R. C. Sproul and the Hypostatic union

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Sam Jer

Puritan Board Junior
I did not want to derail the previous thread, so I will ask here.

Every few months on the PB people seem to find it helpful or necessary to criticize VT for something or other. To my knowledge, no other theologian in the entire Reformed world has been subjected to this on the PB. Sproul has problems in his Christology (he borders on Nestorianism, though not quite there), and his viewpoints on the second and fourth commandments, but he gets quite a pass. Sproul is arguably FAR more influential and celebrity-like a figure than VT ever was. And yet it is VT who gets bashed over and over and over again on this board. It is more than tiresome. It is ridiculous.
In the intrest of clarifying Christology for those who, like me, were probably influenced by him in the area and are not necessarily well versed on every detail of Christology: what precisely are his problems in Christology?
 
So, the orthodox Reformed view is that there is a communication of properties (communicatio idiomatum) from each nature to the whole person, not from one nature to the other nature. What can be said about the human nature can be said about the whole person. What can be said about the divine nature can be said about the whole person. And, something can be said about Jesus that strictly applies to one nature while calling him by the other nature. An instance of this is Acts 20:28. God doesn't have blood. The God-man does. Two places where this type of language crops up is 1. whether Mary is the theotokos, the God-bearer. As long as we understand the terms correctly here, we affirm that Mary is the theotokos. What we mean by it is that Mary bore the person in her womb who is the God-man. We, of course, do not mean that she is somehow connected to the origin of God himself. 2. whether God died on the cross. We don't say that God died on the cross. God cannot die. But the God-man did die on the cross. The person of Christ died on the cross. In my opinion, Hodge's ST has the very best discussion of this (I checked all the great ones about ten years ago on this subject and Hodge outflew all others).

Sproul has hesitancies with talking this way, preferring to say that Jesus in his human nature died. In denying the Roman Catholic communicatio idiomatum (which is between the natures) he doesn't seem to acknowledge fully the Reformed version, which is between each nature and the person. I tried to find something in his Truths We Confess book, but I didn't find it there. There are places where he does this, but I cannot currently remember where they are. I discussed it on my blog, but I can't even find that now!
 
I tried to find something in his Truths We Confess book, but I didn't find it there. There are places where he does this, but I cannot currently remember where they are. I discussed it on my blog, but I can't even find that now!
There is one place I find where he talked about Roman Catholic communicatio idiomatum, but I'm not sure that's exactly the one you're referencing.
The Roman Catholic Church says that the body and blood of Jesus can be at more than one place at the same time by virtue of what is called the communicatio idiomatum (communication of attributes). Rome says that the divine nature communicates divine powers and properties to the human nature, specifically the power of omnipresence, enabling it to be present wherever the Mass is celebrated. But that notion involves a confusion or mixture of the two natures. It involves the deification of the human nature of Jesus. If His human nature is no longer restricted by time and space, He is no longer human.
The Reformers did believe in the real presence of Christ at the Lord’s Supper, but they insisted that He is there in His divine nature, not His human nature. The response from Rome would be that if His divine nature is there and His human nature is not, we have fallen into the Nestorian error of dividing and separating the two natures. The Reformed response is that two things can be distinguished without being separated. For example, we can distinguish someone’s body from his soul without harming him at all. But if we separate his body from his soul, we kill him. The Reformation view is that the physical nature of Jesus ascended into heaven and is there now—not anywhere else. But His divine nature is never absent from us. That is what Jesus said to His disciples, “A little while, and you will see me no longer; and again a little while, and you will see me” (John 16:16). In one sense, Jesus is no longer here; in another sense, He is.
The person of Christ is still a perfect union of a divine nature and a human nature. The human nature is in heaven. The divine nature is not limited to the physical confines of the body of Jesus. When God became incarnate in Christ, God was not confined to the place where Jesus was in Palestine. The divine nature retained its property of omnipresence. The person of Christ can be everywhere, but that ability is through the power of the divine nature, not the human nature.
That is why we can say, when we come to the Lord’s Supper, that we enter into communion with the risen Christ. He is with us by virtue of His divine nature. When we commune with the divine in the Lord’s Supper, we commune with the whole person, because Christ’s divine nature is not separated from His human nature. The person is here, but only by way of His divine omnipresence, not by bringing His body with Him.
R.C. Sproul, Truths We Confess, 246
I think he also talks about Roman Catholic communicatio idiomatum under the Lord's Supper chapter; I'll check that. but I did find his discussion on Christ's impeccability and your blog on Was Jesus Able to Sin?
The best theologians, past and present, have been divided on the question of whether Jesus could have sinned. It seems best to say that since Jesus was truly human, it was possible for Him to sin. Obviously, the divine nature cannot sin. But if Christ’s divine nature prevented Him from sinning, then in what sense did He obey the law of God as the second Adam? At His birth, Jesus’ human nature was exactly the same as Adam’s before the fall, with respect to His moral capabilities. Jesus had what Augustine called the posse peccare and the posse non peccare, that is, the ability to sin and the ability not to sin. Adam sinned; Jesus did not. Satan did everything in his power to corrupt Jesus and tempt Him to sin. That would have been an exercise in futility had he been trying to tempt God to sin. Satan was not trying to get God to sin. He was trying to get Christ to sin according to His human nature, so that He would not be qualified to be the Savior.
At the same time, Christ was uniquely sanctified and ministered to by the Holy Spirit. In order to sin, a person must have a desire for sin. But Jesus’ human nature throughout His life was marked by a zeal for righteousness. “My food is to do the will of him who sent me” (John 4:34), He said. As long as Jesus had no desire to sin, He would not sin. It seems wrong to think that Christ’s divine nature made it impossible for His human nature to sin. If that were the case, the temptation, the tests, and His assuming of the responsibility of the first Adam would have all been charades. This position protects the integrity of the authenticity of the human nature because it was the human nature that carried out the mission of the second Adam on our behalf. It was the human nature uniquely anointed beyond measure by the Holy Spirit.
R.C. Sproul, Truths We Confess, 251
 
Isn't that the Lutheran view?

The Lutheran view is a communication from nature to nature. The Reformed view is from nature to Person.

I don't think Sproul gets a pass on PB. Numerous threads have discussed problematic areas, including his commitment to classical apologetics. I can recall discussions on the 2nd and 4th commandment, as well as weaknesses in Christology.
 
The Lutheran view is a communication from nature to nature. The Reformed view is from nature to Person.
What I meant was that what he deacribed as the Romanist view sounds to me like what I have been told the Lutheran view is.
 
