Two wills of God

[timmopussycat]

Tim, I was going to save you some time by posting some links, but you were faster than I was. In any case, here are some things you might find of interest.

Mr. Winzer reviews John Murray

One previous discussion on this topic

Another previous discussion on this topic

This post may also prove helpful

Look at those threads: also look at the quotes I posted from Dr. Muller on this thread. Your post to me shows that you didn't actually appreciate the force of what was quoted on there - or at least you didn't take it into account in your reply.

In addition, your description of God is sadly lacking - He is generally happy, but not so much that He can't have transitory emotions? I rather hope you don't quite understand what you're saying there: it boils down to this, that though God may have a cheerful temperament, He is subject nonetheless to mood swings.

These previous threads show that the board administration has come to a definite position on the confession's teaching with regard to divine emotions and the confessional doctrines of immutability and impassibility. Promotion of error on this point is not going to be tolerated.

Reuben, of the other threads you cite, the Murray review did not open for me and at least one of the previous discussions appears to come to the position I outline below. As you will see I suspect much of this present thread is due to individuals talking past each other by interpreting words such as "emotivity" as they understood it, rather than noticiing how the writers using it had qualified the terms.

I had read your citations from Muller but did not want to comment on them, as I have reason to suspect that I need to study more than the excerpts you cited, since none of them attempt to give the reasons why the Reformers arrived at their conclusion i.e. why that conclusion followed from particular Biblical texts something I assume Muller gives in his footnotes which would have taken you too long to type up. Since PRRD is not immediately available to me, I wanted to withhold comment and even more so once I discovered that Dr. Bob cited him in an earler thread (which I discovere before you included it in your post)as writing the following (citation please Dr. Bob?):

Since a passion has its foundation or origin ad extra [without] and its terminus ad intra [within], it cannot be predicated of God and, in fact, fails to correspond in its dynamic with the way that God knows. An affection or virtue, by way of contrast, has its foundation or source ad intra and terminates ad extra, corresponding with the pattern of operation of the divine communicable attributes and, in particular, with the manner of the divine knowing. This understanding of affections and passions corresponds, moreover, with the etymology of the terms: an af- or ad-fectio from adficio, to exert an influence on something—in other words, an influence directed toward, not a result from, something; whereas passio, from patior, is a suffering or enduring of something—it can refer to an occurrence or a phenomenon and even to a disease.

This is not too far removed from the Muller excerpt from p. 553 which Reuben earlier supplied:

Nor, indeed, has the basic doctrinal assumption shifted: life the Reformers, the orthodox assume that God has affectiones that characterize his relationship to the world and that some analogy can be drawn between these "divine affections" and the affections that belong to human willing — with the major qualification that, unlike human affections, the divine affections do not indicate essential change in God and that they are permanent rather than transient dispositions.

Notice that Muller distinguishes between rejecting passions originating ad extra as experienced by God and His affections which originate ad intra and terminate ad extra. It appears that Muller views these affections as a biblically accurate description of God's capacity for feeling. To put what I think Dr. Bob and Dr. Packer are saying and what I am definitely saying into Muller's language, God's experience of feelings are self chosen "affections" and not passions originating ad extra.

With that clarified, is there anything in Scripture that renders this view of God's affections either unscriptural or unconfessional? If not then what is this fuss about?

 

[MW]

It must be remembered that the terms ad extra and ad intra simply refer to what is external and what is internal in relation to God. God's external working changes simply by virtue of the fact that the creation changes; but divines are careful to note that God wills this outward change, and that internally speaking there is no change in the will of God.

 

[timmopussycat]

[While a wish may include an aspiration for things to come to pass, it does not necessarily include an expectation that the thing desired will come to pass.

Whence the disappointment at Israel's disobedience if there was no aspiration included in the wish? One is not at liberty to give words a meaning they do not inherently possess. If they are to be taken literally then they must be understood according to the full force of their meaning. Anthropopathism can give the expressions their full force because they are explained in terms of the immanence of God in salvation history.

That one may strongly desire an event to come to pass, expect it not to come to pass, yet be dissapointed when it actually does not come to pass is not impossible either for humans or for God. Let me give two examples one human, one from Christ. Note that although I present the examples in this order, I am not reasoning from lesser to greater.

