Waldron On The Civil Magistrate

[KMK]

This is from A Modern Exposition of the 1689 Baptist Confession of Faith, by Samuel E. Waldron, pg. 296.

It might be argued that Romans 13:3-4 requires civil rulers to punish evil and since evil is to be defined by God's law that violations of the 'first table' of the law should be punished by the civil authority. Besides what has already been said, three comments are appropriate. Firstly, some limitation of the term 'evil' must be assumed in Romans 13:3-4 since the civil ruler is obviously not to punish private evil or evil of the heart. Secondly, interestingly enough, when Paul goes on to speak of the law in Romans 13, he speaks only of the 'second table' of the law. Thirdly, the historical context of Romans 13 makes incredible the idea that civil rulers are to punish religious evil. Paul is not speaking ideally in Romans 13, but of the actual conduct of the Roman government as it ruled during his life. Without doubt, the Roman emperors were not a cause of fear for religious evil behaviour (Rom 13:1,3-4).

What do y'all think?

 

[larryjf]

I'm not even convinced that the two tables of the Law are a division between religious and civil law.

It could be that the two tablets are copies of each other. So that one copy would be for the Ark of the Covenant, and one copy for the people of God to read.

This was a common practice in making covenants. Each party of the covenant would be given a copy of the covenant.

 

[timmopussycat]

This is from A Modern Exposition of the 1689 Baptist Confession of Faith, by Samuel E. Waldron, pg. 296.

It might be argued that Romans 13:3-4 requires civil rulers to punish evil and since evil is to be defined by God's law that violations of the 'first table' of the law should be punished by the civil authority. Besides what has already been said, three comments are appropriate. Firstly, some limitation of the term 'evil' must be assumed in Romans 13:3-4 since the civil ruler is obviously not to punish private evil or evil of the heart. Secondly, interestingly enough, when Paul goes on to speak of the law in Romans 13, he speaks only of the 'second table' of the law. Thirdly, the historical context of Romans 13 makes incredible the idea that civil rulers are to punish religious evil. Paul is not speaking ideally in Romans 13, but of the actual conduct of the Roman government as it ruled during his life. Without doubt, the Roman emperors were not a cause of fear for religious evil behaviour (Rom 13:1,3-4).

What do y'all think?

As far as he goes Waldron is quite right in his first and second points. Although it is clear that Paul could not have expected the Roman government to address the religious evils arising from breaches of the first table, Paul's words here are a description of what was, not a statement of what should be the norm in a Christian state where a majority of voters are Christian. To such a situation, these verses do not directly speak. The idea that that civil rulers are never to punish religous evil is not necessarily precluded by this text.

Christian voters in modern states (especially if they are a majority or significant minority) need to ask themselves the following questions: how should they best apply the civil stipulations of both tables of the Old Testament law to their states in order to benefit from the wisdom of God therein contained? and second, how should they justify such applications? The answers must be found in other places in Scripture.

 

[VirginiaHuguenot]

1. The civil magistrate ought not to punish inward sins of the heart, but the bit about 'private evil' needs further clarification. Some sins can be committed in private which are nevertheless, or should be, crimes punishable by law. While privacy has some bearing on the appropriateness of government intervention, it is not an absolute bar to the compelling interest of the state in protecting the innocent or punishing the guilty. Abortion is one such example.

2. Calvin on Rom. 13.9: "It cannot be from this passage concluded what precepts are contained in the second table, for he subjoins at the end, and if there be any other precept He indeed omits the command respecting the honoring of parents; and it may seem strange, that what especially belonged to his subject should have been passed by. But what if he had left it out, lest he should obscure his argument? Though I dare not to affirm this, yet I see here nothing wanting to answer the purpose he had in view, which was to show, — that since God intended nothing else by all his commandments than to teach us the duty of love, we ought by all means to strive to perform it. And yet the uncontentious reader will readily acknowledge, that Paul intended to prove, by things of a like nature, that the import of the whole law is, that love towards one another ought to be exercised by us, and that what he left to be implied is to be understood, and that is, — that obedience to magistrates is not the least thing which tends to nourish peace, to preserve brotherly love."