What I meant was that what he deacribed as the Romanist view sounds to me like what I have been told the Lutheran view is.

OK. Sorry for the misunderstanding. The Roman Catholic locates the Eucharistic presence in a unique, supernatural conversion of the elements, preserving the localised presence of Christ's humanity in heaven. He doesn't need to posit a nature to nature communication.
 
So, the orthodox Reformed view is that there is a communication of properties (communicatio idiomatum) from each nature to the whole person, not from one nature to the other nature. What can be said about the human nature can be said about the whole person. What can be said about the divine nature can be said about the whole person. And, something can be said about Jesus that strictly applies to one nature while calling him by the other nature. An instance of this is Acts 20:28. God doesn't have blood. The God-man does. Two places where this type of language crops up is 1. whether Mary is the theotokos, the God-bearer. As long as we understand the terms correctly here, we affirm that Mary is the theotokos. What we mean by it is that Mary bore the person in her womb who is the God-man. We, of course, do not mean that she is somehow connected to the origin of God himself. 2. whether God died on the cross. We don't say that God died on the cross. God cannot die. But the God-man did die on the cross. The person of Christ died on the cross. In my opinion, Hodge's ST has the very best discussion of this (I checked all the great ones about ten years ago on this subject and Hodge outflew all others).

Sproul has hesitancies with talking this way, preferring to say that Jesus in his human nature died. In denying the Roman Catholic communicatio idiomatum (which is between the natures) he doesn't seem to acknowledge fully the Reformed version, which is between each nature and the person. I tried to find something in his Truths We Confess book, but I didn't find it there. There are places where he does this, but I cannot currently remember where they are. I discussed it on my blog, but I can't even find that now!
I appreciate this, Lane. I've wondered why R.C. Sproul seemed to shy away from the each-nature-to-the-person language. Maybe it was because he ran into Monophysite thinking often, hence why he may sound quasi-Nestorian from time-to-time. I don't know. I experienced something like this last night as I was in a group of about 10 discussing various things and someone asked the question: "when Jesus was on earth, did he suppress any divine attributes/not use them/not have them?" and someone answered "yes". As you may imagine, the discussion became lively rather quickly. I saw last night that the each-nature-to-the-person language likely has to be explained carefully in the presence of those who have not been brought up and instructed in these things, especially Chalcedon..........
 
In my opinion, Hodge's ST has the very best discussion of this (I checked all the great ones about ten years ago on this subject and Hodge outflew all others).

The facts which the Bible teaches concerning the person of Christ are, first, that He was truly man, i. e., He had a perfect or complete human nature. Hence everything that can be predicated of man (that is, of man as man, and not of man as fallen) can be predicated of Christ.

Secondly, He was truly God, or had a perfect divine nature. Hence everything that can be predicated of God can be predicated of Christ. Thirdly, He was one person. The same person, self, or Ego, who said, “I thirst,” said, “Before Abraham was, I am.” This is the whole doctrine of the incarnation as it lies in the Scriptures and in the faith of the Church.

Proof of the Doctrine

The proof of this doctrine includes three distinct classes of passages of Scripture, or may be presented in three different forms.

First, the proof of the several elements of the doctrine separately.
Secondly, the current language of the Scriptures which speak of Christ, from beginning to end, sometimes as man and sometimes as God; and combine the two modes of statement, or pass from the one to the other as naturally and as easily as they do when speaking of man as mortal and immortal, or as corporeal and as spiritual.
Thirdly, there are certain passages of Scripture in which the doctrine of the incarnation is formally presented and dogmatically asserted.

First Argument, all the Elements of the Doctrine separately taught

First, the Scriptures teach that Christ was truly man or had a complete human nature. That is, He had a true body and a rational soul.

Christ had a True Body

By a true body is meant a material body, composed of flesh and blood, in everything essential like the bodies of ordinary men. It was not a phantasm, or mere semblance of a body. Nor was it fashioned out of any heavenly or ethereal substance. This is plain because He was born of a woman. He was conceived in the womb of the Virgin Mary, nourished of her substance so as to be consubstantial with her. His body increased in stature, passing through the ordinary process of development from infancy to manhood. It was subject to all the affections of a human body. It was subject to pain, pleasure, hunger, thirst, fatigue, suffering, and death. It could be seen, felt, and handled. The Scriptures declare it to have been flesh and blood, “Forasmuch then as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the same.” (Hebrews 2:14.) Our Lord said to his terrified disciples, “A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have.” (Luke 24:39.) He was predicted in the Old Testament as the seed of the woman; the seed of Abraham; the Son of David. He was declared to be a man; a man of sorrows; the man Christ Jesus; and He called Himself the Son of Man. This designation occurs some eighty times in the Gospel. Nothing, therefore, is revealed concerning Christ more distinctly than that He had a true body.

Christ had a Rational Soul

It is no less plain that He had a rational soul. He thought, reasoned, and felt; was joyful and sorrowful; He increased in wisdom; He was ignorant of the time when the day of judgment should come. He must, therefore, have had a finite human intelligence. These two elements, a true body and a rational soul, constitute a perfect or complete human nature, which is thus proved to have entered into the composition of Christ’s person.

Christ is truly God

Secondly, the Scriptures, with equal clearness, declare that Christ was truly God. This has been already proved at length. All divine names and titles are applied to Him. He is called God, the mighty God, the great God, God over all; Jehovah; Lord; the Lord of lords and the King of kings. All divine attributes are ascribed to Him. He is declared to be omnipresent, omniscient, almighty, and immutable, the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. He is set forth as the creator and upholder and ruler of the universe. All things were created by Him and for Him; and by Him all things consist. He is the object of worship to all intelligent creatures, even the highest; all the angels (i. e., all creatures between man and God) are commanded to prostrate themselves before Him. He is the object of all the religious sentiments; of reverence, love, faith, and devotion. To Him men and angels are responsible for their character and conduct. He required that men should honour Him as they honoured the Father; that they should exercise the same faith in Him that they do in God. He declares that He and the Father are one: that those who had seen Him had seen the Father also. He calls all men unto him; promises to forgive their sins; to send them the Holy Spirit; to give them rest and peace: to raise them up at the last day; and to give them eternal life. God is not more, and cannot promise more, or do more than Christ is said to be, to promise, and to do. He has, therefore, been the Christian’s God from the beginning, in all ages and in all places.