In my days as a trombone performance major at University, an annual ritual was to apply for a position in the National Youth Orchestra of Canada. I had particular problems with one excerpt in the audition list; and although I always aced the others and strongly desired to get into the orchestra, I never seriously expected to pass the audition. Yet every time the letter with the bad news arrived, I experienced the human emotion of disappointment because, contrary to my wish, my expectation had now been actualized.

It seems to me that Christ's prayer in the garden of Gethsemene goes through something of the same process. He had a strong desire not to drink the cup and an even stronger desire to do the father's will and the two were in conflict since his whole prayer shows that He had reason to believe that drinking the cup was the father's will. The strength of both of Christ's desires was such that the strain on his human constitution produced bloody sweat. Christ's resignation in his second and third prayers suggests that He had recognized that his desire would not be granted and that his recognition, contrary to his lesser wish to avoid it, that the cup must be drunk, may well have been accompanied with the human emotion of disappointment.

Turning to God and using Muller's terminology of affections originating ad intra not emotions arising from without, may we not posit that God, well anticipating Israel's disobedience, has, for whatever reasons of his own, allowed himself, to experience and express the affection of disappointment when it finally eventuated?

Dr. Bob maintains nothing of the sort. He ultimately predicates the fulfilment of God's decrees on God, not on man's responses when he writes

He undoubtedly allows the "ultimate" fulfilment of God's decrees to depend on God, but he specifically maintains that God wills things to happen which do not happen because the event "proximately" depends upon man's obedience. He has said so in plain black and white. The very texts he adduces in support of these desires in God are texts which speak of the failure of men to obtain the blessings of God because of their lack of obedience. The ultimate resolution in the unconditional decree of God does not negate his affirmation that there is a proximate frustration of God's will which is owing to the disobedience of men.

Please the exact quote from which you derive this and show how you do so, because I do not find anything in this thread that fairly leads you to this conclusion. Rather, I am wondering if a possible equivocation on the word "will" is misleading you. Putting the question in Muller's terms: why is it unScriptural to posit that God lets himself experience an affection (originating ad intra) somwhat analogus to the human emotions of disappointment when, from his eternal perspective, he interacts with those moments at which his will of precept, not decree, is violated?

I suggest that God's "feelings" of disappointment or similar are affections volitionally experienced by God when his precepts are violated and the consequences result. This will hold true of both Israel's disobedience and the rejection of the gospel by reprobates. If I am correct God's proper will, his will of decree, is not involved in either case.

BTW thanks for supplying the link to your review. Of 3 links to it I had seen, yours was the only one that worked.

Owen was undoubtedly depending on the exegetical groundwork which had already become part and parcel of the catholic tradition in which he was operating. The very fact that he did not provide individual exegesis goes to show how firmly the anthropopathic rule is embedded in Christian theology.

However helpful tradition may be, the WCF tells us that Scripture or good and necessary deductions from the same as the only grounds of settling controversy. Anthing less than supplying Scripture and and at least the gist of the supporting exegesis in theological controversy, is by definition sub-Reformed.

In theological controversy, making any claim unsupported by Scripture and at least a gist of the supporting exegesis, in this case the claim that the anthorpopathic rule is embedded in Christian theology, carries with it a message that those who follow the practice may not realize. It tells readers who may not have an exhaustive knowlege of the Reformed tradition, not only that the claimant believes that they are ignorant, but that the claimant will not bother to minister to their ignorance, which in turn suggests that the claimant believes they are invincibly ignorant.

I don't think any teacher should ever take the risk of making such a suggestion. Here is one way of making sure such situations don't arise.

Could it not be made board policy that theological arguments were required to be supported by Scripture and exegesis FIRST? That doesn't mean that tradition can't be used. One could simply lay out the Scriptures and the exegesis then mention something like that "this line has been adopted by Calvin, Bullinger, the WCF and others."

I believe this practice would prove a profoundly helpful discipline for us.

