Moral Argument and Presuppositionalism

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Henoch

Puritan Board Freshman
Is the moral argument classical apologists use similar to that which presuppositionalists use?
I just saw Jeff Durbin using something like the moral argument(you believe in materialism therefore you have no standard as you're just matter in motion,etc.) in a debate. So are there arguments like the moral argument where VanTillianism and Evidential apologetics overlap? Is the only difference that presuppositionalists demolish atheistic presuppositions before they present evidence or something?
 
Is the moral argument classical apologists use similar to that which presuppositionalists use?
I just saw Jeff Durbin using something like the moral argument(you believe in materialism therefore you have no standard as you're just matter in motion,etc.) in a debate. So are there arguments like the moral argument where VanTillianism and Evidential apologetics overlap? Is the only difference that presuppositionalists demolish atheistic presuppositions before they present evidence or something?

There is some overlap, but classical apologists press the point on a moral lawgiver rather than a moral standard. Either side can use it.
 
I think I used to be more enthusiastic about presuppositionalism when I was younger and the world seemed to have a greater sense of the law written on the heart. Bahnsen and others were interesting because the arguments seemed so capable of destroying the confidence of atheists who suddenly discovered they had their feet firmly planted in mid-air.

The problem, as I see it, with some presub approaches is that it's not enough to apologetically destroy arguments and convince others that they are wrong. I know there is more to that, but I also think that there needs to be a place to positively construct, with people who may not be Christians, a policy or law decision that is appropriate. I realize that there is a place for apologetics to defend against scorrers and convince others of the claims of the Gospel but there is also a world in which unbelievers will continue to unbelieve and we need to be able to produce arguments that will affect both the big and the mundane decisions of how to govern or provide policy advice.
 
I think I used to be more enthusiastic about presuppositionalism when I was younger and the world seemed to have a greater sense of the law written on the heart. Bahnsen and others were interesting because the arguments seemed so capable of destroying the confidence of atheists who suddenly discovered they had their feet firmly planted in mid-air.

The problem, as I see it, with some presub approaches is that it's not enough to apologetically destroy arguments and convince others that they are wrong. I know there is more to that, but I also think that there needs to be a place to positively construct, with people who may not be Christians, a policy or law decision that is appropriate. I realize that there is a place for apologetics to defend against scorrers and convince others of the claims of the Gospel but there is also a world in which unbelievers will continue to unbelieve and we need to be able to produce arguments that will affect both the big and the mundane decisions of how to govern or provide policy advice.
That's a really good point!
I was in this dilemma on whether to read Presup or Classical apologetics books, especially after I heard some presuppositionalists argue that it's highly unbiblical to "make the atheist's fallen reason the highest court of appeal" and classicalism would be like playing in their court, etc.
Would you still recommend reading evidentialist works - like those by Turek and Craig?
 
I was in this dilemma on whether to read Presup or Classical apologetics books, especially after I heard some presuppositionalists argue that it's highly unbiblical to "make the atheist's fallen reason the highest court of appeal" and classicalism would be like playing in their court, etc.

The better presups avoid rhetorically emotional comments like that. I am a classical guy and I have used the cosmological argument with much profit. No one is making the unbeliever's reason the highest court of appeal. The unbeliever has the rational faculty and depending on where he is, might have questions about the faith. The way a classicalist responds will often depend on what's going: objections, stumbling blocks, etc.
Would you still recommend reading evidentialist works - like those by Turek and Craig?

Norman Geisler is the one I always go to. Douglas Groothuis has released some excellent material on classical apologetics. Sproul is really good on classical apologetics. I've reviewed them below, except for Groothuis.
 
The better presups avoid rhetorically emotional comments like that. I am a classical guy and I have used the cosmological argument with much profit. No one is making the unbeliever's reason the highest court of appeal. The unbeliever has the rational faculty and depending on where he is, might have questions about the faith. The way a classicalist responds will often depend on what's going: objections, stumbling blocks, etc.