3. Calvin again on the duty of magistrates to uphold piety and punish public impiety (Institutes 4.20.9):

9. The duty of magistrates, its nature, as described by the word of God, and the things in which it consists, I will here indicate in passing. That it extends to both tables of the law, did Scripture not teach, we might learn from profane writers; for no man has discoursed of the duty of magistrates, the enacting of laws, and the common weal, without beginning with religion and divine worship. Thus all have confessed that no polity can be successfully established unless piety be its first care, and that those laws are absurd which disregard the rights of God, and consult only for men. Seeing then that among philosophers religion holds the first place, and that the same thing has always been observed with the universal consent of nations, Christian princes and magistrates may be ashamed of their heartlessness if they make it not their care. We have already shown that this office is specially assigned them by God, and indeed it is right that they exert themselves in asserting and defending the honour of him whose vicegerents they are, and by whose favour they rule. Hence in Scripture holy kings are especially praised for restoring the worship of God when corrupted or overthrown, or for taking care that religion flourished under them in purity and safety. On the other hand, the sacred history sets down anarchy among the vices, when it states that there was no king in Israel, and, therefore, every one did as he pleased (Judges 21:25). This rebukes the folly of those who would neglect the care of divine things, and devote themselves merely to the administration of justice among men; as if God had appointed rulers in his own name to decide earthly controversies, and omitted what was of far greater moment, his own pure worship as prescribed by his law. Such views are adopted by turbulent men, who, in their eagerness to make all kinds of innovations with impunity, would fain get rid of all the vindicators of violated piety. In regard to the second table of the law, Jeremiah addresses rulers, “Thus saith the Lord, Execute ye judgment and righteousness, and deliver the spoiled out of the hand of the oppressor: and do no wrong, do no violence to the stranger, the fatherless, nor the widow, neither shed innocent blood” (Jer. 22:3). To the same effect is the exhortation in the Psalm, “Defend the poor and fatherless; do justice to the afflicted and needy. Deliver the poor and needy; rid them out of the hand of the wicked” (Ps. 82:3, 4). Moses also declared to the princes whom he had substituted for himself, “Hear the causes between your brethren, and judge righteously between every man and his brother, and the stranger that is with him. Ye shall not respect persons in judgment; but ye shall hear the small as well as the great: ye shall not be afraid of the face of man, for the judgment is God’s” (Deut. 1:16). I say nothing as to such passages as these, “He shall not multiply horses to himself, nor cause the people to return to Egypt;” “neither shall he multiply wives to himself; neither shall he greatly multiply to himself silver and gold;” “he shall write him a copy of this law in a book;” “and it shall be with him, and he shall read therein all the days of his life, that he may learn to fear the Lord his God;” “that his heart be not lifted up above his brethren” (Deut. 17:16-20). In here explaining the duties of magistrates, my exposition is intended not so much for the instruction of magistrates themselves, as to teach others why there are magistrates, and to what end they have been appointed by God. We say, therefore, that they are the ordained guardians and vindicators of public innocence, modesty, honour, and tranquillity, so that it should be their only study to provide for the common peace and safety. Of these things David declares that he will set an example when he shall have ascended the throne. “A froward heart shall depart from me: I will not know a wicked person. Whoso privily slandereth his neighbour, him will I cut off: him that hath an high look and a proud heart will not I suffer. Mine eyes shall be upon the faithful of the land, that they may dwell with me: he that walketh in a perfect way, he shall serve me” (Psalm 101:4-6). But as rulers cannot do this unless they protect the good against the injuries of the bad, and give aid and protection to the oppressed, they are armed with power to curb manifest evil-doers and criminals, by whose misconduct the public tranquillity is disturbed or harassed. For we have full experience of the truth of Solon’s saying, that all public matters depend on reward and punishment; that where these are wanting, the whole discipline of states totters and falls to pieces. For in the minds of many the love of equity and justice grows cold, if due honour be not paid to virtue, and the licentiousness of the wicked cannot be restrained, without strict discipline and the infliction of punishment. The two things are comprehended by the prophet when he enjoins kings and other rulers to execute “judgment and righteousness” (Jer. 21:12; 22:3). It is righteousness (justice) to take charge of the innocent, to defend and avenge them, and set them free: it is judgment to withstand the audacity of the wicked, to repress their violence, and punish their faults.

 

[KMK]

I'm not even convinced that the two tables of the Law are a division between religious and civil law.

It could be that the two tablets are copies of each other. So that one copy would be for the Ark of the Covenant, and one copy for the people of God to read.