 

[py3ak]

Tim, I don't have a lot of time right at the moment, but look at the Muller citation from PRRD III, p. 553. Note that God's affections are permanent not transient (Dr. Gonzales' previous quote from Muller is drawn from that same section, pp.551-561).

That is hugely different from your previous suggestions in this thread about God having momentary sorrow/frustration/regret/etc., etc. So if God's affections are permanent, but you would like to assert that they include self-inflicted sorrow/frustration/regret, then God is "forever frustrated". Does that sound like the One who has all blessedness and sufficiency in Himself?

One more point: if I say that God is one do I really have to provide an exegesis of Deuteronomy 6 and 1 Corinthians 8? This is part of our Christian heritage: we can take it for granted in the sense of not having to prove it every time we speak. In the same way, that God is most wise, most pure, most simple, most blessed is part of our heritage: I don't have to list the references and expound the texts everytime I speak of it. That is in part what a confession does: it provides a common understanding of Scripture.

 

[timmopussycat]

Tim, I don't have a lot of time right at the moment, but look at the Muller citation from PRRD III, p. 553. Note that God's affections are permanent not transient (Dr. Gonzales' previous quote from Muller is drawn from that same section, pp.551-561).

That is hugely different from your previous suggestions in this thread about God having momentary sorrow/frustration/regret/etc., etc. So if God's affections are permanent, but you would like to assert that they include self-inflicted sorrow/frustration/regret, then God is "forever frustrated". Does that sound like the One who has all blessedness and sufficiency in Himself?

Where is the Scriptural evidence that supports the premise that God's affections on occasion cannot be a) transient since they are b) subsumed by contrary and superior affections arising from the fulfillment of his will of decree?

One more point: if I say that God is one do I really have to provide an exegesis of Deuteronomy 6 and 1 Corinthians 8? This is part of our Christian heritage: we can take it for granted in the sense of not having to prove it every time we speak. In the same way, that God is most wise, most pure, most simple, most blessed is part of our heritage: I don't have to list the references and expound the texts everytime I speak of it. That is in part what a confession does: it provides a common understanding of Scripture.

As I already pointed out, the WCF and the Scripture text it gives in support do not explicitly address the possibility of God having momentary affections when it denies that God has "passions." Therefore, before denying the possibility, one must prove that such are included in the Confessional "passions" by exegesis from Scripture or GNC deductions from the same. This you have not yet done, nor supplied sufficient information for your readers to find sufficient Scripture analysis done by others demonstrating that such a denial is in fact biblical.

If a non-Christian or recently converted Christian arrived at your church holding views contrary to "God is one", you would (I hope!!!) take him to those Scriptures to demonstrate that truth rather than asserting the "the tradition says" without telling him why the tradition says so. The claim that all temporary "affective" states premised of God are nothing more than anthropopathisms is far more suble than your test case. Presenting such a claim unaccompanied by Scripture and supporting exegesis presumes an expert's knowledge of Reformed theological exegesis on the part of one's readers and it is not wise to do so.

Not all readers here are Reformed experts and it would be good discipline for us if we consciously considered those readers our primary audience, not to mention that providing Scripture and supporting exegesis brings us in line with the confessional position mandated by the WCF for setlling theological controversy.

 

[toddpedlar]

In any discussion it is highly impractical and unreasonable to expect everyone to do what you ask, Tim. You are also misunderstanding the way theological debate does and should take place. The arguments against the emotivity you posit to be characteristic of God have been shot down time and again, using Scripture. Must everyone in every discussion repeat the entireity of those same arguments? Must those same Scripture references be brought up exhaustively every single time someone puts forth a position like yours of God's transient emotions?

I suppose if you want to grind any discussion to a halt, you can expect this of people... but don't expect your unreasonable expectations to be respected. The point is that the position you want to argue for is NOT Biblical, and it has been argued, with Scripture by many - including those who wrote the Confessions that you claim as your own, by joining this board, and many others throughout Reformed history. Must every discussion be an indepth exegesis of the large array of Scripture references that are in play on any given topic? You're asking for something unwieldy and, in my opinion, quite foolish.

 

[Dr. Bob Gonzales]

Tim, I don't have a lot of time right at the moment, but look at the Muller citation from PRRD III, p. 553. Note that God's affections are permanent not transient (Dr. Gonzales' previous quote from Muller is drawn from that same section, pp.551-561).

