Theories about Adam's fall

[TheOldCourse]

Once unbelief was born the act of eating followed as a matter of course. The two go hand in hand. I don't think they can be separated. On the other side, the mere contemplation of fruit which was indifferent in its own nature by an upright being would not have constituted an "evil cogitation." Part of the positive benefit of the probation would have been moral maturity as he contemplated his dependence on the Life-giver and Law-giver, and this maturity includes thinking through ramifications.

The contemplation that the fruit "was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise" is interesting. This seems to be a natural inclination over the spiritual inclination which only proceeds from The Mouth of God. I understand we maybe should not enter into the thinking donum superadditum but that concept appears to me to be unavoidable because even a naturally good Adam needed grace to attain to the spiritual good Our Lord commanded.

No, we can speak about him not being given that persevering and confirming grace that was promised upon fulfilment of the covenant, but he did not need added grace to fulfill the Lord's commands. While the Reformed have rejected the Arminian contention that human responsibility implies human ability in the fallen, they have held that this does obtain in Adam's case where he had not lost the freedom from necessity by guilt. For instance Zanchi:

Second, the punishment added to the sin even more confirms the same: Otherwise (says God) "at the hour that you eat it, you will certainly die." But why the threat if it stood not free to Adam to keep or not keep the precept? Although we too are threatened with eternal death, if we do not keep the law; and unless he effects by his grace that we fulfill it, we cannot fulfill, yet there is a difference, as I said, between our state of affairs and Adam's. The fact that we cannot keep the law and on the contrary cannot but transgress it, adheres to us as guilt because we lost in Adam the freedom from necessity. For that reason, whether we can or cannot obey, the just punishment awaits us, and therefore God rightly adds his threats. But Adam was rightous and just so that he could obey the law of God if he willed; and consequently if he would not obey, the just punishment was promulgated. So even the punishment added to the law convinces that Adam was completely free from the necessity of doing or not doing good or bad. (from The Free Choice of our First Parents Before the Fall.)

I would also note that when Zanchi states that Adam was completely free from necessity, he elsewhere elaborates that he is both free from external necessity and coercion, but also internal necessity springing from concupiscence by which he would be "impelled or even attracted towards the bad".

 

[MW]

I understand we maybe should not enter into the thinking donum superadditum but that concept appears to me to be unavoidable because even a naturally good Adam needed grace to attain to the spiritual good Our Lord commanded.

According to those who espouse it, the superadditum was something given to Adam to enable communion with God, and it was something he lost by the fall; it was not an hypothetical thing which might have caused him to stand.

Its falsehood lies in supposing there is a deficiency in the creation of man as the image of God, as if communion with God could not be enjoyed in this state. It is also used to support Rome's unbiblical teaching of infused righteousness.

 

[ThomasT]

3) We don’t choose our inclinations, and hence we don’t choose our motives.

We do not presently choose our inclinations, but our inclinations are the result of a past course of rational choices. If it were not so, no person could be inclined to new directions. It would also entail a passive element in the human constitution which makes the consciousness of choosing a deception, since the choice itself would be governed by an inclination which does not genuinely arise from the person.

When you later deny that spontaneity solves the problem, you are correct in a sense, that is, it cannot solve the artificial problem created by a false psychology. But if spontaneity were accepted in the full sense, it accounts for the possibility of new directions. When this is taken in with mutability and probation, and with temptation offering inducement, all the elements are in place to explain the fall.

Your objections keep bouncing off one element onto another, but take them in their cumulative effect and there is no basis to your objections.

You said that our inclinations are a result of past rational choices. This is true in a narrow sense but also highly misleading, and I think it forms the heart of our disagreement. In a nutshell, what I’m saying is that rational choice can change our behavior but not our nature.

We’re born with all kinds of terrible inclinations (selfishness, hatred, jealousy, etc). Society uses its considerable influence to suppress these inclinations. But it doesn’t accomplish this very important task by calling upon us to find new inclinations in place of the old ones. Rather it gives us practical reasons to cooperate with its scheme of suppression. Society warns us from an early age that we face prison and other unpleasant penalties if we choose not to suppress the inclinations it disapproves of.

Our suppression of certain inclinations is successful only because we were born with the counterbalancing inclinations to hate social ostracism, to fear the loss of our personal freedom, to loathe the grim specter of the gallows, and to abhor all the other disagreeable penalties society can impose on our self-interested desires. If we didn’t have these socially useful inclinations (love of life and freedom, etc), society would cease to exist. Society would have no leverage over us and we’d all be monsters. So society (and the way our reason responds to society’s threats) succeeds in its limited design but doesn’t change us fundamentally – the inclinations we were born with are the ones we’ll die with.

The point here is that rational choice can’t give us new inclinations; it can only make us act on one existing inclination instead of another. When we move in a new direction, it isn’t because our reason has created a new inclination. It’s because (for example) the penalty for tax fraud has increased from a mere fine to a long prison sentence. We’re still the same old tax-cheat in terms of our moral nature. The difference is that we can live with a fine but not with prison. And that’s not because our reason has simply decreed it to be so. It’s because our reason has recognized and accommodated our inclination to love freedom, an inclination we simply possess but never chose.