This was a common practice in making covenants. Each party of the covenant would be given a copy of the covenant.

I am not sure I follow. What bearing does this have on the discussion?

 

[KMK]

1. The civil magistrate ought not to punish inward sins of the heart, but the bit about 'private evil' needs further clarification. Some sins can be committed in private which are nevertheless, or should be, crimes punishable by law. While privacy has some bearing on the appropriateness of government intervention, it is not an absolute bar to the compelling interest of the state in protecting the innocent or punishing the guilty. Abortion is one such example.

Does Waldron define 'private evil' with the words, 'sins of the heart'? Or is it a theological term that I am not famiar with? Does 'private evil' means acting out sins with nobody watching?

 

[larryjf]

I'm not even convinced that the two tables of the Law are a division between religious and civil law.

It could be that the two tablets are copies of each other. So that one copy would be for the Ark of the Covenant, and one copy for the people of God to read.

This was a common practice in making covenants. Each party of the covenant would be given a copy of the covenant.

I am not sure I follow. What bearing does this have on the discussion?

If the idea that the law is divided into two tablets - one for religion and one for civil - is an invention not supported by Scripture or the historical context, then we shouldn't use that to defend the idea that only one tablet is civilly enforceable.

 

[VirginiaHuguenot]

1. The civil magistrate ought not to punish inward sins of the heart, but the bit about 'private evil' needs further clarification. Some sins can be committed in private which are nevertheless, or should be, crimes punishable by law. While privacy has some bearing on the appropriateness of government intervention, it is not an absolute bar to the compelling interest of the state in protecting the innocent or punishing the guilty. Abortion is one such example.

Does Waldron define 'private evil' with the words, 'sins of the heart'? Or is it a theological term that I am not famiar with? Does 'private evil' means acting out sins with nobody watching?

I would normally contrast 'private evil' with 'public evil'. Thus, like 'evil of the heart', 'private evil' is hidden from view and therefore seems to escape the purview of the magistrate's jurisdiction. I think this is what Waldron is saying, and therefore, I felt the need to clarify the point. My point is that government intervention in private matters must meet a certain threshold of compelling state interest, but should not be barred completely.

 

[MW]

The apostle Paul's actions before the civil magistrate demonstrate clearly that he considered religious issues the domain of the powers that be:

Acts 25:7-11, "And when he was come, the Jews which came down from Jerusalem stood round about, and laid many and grievous complaints against Paul, which they could not prove. While he answered for himself, Neither against the law of the Jews, neither against the temple, nor yet against Caesar, have I offended any thing at all. But Festus, willing to do the Jews a pleasure, answered Paul, and said, Wilt thou go up to Jerusalem, and there be judged of these things before me? Then said Paul, I stand at Caesar’s judgment seat, where I ought to be judged: to the Jews have I done no wrong, as thou very well knowest. For if I be an offender, or have committed any thing worthy of death, I refuse not to die: but if there be none of these things whereof these accuse me, no man may deliver me unto them. I appeal unto Caesar."

 

[KMK]

The apostle Paul's actions before the civil magistrate demonstrate clearly that he considered religious issues the domain of the powers that be:

Acts 25:7-11, "And when he was come, the Jews which came down from Jerusalem stood round about, and laid many and grievous complaints against Paul, which they could not prove. While he answered for himself, Neither against the law of the Jews, neither against the temple, nor yet against Caesar, have I offended any thing at all. But Festus, willing to do the Jews a pleasure, answered Paul, and said, Wilt thou go up to Jerusalem, and there be judged of these things before me? Then said Paul, I stand at Caesar’s judgment seat, where I ought to be judged: to the Jews have I done no wrong, as thou very well knowest. For if I be an offender, or have committed any thing worthy of death, I refuse not to die: but if there be none of these things whereof these accuse me, no man may deliver me unto them. I appeal unto Caesar."

Is it possible, Rev Winzer, that Paul's actions simply demonstrate that he knew the Romans believed they had such jurisdiction and was subjecting himself to the powers that be? In other words,, his actions prove his approval of subjecting to the higher powers and not necessarily an approval of the magistrates authority over religious matters.

I am aware that this discussion might deteriorate into a debate over WCF 23:3 and it is not my desire to do so.