Norman Geisler is the one I always go to. Douglas Groothuis has released some excellent material on classical apologetics. Sproul is really good on classical apologetics. I've reviewed them below, except for Groothuis.
Thanks for those resources, brother!Really appreciate it!!
 
That's a really good point!
I was in this dilemma on whether to read Presup or Classical apologetics books, especially after I heard some presuppositionalists argue that it's highly unbiblical to "make the atheist's fallen reason the highest court of appeal" and classicalism would be like playing in their court, etc.
Would you still recommend reading evidentialist works - like those by Turek and Craig?
For one good questions! I myself would shy away from making the assertion that many presup's make about a "biblical method" that is binding on all believers. Every argument I've read from various schools of thought have some merit but seem to stretch their exegesis beyond what's actually going on. If presuppositionalism is the biblical method than why do we not find early Christian thinkers using it except for superficial overlaps here or there?
Use what works best for you. Every apologist finds his or herself in a particular time and place, and specific expertise, so they must use the tools around them to defend the faith. Biblical knowledge is essential though. I think that the method which is best largely reduces to personal preference and experience, for instance Jacob and I disagree on methodology but have mutual respect to the point that I wouldn't want anyone else by my side defending the faith.
We've debated these things we know each other's strengths and weaknesses so that we could compliment each other's method and style to a much more complete overall approach. Without letting the unbeliever know of internal family squabbles. We'd have a unified approach.
 
I think I used to be more enthusiastic about presuppositionalism when I was younger and the world seemed to have a greater sense of the law written on the heart. Bahnsen and others were interesting because the arguments seemed so capable of destroying the confidence of atheists who suddenly discovered they had their feet firmly planted in mid-air.

The problem, as I see it, with some presub approaches is that it's not enough to apologetically destroy arguments and convince others that they are wrong. I know there is more to that, but I also think that there needs to be a place to positively construct, with people who may not be Christians, a policy or law decision that is appropriate. I realize that there is a place for apologetics to defend against scorrers and convince others of the claims of the Gospel but there is also a world in which unbelievers will continue to unbelieve and we need to be able to produce arguments that will affect both the big and the mundane decisions of how to govern or provide policy advice.
Do you think that VanDrunnen has made some steps in this direction as a Vantillian?
 
Yes, I think he's tried to help advance moral arguments, whether one agrees with him.

I don't know if this point has been made explicitly, and I just now thought of it, I wonder if moral law arguments operate on some form of natural law. I never use the moral law argument, either when I was presup or now as classical, so I never thought about it.
 
I don't know if this point has been made explicitly, and I just now thought of it, I wonder if moral law arguments operate on some form of natural law. I never use the moral law argument, either when I was presup or now as classical, so I never thought about it.
I think this recent interview was interesting: https://mortificationofspin.podbean.com/e/abortion-tearing-us-apart/

Ryan Anderson addresses the issue of Natural Law and notes that you have to have some sort of Biblical grounding to ultimately give it some reference.

That said, the kind of arguments that Robbie George has preferred about unborn children are highly effective in making moral arguments in the public square.
 
For one good questions! I myself would shy away from making the assertion that many presup's make about a "biblical method" that is binding on all believers. Every argument I've read from various schools of thought have some merit but seem to stretch their exegesis beyond what's actually going on. If presuppositionalism is the biblical method than why do we not find early Christian thinkers using it except for superficial overlaps here or there?
Use what works best for you. Every apologist finds his or herself in a particular time and place, and specific expertise, so they must use the tools around them to defend the faith. Biblical knowledge is essential though. I think that the method which is best largely reduces to personal preference and experience, for instance Jacob and I disagree on methodology but have mutual respect to the point that I wouldn't want anyone else by my side defending the faith.
We've debated these things we know each other's strengths and weaknesses so that we could compliment each other's method and style to a much more complete overall approach. Without letting the unbeliever know of internal family squabbles. We'd have a unified approach.
Thanks for that wonderful answer, brother! Very true- most reformed scholastics/early christian apologists were evidentialists
 
Thanks for that wonderful answer, brother! Very true- most reformed scholastics/early christian apologists were evidentialists
Well, thank you, but they were "whatever worked in their time or place" the method was pragmatic. They used the tools around them to fight the battles around them. Transcendental arguments had not really been formalized yet, so when Van Till comes along and utilizes that argument as a tool it was pretty unique. That was his method.
 