And so if Adam moved in a new direction, it wasn’t because he created a new inclination but rather because he acted on an existing one as a result of a change in external influences.

But without sinful inclinations this wouldn’t have been possible, regardless of the external influences. Adam could have been physically forced by external circumstances to eat the fruit, his mouth moving at the whim of an evil spirit or a powerful alien. But he couldn’t be forced, with rational spontaneity at work, to desire to disobey God. He had to choose this himself, without force. And he couldn’t have chosen this without an inclination to do so. Adam had no “true self” apart from the nature he was given.

 

[MW]

We’re born with all kinds of terrible inclinations (selfishness, hatred, jealousy, etc).

The biblical and reformed doctrine is total depravity, that a person is corrupted throughout the whole of his being, not that he is as utterly wicked as he could be. A person is born with the seeds of vices in their sinful fallen nature, but they are not born with those vices; they develop if and when the person gives himself to them.

What you say about society is true. The good providence of God uses it as a restraint on the sinful inclinations of men. But men choose whether the society is going to exercise that restraint on them. In a court room one might find two kinds of people: one of them is seeking to maintain judgment and justice while the other is a convicted criminal. Sinful inclination cannot explain why one has chosen one path while the other has opted for a different path.

To come back to Adam, your problem is your problem. One school of thought accepts the fact that an upright man had the power to choose contrary to his upright character, and faces none of the problems you raise. When a philosophical theory creates problems for understanding the biblical record I would suggest the philosophy has ceased to serve as the handmaid to theology.

 

[earl40]

I understand we maybe should not enter into the thinking donum superadditum but that concept appears to me to be unavoidable because even a naturally good Adam needed grace to attain to the spiritual good Our Lord commanded.

According to those who espouse it, the superadditum was something given to Adam to enable communion with God, and it was something he lost by the fall; it was not an hypothetical thing which might have caused him to stand.

Its falsehood lies in supposing there is a deficiency in the creation of man as the image of God, as if communion with God could not be enjoyed in this state. It is also used to support Rome's unbiblical teaching of infused righteousness.

Not willing to fall into the trap of Rome which I have been gratefully delivered from I wish to ask if permitted....Was pre fall Adam filled "above measure" (WCF 8:3) as Our Lord was while He was on His mission here? If not is this amount or type of grace, less than "beyond measure", maybe a reason why Adam fell? In other words, it is not super added grace, but a lack of grace given that explains why Adam was unable to pass God's test?

I can see there is a difference between regenerate peccable (mutable morality) man before he is in glory, and when he is impeccable (immutable morality) in glory.

I think I have hit that wall of mystery in that to even ask denies how Our Federal head in the fall was lacking something (knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness)which of course I believe to be not true. For Adam did have knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness.

 

[MW]

Was pre fall Adam filled "above measure" (WCF 8:3) as Our Lord was while He was on His mission here? If not is this amount or type of grace, less than "beyond measure", maybe a reason why Adam fell? In other words, it is not super added grace, but a lack of grace given that explains why Adam was unable to pass God's test?

It suffices to say that Adam was upright and natural, and was probated as such. Personal obedience was required. He was capable in and of himself to stand. He chose otherwise.

 

[ThomasT]

We’re born with all kinds of terrible inclinations (selfishness, hatred, jealousy, etc).

The biblical and reformed doctrine is total depravity, that a person is corrupted throughout the whole of his being, not that he is as utterly wicked as he could be. A person is born with the seeds of vices in their sinful fallen nature, but they are not born with those vices; they develop if and when the person gives himself to them.

What you say about society is true. The good providence of God uses it as a restraint on the sinful inclinations of men. But men choose whether the society is going to exercise that restraint on them. In a court room one might find two kinds of people: one of them is seeking to maintain judgment and justice while the other is a convicted criminal. Sinful inclination cannot explain why one has chosen one path while the other has opted for a different path.

To come back to Adam, your problem is your problem. One school of thought accepts the fact that an upright man had the power to choose contrary to his upright character, and faces none of the problems you raise. When a philosophical theory creates problems for understanding the biblical record I would suggest the philosophy has ceased to serve as the handmaid to theology.

The fact that a) we all have criminal inclinations and b) not all of us are criminals doesn’t take us any closer to explaining how Adam sinned. The reason (or rather partial reason) some of us murder and some of us don’t is that our inclination to murder co-exists with our inclination not to murder. We have an inclination to disobey the law (man’s law) and an inclination to obey the law (through fear of punishment and desire for social approval). Yet Adam’s inclination to obey God didn’t co-exist with a desire to disobey Him.

But stepping away from Adam for second to respond to your observation about the world being divided into law-abiders and law-breakers, yet all of us, law-abiders and law-breakers alike, being inclined to break the law: Why are some of us criminals and not others? It isn’t because of rational choice. Rational choice, when it’s working correctly, serves only to affirm the strongest inclination we experience at any given moment. We don’t simply choose to behave one way or another independently of our inclinations.