Christ One Person

Thirdly, He was, nevertheless, although perfect man and perfect God, but one person. There is, in the first place, the absence of all evidence of a twofold personality in Christ. The Scriptures reveal the Father, Son, and Spirit as distinct persons in the Godhead, because they use the personal pronouns in reference to each other. The Father says Thou to the Son, and the Son says Thou to the Father. The Father says to the Son, “I will give thee;” and the Son says, “Lo, I come to do thy will.” Moreover the one is objective to the other. The Father loves and sends the Son; the Son loves and obeys the Father. The same is true of the Spirit. There is nothing analogous to this in the case of Christ. The one nature is never distinguished from the other as a distinct person. The Son of God never addresses the Son of Man as a different person from Himself. The Scriptures reveal but one Christ. In the second place, besides this negative proof, the Bible affords all the evidence of the individual personality of our Lord that the case admits of. He always says I, me, mine. He is always addressed as Thou, thee, thine. He is always spoken of as He, his, him. It was the same person to whom it was said, “Thou art not yet fifty years old;” and “Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the works of thine hands.” The individual personality of Christ is set forth as clearly and as variously as that of any other personage of whose history the Scriptures give us the record. In teaching that Christ had a perfect human and a perfect divine nature, and is one person, the Bible teaches the whole doctrine of the incarnation as it has entered into the faith of the Church from the beginning.

Second Argument, from the Current Representations of Scripture

The current language of Scripture concerning Christ proves that He was at once divine and human. In the Old Testament, He is set forth as the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Judah and the family of David; as to be born of a virgin in the town of Bethlehem; as a man of sorrows; as meek and lowly; as bearing the chastisement of our sins, and pouring out his soul unto death. He is everywhere represented as a man. At the same time He is everywhere represented as God; He is called the Son of God, Immanuel, the Mighty God, Jehovah our righteousness; and He is spoken of as from everlasting; as enthroned in heaven and receiving the adoration of angels. In the New Testament, the same mode of representation is continued. Our Lord, in speaking of Himself, and the Apostles when speaking of Him, uniformly speak of Him as a man. The New Testament gives his genealogy to prove that He was of the house and lineage of David. It records his birth, life, and death. It calls Him the Son of Man, the man Christ Jesus. But with like uniformity our Lord assumes, and the Apostles attribute to Him a divine nature. He declares Himself to be the Son of God, existing from eternity, having all power in heaven and in earth, entitled to all the reverence, love, and obedience due to God. The Apostles worship Him; they call Him the great God and Saviour; they acknowledge their dependence upon Him and responsibility to Him; and they look to Him for pardon, sanctification, and eternal life. These conflicting representations, this constant setting forth the same person as man, and also as God, admits of no solution but in the doctrine of the incarnation. This is the key to the whole Bible. If this doctrine be denied all is confusion and contradiction. If it be admitted all is light, harmony, and power. Christ is both God and man, in two distinct natures, and one person forever. This is the great mystery of Godliness. God manifest in the flesh is the distinguishing doctrine of the religion of the Bible, without which it is a cold and lifeless corpse.

Third Argument, from Particular Passages of Scripture

Although, as appears from what has already been said, the doctrine of the incarnation does not rest on isolated proof-texts, but upon the broad basis of the whole revelation of God concerning the person and work of his Son, yet there are some passages in which this doctrine is so clearly stated in all its elements, that they cannot be properly overlooked in treating of this subject. To this class of passages belongs,—

1. The first chapter of John, verses 1-14. It is here taught concerning the Logos, (1.) that He existed in eternity. (2.) That He was in intimate relation to God. (3.) That He was God. (4.) That He was the Creator of all things. (5.) In Him was life. Having life in himself, He is the source of life to all that live. That is, He is the source of natural, of intellectual, and of spiritual life. (6.) And, therefore. He is the true light; that is, the fountain of all knowledge and all holiness. (7.) He came into the world, and the world although made by Him, did not recognize Him. (8.) He came to his own people, and even they did not receive Him. (9.) He became flesh, i. e., He assumed our nature, so that He dwelt among us as a man. (10.) And, says the Apostle, we saw his glory, a glory which revealed Him to be the only begotten of the Father. It is here taught that a truly divine person, the eternal Word, the Creator of the world, became man, dwelt among men, and revealed Himself to those who had eyes to see, as the eternal Son of God. Here is the whole doctrine of the incarnation, taught in the most explicit terms.

2. A second passage to the same effect is found in 1 John 1:1-3. It is there taught that what was in the beginning, what was with God, what was eternal, what was essentially life, appeared on earth, so as to be seen, heard, looked upon, and handled. Here, again, a divine, invisible, eternal person, is said to have assumed our nature, a real body and a rational soul. He could be seen and touched as well as heard. This is the main idea of this epistle. The incarnation is declared to be the characteristic and essential doctrine of the gospel. “Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God: and every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God: and this is that spirit of antichrist, whereof ye have heard that it should come; and even now already is it in the world.”

3. In Romans 1:2-5, the Apostle says that the gospel concerns the Son of God, who is our Lord Jesus Christ, who, as to his human nature, κατὰ σάρκα, is the Son of David, but as to his divine nature, κατὰ πνεῦμα, is the Son of God. Here also the two natures and one person of the Redeemer are clearly asserted. The parallel passage to this is Romans 9:5, where Christ is said κατὰ σάρκα to be descended from the fathers, but at the same time to be God over all and blessed forever. The same person is declared to be the supreme God and a child of Abraham, a member of the Hebrew nation by natural descent.

4. In 1 Timothy 3:16, we are taught that God was “manifest in the flesh, justified in the Spirit, seen of angels, preached among the Gentiles, believed on in the world, received up into glory.” In this passage the reading is indeed doubtful. The common text which has Θεός has the support of almost all the cursive, and of some of the uncial manuscripts, of several of the versions, and of many of the Greek fathers. But whether we read Θεός or ὁς, the meaning is substantially the same. Two things are plain: first, that all the predicates in this verse belong to one subject; and secondly, that that subject is Christ. He, his person, is the great mystery of Godliness. He was manifested in the flesh (i. e., in our nature); He, as thus manifested, the Theanthropos, was justified, i. e., proved to be just, i. e., to be what He claimed to be (namely, the Son of God), by the Spirit, either by the divine nature or majesty dwelling in Him, or by the Holy Ghost, whose office it is to take the things of Christ and reveal them unto us. He, this incarnate God, was seen, i. e., recognized and served by angels; preached among the Gentiles as the Son of God and Saviour of men; believed upon as such; and finally received up into glory. All that the Church teaches concerning the person of Christ, is here taught by the Apostle.

