Turretin's Method of Theology (or how not to be a Campbellite)

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RamistThomist

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(Turretin did not know of the Campbellites. That was my application.)

I think the below marks of the parameters of a Reformed theological method. A biblicist method, by contrast, rejects this.

When earlier writers spoke of a marrow (medulla) of theology, they meant the core distilled into a succinct summary, often set apart with division markers. In Topic 1, Turretin evaluates the role of reason in theology. For modern day discussions, it serves as a test on whether one is a biblicist or not. If one cannot affirm Turretin’s principia, then one is a biblicist. This outline, or marrow, takes Turretin’s main argument in each of his propositions under Topic 1 and presents them for fast retrieval.

1. Second question: whether there is a theology and its divisions.
  • Answer: theology has been divided into three: natural (reason), supernatural (grace), and beatific (glory) (I.II.IX).

2. Whether natural theology can be granted.
  • Statement of the question: We are speaking of natural first principles of knowledge from which conclusions both theoretical and practical are deduced (I.III.II). “The orthodox…uniformly teach that there is a natural theology, partly innate (derived from the book of conscience by means of common notions [koinas ennoias]) and partly acquired” (IV).
  • Proof: the nature of the thing “proves it because such a work of the law is meant by whose instinct man not only distinguishes between good and evil, but is prompted to perform the one and avoid the other” (V).

3. The object of theology: Are God and divine things the object of theology? We affirm.
  • Statement of the question: He is considered “as he is our God (i.e., covenanted in Christ as he has revealed himself to us in his word not only as the object of knowledge, but also of worship) (I.V.IV).

4.Is human reason the principle and rule by which the doctrines of the Christian religion and theology ought to be measured? We deny against the Socinians.
  • We distinguish on reason: Reason is ministerial and organic, not despotic (I.VIII.VI). It is an instrument of faith, not its foundation (VII).
  • Augustine distinguishes the truth of propositions from the truth of conclusions. The former is axiomatic, the latter discursive (XI). Divine revelation corresponds to the former, right reason to the latter.
  • Where does reason fit in the argument? A mixed syllogism contains one proposition of faith and one of reason. Reason then functions as the instrumental premise (XIII).

5. Does any judgment belong to reason in matters of faith? Or is there no use for it at all?
  • Two extremes: excess of reason (Socinians) and defect (Anabaptists).
  • Statement of the question; the question does not concern the judgment of decision by which controversies are publicly determined. No one of us attributes this to reason, but either to God alone speaking in the Scriptures (if we speak of supreme judgment) or to pastors appointed in the church (if we treat of subordinate judgment)(I.iX.II).
  • Man in sin still retains first principles. These first principles are true not only in nature, but also in grace and the mysteries of faith…Although reason and faith are of different classes (the one natural, the other supernatural), they are not however opposed (V).

6. May the judgment of contradiction be allowed to human reason in matters of faith? We affirm.
  • State of the question: three things must be distinguished: reason judging, the principle from which the judgment is formed, and the rule of consequence by which it is formed:
    • The reason is that which is enlightened.
    • The principles are those given in the Scriptures.
    • The rule is in application.

7. Twelfth question: may doctrines be legitimately proved by consequences drawn from Scripture? We affirm. (I.XII.1).
  • Although the intellect which educes consequences is fallible, it does not follow that the consequences themselves are false and uncertain.
  • To prove a consequence of faith, the middle term must be taken not from nature, but from the Scriptures.
  • Reason is not the principle of the thing, but of the knowledge of the thing (XXVI).

8. Thirteenth Question: Is there any use of philosophy in theology? We affirm.
  • Reason receives the principles from the light of faith, yet (this light preceding) it ought to judge how the parts cohere (I.XIII.V).
 
Logic is an attribute of God. Otherwise, if God creates the laws of logic and subsequently subordinates himself to them - freely or not - the laws of logic would govern the universe rather than God himself.

That's a paraphrase of Vern Poythress of the top of my head from memory. Any errors are probably mine and not likely his.
 
Logic is an attribute of God. Otherwise, if God creates the laws of logic and subsequently subordinates himself to them - freely or not - the laws of logic would govern the universe rather than God himself.