Our inclinations can be – and easily are – inflamed or suppressed by natural conditions, internal and external. It’s the differences in natural conditions between persons that determine, ultimately, why I’m a criminal (say) and you’re not. These natural conditions are endless. Here’s a partial list of the questions we have to ask in terms of natural conditions when we want to determine why someone committed a crime.

1) Was he (the criminal) raised to fear the law? For how long – for just his childhood but not his adolescence? Was he raised to fear the law at home but not at school? At school but not (God forbid) at church? Did he associate with people who knew no fear of the law? We know that the way a person is raised strongly correlates to how he behaves as an adult.

2) What’s his genetic makeup? A study in Finland recently identified two “violence” genes. The study found that persons with these genes are 13 times more likely to commit violent crime than persons without them.

3) Was he abused as a child? Child abuse very clearly correlates to adult crime.

4) Is he a male or female? If he’s a male, he’s more likely, statistically, to commit crimes, male hormones being more provocative of violence than females’.

5) How educated is he? Higher levels of education correlate to lower rates of crime, and lower levels of education to higher rates of crime. The same is true with intelligence.

6) How healthy is his diet? Even poor nutrition has been correlated to crime.

We could go on. The point is that natural conditions, external and internal, congenital and environmental, inflame or suppress our inclinations, and at any given moment they create a very complex mix, constantly shifting, of potential motives for our behavior. It’s no accident that the motive we “choose” to follow is always the one that’s derived from our strongest momentary inclination.

Rational choice merely meets the conditions that are necessary for us to act in ways that can be said to express our true nature (and by “nature” I mean our mix of inclinations). And Adam’s true nature contained no inclination to sin. Adam’s sin is thus utterly inexplicable. So to say that Adam’s sin is simply “my problem” strikes me as wishful thinking. There’s a queue a mile long of very intelligent and thoughtful people who look at Adam’s sin the same way I do. And some of these people, incidentally, happen to be Reformed theologians.

 

[MW]

The fact that a) we all have criminal inclinations

yet all of us, law-abiders and law-breakers alike, being inclined to break the law:

Why do you think all are inclined to break the law? Self-preservation and social harmony are civil virtues that the flesh as fallen from God might incline towards.

 

[MW]

Rational choice merely meets the conditions that are necessary for us to act in ways that can be said to express our true nature

Your view of social conditions is nothing more than the sensualistic theory and serves to deny the biblical teaching of rationality and responsibility. People in the worst of conditions have risen above them.

 

[earl40]

It suffices to say that Adam was upright and natural, and was probated as such. Personal obedience was required. He was capable in and of himself to stand. He chose otherwise.

So was Adam not upright and spiritual? Or was the spiritual aspect not attained because he fell? For it is common to say that Adam died spiritually when he sinned that day.

 

[MW]

So was Adam not upright and spiritual? Or was the spiritual aspect not attained because he fell? For it is common to say that Adam died spiritually when he sinned that day.

"Spiritual" is being used in a different sense there; it is more a reference to his holy union and communion with God. When I say "natural" and "spiritual" I am specifically thinking in terms of the eschatological contrast of 1 Cor. 15, which can be interchanged by earthy and heavenly. While Adam was "spiritual" in the sense that he enjoyed upright communion with God, it was still after the earthy and natural order of things.

 

[earl40]

So was Adam not upright and spiritual? Or was the spiritual aspect not attained because he fell? For it is common to say that Adam died spiritually when he sinned that day.

"Spiritual" is being used in a different sense there; it is more a reference to his holy union and communion with God. When I say "natural" and "spiritual" I am specifically thinking in terms of the eschatological contrast of 1 Cor. 15, which can be interchanged by earthy and heavenly. While Adam was "spiritual" in the sense that he enjoyed upright communion with God, it was still after the earthy and natural order of things.

Thank you.

 

[ThomasT]

The fact that a) we all have criminal inclinations

yet all of us, law-abiders and law-breakers alike, being inclined to break the law:

Why do you think all are inclined to break the law? Self-preservation and social harmony are civil virtues that the flesh as fallen from God might incline towards.

Just to be clear, I agree that most of us do incline more strongly toward obeying the law than disobeying it. But this is only because of forces we don’t control that encourage the law-abiding inclinations we have and discourage the ones that without social suppression would make us law-breakers. If we were all raised to be criminals or terrorists, our situation with respect to the law would probably be very different.

It’s true that many people have risen above their circumstances. But this isn’t because they were able to reject the strongest inclinations acting on them at any given moment; it’s because the circumstances that would have normally made for a law-breaker (child abuse, etc) in these lucky few were ineffective, thanks (for example) to an unusually strong counterbalancing inclination in their nature to live in harmony with society. (Call this “natural grace” if you like.) These men didn’t make their choice to obey the law in some kind of autonomous “choice room” sealed off from their inclinations.

