Prufrock
Arbitrary Moderation
I have noticed a great many threads lately (and some quite intense) regarding Theonomy and more radical two kingdom theologies. The problem is, these threads often make it appear there are only two options: you either think the magistrate is only concerned with the second table of the Law, or you are a Theonomist. Not to start another debate on the topic, but I feel it somewhat important to inform those who may be confused by these threads that there is another major historic position: the one which Turretin refers to as the one held by the orthodox (X.XXVI.II). We are not Theonomists.
For this position, I'll start with a quote graciously provided by Benjamin Glaser (Backwoods Presbyterian):
Also, for further elucidation, Brown later states:
Brown is an excellent representative here of the orthodoxy claimed by Turretin (but note: these are not Theonomic statements). Brown also claims the following:
For further explanation, let us turn to Turretin, the master himself. He sets up three parties of thought respecting the Jewish civil law (Note, not the ceremonial law). 1.) The antinomians or anabaptists who say it is abrogated simply; 2.) Those who think it is still in force and that states should be governed as the Jewish state: these, he claims, go too far. 3.) And finally, that middle ground which he claims the orthodox hold, which will be elaborated below. That Turretin claims this is very important: he is not a theologian to go off the deep end, but consistently and thoroughly represents the mainstream Reformed orthodoxy of the period. The fact that he attaches the following interpretation (and not the Theonomic interpretation) is quite telling. [The following is a summary of Topic 11, Question 26 of his Institutes.]
Turretin begins by recognizing the spiritual type of the kingdom of Christ which was the Jewish state: note, this does not mean that Israel was a type of the church -- Israel, in fact, was the church; but, as a civil body politic, it was a type of Christ's Kingdom. Turretin therefore holds that the orthodox claim that "the Jewish polity having been taken away, whatever had a peculiar relation to it must also necessarily have ceased."
Thus he further explains:
Further, he claims that, though the Jewish law "were sanctioned by God, it does not follow that on this account they ought to be perpetual." He explains his meaning:
We see represented here a two-table Theocratic understanding of the magistrate and law which is not Theonomic, and which Turretin claims to be the orthodox Reformed position. In other words, a position in which the magistrate is duty-bound to enforce the natural law of God, which is expressed by both tables of the 10 Commandments; he is to establish the church and protect it, and to not authoritatively tolerate the public worship of other religions; in the midst of all this, however, the laws are not to be duplications of the Jewish civil law, which was enacted specifically for the circumstances of that nation.
I realize this was lengthy, but I hope it will help assuage some confusion that may arise on the part of those new to the issue -- Theonomy and "not Theonomy" are not the only two possibilities; nor are all (or most!) historic Reformed Theocrats also Theonomists.
For this position, I'll start with a quote graciously provided by Benjamin Glaser (Backwoods Presbyterian):
God, as Creator and Governor of the world, is the author of all civil government. Nor have either subjects or magistrates the smallest degree of liberty or power, but what they derive from Him, and for what they must be accountable to Him. Not, therefore, the will of subjects, or the the consciousnesses of magistrates, but the Law of God, as Supreme Governor, must be the real standard of all laws enacted by men. Nor must men's civil interests, but the Glory of God, as Founder and Supreme Governor of nations, be intended as their chief end, in all civil subjection and government. To maintain the contrary, necessarily involves in the depths of atheism. John Brown, Systematic Theology, 23
Also, for further elucidation, Brown later states:
As magistrates derive their whole power and authority from God himself, and are bound as his deputies to exercise it for his honor...they cannot establish any religion but that which is of God, --they cannot authoritatively tolerate a false religion. ibid, 27
Brown is an excellent representative here of the orthodoxy claimed by Turretin (but note: these are not Theonomic statements). Brown also claims the following:
Except in the case of the Jewish nation, God permits civil societies to establish what particular form of government they find most agreeable to their circumstances, if they be not contrary to his law. ibid, 24
For further explanation, let us turn to Turretin, the master himself. He sets up three parties of thought respecting the Jewish civil law (Note, not the ceremonial law). 1.) The antinomians or anabaptists who say it is abrogated simply; 2.) Those who think it is still in force and that states should be governed as the Jewish state: these, he claims, go too far. 3.) And finally, that middle ground which he claims the orthodox hold, which will be elaborated below. That Turretin claims this is very important: he is not a theologian to go off the deep end, but consistently and thoroughly represents the mainstream Reformed orthodoxy of the period. The fact that he attaches the following interpretation (and not the Theonomic interpretation) is quite telling. [The following is a summary of Topic 11, Question 26 of his Institutes.]
Turretin begins by recognizing the spiritual type of the kingdom of Christ which was the Jewish state: note, this does not mean that Israel was a type of the church -- Israel, in fact, was the church; but, as a civil body politic, it was a type of Christ's Kingdom. Turretin therefore holds that the orthodox claim that "the Jewish polity having been taken away, whatever had a peculiar relation to it must also necessarily have ceased."
Thus he further explains:
What does this mean?"In the laws founded upon the common right or the law of nature, the substance of the precept must be distinguished from its circumstances...The former are perpetual in all parts; the latter on the other hand, only relatively."
The above is a highly important statement. The orthodox, to Turretin, held that the laws of a state were not to mirror those of Israel; rather, they were founded upon the general equity, without necessarily the same effects. Rather,Thus in the laws concerning the punishment of crimes, the substance of the punishment is of natural right, but the manner and degree of punishment is of particular right and on that account mutable.
The laws of a state, he claims, must be based upon the equity of the moral or natural law; but do not have to reflect those of Israel, nor have the same provisions and punishments.The polity having been abolished, the laws must necessarily be abolished upon which that polity was founded. They are of positive right and referred simply to the Jewish state....[t]he forensic law as to general determinations, founded upon the moral law, is not abrogated; but as to special determination, which concerned the state of the Jews, is abrogated.
Further, he claims that, though the Jewish law "were sanctioned by God, it does not follow that on this account they ought to be perpetual." He explains his meaning:
This is why he could claim that other nations' laws, such as Roman law, could be more appropriate for a nation than Jewish law, without also deprecating the Jewish law or making man wiser than God. The good parts of Roman law arise because they are founded upon God's law (that is, the natural law which is expressed in the 10 commandments); and as such, so long as they are so founded, can be "better" than the Jewish law, as "being derived from natural and common right they can be more suitable to places, times and persons."God, from positive and free right, could give them for a certain time and for certain reasons, to some one nation, which would have not have force with respect to others. What is good for one is not immediately so for another.
We see represented here a two-table Theocratic understanding of the magistrate and law which is not Theonomic, and which Turretin claims to be the orthodox Reformed position. In other words, a position in which the magistrate is duty-bound to enforce the natural law of God, which is expressed by both tables of the 10 Commandments; he is to establish the church and protect it, and to not authoritatively tolerate the public worship of other religions; in the midst of all this, however, the laws are not to be duplications of the Jewish civil law, which was enacted specifically for the circumstances of that nation.
I realize this was lengthy, but I hope it will help assuage some confusion that may arise on the part of those new to the issue -- Theonomy and "not Theonomy" are not the only two possibilities; nor are all (or most!) historic Reformed Theocrats also Theonomists.