That's a paraphrase of Vern Poythress of the top of my head from memory. Any errors are probably mine and not likely his.

I do not know if logic is properly an attribute of God. Similarly, I am not sure God "created" logic.

As to subordinating himself to logic, that might be the wrong way to say it. God cannot do logical impossibilities, yet that does not seem like he subordinates himself to Logic. God cannot create a world in which he simultaneously exists and not exists.

Moreover, we believe God cannot lie, but no one who says that thinks God subordinated himself to Ethics.
 
(Turretin did not know of the Campbellites. That was my application.)

I think the below marks of the parameters of a Reformed theological method. A biblicist method, by contrast, rejects this.

When earlier writers spoke of a marrow (medulla) of theology, they meant the core distilled into a succinct summary, often set apart with division markers. In Topic 1, Turretin evaluates the role of reason in theology. For modern day discussions, it serves as a test on whether one is a biblicist or not. If one cannot affirm Turretin’s principia, then one is a biblicist. This outline, or marrow, takes Turretin’s main argument in each of his propositions under Topic 1 and presents them for fast retrieval.

1. Second question: whether there is a theology and its divisions.
  • Answer: theology has been divided into three: natural (reason), supernatural (grace), and beatific (glory) (I.II.IX).

2. Whether natural theology can be granted.
  • Statement of the question: We are speaking of natural first principles of knowledge from which conclusions both theoretical and practical are deduced (I.III.II). “The orthodox…uniformly teach that there is a natural theology, partly innate (derived from the book of conscience by means of common notions [koinas ennoias]) and partly acquired” (IV).
  • Proof: the nature of the thing “proves it because such a work of the law is meant by whose instinct man not only distinguishes between good and evil, but is prompted to perform the one and avoid the other” (V).

3. The object of theology: Are God and divine things the object of theology? We affirm.
  • Statement of the question: He is considered “as he is our God (i.e., covenanted in Christ as he has revealed himself to us in his word not only as the object of knowledge, but also of worship) (I.V.IV).

4.Is human reason the principle and rule by which the doctrines of the Christian religion and theology ought to be measured? We deny against the Socinians.
  • We distinguish on reason: Reason is ministerial and organic, not despotic (I.VIII.VI). It is an instrument of faith, not its foundation (VII).
  • Augustine distinguishes the truth of propositions from the truth of conclusions. The former is axiomatic, the latter discursive (XI). Divine revelation corresponds to the former, right reason to the latter.
  • Where does reason fit in the argument? A mixed syllogism contains one proposition of faith and one of reason. Reason then functions as the instrumental premise (XIII).

5. Does any judgment belong to reason in matters of faith? Or is there no use for it at all?
  • Two extremes: excess of reason (Socinians) and defect (Anabaptists).
  • Statement of the question; the question does not concern the judgment of decision by which controversies are publicly determined. No one of us attributes this to reason, but either to God alone speaking in the Scriptures (if we speak of supreme judgment) or to pastors appointed in the church (if we treat of subordinate judgment)(I.iX.II).
  • Man in sin still retains first principles. These first principles are true not only in nature, but also in grace and the mysteries of faith…Although reason and faith are of different classes (the one natural, the other supernatural), they are not however opposed (V).

6. May the judgment of contradiction be allowed to human reason in matters of faith? We affirm.
  • State of the question: three things must be distinguished: reason judging, the principle from which the judgment is formed, and the rule of consequence by which it is formed:
    • The reason is that which is enlightened.
    • The principles are those given in the Scriptures.
    • The rule is in application.

7. Twelfth question: may doctrines be legitimately proved by consequences drawn from Scripture? We affirm. (I.XII.1).
  • Although the intellect which educes consequences is fallible, it does not follow that the consequences themselves are false and uncertain.
  • To prove a consequence of faith, the middle term must be taken not from nature, but from the Scriptures.
  • Reason is not the principle of the thing, but of the knowledge of the thing (XXVI).