 

[ThomasT]

Rational choice merely meets the conditions that are necessary for us to act in ways that can be said to express our true nature

Your view of social conditions is nothing more than the sensualistic theory and serves to deny the biblical teaching of rationality and responsibility. People in the worst of conditions have risen above them.

We can affirm a Reformed understanding of responsibility without denying that man is a slave to his nature (his inclinations). I think we’re in line with Scripture when we say that most men have an inclination to avoid pain and that rational men know that defiance of society’s laws is a major source of the pain we seek to avoid. But here rational choice (as always) is simply rubber-stamping an inclination we find ourselves in possession of and that society happened to have reinforced in us.

 

[MW]

But this is only because of forces we don’t control

So in the end you have man governed by inclinations which are under the control of external forces, and with no freedom to choose otherwise.

Your view, though, binds you to believe that you could not have chosen otherwise but to think what you think. Since your thoughts have been necessitated by inclinations which are not under your control but bound by external forces, there is no reason to accept your view as a genuine rational belief. It is self-refuting.

 

[ThomasT]

But this is only because of forces we don’t control

So in the end you have man governed by inclinations which are under the control of external forces, and with no freedom to choose otherwise.

Your view, though, binds you to believe that you could not have chosen otherwise but to think what you think. Since your thoughts have been necessitated by inclinations which are not under your control but bound by external forces, there is no reason to accept your view as a genuine rational belief. It is self-refuting.

A point of clarification: Our actions are determined by both external (social and physical) forces and internal forces (our inclinations), not just external ones. I’ve been emphasizing external forces only to explain why people who may be more or less similar in their inclinations sometimes act in radically different ways.

You seem to be saying that your beliefs are reliable because it was your choices that affirmed them. But this can be true only if by “reliable beliefs” we mean beliefs that are “authentically yours” rather than someone else’s. And yet authenticity doesn't make something true. Moreover, the reliability of reason itself has no necessary dependence on choice. Why you seem to think that a brain can’t be capable of reasoning properly unless its processes are directed by some “choice faculty” that no one has ever even defined coherently, much less located, is a mystery to me.

A rational outcome is one that follows rules of logic and evidence. Our brain can produce these outcomes even when we dream. The fact that something – the brain – works on its own doesn’t make its outcomes – rational belief – unreliable.

But let’s say for a moment that you’re right, that we can have no confidence in any belief that’s not been approved by this mysterious choice function you talk about. But then how do we know that this choice function is itself reliable? Just because you made what you thought was a rational decision, independently of deterministic forces, doesn’t mean your decision was rational. We choose to act on irrational beliefs every day, all the while believing that we’re acting rationally. We have no power, within ourselves, to simply “know” that a decision we made was rational. No creature has rational infallibility.

The truth is that all knowledge is unreliable, free will or no free will. Gödel made this clear in his Incompleteness Theorem. So you’re stuck with the same unreliability I am. Perfectly reliable knowledge of anything requires total knowledge of everything. And only God has this kind of knowledge.

 

[MW]

A point of clarification: Our actions are determined by both external (social and physical) forces and internal forces (our inclinations), not just external ones.

But you have stated we don't choose our inclinations. So at no point in the process do you give man any freedom of choice. According to you man only chooses according to his inclinations over which he has no control, whilst external forces are shaping his inclinations.

You seem to be saying that your beliefs are reliable because it was your choices that affirmed them.

I have only spoken about the rationality of the belief. To be rational it must be such that the person could freely adjudge the facts. The reason seeks out the truth just as the will seeks out the good. If you take away freedom to choose the good you equally take away freedom to reason according to truth. Voluntariness is basic to the process.

But let’s say for a moment that you’re right, that we can have no confidence in any belief that’s not been approved by this mysterious choice function you talk about.

There is nothing mysterious about it. To be mine it must be voluntary, and because it is mine I am responsible for it. According to your theory you are not responsible for what you believe. Outward conditions are moving you; you are not moving yourself.

Your subsequent challenge proceeds on the conflation of rationality and reliability. Man is fallen. That accounts for unreliabilty. At the same time it is a free and rational process in which the fallen man is engaged. That is what makes his choices his own for which he is accountable.

 

[ThomasT]

A point of clarification: Our actions are determined by both external (social and physical) forces and internal forces (our inclinations), not just external ones.

But you have stated we don't choose our inclinations. So at no point in the process do you give man any freedom of choice. According to you man only chooses according to his inclinations over which he has no control, whilst external forces are shaping his inclinations.

You seem to be saying that your beliefs are reliable because it was your choices that affirmed them.

I have only spoken about the rationality of the belief. To be rational it must be such that the person could freely adjudge the facts. The reason seeks out the truth just as the will seeks out the good. If you take away freedom to choose the good you equally take away freedom to reason according to truth. Voluntariness is basic to the process.

But let’s say for a moment that you’re right, that we can have no confidence in any belief that’s not been approved by this mysterious choice function you talk about.

