RamistThomist
Puritanboard Clerk
Reid, Thomas. Lectures on Natural Theology. Eds. Barham, James A. and Akins, Jake. 2020.
The English philosopher William Paley, known for his “Watchmaker Argument,” is often considered the precursor to the Intelligent Design movement. If Thomas Reid’s lecture notes on natural theology were made readily available in the 1700s, he might share that distinction with Paley. In terms of modern science, few of Reid’s arguments will sway secularists. In terms of philosophy, however, he anticipated many current debates on analogy, other minds, and the like. These are a series of lectures (73-87) comprising his course in Moral Philosophy. The editors are to be commended for cleaning up the text and making it accessible for modern audiences.
Lecture 73
Reid begins on a pious note: “There is no kind of knowledge that tends so much to elevate the mind as the knowledge of God.” To know God we need both revelation and reason. It is by reason that we evaluate, even positively, God’s revelation.
Reid rebuts the idea that belief in God is tied to belief in the afterlife. A moment’s reflection shows this does not follow. To be sure, most who believe in God do believe in an afterlife. Nonetheless, there is no logical connection between God’s non-existence and the non-existence of the afterlife.
Argument from First Cause: Everything beginning to exist has a cause. This has the status of a “First Principle.” Either, there is a First Cause or an endless regress. There cannot be an endless regress (which he will develop later). Therefore, there is a First Cause.
Lecture 74
Reid moves from the existence of a First Cause to the nature of said Cause. Because this cause is eternal, he must have the properties of life, power, and intelligence. From here Reid shifts back to an argument in the earlier lecture on the impossibility of an infinite regress:
“The causes form a chain; there cannot be an infinite number without a beginning because chains cannot hang in air without an anchor point.”
Reid’s argument from design is not quite the same as William Paley’s “Watchmaker Argument.” Reid’s point, rather, is there is an Intelligence behind it. This is a subtle yet significant observation. Paley, or at least popular summaries of Paley, reason from the effects of design to a Designer. Reid certainly does that, but he notes, although does not develop, something else: Intelligence and information imply one another. Information, especially sophisticated information (and Reid had no idea of the complexity of DNA), requires intelligence, not chance.
Lecture 79
Granted some of the properties of this Being, what else may we infer? Reid, echoing if not directly quoting Bishop Butler, reasons from the analogy of man’s mind, especially in its moral dimensions, to the divine mind. Reid sees a correspondence between the Virtues and the qualities of a man’s mind. In order for this project to work, Reid must address the arguments of the Scottish skeptic, David Hume. Hume said one cannot reason analogically in this way because past experience does not give indicators of the divine or miracles. Reid notes, however, that not everything can be proved from past experience. For example, no one can observe wisdom in the abstract (Reid correctly avoids the language of the “form of Wisdom,” as that would beg the question against Hume); we can only observe its effects.
Even worse, if we applied Hume’s argument consistently, we would have to reject the existence of other minds and end up in the worst solipsism. It is rather astonishing that Reid echoed Alvin Plantinga’s project (cf. God and Other Minds) almost word-for-word. To be sure, skeptics today reject the existence of the mind and instead reduce all mental phenomena to physical brain states. One can substitute “consciousness” for mind and the argument holds. If all that I can know are my own mental states, then it is not clear how I can believe that other people have these same (or similar) mental states.
Lectures 80-81
Reid now begins to unpack, as hinted above, the attributes of God. Such a God, existing outside the chain of causal events, must be eternal. If God is eternal, so Reid reasons, he is “necessarily self-existing.” I agree with Reid, but it is not clear at this point in the exposition why that must be so. We will see if he develops this idea later. I think he means that an eternal God is an infinite God, and an infinite being must be self-existing. He is not clear on this point.
Reid, being a Scottish Presbyterian, albeit of a more moderate sort, has a fine, if brief, section on divine foreknowledge. Contrary to open theists today (and some Jesuits of his own day), Reid maintains that the Divine Mind can know with certainty the future free actions of his creatures. Simply because humans cannot understand it does not make God limited in this regard.
Lecture 86
Reid tries to reason by analogy from human virtues and their necessity to the fact that God must be virtuous. It is a difficult argument to make. He is very close to saying “Because we must be good, God is good.” I think such an argument can be made, but I do not think Reid fully succeeds. Nonetheless, he does give us some noble sentiments on virtue:
“The consciousness of a wise and worthy conduct will always inspire with strength of Mind. It encourages the heart of a Man and makes his Countenance to shine, and the more costly the sacrifice he has offered at the shrine of Virtue, he will find his triumph greater.”
Lecture 87
Reid’s wit never fails to please: “Let the atheist rejoice in the conviction of owing his being to a fortuitous dance of atoms, and let him rest in the uncertain hope of a future world by the same capricious fate!”
Evaluation
In this series of lectures Reid is always good but never very good. He is a better writer than most philosophers, and his criticisms of David Hume never fail to delight us. Unfortunately, the reader is often left confused at the lack of order in the topics. Reid will make an argument for the existence of God, but in the next paragraph raise important points on God’s nature, some of which are not fully developed until many lectures later.
In terms of current apologetics, this book has some value, though it cannot replace current works in either classical apologetics or Intelligent Design. For students of Reid and of the Scottish Enlightenment in general, it is a valuable addition.