 

[MW]

Is it possible, Rev Winzer, that Paul's actions simply demonstrate that he knew the Romans believed they had such jurisdiction and was subjecting himself to the powers that be? In other words,, his actions prove his approval of subjecting to the higher powers and not necessarily an approval of the magistrates authority over religious matters.

This would have him appealing to an authority which had no authority; I can't see how that can be reconciled with the moral integrity of a servant of God.

 

[timmopussycat]

The apostle Paul's actions before the civil magistrate demonstrate clearly that he considered religious issues the domain of the powers that be:

Acts 25:7-11, "And when he was come, the Jews which came down from Jerusalem stood round about, and laid many and grievous complaints against Paul, which they could not prove. While he answered for himself, Neither against the law of the Jews, neither against the temple, nor yet against Caesar, have I offended any thing at all. But Festus, willing to do the Jews a pleasure, answered Paul, and said, Wilt thou go up to Jerusalem, and there be judged of these things before me? Then said Paul, I stand at Caesar’s judgment seat, where I ought to be judged: to the Jews have I done no wrong, as thou very well knowest. For if I be an offender, or have committed any thing worthy of death, I refuse not to die: but if there be none of these things whereof these accuse me, no man may deliver me unto them. I appeal unto Caesar."

Actually this passage is insufficient to prove that Paul considered religous issues should be the proper domain of the civil magistrate. For it appears that there were only one live issues at this point: the original charges, which were purely civil.

As civil rulers of Palestine, the Romans had jurisdiction over civil offenses such as riots. Paul had been originally arrested because he was at the centre of a riot he did not cause, and remained under arrest only because
a)the authorities learned of a plot against him and
b)he did not pay a bribe to the previous governor.

Although the Jews had brought other charges at this trial, Luke records that they could not prove them. These new accusations presented to the governor must have concerned alleged violations of Roman law, because, as Acts 18:14,15 tells us plainly, the Romans did not judge violations of Mosaic law in cases where the Roman law did not echo it. Since Paul had firsthand knowledge of the Roman refusal to judge Jewish religious questions, and since no religious questions could have been before the court, Paul's comment "Neither against the law of the Jews neither against the temple" need not be read as affirming anything more than a statement of Paul's total innocence under not just the Roman law but under Jewish law as well. Paul had very good reason to make such a claim at that moment: his innocence of wrongdoing under Jewish law as well as well as Roman, meant that he should have been immediately freed. Given how the trial seems to have progressed to this point, Paul may have anticipated that this new governor had more than justice affecting his decisions and may have been doing nothing more by his sentence than laying the groundwork for an appeal to Caesar in order to have the origianal civil charges dismissed if this trial did not result in his freedom.

 

[Contra_Mundum]

I'm not even convinced that the two tables of the Law are a division between religious and civil law.

It could be that the two tablets are copies of each other. So that one copy would be for the Ark of the Covenant, and one copy for the people of God to read.

This was a common practice in making covenants. Each party of the covenant would be given a copy of the covenant.

I am not sure I follow. What bearing does this have on the discussion?

If the idea that the law is divided into two tablets - one for religion and one for civil - is an invention not supported by Scripture or the historical context, then we shouldn't use that to defend the idea that only one tablet is civilly enforceable.

Let me say, First, I actually think that the "two tablets" (Deut. 10:4) may well have been identical as to content (each containing all 10 words).

However, it is not unbiblical to speak of the "two tables" of the law. This language doesn't come from "tablets" (although that is certainly a convenient mnemonic), but from the notion of a "list"--as in "table of contents".

Where is the idea of "two lists" expressed? How about Jesus?
Mt.22:37-40

Jesus said unto him, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets.​

Or take this list right out of Rom 13:9

For this, (7) Thou shalt not commit adultery, (6) Thou shalt not kill, (8) Thou shalt not steal, (9) Thou shalt not bear false witness, (10) Thou shalt not covet; and if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.​

Did you see how Paul takes the second half of the 10C and puts them under the 2nd Great Commandment?

Jesus again:
Mark 10:19

You know the commandments: 'Do not murder, Do not commit adultery, Do not steal, Do not bear false witness, Do not defraud, Honor your father and mother.'"​

Mark alone of the three Synoptic gospellers includes the note "do not defraud." Is that a reference to the 10th? Whether or not, here is an instance of #5 being tacked onto the others for inclusion in this list or table of "loving one's neighbor" (compare with Mat 19:18-19).