There is nothing mysterious about it. To be mine it must be voluntary, and because it is mine I am responsible for it. According to your theory you are not responsible for what you believe. Outward conditions are moving you; you are not moving yourself.

Your subsequent challenge proceeds on the conflation of rationality and reliability. Man is fallen. That accounts for unreliabilty. At the same time it is a free and rational process in which the fallen man is engaged. That is what makes his choices his own for which he is accountable.

It's true that the kind of helplessness I'm describing leaves us with mere free agency. But the bad things we do as a (partial) result of the way external forces have shaped our inclinations wouldn't have happened in the first place without bad inclinations. And these bad inclinations aren't themselves a product of external forces. They represent our real nature. They weren't placed in us by society.

Is this a miserable condition I'm describing for humanity? Yes. But your solution remains maddeningly elusive to me. This contrary choice you talk about strikes me as a kind of circle with no real cause. I'm at a loss to explain, as are many others who've looked closely at contrary choice, how a choice can be made that doesn’t represent the strongest inclination acting on us at the moment we made the choice. A contrary choice is a decision. But a decision made on the basis of what? Why do I choose not to murder? Because murder “seems bad” to me and I "want" to do good? But why do I want to do good?

Every choice requires a motive, and voluntariness isn’t a motive itself. One can’t explain a choice simply by saying it was voluntary.

 

[MW]

It's true that the kind of helplessness I'm describing leaves us with mere free agency. But the bad things we do as a (partial) result of the way external forces have shaped our inclinations wouldn't have happened in the first place without bad inclinations. And these bad inclinations aren't themselves a product of external forces. They represent our real nature. They weren't placed in us by society.

This "real nature" is in all sinners, yet all sinners do not choose the same things. You are unable to give a genuine account for why one sinner might seek to uphold the law while another breaks it. You can only fall back on something external to the person in order to describe the differences. There is something passive and animalistic in the "helplessness" you describe. There is nothing "wilful" in it on a personal and individual level. It is not true "human" helplessness.

Man's depravity and inability is spiritual. Man's reason and will functioning properly in relation to temporal things is used in Scripture to prove man's inexcusableness when it comes to the evil use of his reason and will in things pertaining to God.

Why do I choose not to murder? Because murder “seems bad” to me and I "want" to do good? But why do I want to do good?

Man is made to do good. His powers of reason and volition are made to function this way. It is the deceitful heart which presents the lie as truth and evil as good. We need go no farther than the explanation which the Bible provides.

Every choice requires a motive, and voluntariness isn’t a motive itself. One can’t explain a choice simply by saying it was voluntary.

The rationality of the choice requires a motive. Voluntariness is the essence of the choice. Evil fathers give good gifts to their children. Why? This is their flesh and blood for which they feel a binding affection. It may also be that their own honour is tied up with it; and there may be many other ulterior motives factoring into it. But the giving of a fish or bread as opposed to a scorpion or a stone is a conscious act of their own choosing and flows voluntarily from their own individual person. They do not do it to the glory of God, and it does not flow from a heart purified by faith, and is therefore a sinful act; but so far as the formal act is concerned it is something good which they voluntarily choose to do.

 

[rickclayfan]

@ThomasT

I believe the heart of the issue here and the difficulty that you possess in understanding the fall of Adam lies in the fact that we assume that simplistic explanations of our actions and nature are indeed true. We must understand that the soul is an unfathomable abyss. We do it injustice by making such simplistic explanations of it. We must subject our reasonings and understanding to God's word. Who are we to trust more--fallible human comprehension of the soul or the infallible testimony of God? If we are unwilling to do so, we do so to our harm. We cannot continue with the premise that our understanding of our soul should subject biblical doctrines to it.

In regard to the Edwardsian interpretation of the will and its actions, read Cunningham's (Historical Theology) discussion of it in the chapter about the will. His view subtly makes the will a neutral power that is governed by our inclinations. That is not the view of Scripture.

 

[ThomasT]

The rationality of the choice requires a motive. Voluntariness is the essence of the choice. Evil fathers give good gifts to their children. Why? This is their flesh and blood for which they feel a binding affection. It may also be that their own honour is tied up with it; and there may be many other ulterior motives factoring into it. But the giving of a fish or bread as opposed to a scorpion or a stone is a conscious act of their own choosing and flows voluntarily from their own individual person. They do not do it to the glory of God, and it does not flow from a heart purified by faith, and is therefore a sinful act; but so far as the formal act is concerned it is something good which they voluntarily choose to do.

Your fish/stone hypothetical is highly useful; it takes us straight to the center of our disagreement.

Let’s say we have two fathers, Father A and Father B. Father A gives his son a fish. Father B, who has the same power of reason (and the same economic means) as Father A, gives his son a stone. Why are their choices different?

