausible because the mass scale of creation defies evidential particularisation on a small scale. Old earth scientism is not plausible because the small scale evidence does not support the probability of mass scale developments.

God spake and it was done! I expect small scale experimentation to prove long periods of time would have been required for any act of creation to become a reality by natural processes. The evidence in fact suggests that natural processes would have required an infinite amount of time to produce what we see since natural processes could not have produced anything that we see.

Seems you used the term 'scientism' for a very specific reason? I can understand and affirm your last sentence, but it gives the appearance of being inconsistent with your statement implying that YEC is not scientific -- unless that's not what you're saying.
 
Seems you used the term 'scientism' for a very specific reason? I can understand and affirm your last sentence, but it gives the appearance of being inconsistent with your statement implying that YEC is not scientific -- unless that's not what you're saying.

Yes, I use scientism specifically to distinguish the doctrine from the science. And yes, I cannot regard YEC as scientific because it is bound by its doctrine to read the evidence in a non-scientific, praeter-natural way.
 
Seems you used the term 'scientism' for a very specific reason? I can understand and affirm your last sentence, but it gives the appearance of being inconsistent with your statement implying that YEC is not scientific -- unless that's not what you're saying.

Yes, I use scientism specifically to distinguish the doctrine from the science. And yes, I cannot regard YEC as scientific because it is bound by its doctrine to read the evidence in a non-scientific, praeter-natural way.

Why conclude this? Is there something unique about YEC that does not apply to OEC or to evolutionism?
If not, it's not the doctrinal impetus of YEC that is the issue of contention but I suspect, disagreeable conclusions.
 
MW said:
Young earth scientism is not plausible because the mass scale of creation defies evidential particularisation on a small scale. Old earth scientism is not plausible because the small scale evidence does not support the probability of mass scale developments.
By "mass scale," are you referring to "large scale"/"large things separated by large distances" or do you mean "the size of everyday matter that we see"? I'm not entirely sure what is being said here; would you be willing to explain again? It sounds like you are saying that (a) we only have evidence made on a small scale, (b) we cannot find a way to make the things we know on a small scale to grow into the things that are on a large scale, and (c) we cannot find a way to break the things we know on a large scale to the things we know on a small scale? I'm not sure how YEC/OEC fits into these.

Justified said:
Thanks. What do you think about instrumentalism (anti-realism) and scientific realism? I know Gordon Clark was an instrumentalist.
It's been a while since I looked at those things carefully and precisely, so take what I say with that in mind. I like scientific realism. I've often debated with myself whether my own position is realist or instrumentalist. It's definitely not antirealist. Scientific realism makes sense of the fact that we are able to make predictions with our theories: even predicting real things simply because they must exist for the theory to make sense or be complete. I know instrumentalists argue that this sort of argument for scientific realism is strictly speaking logically fallacious, but for some reason, it is hard to shake the compelling power of certain predictions in order to say that the concepts are all in our head or refer only to the operations that an experimenter performs. In reply to the instrumentalist, I would say that while some parts of our theories are inherently conceptual, the concepts nevertheless represent either real entities or some part or aspect of real entities; hence, the ability for theoretical prediction is plausible while maintaining the valid concern that theoretical entities have been conceptualized to some degree. Maybe an "electron" as a "fundamental particle" does not exist, but there is some aspect, object, slice, or part of reality that behaves as the mathematical object and "fundamental particle" that we call an "electron." I think this allows for realism in some sense.

I remember finding a useful definition of "functional explanation" that I liked, but I cannot find it. If one viewed scientific explanations as ultimately "functional" in nature, then the theories are ultimately descriptive, even though in relation to themselves and the things themselves the theories are explanatory. The realism is in the relation between the things the theories describe, the relation of the description to reality, and in the relation of the foundation of the theory to reality (i.e., experimental or observational data). Explaining exactly where the realism lies is tricky for me, which is why I sometimes wonder if this is still a form of instrumentalism, not realism.
 
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Why conclude this? Is there something unique about YEC that does not apply to OEC or to evolutionism?

I called OEC scientism as well. Reason: because doctrine is driving the conclusion, not experimental science.

If not, it's not the doctrinal impetus of YEC that is the issue of contention but I suspect, disagreeable conclusions.

I hold to a young earth from a doctrinal point of view. I will even go as far as Ussher for 4004 BC in chronology and calculating the genealogies, and I regard the genealogies as intending to give literal time spans. So there is no problem with the conclusion. The problem is with the methodology -- attempting to give a unified and ultimate explanation to variegated evidence.
 
I'm not sure how YEC/OEC fits into these.