The English philosopher William Paley, known for his “Watchmaker Argument,” is often considered the precursor to the Intelligent Design movement. If Thomas Reid’s lecture notes on natural theology were made readily available in the 1700s, he might share that distinction with Paley. In terms of modern science, few of Reid’s arguments will sway secularists. In terms of philosophy, however, he anticipated many current debates on analogy, other minds, and the like. These are a series of lectures (73-87) comprising his course in Moral Philosophy. The editors are to be commended for cleaning up the text and making it accessible for modern audiences.
Lecture 73
Reid begins on a pious note: “There is no kind of knowledge that tends so much to elevate the mind as the knowledge of God.” To know God we need both revelation and reason. It is by reason that we evaluate, even positively, God’s revelation.
Reid rebuts the idea that belief in God is tied to belief in the afterlife. A moment’s reflection shows this does not follow. To be sure, most who believe in God do believe in an afterlife. Nonetheless, there is no logical connection between God’s non-existence and the non-existence of the afterlife.
Argument from First Cause: Everything beginning to exist has a cause. This has the status of a “First Principle.” Either, there is a First Cause or an endless regress. There cannot be an endless regress (which he will develop later). Therefore, there is a First Cause.
Lecture 74
Reid moves from the existence of a First Cause to the nature of said Cause. Because this cause is eternal, he must have the properties of life, power, and intelligence. From here Reid shifts back to an argument in the earlier lecture on the impossibility of an infinite regress:
“The causes form a chain; there cannot be an infinite number without a beginning because chains cannot hang in air without an anchor point.”
Reid’s argument from design is not quite the same as William Paley’s “Watchmaker Argument.” Reid’s point, rather, is there is an Intelligence behind it. This is a subtle yet significant observation. Paley, or at least popular summaries of Paley, reason from the effects of design to a Designer. Reid certainly does that, but he notes, although does not develop, something else: Intelligence and information imply one another. Information, especially sophisticated information (and Reid had no idea of the complexity of DNA), requires intelligence, not chance.
Lecture 79
Granted some of the properties of this Being, what else may we infer? Reid, echoing if not directly quoting Bishop Butler, reasons from the analogy of man’s mind, especially in its moral dimensions, to the divine mind. Reid sees a correspondence between the Virtues and the qualities of a man’s mind. In order for this project to work, Reid must address the arguments of the Scottish skeptic, David Hume. Hume said one cannot reason analogically in this way because past experience does not give indicators of the divine or miracles. Reid notes, however, that not everything can be proved from past experience. For example, no one can observe wisdom in the abstract (Reid correctly avoids the language of the “form of Wisdom,” as that would beg the question against Hume); we can only observe its effects.
Even worse, if we applied Hume’s argument consistently, we would have to reject the existence of other minds and end up in the worst solipsism. It is rather astonishing that Reid echoed Alvin Plantinga’s project (cf. God and Other Minds) almost word-for-word. To be sure, skeptics today reject the existence of the mind and instead reduce all mental phenomena to physical brain states. One can substitute “consciousness” for mind and the argument holds. If all that I can know are my own mental states, then it is not clear how I can believe that other people have these same (or similar) mental states.
Lectures 80-81
Reid now begins to unpack, as hinted above, the attributes of God. Such a God, existing outside the chain of causal events, must be eternal. If God is eternal, so Reid reasons, he is “necessarily self-existing.” I agree with Reid, but it is not clear at this point in the exposition why that must be so. We will see if he develops this idea later. I think he means that an eternal God is an infinite God, and an infinite being must be self-existing. He is not clear on this point.
Reid, being a Scottish Presbyterian, albeit of a more moderate sort, has a fine, if brief, section on divine foreknowledge. Contrary to open theists today (and some Jesuits of his own day), Reid maintains that the Divine Mind can know with certainty the future free actions of his creatures. Simply because humans cannot understand it does not make God limited in this regard.
Lecture 86
Reid tries to reason by analogy from human virtues and their necessity to the fact that God must be virtuous. It is a difficult argument to make. He is very close to saying “Because we must be good, God is good.” I think such an argument can be made, but I do not think Reid fully succeeds. Nonetheless, he does give us some noble sentiments on virtue:
“The consciousness of a wise and worthy conduct will always inspire with strength of Mind. It encourages the heart of a Man and makes his Countenance to shine, and the more costly the sacrifice he has offered at the shrine of Virtue, he will find his triumph greater.”
Lecture 87
Reid’s wit never fails to please: “Let the atheist rejoice in the conviction of owing his being to a fortuitous dance of atoms, and let him rest in the uncertain hope of a future world by the same capricious fate!”
Evaluation
In this series of lectures Reid is always good but never very good. He is a better writer than most philosophers, and his criticisms of David Hume never fail to delight us. Unfortunately, the reader is often left confused at the lack of order in the topics. Reid will make an argument for the existence of God, but in the next paragraph raise important points on God’s nature, some of which are not fully developed until many lectures later.
In terms of current apologetics, this book has some value, though it cannot replace current works in either classical apologetics or Intelligent Design. For students of Reid and of the Scottish Enlightenment in general, it is a valuable addition.