You said that Father A has a motive (honour) for giving his son a fish. We’ll agree, then, that a motive exists for Father A’s choice. We’ll give Father B a motive as well for his own (evil) choice. We’ll say he hates his son because the son reminds him of his estranged ex-wife. We’ll go a step further in our scenario and say that Father A hates his own son, too, and that he hates the child for the same reason Father B hates his (the son reminds him of his ex-wife). Finally, we'll say that Father B, like Father A, has an inclination for honourable behavior.

So now both Father A and Father B have motives for their choices. But we’re stuck with some obvious problems.

1) Why did Father A suppress his hatred of both son and ex-wife and choose to give his son a good gift? In other words, why did he allow his sense of honour to overrule his hatred?

2) Why did Father B not suppress his hatred and instead choose to give his son an evil gift? Why did he allow his hatred to overrule his sense of honour?

The answer can’t be either reason or voluntariness. Reason merely explains to us the implications, moral and practical, of our behavior, and reason did the same work for both men. Voluntariness can’t be the explanation, either. There are two problems with using voluntariness as an explanation. First, both men made voluntary choices. Second, voluntariness is merely a particular power of choice and not an explanation for the choice itself.

You can argue that each father made a choice that was true to himself. Great – but why does one have a true self that suppresses hate and the other have a true self that indulges it?

 

[ThomasT]

@ThomasT

I believe the heart of the issue here and the difficulty that you possess in understanding the fall of Adam lies in the fact that we assume that simplistic explanations of our actions and nature are indeed true. We must understand that the soul is an unfathomable abyss. We do it injustice by making such simplistic explanations of it. We must subject our reasonings and understanding to God's word. Who are we to trust more--fallible human comprehension of the soul or the infallible testimony of God? If we are unwilling to do so, we do so to our harm. We cannot continue with the premise that our understanding of our soul should subject biblical doctrines to it.

In regard to the Edwardsian interpretation of the will and its actions, read Cunningham's (Historical Theology) discussion of it in the chapter about the will. His view subtly makes the will a neutral power that is governed by our inclinations. That is not the view of Scripture.

If the soul is an "unfathomable abyss" (and it clearly is; we agree here), why wouldn't contrary choice, which resides (assuming it exists) in the soul, not be anything but an unfathomable mystery itself? Why pretend that it makes any sense? Even if it's true it still makes no sense. I've been arguing that contrary choice is inexplicable, not that it absolutely must be false.

 

[rickclayfan]

If the soul is an "unfathomable abyss" (and it clearly is; we agree here), why wouldn't contrary choice, which resides (assuming it exists) in the soul, not be anything but an unfathomable mystery itself? Why pretend that it makes any sense? Even if it's true it still makes no sense. I've been arguing that contrary choice is inexplicable, not that it absolutely must be false.

I agree that it is inexplicable. However, reading your previous comments, it seems as if you inflexibly hold to the notion that choices cannot be made with a previous inclination (e.g., a sinful choice cannot be performed without a sinful inclination). To me it seems too much of an over-simplification of the nature of our choices to hold to this notion. I understand this is how Edwards sought to explain the bondage of our will. However, that is merely a human conception (not to mention his views on original sin, which were somewhat problematic). Not to diminish his great worth to the Church, he seems to have entertained too much freedom trying to sophisticatedly and inductively explain some things. Where human reason cannot reach, it safest to submit to the testimony of Scripture (why it possesses such authority is a different discussion).

What Scripture teaches in regard to the Fall: 1) Adam was created holy and righteous. 2) He fell into sin. How we can explain this, I do not know; and I do not think it is wise to dissect it with the dim light of reason. If we were arguing using objective facts, the case would be different. But here we are conversing in reference to something very shadowy and incomprehensible, the human soul and its faculties.

This may be of some help: our immutable standing in salvation, our perseverance, is grounded on Christ. Adam stood on a mutable ground, his free will.

 

[MW]

Let’s say we have two fathers, Father A and Father B. Father A gives his son a fish. Father B, who has the same power of reason (and the same economic means) as Father A, gives his son a stone. Why are their choices different?

Indeed, why are they different? This is your inexplicable dilemma. You cannot explain why they are different without having recourse to external forces. But if external forces make the difference you cannot hold the individual responsible for his actions.

A whole series of choices has preceded your scenario and made the fathers what they are at the moment they come to this particular scenario. And their strongest inclination to act in one way or another is owing to this series of choices. If their previous choices were not an originating factor in their attitudes and behaviours you could not say that they are responsible for the "hate" you have ascribed to them.

Moreover, with the power to originate action, the fathers might contemplate the moral evil of hating their own flesh and blood, and be moved by that moral consideration to begin acting in a way that befits their relation.

You state this as a problem because you refuse to accept the obvious solution to your problem. And knowing your previous choices I can almost predict that you will come back without anything substantial to the solution except to say it is a problem you cannot reconcile with your necessarian scheme. But as I also grant you have the power to originate action within yourself, I hope better things of you, so that we do not have to keep going around in circles.

 

[ThomasT]

Let’s say we have two fathers, Father A and Father B. Father A gives his son a fish. Father B, who has the same power of reason (and the same economic means) as Father A, gives his son a stone. Why are their choices different?

