Threading the needle on Nestorianism vs dyothelitism

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Additional question here that I asked before in a worse form.

For something like the Son not knowing the day or the time, how do you handle this without falling into Nestorianism by completely bifurcating the 2 natures and wills? Does that make sense?
 
Additional question here that I asked before in a worse form.

For something like the Son not knowing the day or the time, how do you handle this without falling into Nestorianism by completely bifurcating the 2 natures and wills? Does that make sense?
He knows in his divine person but from his human nature
 
He knows in his divine person but from his human nature
And now follow up. How does this compare to the Reformed argument against depictions of Christ? If He knows the time in his divine person, but not his human nature what's the response to the same method flipped: "we are depicting the human man, not his divine nature"?

Back to the Mt. 24:36 text, many interlocutors point out that the text states "Son" even as a follow up to the Angels not knowing, but only the Father. (The emphasis is on the person, and not nature(s)). Unitarians utilize this passage to put forward their arguments against the divinity of Jesus.
 
And now follow up. How does this compare to the Reformed argument against depictions of Christ? If He knows the time in his divine person, but not his human nature what's the response to the same method flipped: "we are depicting the human man, not his divine nature"?

Back to the Mt. 24:36 text, many interlocutors point out that the text states "Son" even as a follow up to the Angels not knowing, but only the Father. (The emphasis is on the person, and not nature(s)). Unitarians utilize this passage to put forward their arguments against the divinity of Jesus.

There is only one subject who acts or knows. To deny this is to affirm Nestorianism. It doesn't matter whether the text refers to the Son or to Jesus Christ, for they are the same subject.

The question, then, is how it can be true that the one subject, the Son (Jesus Christ), does not know the day or hour if that same subject is omniscient (due to His divine nature). But that is easily explained by the fact that same subject not only has a divine nature but also a human nature.
 
And now follow up. How does this compare to the Reformed argument against depictions of Christ? If He knows the time in his divine person, but not his human nature what's the response to the same method flipped: "we are depicting the human man, not his divine nature"?

Back to the Mt. 24:36 text, many interlocutors point out that the text states "Son" even as a follow up to the Angels not knowing, but only the Father. (The emphasis is on the person, and not nature(s)). Unitarians utilize this passage to put forward their arguments against the divinity of Jesus.
The divine person still knows. He just doesn't get that knowledge from his human nature.
 
There is only one subject who acts or knows. To deny this is to affirm Nestorianism. It doesn't matter whether the text refers to the Son or to Jesus Christ, for they are the same subject.

The question, then, is how it can be true that the one subject, the Son (Jesus Christ), does not know the day or hour if that same subject is omniscient (due to His divine nature). But that is easily explained by the fact that same subject not only has a divine nature but also a human nature.
THIS is my exact quandary. If we say He knew in his divine self, how is this NOT Nestorianism? This is what I'm having an issue understanding.

Thanks all for the great responses!
 
THIS is my exact quandary. If we say He knew in his divine self, how is this NOT Nestorianism? This is what I'm having an issue understanding.

Thanks all for the great responses!

I am confused by your question. All of the following statements are compatible and avoid Nestorianism:

The divine person knew because of His divine nature.

The divine person did not know because of His human nature.

There is no additional human person, because the divine person assumed an impersonal human nature.
 
But isn't the crux of Nestorianism "over separating" the natures? i.e. the opposite of what ended up being the Chalcedonian Definition? I know the natures aren't "swallowed up" into each other like Eutychianism though.
 
But isn't the crux of Nestorianism "over separating" the natures? i.e. the opposite of what ended up being the Chalcedonian Definition? I know the natures aren't "swallowed up" into each other like Eutychianism though.

Nestorianism is the idea that there are two distinct subjects or persons - this idea is false. Nestorianism is not the idea that there are two distinct natures - this idea is orthodox.
 
But isn't the crux of Nestorianism "over separating" the natures? i.e. the opposite of what ended up being the Chalcedonian Definition? I know the natures aren't "swallowed up" into each other like Eutychianism though.
i think it has to do with separating the natures into two different acting subjects. The natures are separate, not confused or mingled, in one acting subject.
 
The document in the following post helped me better understand person vs. nature: https://www.puritanboard.com/threads/mike-riccardis-notes-on-the-recent-trinity-debates.110867/
Can't seem to access this. Could you paste maybe the gist of it?

