"Undeniable" evidence?

[Confessor]

I was thinking about how evidence is always interpreted within a specific framework, or philosophy of evidence. There's no such thing as a brute fact, or following the facts where they may lead (towards a new presupposition, that is), etc., because presuppositions are present and maintained throughout the reasoning process, not determined at the end of it.

But is there really no such thing as evidence that ought to alter someone's presupposition? Keep in mind that when I use "evidence" in this sense, I don't mean any kind of argument; I mean the type of evidence used in evidentialism that doesn't show the implications of presuppositions; it rather tries to sway the unbeliever with less proximate facts.

Say, for example, that you could go back in time and see with your own eyes that Jesus' corpse was stolen from the tomb (or some other alleged Resurrection explanation). Would that not be evidence enough to tell you that Christianity is false? Or would it be rationally permissible to state that it must have been a hallucination?

I'm trying to understand if there is any kind of fusion between presup and evidentialism, and this question (actually, this specific scenario) has been bugging me.

 

[Ex Nihilo]

Say, for example, that you could go back in time and see with your own eyes that Jesus' corpse was stolen from the tomb (or some other alleged Resurrection explanation). Would that not be evidence enough to tell you that Christianity is false? Or would it be rationally permissible to state that it must have been a hallucination?

But doesn't the hypothetical itself presuppose a world in which it is possible that the resurrection did not happen? And since that is not the case in this world, it isn't necessarily possible to draw conclusions about the actual weight of evidence on the basis of the hypo.

 

[Confessor]

Say, for example, that you could go back in time and see with your own eyes that Jesus' corpse was stolen from the tomb (or some other alleged Resurrection explanation). Would that not be evidence enough to tell you that Christianity is false? Or would it be rationally permissible to state that it must have been a hallucination?

But doesn't the hypothetical itself presuppose a world in which it is possible that the resurrection did not happen? And since that is not the case in this world, it isn't necessarily possible to draw conclusions about the actual weight of evidence on the basis of the hypo.

That is an awesome answer! Thank you.

 

[kalawine]

I was thinking about how evidence is always interpreted within a specific framework, or philosophy of evidence. There's no such thing as a brute fact, or following the facts where they may lead (towards a new presupposition, that is), etc., because presuppositions are present and maintained throughout the reasoning process, not determined at the end of it.

But is there really no such thing as evidence that ought to alter someone's presupposition? Keep in mind that when I use "evidence" in this sense, I don't mean any kind of argument; I mean the type of evidence used in evidentialism that doesn't show the implications of presuppositions; it rather tries to sway the unbeliever with less proximate facts.

Say, for example, that you could go back in time and see with your own eyes that Jesus' corpse was stolen from the tomb (or some other alleged Resurrection explanation). Would that not be evidence enough to tell you that Christianity is false? Or would it be rationally permissible to state that it must have been a hallucination?

I'm trying to understand if there is any kind of fusion between presup and evidentialism, and this question (actually, this specific scenario) has been bugging me.

There seem to me to be problems with your question and your scenario. Believe me, I don't claim to be an expert by any means. But wouldn't your "specific framework, or philosophy of evidence" be full of presuppositions? When you lay hold of any particular philosophy you are taking on presuppositions, aren't you? I'm sure that you have already considered the idea that if you could go back in time you would have to know for certain that (1) it truly was Jesus' corpse and (2) it truly was Jesus' tomb and (3) (most importantly) that you had truly gone back in time. I guess you covered that possibility when you asked, "Or would it be rationally permissible to state that it must have been a hallucination?" Maybe I'm over simplifying this (please forgive me if I am missing something here) but if I were to find myself murdering one of my sons (for no obvious reason) I could rely on the basic law of non-contradition:

People do not murder people they love (for no obvious reason)
My son is someone I love
I would never murder my son (for no obvious reason)

At this point I would have to wake myself up from your scenario and "rationally" permit myself to state that it must have been a hallucination.

Am I misunderstanding what you are asking here? I guess you know from my answer that I am a pressupositionalist.

 

[kalawine]

Say, for example, that you could go back in time and see with your own eyes that Jesus' corpse was stolen from the tomb (or some other alleged Resurrection explanation). Would that not be evidence enough to tell you that Christianity is false? Or would it be rationally permissible to state that it must have been a hallucination?

But doesn't the hypothetical itself presuppose a world in which it is possible that the resurrection did not happen? And since that is not the case in this world, it isn't necessarily possible to draw conclusions about the actual weight of evidence on the basis of the hypo.

That is an awesome answer! Thank you.

I agree. Great answer!

 

[FrielWatcher]

Say, for example, that you could go back in time and see with your own eyes that Jesus' corpse was stolen from the tomb (or some other alleged Resurrection explanation). Would that not be evidence enough to tell you that Christianity is false? Or would it be rationally permissible to state that it must have been a hallucination?

But doesn't the hypothetical itself presuppose a world in which it is possible that the resurrection did not happen? And since that is not the case in this world, it isn't necessarily possible to draw conclusions about the actual weight of evidence on the basis of the hypo.

Let us leave it to the High-Falutin', Cambridge, Mass, Harvard Lawyer to handle the evidences.

I am having a hard time understanding what you want your end result to be based on evidences gained? Mister mister goes back in time to the day of Jesus' burial.

1. Jesus is gone from the tomb on the third day with no evidence of tampering from human hands and has resurrected.

2. Jesus is gone from the tomb with evidence of tampering from human hands; his corpse was taken out by compatriots or others.

3. Jesus is gone from the tomb with evidence he walked out alive sans resurrection or death.

Now what does this say to the observer? (I must state at this point that I am a firm believer in the Apostle's Creed and the Westmister Standard fully affirming the resurrection of Christ from the dead and His appearance to the apostles and His ascention in the heaven where He sits at the right hand of the Father).

So, one person sees one of these three scenarios. Then what? I affirm Ex Nihilo's point about presupposition. But again can you clarify your point? It seems that you are asking the question to gain insight or an answer to a particular situation.