5. No passage, however, is more full and explicit on this subject than Philippians 2:6-11. Of one and the same subject or person, it is here taught, (1.) That He was God, or existed in the form of God. The form of a thing is the mode in which it reveals itself; and that is determined by its nature. It is not necessary to assume that μορφή has here, as it appears to have in some other cases, the sense of φύσις; the latter is implied in the former. No one can appear, or exist in view of others, in the form of God, i. e., manifesting all divine perfections, who is not God. (2.) Hence it is asserted that the person spoken of was equal to God. (3.) He became a man like other men, and assumed the form of a servant, i. e., appeared among men as a servant. (4.) He submitted to die upon the cross. (5.) He has been exalted above all created beings, and invested with universal and absolute authority. Christ, therefore, of whom this passage treats, has a divine nature, and a human nature, and is one person.

6. In Hebrews 2:14, the same doctrine concerning the person of Christ is clearly taught. In the first chapter of that Epistle the Son is declared to be the brightness of the Father’s glory and the express image of his substance (i. e., of what the Father is). By Him the worlds were made. He upholds all things by the word of his power. He is higher than the angels, i. e., than all intelligent creatures. They are bound to worship Him. They are addressed as mere instruments; but the Son as God. He made the heavens and laid the foundations of the earth. He is eternal and immutable. He is associated with God in glory and dominion. He, the person of whom all this is said in the first chapter, in the second chapter is declared to be a man. In Him was fulfilled all the sacred writer in the eighth Psalm had taught concerning the universal dominion assigned to man. Men are declared to be his brethren, because He and they are of one nature. As they are partakers of flesh and blood. He also took part in the same, in order that He might die, and by death redeem his people from all the evils of sin. Nothing can be plainer than that the Scriptures do teach that Christ is truly God, that He is truly man, and that He is one person. They assert of Him whatever may be said of God, and everything that can be said of a sinless man. They enter into no explanations. They assume it as a certain fact that Christ is God and man in one person, just as they assume that a man is a soul and body in one person. Here the subject might be left. All the ends of the spiritual life of the believer, are answered by this simple statement of the doctrine concerning Christ’s person as it is presented in the Scriptures. False explanations, however, create the necessity for a correct one. Errorists in all ages have so explained the facts recorded concerning Christ, as either to deny the truth concerning his divine nature, or the integrity of his human nature, or the unity of his person. Hence the Church has been constrained to teach what the Bible doctrine involves: first, as to the nature of the union of the two natures in Christ; and secondly, as to the consequences of that union.

Hodge, Charles. Systematic Theology: The Complete Three Volumes (pp. 901-907). GLH Publishing. Kindle Edition.
 
More from Hodge for edification purposes. (I understand why some systematic theologies read like devotionals and can culminate in doxology!)

The Hypostatical Union

Two Natures in Christ

There is a union. The elements united are the divine and human nature. By nature, in this connection is meant substance. In Greek the corresponding words are φύσις and οὐσία; in Latin, natura and substantia. The idea of substance is a necessary one. We are constrained to believe that where we see the manifestation of force, there is something, an objective entity which acts, and of which such force is the manifestation. It is self-evident that a non-ens cannot act. It may be well here to call to mind a few admitted principles which have already been repeatedly adverted to.

(1.) It is intuitively certain that attributes, properties, and power or force, necessarily imply a substance of which they are manifestations. Of nothing, nothing can be predicated. That of which we can predicate the attributes either of matter or mind, must of necessity be a reality.
(2.) It is no less certain that where the attributes are incompatible, the substances must be different and distinct. That which is extended cannot be unextended. That which is divisible cannot be indivisible. That which is incapable of thought cannot think. That which is finite cannot be infinite.
(3.) Equally certain is it that attributes cannot exist distinct and separate from substance. There cannot be accidentia sine subjecto; otherwise there might be extension without anything extended, and thought without anything that thinks.
(4.) Again, it is intuitively certain that the attributes of one substance cannot be transferred to another. Matter cannot be endowed with the attributes of mind; for then it would cease to be matter. Mind cannot be invested with the properties of matter, for then it would cease to be mind; neither can humanity be possessed of the attributes of divinity, for then it would cease to be humanity. This is only saying that the finite cannot be infinite.

Speaking in general terms, in the whole history of human thought, these principles have been recognized as axiomatic; and their denial puts an end to discussion. If the above mentioned principles be admitted, then it follows that in setting forth his Son as clothed in all the attributes of humanity, with a body that was born of a woman, which increased in stature, which was seen, felt, and handled; and with a soul that was troubled, joyful, and sorrowful, that increased in wisdom and was ignorant of certain things, God intends and requires that we should believe that He was a true man,—not a phantom, not an abstraction,—not the complex of properties without the substance of humanity, but a true or real man, like other men, yet without sin. In like manner when He is declared to be God over all, to be omniscient, almighty, and eternal, it is no less evident that He has a truly divine nature; that the substance of God in Him is the subject in which these divine attributes inhere. This being so, we are taught that the elements combined in the constitution of his person, namely, humanity and divinity, are two distinct natures, or substances. Such has been the faith of the Church universal.

In those ancient creeds which are adopted by the Greek, Latin, and Protestant Churches, it is declared that Christ as to his humanity is consubstantial with us, and as to his divinity, consubstantial with the Father. In the Council of Chalcedon, the Church declared our Lord to be,1 Θεὸν ἀληθῶς καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἀληθῶς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐκ ψυχῆς λογικῆς καὶ σώματος, ὁμοούσιον τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ τὴν θεότητα καὶ ὁμοούσιον τὸν αὐτὸν ἡμῖν κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπότητα. Thomas Aquinas says,2 “Humana natura in Christo quamvis sit substantia particularis: qui tamen venit in unionem cujusdam completi, scilicet totius Christi, prout est Deus et homo, non potest dici hypostasis vel suppositum: Sed illum completum ad quod concurrit, dicitur esse hypostasis vel suppositum.” In all the creeds of the Reformation the same doctrine is presented. In the “Augsburg Confession”3 it is said, “Filius Dei assumpsit humanam naturam in utero beatae Mariae virginis, ut sint duae naturae, divina et humana, in unitate personae inseparabiliter conjunctae, unus Christus, vere Deus et vere homo.” “Natura (φύσις, οὐσία) in Christo est substantia vel divinitatis vel humanitatis. Persona (ὑπόστασις, πρόσωπον) Christi est individuum ex utraque natura et divina et humana, conjuncta, non mixta, concretum.”4 In the “Second Helvetic Confession”5 it is said, “Agnoscimus in uno atque eodem Domino nostro Jesu Christo, duas naturas (for natura, substantia is used in other parts of the chapter), divinam et humanam….. In una persona unitae vel conjunctae [sunt]: ita ut unum Christum Dominum, non duos veneremur: unum inquam verum Deum, et hominem, juxta divinam naturam Patri, juxta humanam vero nobis hominibus consubstantialem, et per omnia similem, peccato excepto.” Therefore the theologians teach,6 “Natura divina est essentia divina, qua Christus Patri et Spiritui Sancto coessentialis est. Natura humana est essentia seu substantia humana, qua Christus nobis hominibus coessentialis est.” Or as stated in the ancient creeds, Christ is not ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος (one person and another person), but ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο (one substance and another substance).