Indeed, why are they different? This is your inexplicable dilemma. You cannot explain why they are different without having recourse to external forces. But if external forces make the difference you cannot hold the individual responsible for his actions.

A whole series of choices has preceded your scenario and made the fathers what they are at the moment they come to this particular scenario. And their strongest inclination to act in one way or another is owing to this series of choices. If their previous choices were not an originating factor in their attitudes and behaviours you could not say that they are responsible for the "hate" you have ascribed to them.

Moreover, with the power to originate action, the fathers might contemplate the moral evil of hating their own flesh and blood, and be moved by that moral consideration to begin acting in a way that befits their relation.

You state this as a problem because you refuse to accept the obvious solution to your problem. And knowing your previous choices I can almost predict that you will come back without anything substantial to the solution except to say it is a problem you cannot reconcile with your necessarian scheme. But as I also grant you have the power to originate action within yourself, I hope better things of you, so that we do not have to keep going around in circles.

You seem to be more interested in making the point that my own explanation for human behavior deprives us of moral responsibility than you are in addressing the core problem of contrary choice. So why don’t we say that you’re right about mere free agency – that mere free agency leaves us helpless and thus incapable of making moral choices.

But where does this leave contrary choice? Is contrary choice our default position? Mere free agency doesn’t give us the moral responsibility we’re looking for and so now we’re stuck with believing in a capacity for a kind of choice that defies all reason?

You explained the choices in the two-fathers scenario by pointing to earlier choices. But doesn’t this simply bring up the obvious question of why the two men made their earlier choices? Aren’t you just using an earlier exercise of choice to explain a later one? If every choice rests on a prior choice, how did we come to make our first choice?

What you’ve never explained to us is how the power of reason and voluntariness can cause us to act on one motive and reject a competing one. We can’t say that our choice is caused by reason because reason only illuminates the nature of physical and moral reality. It doesn’t make choices. No one’s reason ever made a choice. We can’t use voluntariness, either, because voluntariness merely allows us to make choices that are authentically ours. And it’s no use talking about my choices being authentically mine if we haven’t explained how I have the ability to make choices that shape my true self in the first place. Where did this true self you talk about come from? From my earlier choices? But weren’t those earlier choices also expressions of my true self?

You’ve run into an infinite-regression problem, and to avoid it you’ve forced us into a loop. The circles you mentioned in your last note are your own creations, not mine.

 

[ThomasT]

If the soul is an "unfathomable abyss" (and it clearly is; we agree here), why wouldn't contrary choice, which resides (assuming it exists) in the soul, not be anything but an unfathomable mystery itself? Why pretend that it makes any sense? Even if it's true it still makes no sense. I've been arguing that contrary choice is inexplicable, not that it absolutely must be false.

I agree that it is inexplicable. However, reading your previous comments, it seems as if you inflexibly hold to the notion that choices cannot be made with a previous inclination (e.g., a sinful choice cannot be performed without a sinful inclination). To me it seems too much of an over-simplification of the nature of our choices to hold to this notion. I understand this is how Edwards sought to explain the bondage of our will. However, that is merely a human conception (not to mention his views on original sin, which were somewhat problematic). Not to diminish his great worth to the Church, he seems to have entertained too much freedom trying to sophisticatedly and inductively explain some things. Where human reason cannot reach, it safest to submit to the testimony of Scripture (why it possesses such authority is a different discussion).

What Scripture teaches in regard to the Fall: 1) Adam was created holy and righteous. 2) He fell into sin. How we can explain this, I do not know; and I do not think it is wise to dissect it with the dim light of reason. If we were arguing using objective facts, the case would be different. But here we are conversing in reference to something very shadowy and incomprehensible, the human soul and its faculties.

This may be of some help: our immutable standing in salvation, our perseverance, is grounded on Christ. Adam stood on a mutable ground, his free will.

I think the argument I'm really interested in making is that contrary choice is inexplicable. Happily we seem to agree on that. I'll accept your points about the dangers of jumping to conclusions on a subject as murky as the human soul.

 

[MW]

You seem to be more interested in making the point that my own explanation for human behavior deprives us of moral responsibility than you are in addressing the core problem of contrary choice. So why don’t we say that you’re right about mere free agency – that mere free agency leaves us helpless and thus incapable of making moral choices.

I am interested in preserving the biblical teaching of rationality and responsibility. Philosophical necessity invents problems for that teaching. If necessarian views were not imposed on the teaching it would stand fine on its own. The problems only emerge from trying to examine the biblical teaching in the light of an extraneous and needless philosophy.

But where does this leave contrary choice? Is contrary choice our default position? Mere free agency doesn’t give us the moral responsibility we’re looking for and so now we’re stuck with believing in a capacity for a kind of choice that defies all reason?

You conceive of it as defying all reason because you are stuck in the mud of necessary choice. Whether a person chooses A or B it is enough to say that it was rationally motivated and a voluntary choice. There is no power to act contrary to the dependency and interdependency of the human state, but there is a self-determining and voluntary power which introduces an element of contingency into the process.

how did we come to make our first choice?