Ruben,

I'm not advancing my own position on the subject, but I do think a clarification need to be made that contradicts your assertion above, which you apparently base on Richard Muller. You said, "Note that God's affections are permanent not transient."

However, John Owen rejects that God has affections for the reasons below. Note especially how Owen's description of affections in point #3 differs from your (or Muller's) assertion:

1. "Affections, considered in themselves, have always an incomplete, imperfect act of the will or volition joined with them."
2. "They have their dependence on that wherewith he in whom they are is affected; that is, they owe their rise and continuance to something without him in whom they are."
3. "Affections are necessarily accompanied with change and immutability; yea, he who is affected properly is really changed."
4. "Many of the affections here ascribed to God do eminently denote impotence."

Your servant,

-----Added 5/8/2009 at 02:44:52 EST-----

To the Administrators, Moderators, and PB members,

The Rev. Winzer has accused me three times of affirming Arminian views. True, he hasn't called me a "full-blown" Arminian. But attaching that epithet to views advanced on this list is obviously calculated to foster suspicion and to cast aspersion on one's opponent. I have grown weary of trying to interact with him. I do, however, want to make one last attempt to clear myself of his charges.

Please consider the following:

(1) My view of God having "unfulfilled desires" is not equivalent to saying God has unfilled decrees. It is equivalent, rather, to saying that God has unfulfilled commands or revealed obligations.

To "command" or "obligate" means "to bind or oblige morally or legally." In the case of God, he "binds or obligates humans to be and to do that of which he approves and in which he delights, namely, his moral law. I fail to see how one can command another person to conform to that concerning which he approves and in which he takes delight without simultaneously WANTING that person do comply. Note that I didn't say "WILLING" in the sense of effectively bringing to realization. I simply hold that what God commands men to do, He wants them to do. Consider the following illustration from Scripture:

"What do you think? There was a man who had two sons. He went to the first and said, 'Son, go and work today in the vineyard.' "'I will not,' he answered, but later he changed his mind and went. "Then the father went to the other son and said the same thing. He answered, 'I will, sir,' but he did not go. "Which of the two did what his father wanted?" "The first," they answered. Jesus said to them, "I tell you the truth, the tax collectors and the prostitutes are entering the kingdom of God ahead of you" (Matthew 21:28-31).
​

Obviously, the Greek word thelema does not refer to God's decretive purpose in this context but to his revealed will. Here's the definition offered by Bauer, Arndt, and Gingrich for thelema in this sense:

"what one wishes to bring about by the activity of others, to whom one assigns a task" (emphasis added).
​

So my view of the relationship between "command" and "desire" is grammatically sound and, I believe, theological sound and within Reformed Confessional Christianity (see below).

(2) My view of God having desires that he does not sovereignly choose to fulfill is NOT equivalent to the Arminian view Owen is refuting.

The "unfulfilled desires" in God posited by the Arminian position asserts that such desires are unfulfilled because of the contingency of the human will. I, on the other hand, make all states of affairs, events, and human actions contingent on God's sovereign and unconditional decree. Therefore, Rev. Winzer is wrong in equating my view of God's optative wish with the Arminian view of optative wish that Owen was refuting.

(3) The Reverend Winzer is allowed to twist what I say and get away with it. Consider the following:

a) I cited Owen who represents the Arminian position thus: "Secondly, They affirm that God is said properly to expect and desire divers things which yet never come to pass.

b) Then I responded: "Note first that I have not argued that God "properly expects" the desires he does not decree to come to pass." I pointed this out because "desire" and "expectation" are not synonymous. "Desire" means "to wish or long for." "Expect," on the other hand, denotes, "to regard as likely to happen; anticipate the occurrence or the coming of." While the Arminians Owen is refuting may want to posit both ideas, I do not for the simple reason that I don't believe the Arminian position Owen addresses here is Scriptural.

c) Nevertheless, Rev. Winzer responds refuses to accept my rejection of the Arminian position but writes in response to my rejection of unfulfilled "expectations" in God, "If one appeals to an optative as literal he does not have liberty to deny the optative force of the expression. The optative expresses a "wish" for things to come to pass, and a "wish" includes the state of aspiration."