Well, thank you, but they were "whatever worked in their time or place" the method was pragmatic. They used the tools around them to fight the battles around them. Transcendental arguments had not really been formalized yet, so when Van Till comes along and utilizes that argument as a tool it was pretty unique. That was his method.
Makes sense
I wonder, could the transcendental argument serve as an additional argument in a classical apologetic framework or would it just contradict everything?
 
Makes sense
I wonder, could the transcendental argument serve as an additional argument in a classical apologetic framework or would it just contradict everything?

Only in a very limited sense. Aristotle himself was aware of transcendental issues regarding logic. We in the classical tradition say God is first in the order of being, which sometimes sounds like a transcendental argument. God, however, is not (always) the first in the order of knowing.

Moreover, some of the stronger Transcendental arguments make it seem like we must first get the unbeliever to be convinced of skepticism (i.e., without x you cannot know anything) before moving to the Christian God. That seems counterintuitive to me and sometimes backfires.

People who like the ontological argument sometimes like transcendental arguments, since both are arguing for an a priori view of God.
 
Makes sense
I wonder, could the transcendental argument serve as an additional argument in a classical apologetic framework or would it just contradict everything?
I'm personally a Pragmatist, William James is one of my favorite philosophers (along with Richard Rorty). So I say use what works best in any given situation. There's a place for debating the in family disagreement over what method is better but that's an in family squabble. I have younger brothers so I know all about that.
Why do I prefer the transcendental method over others?
In most situations I can adapt the transcendental method to suit the needs of the situation. Van Til said that basically "you can start from any fact of experience and show how Christian theism is the only presupposition that makes that fact make sense as it is."
So a lot of people have heard of morality, meaning, science, etc but it can really be anything. But if your three or more arguments don't work what do you do then? But if you prefer classical arguments use them.
 
Only in a very limited sense. Aristotle himself was aware of transcendental issues regarding logic. We in the classical tradition say God is first in the order of being, which sometimes sounds like a transcendental argument. God, however, is not (always) the first in the order of knowing.

Moreover, some of the stronger Transcendental arguments make it seem like we must first get the unbeliever to be convinced of skepticism (i.e., without x you cannot know anything) before moving to the Christian God. That seems counterintuitive to me and sometimes backfires.

People who like the ontological argument sometimes like transcendental arguments, since both are arguing for an a priori view of God.
I think you give a very fair and accurate criticism of most presups on the internet. They can be so belligerent sometimes. Choosing hats.com is one of my favorites personally, those guys don't seem to be belligerent to me in their debates.
I have no problem with saying "God is the first in the order of being", I say he's first in the order of everything.
Since I defend Christianity theism God is one of those elements. My method allows me to start anywhere and argue backwards to Christian theism. The skepticism point you make is also fair but with all do respect the unbeliever should be skeptical about their total lived experience. They can't make epistemological, moral, or any sense of anything.
For anyone following along (because I already know Jacob is well aware of this individual) William Edgar is very good on this approach to Van Til that I'm laying out here. His intro to apologetics course (on the Westminster seminary website is amazing. He mixes the method of Van Til with the style of Francis Schaeffer and he wrote a paper comparing and contrasting the two, ultimately siding with Van Til (his former colleague, being that he just retired, K Scott Oliphant said nothing better has been written about the two).
 