That goes beyond the scope of philosophical investigation and moves into the realms of child psychology. It suffices, metaphysically, to say that earlier choices were involved in the attitudes which are assumed in the present, and that the power exists for the responsible agent to originate a new course of action based on moral imperatives. If he couldn't be persuaded to move in a new direction all moral discourse would be futile.

What you’ve never explained to us is how the power of reason and voluntariness can cause us to act on one motive and reject a competing one.

That has already been sufficiently explained. The reason and will are not neutral. Man is created to be moved by truth and inclined to good. The deceitful heart presents a lie as truth and evil as good. Who has ever bought a product after hearing a salesman tell you that he is a liar and the product is no good? It is bought on the assumption that the salesman tells you the truth and that the product is good for the consumer.

You’ve run into an infinite-regression problem, and to avoid it you’ve forced us into a loop. The circles you mentioned in your last note are your own creations, not mine.

Voluntary choice means the person has the power to break the cycle and initiate a new course of action. The circle belongs to the theory which supposes the man is necessitated to choose according to prior conditions which he cannot help.

 

[ThomasT]

When we started this discussion, I noted that I couldn’t make any sense of contrary choice and that therefore I had to regard contrary choice, absent any new compelling arguments for it, as a serious intellectual problem. You responded by saying that contrary choice presents us with no inherent problem at all and that it doesn’t leave us with any mystery to unravel.

And yet many people I’ve spoken to who believe strongly in contrary choice are just as convinced as I am that it’s a hopeless paradox. Why you seem to think that contrary choice needs to be explicable in order to be true makes me wonder if contrary choice ever had to pass an explicability test in your mind or whether you simply accepted it as an article of faith and then decided automatically that it made sense.

Now you might respond by saying that contrary choice doesn’t need to be explicable in order to be true – that it just happens to be explicable. And yet every attempt on your part to explain this notion of contrary choice has come across as either opaque or circular.

I’ve been asking you to pinpoint for me the faculty within us that functions as a non-determined choice-maker, a choice-maker that can overrule even our strongest inclinations, a choice-maker that can choose among potential motives independently of the strength of the inclinations underlying those motives.

Your most common response has been to refashion the question into a statement. Me: How can our choices be free? You: Because we exercise voluntary choice.

Then, when I point out that voluntary choice means only that our choices are authentic, you talk about the role of reason. Which leads me to respond that reason is utterly incapable of making choices. In your last note you talked about choices being rationally motivated. But this is a false understanding of the role and power of reason. If you put a knife in a box that’s difficult to open, I’ll use my reason to open the box so I can slice a loaf of bread. A serial killer, who may be more intelligent and knowledgeable than I am, will use his reason to open the box as well – but not to slice a loaf of bread. Reason merely explains the implications of what we’re contemplating (we can make a sandwich by using the knife, we can face prison or execution by using the knife). It does not, and cannot, make choices itself.

Lately you’ve been talking about our choices being informed by earlier choices that have shaped who we truly are. I’ve responded by saying that eventually we need to find a non-determined choice somewhere in the choice sequence or we don’t really have true selves that a free choice has shaped – we simply have selves that are truly ours only because they were assigned to us. Your response has been to accuse me of introducing child psychology into a philosophical argument. And yet I’m merely following your line of reasoning to its logical conclusion.

In your last note you brought up the role of deceit in bad choices. But you can’t explain why some people allow themselves to be deceived and others don’t. Everything you propose as a solution to the contrary choice problem invites some immediate and obvious questions, but when I ask these questions you object by telling me that you’ve already answered them.

Which puts us right back to where we started.

 

[MW]

Why you seem to think that contrary choice needs to be explicable in order to be true makes me wonder if contrary choice ever had to pass an explicability test in your mind or whether you simply accepted it as an article of faith and then decided automatically that it made sense.

You are conscious of your choices. What you choose to think, what you choose to believe, what attitude you choose to take, what you choose to imagine, what you choose to feel, what you choose to speak, as well as what you choose to do, are all consciously your own choices for which God will judge you. The very idea that choice is inexplicable takes it out of the realm of the conscious and the accountable. Have a think about it. It is important to uphold divine mysteries, where God is infinite and free; but to speak of ourselves as mysteries to ourselves is ridiculous, and likely indicates a flight from rationality for the sake of escaping accountability.

 

[earl40]

It is important to uphold divine mysteries, where God is infinite and free; but to speak of ourselves as mysteries to ourselves is ridiculous, and likely indicates a flight from rationality for the sake of escaping accountability.

Is the hypothetical thought that Adam could have contemplated to eat without eating the fruit the mystery? I ask because I believe the contemplation of eating the fruit was part of the fall, or sin, that accompanied the act of eating. Or could the thought about disobeying Our Lord without the act of eating be considered sin? I tend to think such (contemplation of eating the fruit) would be sin in of itself even if he did not eat.