The Two Natures are united but not mingled or confounded

We have seen that the first important point concerning the person of Christ is, that the elements united or combined in his person are two distinct substances, humanity and divinity; that He has in his constitution the same essence or substance which constitutes us men, and the same substance which makes God infinite, eternal, and immutable in all his perfections. The second point is, that this union is not by mixture so that a new, third substance is produced, which is neither humanity nor divinity but possessing the properties of both. This is an impossibility, because the properties in question are incompatible. We cannot mingle mind and matter so as to make a substance which is neither mind nor matter, but spiritual matter, for that would be a contradiction. It would amount to unextended extension, tangible intangibility, or visible invisibility.

Neither is it possible that the divine and human natures should be so mingled as to result in a third, which is neither purely human nor purely divine, but theanthropic. Christ’s person is theanthropic, but not his nature; for that would make the finite infinite, and the infinite finite. Christ would be neither God nor man; but the Scriptures constantly declare Him to be both God and man. In all Christian creeds therefore, it is declared that the two natures in Christ retain each its own properties and attributes. They all teach that the natures are not confounded, “Sed salvis potius et permanentibus naturarum proprietatibus in una persona unitae vel conjunctae.” As therefore the human body retains all its properties as matter, and the soul all its attributes as spirit in their union in our persons; so humanity and divinity retain each its peculiar properties in their union in the person of Christ. And as intelligence, sensibility, and will are the properties of the human soul, without which it ceases to be a soul, it follows that the human soul of Christ retained its intelligence, sensibility, and will. But intelligence and will are no less the essential properties of the divine nature, and therefore were retained after its union with the human nature in Christ. In teaching, therefore, that Christ was truly man and truly God, the Scriptures teach that He had a finite intelligence and will, and also an infinite intelligence. In Him, therefore, as the Church has ever maintained, there were and are two wills, two ἐνέργειαι or operations. His human intellect increased, his divine intelligence was, and is infinite. His human will had only human power, his divine will was, and is almighty. Mysterious and inscrutable as all this is, it is not more so than the union of the discordant elements of mind and matter in our own constitution.

There is no Transfer of the Attributes of one Nature to the Other

The third point in relation to the person of Christ, is that no attribute of the one nature is transferred to the other. This is virtually included in what has already been said. There are those, however, who admit that the two natures in Christ are not mixed or confounded, who yet maintain that the attributes of the one are transferred to the other. But the properties or attributes of a substance constitute its essence, so that if they be removed or if others of a different nature be added to them, the substance itself is changed. If you take rationality from mind it ceases to be mind. If you add rationality to matter it ceases to be matter. If you make that extended which in itself is incapable of extension, the identity of the thing is lost. If therefore infinity be conferred on the finite, it ceases to be finite. If divine attributes be conferred on man, he ceases to be man; and if human attributes be transferred to God, he ceases to be God. The Scriptures teach that the human nature of Christ remained in its integrity after the incarnation; and that the divine nature remained divine. The Bible never requires us to receive as true anything which the constitution of our nature given to us by God himself, forces us to believe to be false or impossible.

The Union is a Personal Union

The union of the two natures in Christ is a personal or hypostatic union. By this is meant, in the first place, that it is not a mere indwelling of the divine nature analogous to the indwelling of the Spirit of God in his people. Much less is it a mere moral or sympathetic union; or a temporary and mutable relation between the two. In the second place, it is intended to affirm that the union is such that Christ is but one person. As the union of the soul and body constitutes a man one person, so the union of the Son of God with our nature constitutes Him one person. And as in man the personality is in the soul and not in the body, so the personality of Christ is in the divine nature. Both of these points are abundantly evident from Scripture. The former, or the unity of Christ’s person, has already been proved; and the latter is proved by the fact that the Logos, or Son, was from all eternity a distinct person in the Godhead. It was a divine person, not merely a divine nature, that assumed humanity, or became incarnate. Hence it follows that the human nature of Christ, separately considered, is impersonal. To this, indeed, it is objected that intelligence and will constitute personality, and as these belong to Christ’s human nature personality cannot be denied to it. A person, however, is a suppositum intelligens, but the human nature of Christ is not a suppositum or subsistence. To personality both rational substance and distinct subsistence are essential. The latter the human nature of Christ never possessed. The Son of God did not unite Himself with a human person, but with a human nature. The proof of this is that Christ is but one person. The possibility of such a union cannot rationally be denied. Realists believe that generic humanity, although intelligent and voluntary, is impersonal, existing personally only in individual men. Although realism may not be a correct philosophy, the fact of its wide and long continued prevalence may be taken as a proof that it does not involve any palpable contradiction. Human nature, therefore, although endowed with intelligence and will, may be, and in fact is, in the person of Christ impersonal. That it is so is the plain doctrine of Scripture, for the Son of God, a divine person, assumed a perfect human nature, and, nevertheless, remains one person.

The facts, therefore, revealed in Scripture concerning Christ constrain us to believe,
(1.) That in his person two natures, the divine and the human, are inseparably united; and the word nature in this connection means substance.
(2.) That these two natures or substances are not mixed or confounded so as to form a third, which is neither the one nor the other. Each nature retains all its own properties unchanged; so that in Christ there is a finite intelligence and infinite intelligence, a finite will or energy, and an infinite will.
(3.) That no property of the divine nature is transferred to the human, and much less is any property of the human transferred to the divine. Humanity in Christ is not deified, nor is the divinity reduced to the limitations of humanity.
(4.) The union of the natures is not mere contact or occupancy of the same portion of space. It is not an indwelling, or a simple control of the divine nature over the operations of the human, but a personal union; such a union that its result is that Christ is one person with two distinct natures forever; at once God and man.