I think you give a very fair and accurate criticism of most presups on the internet. They can be so belligerent sometimes. Choosing hats.com is one of my favorites personally, those guys don't seem to be belligerent to me in their debates.
I have no problem with saying "God is the first in the order of being", I say he's first in the order of everything.
Since I defend Christianity theism God is one of those elements. My method allows me to start anywhere and argue backwards to Christian theism. The skepticism point you make is also fair but with all do respect the unbeliever should be skeptical about their total lived experience. They can't make epistemological, moral, or any sense of anything.
For anyone following along (because I already know Jacob is well aware of this individual) William Edgar is very good on this approach to Van Til that I'm laying out here. His intro to apologetics course (on the Westminster seminary website is amazing. He mixes the method of Van Til with the style of Francis Schaeffer and he wrote a paper comparing and contrasting the two, ultimately siding with Van Til (his former colleague, being that he just retired, K Scott Oliphant said nothing better has been written about the two).
Thanks for the tip:
 
Regarding transcendental arguments, I've noticed that a lot of other apologists don't have a problem calling into question the atheist's ability to ground their morality or certainty. I listen to the Unbelievable podcast as a barometer of where Evangelicals are centering their arguments.

I don't have a problem with an eclectic approach to this issue, but the thing that drives me crazy is the way in which some Christian apologists praise unbelief or the "honest seeking" of things practically enthusiastic that some skeptic, denying God, is being honest with himself. The other thing that drives me nuts is the "preponderance of the evidence" philosophical commitments that some have. Both seem to be rooted in making the human thinker the center or the universe to divide whether God, as just another object of investigation, can be determined to be the most probable explanation of reality.

The other thing that drives me crazy is paired with the above trend. Since man is the measure and his acceptance of the evidence and bing "pushed over the threshold", then many Christians are quite content to make doubtful many things in Scripture. Scripture moves from being the foundation of Divine Revelation so that we might know God, to a place where "apologists" feel free to doubt whether the Scripture really teaches certain things or whether God was really involved in things like the judgment of the Canaanites. Things like Hell or any other number of doctrines are negotiable if they represent a barrier to people understanding that "God loves them". I don't think I've seen a doctrine on that podcast that some Christian is not willing to sacrifice on the altar of removing a suppesed barrier to belief.
 
We can also make a distinction between TAs and internal inconsistencies. TAs always show the latter, but use of the latter does not always employ a TA. As Moreland and others, at least dating back to Husserl, have pointed out, materialism cannot explain how universals in logic and geometry can exist. Saying that, however, does not make any judgment on "the preconditions of intelligibility."
 
Regarding transcendental arguments, I've noticed that a lot of other apologists don't have a problem calling into question the atheist's ability to ground their morality or certainty. I listen to the Unbelievable podcast as a barometer of where Evangelicals are centering their arguments.

I don't have a problem with an eclectic approach to this issue, but the thing that drives me crazy is the way in which some Christian apologists praise unbelief or the "honest seeking" of things practically enthusiastic that some skeptic, denying God, is being honest with himself. The other thing that drives me nuts is the "preponderance of the evidence" philosophical commitments that some have. Both seem to be rooted in making the human thinker the center or the universe to divide whether God, as just another object of investigation, can be determined to be the most probable explanation of reality.

The other thing that drives me crazy is paired with the above trend. Since man is the measure and his acceptance of the evidence and bing "pushed over the threshold", then many Christians are quite content to make doubtful many things in Scripture. Scripture moves from being the foundation of Divine Revelation so that we might know God, to a place where "apologists" feel free to doubt whether the Scripture really teaches certain things or whether God was really involved in things like the judgment of the Canaanites. Things like Hell or any other number of doctrines are negotiable if they represent a barrier to people understanding that "God loves them". I don't think I've seen a doctrine on that podcast that some Christian is not willing to sacrifice on the altar of removing a suppesed barrier to belief.
Nicely put sir. That's the other end of the table the biblical/theological end that ought to direct our methodology.
 
Many excellent points have already been made. To attempt one more, there is a distinction between knowing that Christianity is true and defending that Christianity is true.

1. Knowing that Christianity is true does not require argumentation. In fact, there are various definitions of "knowledge." Depending on context, more than one of these might even apply to one's belief that Christianity is true; I might "know" that Christianity is true in more than one sense (e.g. internalism vs. externalism, infallibilism vs. fallibilism).

2. Defending that Christianity is true will often entail argumentation (the realm of what we typically consider to be apologetics)... although one might also say that simple, unspoken obedience to God - even to the point of martyrdom - is an indirect witness to and defense of one's public faith that does not involve syllogistic reasoning.