8. Thirteenth Question: Is there any use of philosophy in theology? We affirm.
  • Reason receives the principles from the light of faith, yet (this light preceding) it ought to judge how the parts cohere (I.XIII.V).
Three points by way of constructive criticism.
1. What is a biblicist? You define it by way of a negative definition but not a positive one, what it is? That can be confusing.
2. What if someone doesn't care about Turretin but takes their theological cues from other people (Hodge, Warfield, Machen, Vos, and/or Bavink for instance) is that person a biblicist de facto?
3. How much disagreement is allowed before one becomes, whether one agrees or not, the "nebulous boogeyman" of biblicist?
You did define your Turretin quote as "parameters of a Reformed theological method" so that helps. Just food for thought.
 
I like Turretin. I have been enjoying my read through his systematic. It will take me many years based on my reading speed and availability of free time, but it is worth it. One question though, don't baptists reject good and necessary consequences? (This is not meant to pick a fight, it is just something I have heard some baptists say)
 
Also, responding to Jamey's comment I tend to agree with him. "Biblicist" seems to be a useless term these days. There are way too many definitions of the word, both positive and negative. You could say the credo magazine definition and that would give some context.
 
1. What is a biblicist? You define it by way of a negative definition but not a positive one, what it is? That can be confusing.

I'll come back to that. A fuller answer probably requires revisiting the Wells-Frame-Muller debate. I think a tentative starting point would be whether the deductions from reason are just as binding for theology, assuming, of course, that reason is a principle, not a foundation, of theology.
2. What if someone doesn't care about Turretin but takes their theological cues from other people (Hodge, Warfield, Machen, Vos, and/or Bavink for instance) is that person a biblicist de facto?

Hodge's ST is literally the cliff notes version of Turretin (with the possible exception of how Hodge glossed divine simplicity).
3. How much disagreement is allowed before one becomes, whether one agrees or not, the "nebulous boogeyman" of biblicist?

That's kind of like asking about the Ship of Theseus. I suppose one could say that Questions 8 and 12 provide a good starting point.
 
Also, responding to Jamey's comment I tend to agree with him. "Biblicist" seems to be a useless term these days. There are way too many definitions of the word, both positive and negative. You could say the credo magazine definition and that would give some context.

I thought about that, but I first remember this debate from the Journal Wars between David Wells, John Frame, and Richard Muller. I will try to expand on that later.
 
God cannot do logical impossibilities,
I assume this statement is not intended as a comprehensive absolute, because, were it taken to its logical(!) extreme, it would eviscerate the doctrines of creation, incarnation, Trinity, justification, and miracles.

It is true, of course, that God did not create logic in the sense of speaking it into existence from nothingness, but He is nonetheless responsible for its existence, having ordained an intelligent mind as steward over an orderly creation. This mind developed logic as a powerful tool unto the discharge of that mandate.
 
I assume this statement is not intended as a comprehensive absolute, because, were it taken to its logical(!) extreme, it would eviscerate the doctrines of creation, incarnation, Trinity, justification, and miracles.

I do not follow. There is nothing logically impossible with the idea of creation, Trinity, etc.
 
I do not follow. There is nothing logically impossible with the idea of creation, Trinity, etc.
Logic requires that the Ultimate be either three Persons or one God, diverse or unitary, not both at the same time. Logic requires that a being be either divine or human, Creator or created, not both at the same time. Logic requires that the sinner suffer the just consequences of his own sin, not transferable to Another.
 
I'll come back to that. A fuller answer probably requires revisiting the Wells-Frame-Muller debate. I think a tentative starting point would be whether the deductions from reason are just as binding for theology, assuming, of course, that reason is a principle, not a foundation, of theology.


Hodge's ST is literally the cliff notes version of Turretin (with the possible exception of how Hodge glossed divine simplicity).


That's kind of like asking about the Ship of Theseus. I suppose one could say that Questions 8 and 12 provide a good starting point.
Ok thats Hodge, what about the rest of them? My point being in all three questions is that it seems you're guilty of the either or fallacy. Whenever you define something that may rule out some of the greatest theologians our tradition has produced it may be time to take a step back and re-think it.
And a lack, to be fair you said you're working on it, of definition for your "nebulous boogeyman" isn't helpful. Remember this is just constructive criticism that's all.
 