§ 4. Consequences of the Hypostatical Union Communion of Attributes

The first and most obvious of these consequences is, the κοινωνία ἰδιωμάτων, or communion of attributes. By this is not meant that the one nature participates in the attributes of the other, but simply that the person is the κοινωνός, or partaker of the attributes of both natures; so that whatever may be affirmed of either nature may be affirmed of the person. As of a man can be affirmed whatever is true of his body and whatever is true of his soul, so of Christ may be affirmed whatever is true of his human nature and whatever is true of his divinity; as we can say of a man that he is mortal and immortal; that he is a creature of the dust and the child of God: so we may say of Christ that He is finite and infinite; that He is ignorant and omniscient; that He is less than God and equal with God; that He existed from eternity and that He was born in time; that He created all things and that He was a man of sorrows. It is on this principle, that what is true of earlier nature is true of the person, that a multitude of passages of Scripture are to be explained. These passages are of different kinds.

1. Those in which the predicate belongs to the whole person. This is the most numerous class. Thus when Christ is called our Redeemer, our Lord, our King, Prophet, or Priest, our Shepherd, etc., all these things are true of Him not as the Logos, or Son, nor as the man Christ Jesus, but as the Θεάνθρωπος, the God-man. And in like manner, when He is said to have been humbled, to have given Himself for us, to be the head of the Church, to be our life, and to be our wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption, this is true of Christ as a person. The same may be said with regard to those passages in which He is said to be exalted above all principalities and powers; to sit at the right hand of God; and to come to judge the world.

2. There are many passages in which the person is the subject, but the predicate is true only of the divine nature, or of the Logos. As when our Lord said, “Before Abraham was I am;” “The glory which I had with thee before the foundation of the world;” or when it is said, “Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the world, and the heavens are the work of thine hands.”

3. Passages in which the person is the subject, but the predicate is true only of the human nature. As when Christ said, “I thirst;” “My soul is sorrowful even unto death.” And when we read that “Jesus wept.” So all those passages which speak of our Lord as walking, eating, and sleeping; and as being seen, touched, and handled. There are two classes of passages under this general head which are of special interest. First, those in which the person is designated from the divine nature when the predicate is true only of the human nature. “The Church of God which He purchased with his blood.” “The Lord of glory was crucified.” The Son knows not the time when the final judgment is to come. (Mark 13:32.) The forms of expression, therefore, long prevalent in the Church, “the blood of God,” “God the mighty maker died,” etc., are in accordance with Scriptural usage. And if it be right to say “God died,” it is right to say “He was born.” The person born of the Virgin Mary was a divine person. He was the Son of God. It is, therefore, correct to say that Mary was the mother of God. For, as we have seen, the person of Christ is in Scripture often designated from the divine nature, when the predicate is true only of the human nature.

On this particular form of expression, which, from its abuse, is generally offensive to Protestant ears, Turrettin remarks: “Maria potest dici vere θεοτόκος seu Mater Dei, Deipara, si vox Dei sumatur concrete pro toto personali Christi, quod constat ex persona Λόγου et natura humana, quo sensu vocatur Mater Domini Luc. 1:43, sed non precise et abstracte ratione Deitatis.”7 The second class of passages under this head are of the opposite kind, namely, those in which the person is denominated from the human nature when the predicate is true only of the divine nature. Thus Christ is called the Son of man who is in heaven. Here the denomination “Son of man” is from the human, while the predicate (ubiquity) is true only of the divine nature. So our Lord says, “What and if ye shall see the Son of man ascend up where He was before?” (John 6:62.) In Romans 9:5, He who was of the fathers (the seed of Abraham and son of David) is declared to be God over all and blessed forever.

4. There is a fourth class of passages which come under the first general head mentioned above, but have the peculiarity that the denomination is derived from the divine nature, when the predicate is not true of the divine nature itself, but only of the Θεάνθρωπος. Thus it is said, “The Son also himself shall be subject to him who put all things under him.” Here the designation Son is from the divine nature, but the subjection predicated is not of the Son as such, or of the Logos, nor is it simply of the human nature, but officially of the God-man. So our Lord says, “The Father is greater than I.” The Father is not greater than the Son, for they are the same in substance and equal in power and glory. It is as God-man that He is economically subject to the Father. Perhaps the passage in John 5:26 may belong to this class. “As the Father hath life in himself; so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself.” This may be understood of the eternal communication of life from the first to the second person of the Trinity (i. e., of eternal generation); or it may refer to the constitution of Christ’s person. And then the term Son would designate, not the Logos, but the Theanthropos, and the communication of life would not be from the Father to the Son, but from God to the Theanthropos. It pleased the Father that Christ should have a divine nature possessed of inherent life in order that He might be the source of life to his people. It is instructive to notice here how easily and naturally the sacred writers predicate of our Lord the attributes of humanity and those of divinity, however his person may be denominated. They call Him Lord, or Son, and attribute to Him, often in the same sentence, what is true of Him only as God, what is true only of his humanity, and what is true of Him only as the God-man. Thus in the beginning of the Epistle to the Hebrews it is said, God hath spoken unto us by his Son. Here Son means the incarnate Logos. In the next clause, “By whom he made the world,” what is said is true only of the eternal Son. So also what immediately follows, Who is “the brightness of his glory and the express image of his person, and upholding all things (the universe) by the word of his power.” But in the next clause, “When he had by himself (i. e., by his sacrificial death) purged away our sins,” the reference is to his human nature, as the body only died. And then it is added. He “sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high,” which is true of the God-man.

The Acts of Christ

The second consequence of the hypostatical union relates to the acts of Christ. As a man is one person, and because he is one person all his acts are the acts of that person, so all the acts of Christ are the acts of his whole person. But, as was before remarked, the acts of a man are of three classes: such as are purely mental, as thought; such as belong exclusively to the body, as digestion and assimilation; and such as are mixed, i. e., both mental and corporeal, as all voluntary acts, as speaking, writing, etc. Yet all are equally the acts of the man. It is the man who thinks, who digests his food, and who speaks. So of the acts of Christ. Some are purely divine, as creation and preservation; some are purely human, as eating, drinking, and sleeping; some are theanthropic, i. e., those in which both natures concur, as in the work of redemption. Yet all these acts are the acts of Christ, of one and the same person. It was Christ who created the world. It was Christ who ate and drank. And it is Christ who redeems us from the power of darkness. Here also, as in the case of the attributes of Christ, his person may be denominated from one nature when the act ascribed to Him belongs to the other nature. He is called God, the Son of God, the Lord of glory, when his delivering Himself unto death is spoken of. And He is called man, or the Son of man, when the acts ascribed to Him involve the exercise of divine power or authority. It is the Son of man who forgives sins; who is Lord of the Sabbath; who raises the dead; and who is to send forth his angels to gather his elect. Such being the Scriptural doctrine concerning the person of Christ, it follows that although the divine nature is immutable and impassible, and therefore neither the obedience nor the suffering of Christ was the obedience or suffering of the divine nature, yet they were none the less the obedience and suffering of a divine person. The soul of man cannot be wounded or burnt, but when the body is injured it is the man who suffers.