Please note carefully his sleight of hand. He says in essence that "wish" includes the "state of aspiration." Okay. I don't argue with that. But that's not the Arminian position Owen is refuting. He's refuting the position that God has BOTH unfulfilled desires AND ALSO unfulfilled "expectations." As I demonstrated above, "expectations" are not equivalent to "the state of aspiration." Hence, the Rev. Winzer fails to discern the distinction between my position and that which Owen is refuting.

(4) Winzer then makes the groundless claim: "Bob maintains the Arminian concept of "conditional will" in a proximate sense. Like the Arminian he posits God willing things which are dependent on human response for their fulfilment."

No, Bob does not make that claim! I emphatically do NOT make God's willing things (in the sense of his decree, which the Arminians simply equate with willing) dependent on the human response for their fulfillment. I have said to you privately and on the board time and time again: All that was, is, or every will be is contingent on God's unconditional decree, and God's unconditional decree is NOT contingent on anything outside God himself--including human responses.

How much more "un-Arminian" do I need to get?! Matthew calls me a Pantheist and gets away with it. Now he claims that I have Arminian views. Well, I do agree with Arminians that God is a Trinity. But I strongly disagree with their rejection of God's absolute sovereignty and the unconditional nature of his decrees.

What more can I say? The Reverend Winzer has already resorted to calling me a Pantheist and now he gets away with labeling my viewpoint Arminian. If I were truly guilty of either of these positions, I should not be allowed to remain on this board. I close with the following summary affirmations:

(1) I affirm the LBCF.
(2) I affirm God's decretive will
(3) I affirm that God's decretive will is not contingent on anything outside himself.
(4) I affirm that what God commands all men to do he wants all men to do. Not in the sense of decree but in the sense of desire.
(5) I affirm that though God's revealed will may be unfulfilled, his decretive will is never unfulfilled.
​

If that 4th proposition places me outside of Confessional Reformed Christianity, then i'm afraid I'll have to plead guilty. That proposition was the majority position of the Fifteenth General Assembly of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church (1948). That certainly suggests that more Reformed teachers and pastors affirmed proposition #4 than simply John Murray. Moreover, if I'm not mistaken, the Christian Reformed Church also adopted a similar view and rejected Herman Hoeksema's view as un-orthodox. So I suspect that Confession Reformed Christianity is broader than some on this board would prefer.

I don't say this because I expect everyone to adopt my position. I only "wish" (can I use that word?!) for a degree of latitude within Confessional bounds that refrains from heaping derogatory epithets on one's opponent simply because he doesn't hold to one's own particular strain of Calvinism.

Respectfully yours,

 

[Dr. Bob Gonzales]

In Isaiah 46:10, the Lord says that He does all that He pleases. So if any of what he pleases (i.e. desires) is left unmet, did God not do all that He desired? I'm pretty confident that God does exactly what He wants and all of what He wants. What a frustrating concept it would be if God decreed that He would desire something that He would not get.

Joshua,

Thanks for your input. Isaiah 46:10 is referring God's decretive will or desire. Such I affirm are never unfulfilled. God's revealed will, however, is sometimes broken and therefore unfulfilled. Since the Greek term thelema, when predicated of God's revealed will, means, "what one wishes to bring about by the activity of others, to whom one assigns a task" (emphasis added), I hold that the conduct of which God approves and to which he obliges humanity is conduct that God also desires humanity to fulfill. I see no contradiction between my position and Isaiah 46:10.

How do you explain the parable that speaks of one son not fulfilling what his father had "wanted" him to do?

Your brother,

 

[py3ak]

Tim, I don't have a lot of time right at the moment, but look at the Muller citation from PRRD III, p. 553. Note that God's affections are permanent not transient (Dr. Gonzales' previous quote from Muller is drawn from that same section, pp.551-561).

Ruben,

I'm not advancing my own position on the subject, but I do think a clarification need to be made that contradicts your assertion above, which you apparently base on Richard Muller. You said, "Note that God's affections are permanent not transient."