What has been created now only comes before our observation as a "product." The act of creation as a "process" is beyond human investigation. We only come to understand the process by divine testimony. On the other hand, the sciences are observing processes. In either case, whether young earth or old earth is the hypothesis, the attempt is to convert the "process" into a "product" which cannot itself be investigated. Hence the "ism." The young earther is beginning with the "process" as he understands it from special revelation, and trying to reduce it down to smaller pieces of evidence. The old earther is beginning with the smaller piece of evidence and building up to a larger process without any evidence that the larger process could take place naturally.
 
Thanks, that is very helpful!

MW said:
What has been created now only comes before our observation as a "product." The act of creation as a "process" is beyond human investigation. We only come to understand the process by divine testimony. On the other hand, the sciences are observing processes. In either case, whether young earth or old earth is the hypothesis, the attempt is to convert the "process" into a "product" which cannot itself be investigated. Hence the "ism."
If what has been created comes before our observation as a "product," how is it unable to be investigated? Or do you simply mean the product as an entire whole cannot be investigated?

MW said:
without any evidence that the larger process could take place naturally.
To make absolutely sure I am understanding this correctly(I hadn't considered before that old earth creationism held doctrinely driven conclusions in the same way young earth creationism does): this is the doctrine the OEC holds and is driving the conclusion?
 
this is the doctrine the OEC holds and is driving the conclusion?

Yes. There is an assumption that what is observed in smaller units could take place by the same processes on a mass scale when there is no evidence for it.
 
Why conclude this? Is there something unique about YEC that does not apply to OEC or to evolutionism?

I called OEC scientism as well. Reason: because doctrine is driving the conclusion, not experimental science.

If not, it's not the doctrinal impetus of YEC that is the issue of contention but I suspect, disagreeable conclusions.

I hold to a young earth from a doctrinal point of view. I will even go as far as Ussher for 4004 BC in chronology and calculating the genealogies, and I regard the genealogies as intending to give literal time spans. So there is no problem with the conclusion. The problem is with the methodology -- attempting to give a unified and ultimate explanation to variegated evidence.
Rev. Winzer, would you say doctrine is driving the evolutionists, as well?

Also, do you think historical science is a legitimate enterprise?
 
Rev. Winzer, would you say doctrine is driving the evolutionists, as well?

Macro-evolution, definitely, yes. We observe micro-evolution within species, but I suppose that could be called something other than evolution as well, or at least it has to be regarded as a different kind of thing to what is claimed for macro-evolution.

Also, do you think historical science is a legitimate enterprise?

I think any science is legitimate as long as it remains within its own domain, recognises its own limitations, and does not impinge on other domains of science.

From one point of view, all sciences fall within the domain of historical investigation because they assume principles and facts that are supposed to have been tried and proven, and that trial must be open to historical investigation. Even our different "departments" of research are the result of an historical process and adapt to the predominance of different ideas.
 
It's been a while since I looked at those things carefully and precisely, so take what I say with that in mind. I like scientific realism. I've often debated with myself whether my own position is realist or instrumentalist. It's definitely not antirealist. Scientific realism makes sense of the fact that we are able to make predictions with our theories: even predicting real things simply because they must exist for the theory to make sense or be complete. I know instrumentalists argue that this sort of argument for scientific realism is strictly speaking logically fallacious, but for some reason, it is hard to shake the compelling power of certain predictions in order to say that the concepts are all in our head or refer only to the operations that an experimenter performs. In reply to the instrumentalist, I would say that while some parts of our theories are inherently conceptual, the concepts nevertheless represent either real entities or some part or aspect of real entities; hence, the ability for theoretical prediction is plausible while maintaining the valid concern that theoretical entities have been conceptualized to some degree. Maybe an "electron" as a "fundamental particle" does not exist, but there is some aspect, object, slice, or part of reality that behaves as the mathematical object and "fundamental particle" that we call an "electron." I think this allows for realism in some sense.

I remember finding a useful definition of "functional explanation" that I liked, but I cannot find it. If one viewed scientific explanations as ultimately "functional" in nature, then the theories are ultimately descriptive, even though in relation to themselves and the things themselves the theories are explanatory. The realism is in the relation between the things the theories describe, the relation of the description to reality, and in the relation of the foundation of the theory to reality (i.e., experimental or observational data). Explaining exactly where the realism lies is tricky for me, which is why I sometimes wonder if this is still a form of instrumentalism, not realism.
The problem for me is that utility does not necessarily imply correspondence to reality. For example, Ptolemy's geocentric model and the heliocentric model both are able to make predictions, such as the orbit of planets. Why did we abandon geocentricism? Because heliocentricism, as it stands now, is easier to work with; it's simpler. However, does it being simpler imply the truth of it? No. Perhaps reality is actually very complicated and not simple. We don't know.

I know what you are saying, though. And it's tough to think through these things. The above is why I have a hard time accepting realism. At the same time, something really intuitive tells me that realism is true.
 
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