In like manner the obedience of Christ was the righteousness of God, and the blood of Christ was the blood of God. It is to this fact that the infinite merit and efficiency of his work are due. This is distinctly asserted in the Scriptures. It is impossible, says the Apostle, that the blood of bulls and of goats could take away sin. It was because Christ was possessed of an eternal Spirit that He by the one offering of Himself hath perfected forever them who are sanctified. This is the main idea insisted upon in the Epistle to the Hebrews. This is the reason given why the sacrifice of Christ need never be repeated, and why it is infinitely more efficacious than those of the old dispensation. This truth has been graven on the hearts of believers in all ages. Every such believer says from his heart, “Jesus, my God, thy blood alone has power sufficient to atone.”

The Man Christ Jesus the object of Worship

Another obvious inference from this doctrine is that the man Christ Jesus is the object of religious worship. To worship, in the religious sense of the word, is to ascribe divine perfections to its object. The possession of those perfections, is, therefore, the only proper ground for such worship. the humanity of Christ, consequently, is not the ground of worship, but it enters into the constitution of that person who, being God over all and blessed forever, is the object of adoration to saints and angels. We accordingly find that it was He whom they saw, felt, and handled, that the Apostles worshipped as their Lord and God; whom they loved supremely, and to whom they consecrated themselves as a living sacrifice.

Christ can sympathize with his People

A third inference which the Apostles drew from this doctrine is, that Christ is a merciful and faithful high-priest. He is just the Saviour we need. God as God, the eternal Logos, could neither be nor do what our necessities demand. Much less could any mere man, however wise, holy, or benevolent, meet the wants of our souls. It is only a Saviour who is both God and man in two distinct natures and one person forever, who is all we need and all we can desire. As God He is ever present, almighty and infinite in all his resources to, save and bless; and as man, or being also a man, He can be touched with a sense of our infirmities, was tempted as we are, was subject to the law which we violated, and endured the penalty which we had incurred. In Him dwells all the fulness of the Godhead, in a bodily form, in fashion as a man, so as to be accessible to us, and so that from his fulness we can all partake. We are therefore complete in Him, wanting nothing. The Incarnate Logos the Source of Life The Scriptures teach that the Logos is everlasting life, having life in Himself, and the source of life, physical, intellectual, and spiritual. They further teach that his incarnation was the necessary condition of the communication of spiritual life to the children of men. He, therefore, is the only Saviour, the only source of life to us. We become partakers of this life, by union with Him. This union is partly federal established in the councils of eternity; partly vital by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit; and partly voluntary and conscious by faith. It is to those who believe, to those who receive Him as God manifest in the flesh, that He becomes eternal life. For it is not they who live, but Christ who liveth in them. (Gal. 2:20.) The life of the believer is not a corporate life, conditioned on union with any outward organization, called the Church, for whosoever calls on the name of the Lord, that is, whosoever religiously worships Him and looks to Him as his God and Saviour, shall be saved, whether in a dungeon or alone in a desert.

The Exaltation of the Human Nature of Christ

Another consequence of the hypostatical union is the exaltation of the humanity of Christ. As the human body in virtue of its vital union with an immortal soul, is immeasurably exalted above any mere material organization in the universe (so far as known or revealed), so the humanity of Christ in virtue of its union with his divine nature is immeasurably exalted in dignity and worth, and even power over all intelligent creatures. The human body, however, is not now, and will not be, even when made like to Christ’s glorious body, so exalted as to cease to be material. In like manner the humanity of Christ is not so exalted by its union with his divine nature as to cease to be human. This would break the bond of sympathy between Him and us. It has been the pious fault of some Christians that they merge his humanity in his Godhead. This is as real, if not so fatal an error, as merging his Godhead in his humanity.

We must hold fast to both. “The Man Christ Jesus,” and “The God over all blessed forever,” is the one undivided inseparable object of the adoration, love, and confidence of the people of God; who can each say,—

“Jesus, my God, I know his name,
His name is all my trust;
Nor will He put my soul to shame,
Nor let my hope be lost.”

Hodge, Charles. Systematic Theology: The Complete Three Volumes (pp. 907-916). GLH Publishing. Kindle Edition.
 
Sproul on if Christ had the ability to sin when he was tempted in the wilderness:

I could be wrong as it is not so easy to track a technical argument on audio without a written text, but it sounds like Sproul has mixed up the necessity of the consequence and the necessity of the consequent. The first is contingent; but he has made the first absolute and the latter contingent. Muller: "necessity of the consequent; i.e., the necessity of something that cannot be other than what it is, which is to say, a simple or absolute necessity." In this respect Jesus simply could not have sinned. So Sproul must have confused the two in his presentation.

My own view is that He could not have sinned in either case. Even in the necessity of the consequence, contingently the covenant of grace does much more than the decree since it secures all the contingencies and ensures the outcome. Christ becomes Surety and says, "Lo, I come, to do thy will." There is no way He could not have done the Father's will for our salvation, including His sinlessness. Add to this that the human nature is enhypostatic, then the human nature is not independent of the Person of the Son, and the Person of the Son simply cannot sin.

By a necessity of the consequent, or absolute necessity, the Person of the Son is divine. It is an absolute, logical impossibility for God to sin. Since the enhypostatic human nature has no independent personal existence apart from the Son, the one Person acting in and through it is impeccable. The actor is holy, therefore the action is holy.

By a necessity of the consequence, or conditional necessity, the Son voluntarily entered the eternal covenant as our Surety. Given this free, contingent decision, it became a necessary consequence that He perfectly fulfil the Father's will, including living a sinless life. For Him to have sinned would have been to break the covenant and make God a liar, which is impossible.

The temptations were real. He truly experienced the full assault in His human soul including His will; but the outcome was never in doubt. His victory was not a narrow escape from possibility, but the assured triumph of our covenantal, divine Saviour.
 
I could be wrong as it is not so easy to track a technical argument on audio without a written text, but it sounds like Sproul has mixed up the necessity of the consequence and the necessity of the consequent. The first is contingent; but he has made the first absolute and the latter contingent. Muller: "necessity of the consequent; i.e., the necessity of something that cannot be other than what it is, which is to say, a simple or absolute necessity." In this respect Jesus simply could not have sinned. So Sproul must have confused the two in his presentation.