I think that there is an inherent ambiguity, then, in "deciding" what absolutely should be in each of these lists or tables, precisely because it is something of a "construct." However, it is a "construct" that Jesus and the Apostles used, and they probably didn't invent it.

 

[larryjf]

The Roman government took away from the Jewish people the right to condemn to death. Since the death penalty is what is required for some of the "ecclesiastical" commands of God wouldn't this imply that Rome did, in fact, affect ecclesiastical judgment?

 

[timmopussycat]

The Roman government took away from the Jewish people the right to condemn to death. Since the death penalty is what is required for some of the "ecclesiastical" commands of God wouldn't this imply that Rome did, in fact, affect ecclesiastical judgment?

By restricting the death penalty to its governors and to violations of Roman law, Rome did affect the enforcement of various Mosaic stipulations. This may be seen in the trial of Christ. As Morison showed in "Who Moved the Stone?," it was easy to show that He was guilty of violating the Pharisaic understanding of torah, but how to prove him guilty of a death penalty offense that would be accepted under Roman law was a real problem.

 

[larryjf]

Rev. Buchanan,

Do you believe that the government is only meant to uphold the "civil" portion of God's moral commands then? And if so, would that include honoring one's mother and father?

 

[MW]

Given how the trial seems to have progressed to this point, Paul may have anticipated that this new governor had more than justice affecting his decisions and may have been doing nothing more by his sentence than laying the groundwork for an appeal to Caesar in order to have the origianal civil charges dismissed if this trial did not result in his freedom.

"May and "may" are speculations, and speculations are no basis for explaining away the plain sense of the words. The word used to describe Paul's "answer for himself" is a technical term which describes his defence against the complaints of the Jews. Hence it is natural to understand those official complaints to have contained the charge of offending against the law of the Jews and the temple. In relation to these charges he directly appealed to Caesar.

 

[MW]

F. F. Bruce, Paul: Apostle of the Heart Set Free, 365:

From what we know of Paul, we may be sure that the uppermost consideration in his appeal to Caesar was not his own safety, but the interests of the gospel... A favourable hearing from the emperor in Rome might win recognition for Christianity, if not as the true fulfilment of Israel's ancestral religion (which Paul believed it to be), at least as a permitted association (collegium licitum) in its own right.

 

[KMK]

The Roman government took away from the Jewish people the right to condemn to death. Since the death penalty is what is required for some of the "ecclesiastical" commands of God wouldn't this imply that Rome did, in fact, affect ecclesiastical judgment?

Did the Roman government 'take away' the right to condemn death, or did the Jews 'abdicate' that right? The answer to this question might have some bearing on Paul's meaning in Rom 13:1-6.

 

[timmopussycat]

Given how the trial seems to have progressed to this point, Paul may have anticipated that this new governor had more than justice affecting his decisions and may have been doing nothing more by his sentence than laying the groundwork for an appeal to Caesar in order to have the origianal civil charges dismissed if this trial did not result in his freedom.

"May and "may" are speculations, and speculations are no basis for explaining away the plain sense of the words. The word used to describe Paul's "answer for himself" is a technical term which describes his defence against the complaints of the Jews. Hence it is natural to understand those official complaints to have contained the charge of offending against the law of the Jews and the temple. In relation to these charges he directly appealed to Caesar.

Certainly the Jews complained and certainly it is natural to find a technical word used to describe Paul's answer: what is at issue is the nature of the Jew's complaint. You are ignoring the Scripture I cited (Acts 18:14,15) to demonstrate that the Romans did not judge religious cases where Roman law was not involved. This seems to have been a broader imperial policy rather than just the policy of a particular city ruler. I believe this can be documented elsewhere but for the moment I can't lay my hands on the reference that states the point formally. But Morison in "Who Moved the Stone," provides another illustration — the Sanhedrin's major problem was not that of proving that Christ was guilty of violating their interpretation of the Mosaic law: they had to charge Christ and provide sufficient evidence to get a guilty verdict under Roman law.

If Roman policy was as I believe it to have been, then in order to even get a hearing, the nature of the Jew's complaints in Acts 25 must have been alleged violations of Roman law. And Paul's statement completely cuts the ground out from under his Jewish accusers. Not only has he done nothing wrong for which Rome could convict him, he has done nothing wrong against the Jewish law or temple. So Paul's statement proves nothing more than the Jews are there without any cause whatsoever, and Paul should be set free forthwith.