However, John Owen rejects that God has affections for the reasons below. Note especially how Owen's description of affections in point #3 differs from your (or Muller's) assertion:

1. "Affections, considered in themselves, have always an incomplete, imperfect act of the will or volition joined with them."
2. "They have their dependence on that wherewith he in whom they are is affected; that is, they owe their rise and continuance to something without him in whom they are."
3. "Affections are necessarily accompanied with change and immutability; yea, he who is affected properly is really changed."
4. "Many of the affections here ascribed to God do eminently denote impotence."

Your servant,

Dr. Gonzales, I should probably have been more clear - I was very pressed for time. Whatever the relationship between Owen's views and what Dr. Muller says is the general view of the Reformed orthodox, it is very clear that Dr. Muller's summary gives no support to Tim's position of transitory emotions, because according to Him the affections are permanent dispositions in God. That does not allow for temporary frustration, temporary sorrow, etc.

I'm sorry to hit and run but I have to head off to a homeless shelter.

 

[Dr. Bob Gonzales]

Joshua,

I wanted to follow up my comments above to attempt to underscore common ground in an honest effort to show that I'm not just trying to be argumentative but that I really do affirm much of what you and others affirm.

First, you write, "I'm pretty confident that God does exactly what He wants and all of what He wants." You are absolutely correct in the following senses:

(1) Anything and everything God chooses to do He does.
(2) All that God wants to do He does.
(3) God doesn't just do generally what he wants to do but precisely and exactly what he decrees to do.
(4) I think we would agree that there are some states of affairs and human conduct of which God morally approves and delights that he does not, however, will to happen. I'm fine with phrasing it, "God did not desire Adam to refrain from eating the forbidden fruit but rather desired or wanted Adam to sin" provided that it's God's decretive will in view.
(5) When God's preceptive will is in view, I prefer to say, "God did not want Adam to take the fruit but he wanted Adam to obey." You and others may not feel comfortable with that language and prefer something like, "God didn't approve of Adam taking the fruit but He approved of Adam obeying." Honestly, in light of passages I've cited where the terms like "want" or "desire" are applied to the preceptive will of God, I can't understand the objection to using those terms provided that we make it clear we're referring not to God's decree (in which he always gets what he wants) but to God's precept (in which men do not always do what God wants them to do.)
​

Second, you write, "What a frustrating concept it would be if God decreed that He would desire something that He would not get."

(1) It would be incompatible with God's perfection should any of his decreed-desires not come to pass.
(2) God has decreed a word in which states of affairs that he commands, i.e., "be holy as I am holy," are not fulfilled. This does not frustrate God since God in his wisdom works all things (including sin) for his own glory and the good of his people.
(3) The thought of God desiring (preceptively) that all men obeying him yet not decreeing that all men obey him may be a "frustrating concept" for us. We're zealous for God's honor, we rightly pray that his kingdom come and his will be done on earth as it is in heaven. The fact remains, however, that God's will is not presently being done on earth as it is in heaven. This is terribly frustrating to God's people. But it's not frustrating to God. God is absolutely free to plan and run the world in the way He sees fit. He "desires obedience, not mere sacrifice" (Hos. 6:6). The fact men do not always comply with his wish does not, however, frustrate God. God is overruling their evil for good (Gen. 50). Such unfulfilled wishes (at the level of precept) are actually fulfilling God's wishes (at the level of decree). So, in the end, God gets his way.
​

In Christ,

 

[MW]

(1) My view of God having "unfulfilled desires" is not equivalent to saying God has unfilled decrees. It is equivalent, rather, to saying that God has unfulfilled commands or revealed obligations.

Drawing on the decretive-preceptive distinction fails to alleviate the situation because Bob has clearly stated in an earlier post that he affirms a "volitional" sense in the preceptive will of God. As has been pointed out, the distinction between decretive and preceptive depends on the non-volitional sense of "will" when applied to "precept." Because Bob affirms a volitional sense to the preceptive will, he makes the preceptive will identical with the decretive will, with the only difference being that the preceptive will is not fulfilled. Hence, looking at the meaning of the words as provided by Bob, he maintains God "volitionally" desires things to come to pass which never will come to pass, just as John Owen represented the Arminians as maintaining.