When I was young, I conflated 1 and 2. While I did not waver in my faith - I've always considered Christianity better than any alternative I have encountered or considered - I did not have full, "epistemic" (as opposed to a mere, psychological "feeling") assurance that Christianity was true. In my mind, there were always more alternatives to Christianity than I could concretely, specifically, internally critique. In my mind, there was no transcendental argument which uniquely selected for Christianity. Underlying my sense of unease was that I needed to argue my way to having full, "epistemic" assurance that Christianity is true. On the contrary, I now think that I defend knowledge I already have had.

Thus, there might be called varieties of presuppositionalism:

A) "Epistemic" presuppositionalism, in which one recognizes that he makes knowledge claims on the basis of assumptions or presuppositions which may be intrinsically "justified" (the full meaning and applicability of which will depend on context), "justified" without the need for argumentation. In this way, one may have "knowledge" (even in the sense of "full, epistemic assurance") that Christianity is true without having to critique infinitely many worldviews or rely on inferential reasoning.

B) "Apologetic" presuppositionalism, in which one defends his presuppositions by intentionally provoking reflection upon his or other's presuppositions: e.g. attempting to show how his presuppositions are coherent and answer certain questions, how other's presuppositions are incoherent, unable to answer certain questions, or incompatible with what else they may claim to believe, etc.

Interestingly, the more one articulates A) in the sense of fleshing out one's exact meaning, the more one will tend to actually be performing B). For example, in a fuller discussion of what it means for something to be intrinsically "justified," one might differentiate and expound on foundationalism in contrast to coherentism, infinitism, and positism. In so doing, one might defend the former (and, by proxy, his alleged intrinsically justified "knowledge") against the latter. One's apologetic will always have a tendency of attempting to confirm what one already "knows." I find this interesting because it shows how circularity might appear in one's apologetic but not in one's structure of knowledge. This might bridge a gap between Clarkian and Van Tilian species of "presuppositionalism."

With all that said, an advantage of one's affirming presuppositionalism of variety A) is that presuppositionalism of variety B) need not be the only apologetic of which one might avail himself. For example, one's internally and epistemically "justified" presupposition might legitimatize other modes of "knowing" (e.g. empirical) and, therefore, other modes of apologetic defenses (e.g. "evidentialism").
 
I don't have the philosophical chops to articulate why certain appeals to epistemic certainty don't work for me or end up being grounded on human reason, etc but I sort of keep it simple with respect to how a person comes to faith in Christ.

What I try to emphasize with fellow Christians is that knowing Christ is much more than gathering all the fats together and agreeing to them.

Christ, at the return of HIs disciples from their proclamation of the Kingdom, praises the Father because He has revealed Himself to them. It's nigh impossible, in my mind, to come up with a mechanism, as science, that really expresses the inscrutability of how the Spirit works to draw men and women to Christ. Even Christ Himself said that the Spirit blows where it wills.

This is why there is always such a sharp line between a Reformed/Biblical understanding of arguing for the faith and a semi-Pelagian or Pelagian view.

The Biblical answer to why I have faith in Christ and know that He alone has words of eternal life is not because I don't waiver but precisely because I have nowhere else to go.

One feels the weight, however, when asked how you know that Christ is risen and ascended because it's not something that you can articulate in a way that won't sound like: "Well, I just know and unless the Father draws you, you will not come to Christ."

It doesn't sound intellectually respectable. It doesn't allow you to engage in the kinds of debates that a William Lane Craig can engage in where he operates on the same plane of human reason as the unbeliever because he thinks that the reason the person isn't believing is ultimately found in a defect of enough intellectual energy to see that all the arguments are in favor of believing in Christ and becoming a believer.

I'm just talking out loud, but I think one of the reasons why a TAG model is satisfying to some Christians owes to a desire to see the unbeliever put in his place and not to have to deal with the fact that we look like knuckleheads. I agree that it's impossible to really understand things truly without Divine revelation but, ultimately, we have to concede that we were not argued into the Kingdom by being shown what fools we are.
 