So could someone reframe the Eastern Orthodox Priest's complaint to me? Ignore the sin aspect of did Jesus give into temptation... the answer is obviously no. I more mean what is the Priest's complaint not about it being sinful, but about it being Nestorian? Are we saying that temptation is a person issue, and not a nature issue? Is that why everyone in the video clarified this, and the priest said "the person here is the issue?"
 
Can't seem to access this. Could you paste maybe the gist of it?
Some of what I found useful (mostly direct quotes):

A person concerns "who," the "agent," and the "subject." A nature concerns "what," the "principle/action," and the "equipment to carry out the subject's desires."

Natures do not act; persons act according to, or by virtue of, their natures.

The original creeds used "nature" and "person" with these definitions in mind; however, by the late 19th century, a definitional shift began showing itself, from "person" to "personality," essentially defining a person as a nature.

Inseparable operations teaches that, since the divine nature is the principle by which the three persons act, therefore God’s external acts (like His nature) are inseparable: every person of the Trinity is active in every divine action. But because some confuse person and nature, they hear inseparable operations (which protects the singularity of God’s nature) as if it erases the distinctions between the persons and affirms singularity of personhood.

The orthodox interpretations of, e.g., Matthew 24:36 is that while the Son was ignorant of the day or hour of His return according to His human nature, nevertheless He did know the day and hour of His return according to His divine nature. “But how can the same person know and not know something at the same time?” Well, those who have embraced Enlightenment metaphysics hear what it sounds like to confess two natures in Christ as if it were a confession of two persons.”

There can be no eternal relations of authority and submission ad intra, within the life of the Trinity from eternity, because (1) submission is the subjection of one will to another, and therefore it requires multiple faculties of will; because (2) will is a property of nature, not person, and thus two wills would require two natures; and because (3) there is only one nature in the Godhead.

If will were a property of a person and not a nature, we would expect Christ, who is one person, to have only one will. If will were a property of a nature and not a person, we would expect that Christ, who has two natures, to have two wills. Which is it? Does the incarnate Christ have one will or two?
If Christ was to heal the human will (along with the rest of human nature), he must have assumed a human will in His incarnation. The Chalcedonian Definition (451) is dyothelite, because it says the human nature that Christ assumed in order to be “perfect in manhood” and “truly man,” “consubstantial with us according to the manhood,” is that He was “of a rational soul and body.” Chalcedon locates will in the soul, and it locates the soul in the nature, not the person. If Christ didn’t assume a human will in His incarnation (as the monothelites contended), it’s difficult to argue that Christ was and is genuinely human, because genuine humans have human wills. If Christ assumed a human will, then He had two wills, both divine and human. And since Christ is one person with two natures, it’s fitting to conclude that will is a faculty properly predicated of a nature and not a person. Most of us already know that will is a property of nature and not person. When we engage in the debate over the bondage and freedom of the will and man’s depravity, we say, “Fallen man has a will, but his will is bound to act in accordance with his nature.”

There is one faculty of will in the Godhead by virtue of the one nature. As a result, there cannot be ad intra eternal submission among the persons of the Trinity, because the single divine will cannot be “subjected” or “subordinated” to itself. Since the incarnate takes on a human nature alongside and into union with His divine nature, He also takes on a human will. Now with the “hardware” needed for submission, He can now subject His human will to the divine will.

When the Bible calls the Son “Son,” it’s not pointing to His eternal submission, but His eternal generation—His eternal fromness from the Father. Just as a father communicates his human nature to his son in ordinary generation, such that his son becomes a distinct person while equally human, so also God the Father eternally communicates to the Son the fullness of the divine essence, so that the Son “becomes” a distinct person while equally God. John 5:18 – “For this reason therefore the Jews were seeking all the more to kill Him, because He not only was breaking the Sabbath, but also was calling God His own Father, making Himself equal with God.”

Every external act that God performs is worked by all three persons of the Trinity. When a biblical text mentions [the work of] one divine person, this
should not be seen as excluding the others.

Nobody disagrees that the incarnate Son submits to the Father. Having assumed a human nature, He submits to the Father by virtue of His human will. But before the Son had a human will distinct from the will of the Father, such submission was impossible. We can’t read texts which speak of incarnate submission back into eternity past, because the Son was not eternally incarnate.

The act of willing itself only requires multiple persons who will; it does not require multiple faculties of will. But submission requires both multiple persons who will and multiple faculties of willing. Why? Because the subject and object of submission is the will itself. Submission is one will (subject) being subjecting to another will (object).
 
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