Ok thats Hodge, what about the rest of them?

Bavinck says the same thing I do in his prolegomena. See especially his discussions on the principium essendi and the externum principium cognoscendi.

Machen praised the metaphysical attributes of God. My point in all of this is that the earlier writers praised these scholastic categories as a way of structuring theology. If one does not like Turretin, that is fine. I do not see how it changes what I have said.
Whenever you define something that may rule out some of the greatest theologians our tradition has produced it may be time to take a step back and re-think it.

I did not do that. In case I was unclear, I was using Turretin as an example. I said a biblicist rejects Turretin's method. Someone who says something very similar to Turretin, such as Hodge and Bavinck, would not be rejecting that method.
 
not both at the same time.

That is not what the law of noncontradiction says. It says A cannot be ~A at the same time and in the same relationship.
Logic requires that the Ultimate be either three Persons or one God
I sort of know why Van Tillians say this, but I think it is a very bad way of speaking about God.
Logic requires that a being be either divine or human, Creator or created, not both at the same time.

This is a confusion of the categories of Person and Nature.
 
To be fair to all sides, even those who might claim to be biblicist admit that defining the term in a satisfactory way is near impossible. Frame lists four definitions, none of which he says he holds to, and I am inclined to agree with him.

In terms of praxis, one could say that a biblicist is someone who rejects the perceived Aristotelian scholasticism of the Reformed Scholastics. This is not a perfect definition, but it can advance the discussion.
 
Bavinck says the same thing I do in his prolegomena. See especially his discussions on the principium essendi and the externum principium cognoscendi.

Machen praised the metaphysical attributes of God. My point in all of this is that the earlier writers praised these scholastic categories as a way of structuring theology. If one does not like Turretin, that is fine. I do not see how it changes what I have said.


I did not do that. In case I was unclear, I was using Turretin as an example. I said a biblicist rejects Turretin's method. Someone who says something very similar to Turretin, such as Hodge and Bavinck, would not be rejecting that method.
Ok, now we're getting somewhere if someone affirms (most, all?) Of Turretin’s list aren't this "nebulous and undefined boogeyman" of biblicist, is that what your point is?
Let's suppose whenever you come up with your definition, again in constructive critical fashion I'll wait for, a person who doesn't care for Turretin doesn't see themselves in that definition. Because they question him on some but not all points how does that make them a biblicist? Does Bavinck's use Schielmacher cause problems for him?
My concern is that you've put a burden on the term biblicist that it cannot bear in any useful way, as someone else already pointed out. Or else you would've started with a definition and worked out from there. We agree that to completely reject Turretin is bad but how does quibbling with his points make one a biblicist? Reformed Orthodoxy's method is vitally important to sound theology but how does rejecting it make one a biblicist? I still think you have an either/or problem here, no third way.
 
Ok, now we're getting somewhere if someone affirms (most, all?) Of Turretin’s list aren't this "nebulous and undefined boogeyman" of biblicist, is that what your point is?
My boogeyman might be nebulous and undefined, but it is real. See Owen Strachan's recent attack on the historic Christian doctrine of divine simplicity. I will link to it when I get home. Cannot on work server.
Because they question him on some but not all points how does that make them a biblicist?

You are missing the point. I reject Turretin on traducianism. Disagreeing with Turretin is not the issue. Disagreeing with the Reformed tradition on the use of reason in formulating theology is.
bad but how does quibbling with his points make one a biblicist?

It does not.
I still think you have an either/or problem here, no third way.
I do not.
 
To be fair to all sides, even those who might claim to be biblicist admit that defining the term in a satisfactory way is near impossible. Frame lists four definitions, none of which he says he holds to, and I am inclined to agree with him.

In terms of praxis, one could say that a biblicist is someone who rejects the perceived Aristotelian scholasticism of the Reformed Scholastics. This is not a perfect definition, but it can advance the discussion.
I assume you their method? What if they are doctrinal reformed but use a different method theologically, are they a biblicist?
 