I don't have the philosophical chops to articulate why certain appeals to epistemic certainty don't work for me or end up being grounded on human reason, etc but I sort of keep it simple with respect to how a person comes to faith in Christ.

My reference to "full, epistemic assurance" was actually inspired by Paul's own usage of the phrase in Colossians 2:2. It also appears in 1 Thessalonians 1:5 and Hebrews 6:11, 10:22. I note this in a few places I've written more extensively on the subject (example).

Christ, at the return of HIs disciples from their proclamation of the Kingdom, praises the Father because He has revealed Himself to them. It's nigh impossible, in my mind, to come up with a mechanism, as science, that really expresses the inscrutability of how the Spirit works to draw men and women to Christ. Even Christ Himself said that the Spirit blows where it wills.

True - on the other hand, epistemic externalists would happily agree with you (example). Full disclosure: I do not agree with Doug's interpretation of Clark per se, but the point is that Doug himself would believe and it might even be true in certain contexts that "With externalism, the justification of true beliefs is possible on the basis of factors outside of oneself; that is – revelation through the word of God and the Holy Spirit enlightening the mind.)."

One feels the weight, however, when asked how you know that Christ is risen and ascended because it's not something that you can articulate in a way that won't sound like: "Well, I just know and unless the Father draws you, you will not come to Christ."

It doesn't sound intellectually respectable. It doesn't allow you to engage in the kinds of debates that a William Lane Craig can engage in where he operates on the same plane of human reason as the unbeliever because he thinks that the reason the person isn't believing is ultimately found in a defect of enough intellectual energy to see that all the arguments are in favor of believing in Christ and becoming a believer.

I'm just talking out loud, but I think one of the reasons why a TAG model is satisfying to some Christians owes to a desire to see the unbeliever put in his place and not to have to deal with the fact that we look like knuckleheads. I agree that it's impossible to really understand things truly without Divine revelation but, ultimately, we have to concede that we were not argued into the Kingdom by being shown what fools we are.

I leave open the possibility of apologetics as a means through which the Spirit works conviction in peoples' minds, but I agree with the gist of your point in terms of wanting to sound intellectually respectable or satisfied with arguments that (perhaps unintentionally) put knowledge of the Creator in subordination to knowledge of something other than His own self-disclosure in the very self-authenticating Scriptures He breathed out.
 
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This is why there is always such a sharp line between a Reformed/Biblical understanding of arguing for the faith and a semi-Pelagian or Pelagian view.

Do you mean a Reformed view of how the Spirit forms faith in us, or do you mean a Reformed view of arguing for the faith ala apologetics? Men like Shedd and Hodge used the traditional arguments, as did many of the post-Reformation Reformed.
 
I also listened to a Moreland interview today and he said, speaking as a classical guy, that apologetics just removes roadblocks; it doesn't "argue people into the faith."
 
Do you mean a Reformed view of how the Spirit forms faith in us, or do you mean a Reformed view of arguing for the faith ala apologetics? Men like Shedd and Hodge used the traditional arguments, as did many of the post-Reformation Reformed.
You and others would probably be interested in chapter 1 of this book (much of which can be read) on ""The Emergence and Evolution of the Reformed Endorsement of Natural Theology." Sudduth (sadly an apostate now) goes through the history of Reformers who endorse inferential reasoning in particular (not merely implanted or immediate knowledge) as a valid apologetic/epistemic tool.
 
You and others would probably be interested in chapter 1 of this book (much of which can be read) on ""The Emergence and Evolution of the Reformed Endorsement of Natural Theology." Sudduth (sadly an apostate now) goes through the history of Reformers who endorse inferential reasoning in particular (not merely implanted or immediate knowledge) as a valid apologetic/epistemic tool.

Fun fact about Sudduth: he was on PB back around 2005. He only posted a few times.
 
I'm glad you mentioned Sudduth. I had forgotten about him. Even with his apostasy, the resources he provides on his page in the analytical tradition are quite good.
 
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