That interpretation fits the facts of the situation.

 

[timmopussycat]

F. F. Bruce, Paul: Apostle of the Heart Set Free, 365:

From what we know of Paul, we may be sure that the uppermost consideration in his appeal to Caesar was not his own safety, but the interests of the gospel... A favourable hearing from the emperor in Rome might win recognition for Christianity, if not as the true fulfilment of Israel's ancestral religion (which Paul believed it to be), at least as a permitted association (collegium licitum) in its own right.

True enough. But if Paul was seeking to pursue that goal, he could have either been seking such recognition from the Emperor's de facto authority to grant it, not a de jure responsibility to do so.

 

[MW]

You are ignoring the Scripture I cited (Acts 18:14,15) to demonstrate that the Romans did not judge religious cases where Roman law was not involved.

The Scripture cited states nothing to this effect. It only mentions Gallio's refusal to enter into an intramural debate concerning a religio licita. Gallio's judgment was tantamount to declaring Christianity a subset of Judaism, the very opposite of what the Jewish establishment were seeking to accomplish.

 

[MW]

True enough. But if Paul was seeking to pursue that goal, he could have either been seking such recognition from the Emperor's de facto authority to grant it, not a de jure responsibility to do so.

The fact that he sought it demonstrates that he thought it was the magistrate's right to give it.

 

[timmopussycat]

True enough. But if Paul was seeking to pursue that goal, he could have either been seking such recognition from the Emperor's de facto authority to grant it, not a de jure responsibility to do so.

The fact that he sought it demonstrates that he thought it was the magistrate's right to give it.

He knew it was within the magistrates capacity to give a de facto recognition. Whether he believed the magistrate had de jure right to do so or not is speculation. A Chinese unregistered Christian may, in integrity, plead for mercy from the communist state without believing that the state has the right to regulate religious matters.

 

[timmopussycat]

You are ignoring the Scripture I cited (Acts 18:14,15) to demonstrate that the Romans did not judge religious cases where Roman law was not involved.

The Scripture cited states nothing to this effect. It only mentions Gallio's refusal to enter into an intramural debate concerning a religio licita.

Which is exactly my point. Roman officials did not get involved when the question under dispute was a Mosaic and not Roman legal question. Which is why the charges the Jews made in Acts 25 must have been charges under Roman and not Mosaic law, otherwise they would not have been heard.

Gallio's judgment was tantamount to declaring Christianity a subset of Judaism, the very opposite of what the Jewish establishment were seeking to accomplish.

As Gallio said this was not "a matter of wrong or vicious crime" so Roman law had no interest and he refused to judge it, but it was rather one where there were " ...questions about words and names and your own law, look after it yourselves. I am unwilling to be judge of such matters."
That Gallio's judgment had the effect of declaring Christianity a subset of Judaism in Roman eyes I do not dispute.

If Gallio refused to judge, then a Roman ruler could refuse to judge a matter not a crime under Roman law. That this was policy across the empire can be determined: I just don't know the source off hand, but Morison"s account proves that Gallio was not alone in the stance he took. Two examples are surely enough to prove the point unless a contrary example or direct testimony is found, no?

 

[MW]

He knew it was within the magistrates capacity to give a de facto recognition. Whether he believed the magistrate had de jure right to do so or not is speculation. A Chinese unregistered Christian may, in integrity, plead for mercy from the communist state without believing that the state has the right to regulate religious matters.

Previously you wrote "true enough" when Bruce stated the apostle had the interests of the gospel at heart and "A favourable hearing from the emperor in Rome might win recognition for Christianity." Recognition for Christianity is much more than seeking mercy from the State. It requires the magistrate to make judgment concerning a religious issue. That is what the apostle appealed to the civil magistrate to decide.

 

[MW]

Which is exactly my point. Roman officials did not get involved when the question under dispute was a Mosaic and not Roman legal question. Which is why the charges the Jews made in Acts 25 must have been charges under Roman and not Mosaic law, otherwise they would not have been heard.

Roman officials became involved when the Jews involved them because their religious establishment was at stake. The whole idea of religio licita/illicita is a religious issue. Gallio had to decide that the dipute fell within the religio licita, and therefore was not his concern. The fact that later officials deliberated on this very point shows that the religious issue was of concern to them.