Bob is clearly using the terms of traditional reformed theology when he claims that there are unfulfilled desires relative to the preceptive will; but he gives a "volitional" sense to the preceptive will, which traditional reformed theology has restricted to the decretive will; hence he effectively destroys the traditional distinction and sets up the Arminian tenet of "conditional will" in its place. Unlike reformed theologians, Bob does not affirm that God will do all His pleasure.

Bob obviously doesn't like being told that he espouses Arminian tenets; the way to remedy that is to alter what one teaches rather than complain about that teaching being called what it is.

 

[Dr. Bob Gonzales]

The "will," according to Richard Muller, is "the appetitive power (potentia appetitiva) of a spiritual being." The adjective "appetitive" signifies "having the quality of desiring gratification; a strong wish or urge."

According to Deuteronomy 5:29, God expresses an optative wish for his people's obedience. I believe that optative wish or desiderative longing when predicated of God signifies that the obedience of human beings is exceedingly pleasing to him, and not without reward.

Does anyone still find fault with this definition of God's preceptive wish as expressed in Deuteronomy 5:29? Yes, it is volitional in the sense that Muller defines "will" or voluntas.

 

[MW]

Does anyone still find fault with this definition of God's preceptive wish as expressed in Deuteronomy 5:29?

As has been pointed out, the reformed tradition finds fault with this definition when it is not understood anthropopathically. As Owen states of the Arminian understanding:

they disesteem the usual answer of divines, that hope, expectation, and such like passions, which include in them any imperfection, are ascribed unto God per anthrwpopatheian — in regard of that analogy his actions hold with such of ours as we perform having those passions.

The degree to which an individual's view reflects the Arminian view will depend on the extent to which one accepts the "usual answer" that divine optatives refer to God's external works rather than to an internal state in God.

 

[Dr. Bob Gonzales]

Does anyone still find fault with this definition of God's preceptive wish as expressed in Deuteronomy 5:29?

As has been pointed out, the reformed tradition finds fault with this definition when it is not understood anthropopathically.

Matthew,

You didn't answer my specific question. I defined the optative wish ascribed to God in Deuteronomy 5:29 as signifying the following: that the obedience of human beings is exceedingly pleasing to him, and not without reward.

Is this Reformed, sub-Reformed, or Arminian?

 

[MW]

You didn't answer my specific question. I defined the optative wish ascribed to God in Deuteronomy 5:29 as signifying the following: that the obedience of human beings is exceedingly pleasing to him, and not without reward.

Is this Reformed, sub-Reformed, or Arminian?

The reformed answer that it is pleasing and rewarded because God wills it; in and of itself such obedience is not commensurate with the pleasure and reward of God. "My goodness extendeth not to thee." Hence the reformed teach that God desires out of fulness rather than out of want. When God is said to desire a certain course of action of men, He only desires that it "should happen," not that it "shall happen."

 

[Dr. Bob Gonzales]

Bob is clearly using the terms of traditional reformed theology when he claims that there are unfulfilled desires relative to the preceptive will; but he gives a "volitional" sense to the preceptive will, which traditional reformed theology has restricted to the decretive will; hence he effectively destroys the traditional distinction and sets up the Arminian tenet of "conditional will" in its place. Unlike reformed theologians, Bob does not affirm that God will do all His pleasure.

Bob obviously doesn't like being told that he espouses Arminian tenets; the way to remedy that is to alter what one teaches rather than complain about that teaching being called what it is.

Matthew's remarks remind me of Herman Hoeksema's opinion of Louis Berkhof and the Synod of Kalamazoo:

For the fact is, that the first point [on common grace] reminds one of the two-faced Janus. Janus was a Roman idol, distinguished by the remarkable feature of having two faces and looking in two opposite directions. And in this respect there is a marked similarity between Janus and the first point. The latter is also two-faced and casts wistful looks in opposite directions.... One of his faces reminds you of Augustine, Calvin, Gomarus; but the other shows the unmistakeable features of Pelagius, Arminius, Episcopius. And your troubles begin when you would inquire of this two-faced oracle, what may be the exact meaning of the first point. For, then this modern Janus begins to revolve, alternatively showing you one face and the other, till you hardly know whether you are dealing with Calvin or Arminius.
​

So Louis Berkhof and his colleagues were, in Hoeksema's view, crypto-Arminians. Oh well, I guess I won't complain too much if I'm lumped together with Louis Berkhof.