My boogeyman might be nebulous and undefined, but it is real. See Owen Strachan's recent attack on the historic Christian doctrine of divine simplicity. I will link to it when I get home. Cannot on work server.


You are missing the point. I reject Turretin on traducianism. Disagreeing with Turretin is not the issue. Disagreeing with the Reformed tradition on the use of reason in formulating theology is.


It does not.

I do not.
So your real target is people messing with the doctrine of God because they reject the method? Third way affirm classical Theism but reject Turretin’s method mostly.
Ok you said people who reject the use of reason in theology. I agree, who are these people?
 
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To be fair to all sides, even those who might claim to be biblicist admit that defining the term in a satisfactory way is near impossible. Frame lists four definitions, none of which he says he holds to, and I am inclined to agree with him.

In terms of praxis, one could say that a biblicist is someone who rejects the perceived Aristotelian scholasticism of the Reformed Scholastics. This is not a perfect definition, but it can advance the discussion.
I think I get part of your point, and I agree (with part of it). I think your argument is if you reject Reformed Orthodox theological method you're a biblicist? I think you'd be better off arguing that a rejection of that makes you susceptible to possible error a more likely outcome. You'll never be able to prove that a rejection of one automatically makes one the other, even if there are some that give biblicist as their reason.
Michael Horton wrote a great essay on this subject agreeing with you as much as I do. In "Beyond The Bounds" essays against Open Theism on Reformed Orthodox method vs Open Theism method essentially arguing the same point.
 
I agree with everything but I'm not a big fan of faculty psychology. I understand that's all they had to work with. But in substance I don't disagree.
 
To be fair to all sides, even those who might claim to be biblicist admit that defining the term in a satisfactory way is near impossible. Frame lists four definitions, none of which he says he holds to, and I am inclined to agree with him.

In terms of praxis, one could say that a biblicist is someone who rejects the perceived Aristotelian scholasticism of the Reformed Scholastics. This is not a perfect definition, but it can advance the discussion.
I had not encountered that article from Frame before. Thanks for sharing.

I think the thing he doesn't really get into that article is a "prolegomena" that marks a theological method and tradition. The Reformed tradition certainly heavily leverages the light of nature. You can see Puritans making theological arguments for the existence and attributes of God appealing to arguments that begin in Scripture but are heavily elaborated by appeals to reasonable arguments (e.g. GNC). It's not as if they discard other theological arguments that end up in different places. I'm surprised, for instance, how often Charnock quotes Amyraut. It's even clear that he and others (including Rutherford) leverage arguments from Roman Catholics.

To a large extent what marks Reformed hermeneutics is the exact opposite of what Frame offers and that is theological "creativity". The tradition, broad at it is on certain points, tends to avoid speculation.

I do think the Reformed have been fairly moored in basic ideas about the existence and attributes of God and tend to cleave very closely to common catholic commitments. Where I think this discussion and debate in the present context would help at times is to demonstrate that the old paths have exegetical and GNC soundness rather than appealing to a catholic tradition. While the latter is important, I see many people just throwing out the charge of Biblicism because they insist on some sort of Thomistic theology of inseparable operations and fail to demonstrate to those who many have more Biblicist paradigms that there is exegetical soundness to the concept and that the "whole package" is necessary before they throw people under the bus as being Biblicists or neo-Socinian.

It's easier in my estimation to demonstrate that certain theologians like Frame have departed from ideas of Simplicity than it is to charge some of the recent critics of this Thomistic resurgence who are only offering sweeping generalizations about the great tradition.
 
I had not encountered that article from Frame before. Thanks for sharing.

I think the thing he doesn't really get into that article is a "prolegomena" that marks a theological method and tradition. The Reformed tradition certainly heavily leverages the light of nature. You can see Puritans making theological arguments for the existence and attributes of God appealing to arguments that begin in Scripture but are heavily elaborated by appeals to reasonable arguments (e.g. GNC). It's not as if they discard other theological arguments that end up in different places. I'm surprised, for instance, how often Charnock quotes Amyraut. It's even clear that he and others (including Rutherford) leverage arguments from Roman Catholics.