 

[timmopussycat]

Which is exactly my point. Roman officials did not get involved when the question under dispute was a Mosaic and not Roman legal question. Which is why the charges the Jews made in Acts 25 must have been charges under Roman and not Mosaic law, otherwise they would not have been heard.

Roman officials became involved when the Jews involved them because their religious establishment was at stake. The whole idea of religio licita/illicita is a religious issue. Gallio had to decide that the dipute fell within the religio licita, and therefore was not his concern. The fact that later officials deliberated on this very point shows that the religious issue was of concern to them.

Your OP attempted to prove that the incident of Acts 25:7-11 meant Paul "considered religious issues the [de jure] right of the powers that be."
It was a de facto reality that Rome would become involved under then existing Roman law and the use Paul's accusers made of it.
That Rome had claimed the right and ability to make such decisions does not mean they had the de jure right to do so.

 

[timmopussycat]

He knew it was within the magistrates capacity to give a de facto recognition. Whether he believed the magistrate had de jure right to do so or not is speculation. A Chinese unregistered Christian may, in integrity, plead for mercy from the communist state without believing that the state has the right to regulate religious matters.

Previously you wrote "true enough" when Bruce stated the apostle had the interests of the gospel at heart and "A favourable hearing from the emperor in Rome might win recognition for Christianity." Recognition for Christianity is much more than seeking mercy from the State. It requires the magistrate to make judgment concerning a religious issue. That is what the apostle appealed to the civil magistrate to decide.

I wrote "true enough" referring to Bruce's statement of Paul's motivation. I also wrote "But if Paul was seeking to pursue that goal" (winning the emporer's recognition for Christianity as religio or collegium licita) for a reason. We cannot be entirely certain that was the motivation underlying his statement: for when he mentions that he has done nothing against law or temple in Acts 25:8, the appeal to Caesar has not yet been mentioned. It is only after Festus proposed the ridiculous (and, for Paul, highly dangerous!!) change of venue to Jerusalem, that Paul appealed to Caesar. And as I have shown and you have agreed ...

[Acts 18:14 15] ... mentions Gallio's refusal to enter into an intramural debate concerning a religio licita.

... Roman courts did not judge matters of religio licita, the charges on which Paul would stand trial before Caesar would only be the original civil ones.

When Paul summs up his defence at 25:8, he is in the following position. Since none of the original civil charges had held up and none of the new civil ones had been proven either, then there is no certain reason to think that Paul is addressing anything other than the civil charges before the court or that he definitely anticipated any other response from Festus than aquittal.

Even if Paul anticipated the necessity of appealling to Caesar at this point, that appeal would have been an appeal of civil charges alone. Even a successful appeal of such charges would not necessarily have led to the emperor's judgment that Christianity was a religio licita, for only if the Jews sent agents to Rome to attempt to add religious charges to the indictment would the possibility of such an imperial judgment arise.

In that case, and if the emperor refused to hear such additional charges, the trial would have achieved the result of winning religio licita status for the new faith — thus freeing messengers of the new faith from being perpetually dragged before the Roman authorities (something that would be a very real benefit to the gospel). But at Act 25:8, Paul is not yet consciously making the appeal to Caesar, and, when he does make it, the text does not show that he has any other motive for making it than to free himself of the civil charges that kept him imprisioned. To achieve such a goal, he could have appealed to Caesar in integrity: he knew that his being free to labour for the churches would be a benefit for the gospel (Phil 1:22-25). If he recognized that a possible additional consequence of a successful appeal would be the attainment of religio licita status for Christianity, he could accept that practical result without necessarily conceding that religious issues were the biblically granted de jure domain of the powers that be.

 

[MW]

... Roman courts did not judge matters of religio licita, the charges on which Paul would stand trial before Caesar would only be the original civil ones.

This is contrary to fact. The officials were forced to decide whether this was a religio illicita or whether it fell under the legally recognised religion of the Jews. Hence it was a religious issue. Paul's subsequent defence before Agrippa demonstrates clearly that he was on trial for a religious issue: "And now I stand and am judged for the hope of the promise made of God unto our fathers," Acts 26:7. Paul's defence was entirely religious. Further, Agrippa said, "Almost thou persuadest me to be a Christian," v. 28. This would not be possible if Paul did not make a case for Christianity.