-----Added 5/8/2009 at 08:36:15 EST-----

You didn't answer my specific question. I defined the optative wish ascribed to God in Deuteronomy 5:29 as signifying the following: that the obedience of human beings is exceedingly pleasing to him, and not without reward.

Is this Reformed, sub-Reformed, or Arminian?

The reformed answer that it is pleasing and rewarded because God wills it; in and of itself such obedience is not commensurate with the pleasure and reward of God. "My goodness extendeth not to thee." Hence the reformed teach that God desires out of fulness rather than out of want. When God is said to desire a certain course of action of men, He only desires that it "should happen," not that it "shall happen."

Once again, the Reverend Winzer dances around the question. You say, "When God is said to desire a certain course of action of men, He only desires that it "should happen," not that it "shall happen." This I whole-heartedly affirm and have never said otherwise, unless, of course, we're talking about God's decree. God's decretive-desires "shall happen" inexorably.

Now, let's get back to the question again Mr. Winzer. A simple answer will do and no evasions please. I defined the optative wish ascribed to God in Deuteronomy 5:29 as signifying the following: that the obedience of human beings is exceedingly pleasing to him, and not without reward.

Is this Reformed, sub-Reformed, or Arminian?

-----Added 5/8/2009 at 08:52:40 EST-----

A Biblical Syllogism for the Reverend Winzer:

Major premise: God's will of precept includes the component of "desire" or "delight" in what conforms to divine virtue: "For I desire [chaphats] steadfast love and not sacrifice, the knowledge of God rather than burnt offerings" (Hos. 6:6).
Minor premise: The concepts of "desire" and "delight" are volitional qualities. The voluntas according to Richard Muller, is "the appetitive power (potentia appetitiva) of a spiritual being." The adjective "appetitive" signifies "having the quality of desiring gratification; a strong wish or urge."
Conclusion: God's preceptive will contains a volitional element.

This syllogism corresponds nicely with the biblical evidence that applies volitional vocabulary both to God's decretive will as well as to his preceptive will. So when the Rev. Winzer writes, "the distinction between decretive and preceptive depends on the non-volitional sense of "will" when applied to "precept," I think either (1) he doesn't read his Bible or (2) he's adopted a narrower definition of "volitional" (apparently limiting it solely to arbitrium or "choice." If the former, he needs to study his Bible ; if the latter he needs to study linguistics.

-----Added 5/8/2009 at 09:10:12 EST-----

Okay, if the Reverend Winzer cannot answer this question, perhaps someone else on the board will oblige. We've been discussing the optative as predicated in God in Deuteronomy 5:29, which reads,

ESV Deuteronomy 5:29 Oh that they had such a mind as this always, to fear me and to keep all my commandments, that it might go well with them and with their descendants forever!
​

I maintain that the optative ascribed to God here signifying the following: that the obedience of these human beings is exceedingly pleasing to God, and not without reward.

Would you classify my understanding of the optative or desiderative will of God as Reformed, sub-Reformed, or Arminian?

 

[MW]

Once again, the Reverend Winzer dances around the question. You say, "When God is said to desire a certain course of action of men, He only desires that it "should happen," not that it "shall happen." This I whole-heartedly affirm and have never said otherwise, unless, of course, we're talking about God's decree. God's decretive-desires "shall happen" inexorably.

No, this is the very hinge of the issue. The optatives taken literally do not express a "should be" but a counterfactual "shall be." The advocate for conditional "volitional" desire in God is maintaining that He wishes something to come to pass as a future event contingent on other factors.

 

[MW]

Would you classify my understanding of the optative or desiderative will of God as Reformed, sub-Reformed, or Arminian?

It is sub-reformed because you hold that human obedience and disobedience affects the essential glory of God and that God desires out of want rather than out of fulness.