To a large extent what marks Reformed hermeneutics is the exact opposite of what Frame offers and that is theological "creativity". The tradition, broad at it is on certain points, tends to avoid speculation.

I do think the Reformed have been fairly moored in basic ideas about the existence and attributes of God and tend to cleave very closely to common catholic commitments. Where I think this discussion and debate in the present context would help at times is to demonstrate that the old paths have exegetical and GNC soundness rather than appealing to a catholic tradition. While the latter is important, I see many people just throwing out the charge of Biblicism because they insist on some sort of Thomistic theology of inseparable operations and fail to demonstrate to those who many have more Biblicist paradigms that there is exegetical soundness to the concept and that the "whole package" is necessary before they throw people under the bus as being Biblicists or neo-Socinian.

It's easier in my estimation to demonstrate that certain theologians like Frame have departed from ideas of Simplicity than it is to charge some of the recent critics of this Thomistic resurgence who are only offering sweeping generalizations about the great tradition.

True, and part of the problem, and Frame hints at this, is defining biblicism. Frame did not give a definition. I have not seen White or Strachan offer a definition of it either.

I think both sides--and I speak of myself--are mired in the problem of defining it by attacking the other position. The critics of the Thomistic resurgence simply attack Aristotle as bad. Classical Reformed scholastics like myself then respond by pointing out where Strachan and others have departed on the doctrine of God.

Maybe my outline of Turretin can move the discussion forward.
 
Roman Catholic, Anglican, Lutheran, and Arminius all have a method and aren't biblicist (whatever that means).

Right. My argument was not intended to say that anyone who disagrees with Turretin is a biblicist. Rather, someone who rejects the idea that reason can play a principial role in theology is a biblicist. That's a good definition for starters. It might need to be fine-tuned later.
 
Right. My argument was not intended to say that anyone who disagrees with Turretin is a biblicist. Rather, someone who rejects the idea that reason can play a principial role in theology is a biblicist. That's a good definition for starters. It might need to be fine-tuned later.
That's good. So like people who are Fundamentalists or theologically empty liberals? I completely agree. Or a Frame or a Strachan who so elevates individual exegesis of particular texts (I do agree with Frame on the limits and use of reason) above and beyond reason or I would call it systematic theology? I also agree.
I think given those parameters you got a good argument on your hands. I've discussed the value of tradition and theology to I don't how many people in my life. I love being American but sometimes our individualism is a problem.
 
True, and part of the problem, and Frame hints at this, is defining biblicism. Frame did not give a definition. I have not seen White or Strachan offer a definition of it either.

I think both sides--and I speak of myself--are mired in the problem of defining it by attacking the other position. The critics of the Thomistic resurgence simply attack Aristotle as bad. Classical Reformed scholastics like myself then respond by pointing out where Strachan and others have departed on the doctrine of God.

Maybe my outline of Turretin can move the discussion forward.
I'd like to think it's possible. I'm frustrated because I have friends on both sides. I do think there is a neo-Socinian spirit in many of those who call themselves Reformed where they imagine a very shallow appeal to prooftexts and what they deem as exegesis allows them freedom to redefine classic theological tenets. Frame is an example, not so much of someone who is a thin Biblicist but someone who forges out in new metaphysical directions and often feels no compunction to stick with Catholicity.

I think the EFS and ERAS debates were a necessary wake-up call to get people to think about small-c catholic Christian ideas that many in the 20th century felt were OK to depart from as long as they were good on salvation proper. The problem, as I see it, is that it's starting to become more of a "club" to be a "classic theist" and isn't being worked out in a mature, Ecclesiastical way. It's not enough to show very broad strokes but to get to specifics of dangers. It's OK as well to acknowledge that a person is in danger of a particular trajectory without labelling them as being in a certain camp. For instance, the Socinian or anabaptist way of thinking may bear similarities to a sort of "I'll study history and arrive at my own conclusions as I read the Scripture" but since they don't always quite "fit" it's not possible to fully label someone. It seems like all conversation is stopping at this point and people are just taking sides.
 
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