My own view is that He could not have sinned in either case. Even in the necessity of the consequence, contingently the covenant of grace does much more than the decree since it secures all the contingencies and ensures the outcome. Christ becomes Surety and says, "Lo, I come, to do thy will." There is no way He could not have done the Father's will for our salvation, including His sinlessness. Add to this that the human nature is enhypostatic, then the human nature is not independent of the Person of the Son, and the Person of the Son simply cannot sin.

By a necessity of the consequent, or absolute necessity, the Person of the Son is divine. It is an absolute, logical impossibility for God to sin. Since the enhypostatic human nature has no independent personal existence apart from the Son, the one Person acting in and through it is impeccable. The actor is holy, therefore the action is holy.

By a necessity of the consequence, or conditional necessity, the Son voluntarily entered the eternal covenant as our Surety. Given this free, contingent decision, it became a necessary consequence that He perfectly fulfil the Father's will, including living a sinless life. For Him to have sinned would have been to break the covenant and make God a liar, which is impossible.

The temptations were real. He truly experienced the full assault in His human soul including His will; but the outcome was never in doubt. His victory was not a narrow escape from possibility, but the assured triumph of our covenantal, divine Saviour.
It seems that if one does not remember to focus on the Divine Person and fails to treat the human nature as enhypostatic, then it introduces a problem and treats Jesus as just another man who theoretically has the possibility of sinning.
 
It seems that if one does not remember to focus on the Divine Person and fails to treat the human nature as enhypostatic, then it introduces a problem and treats Jesus as just another man who theoretically has the possibility of sinning.

That is it in a nutshell. Human nature as such is able to sin, but it is only able to sin because it is also part of a human person. Persons act; natures are. Sin is not merely a physical or psychological event; it is a personal, moral act. It is an act for which a person is responsible. A "nature" in the abstract does not sin; a person sins through their nature.

For Christ there is no human person who could be the subject of a sinful act. The sole acting subject is the Divine Son. He acts through His human nature, but the "who" that is acting is God. That is why His blood is called the blood of God. Therefore, to say Jesus could have sinned is to say God could have sinned. It is an ontological impossibility.
 
What are your thoughts on this?


Could Jesus Have Sinned?​

R.C. Sproul R.C. Sproul


Could Jesus Have Sinned?


The best theologians, past and present, have been divided on the question of whether Jesus could have sinned. I believe that since Jesus was fully human, it was possible for him to sin. Obviously, the divine nature cannot sin. But if Christ's divine nature prevented him from sinning, in what sense did he obey the law of God as the second Adam? At his birth, Jesus' human nature was exactly the same as Adam's before the fall, with respect to his moral capabilities. Jesus had what Augustine called the posse peccare and the posse non peccare, that is, the ability to sin and the ability not to sin. Adam sinned; Jesus did not. Satan did everything in his power to corrupt Jesus and tempt him to sin. That would have been an exercise in futility had he been trying to tempt a divine person to sin. Satan was not trying to get God to sin. He was trying to get the human nature of Christ to sin, so that he would not be qualified to be the Savior.

I think it is wrong to believe that Christ’s divine nature made it impossible for his human nature to sin. —R.C. Sproul
At the same time, Christ was uniquely sanctified and ministered to by the Holy Spirit. In order to sin, a person must have a desire for sin. But Jesus' human nature throughout his life was marked by a zeal for righteousness. "My food is to do the will of Him who sent Me" (John 4:34), he said. As long as Jesus had no desire to sin, he would not sin. I may be wrong, but I think it is wrong to believe that Christ's divine nature made it impossible for his human nature to sin. If that were the case, the temptation, the tests, and his assuming of the responsibility of the first Adam would have all been charades. This position protects the integrity of the authenticity of the human nature because it was the human nature that carried out the mission of the second Adam on our behalf. It was the human nature uniquely anointed beyond measure by the Holy Spirit.


Excerpt from R.C. Sproul's, Truths We Confess
 
"He was trying to get the human nature of Christ to sin, so that he would not be qualified to be the Savior."

This statement from Sproul helps to show a basic misunderstanding. From a classical Christological standpoint it is nonsense. A nature cannot be tempted in isolation from the person. Satan was not tempting a nature; he was tempting the eternal Son of God. He was tempting the Person. And that Person, by virtue of being God, is holy, immutable, and impeccable.

The Person is the acting subject. This does not make the temptation less real, as Sproul seems to suppose. It reveals that Satan's project was futile because he was attacking a Person whose fundamental identity made moral failure impossible. The victory of Christ was not in avoiding a possible fall, but in actively and righteously conquering the tempter as the "Son." The whole temptation is predicated on the Father's testimony, "This is my Son in whom I am well pleased." Everything we confess about Christ is predicated on that fundamental truth, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God."
 
I could be wrong as it is not so easy to track a technical argument on audio without a written text, but it sounds like Sproul has mixed up the necessity of the consequence and the necessity of the consequent. The first is contingent; but he has made the first absolute and the latter contingent. Muller: "necessity of the consequent; i.e., the necessity of something that cannot be other than what it is, which is to say, a simple or absolute necessity." In this respect Jesus simply could not have sinned. So Sproul must have confused the two in his presentation.

My own view is that He could not have sinned in either case. Even in the necessity of the consequence, contingently the covenant of grace does much more than the decree since it secures all the contingencies and ensures the outcome. Christ becomes Surety and says, "Lo, I come, to do thy will." There is no way He could not have done the Father's will for our salvation, including His sinlessness. Add to this that the human nature is enhypostatic, then the human nature is not independent of the Person of the Son, and the Person of the Son simply cannot sin.

By a necessity of the consequent, or absolute necessity, the Person of the Son is divine. It is an absolute, logical impossibility for God to sin. Since the enhypostatic human nature has no independent personal existence apart from the Son, the one Person acting in and through it is impeccable. The actor is holy, therefore the action is holy.

By a necessity of the consequence, or conditional necessity, the Son voluntarily entered the eternal covenant as our Surety. Given this free, contingent decision, it became a necessary consequence that He perfectly fulfil the Father's will, including living a sinless life. For Him to have sinned would have been to break the covenant and make God a liar, which is impossible.

The temptations were real. He truly experienced the full assault in His human soul including His will; but the outcome was never in doubt. His victory was not a narrow escape from possibility, but the assured triumph of our covenantal, divine Saviour.
Sproul takes it further in the clip. He goes on to say denying the ability of Christ to sin revisits the early Monophysite heresy and makes his temptation “a sham”.
 
Sproul takes it further in the clip. He goes on to say denying the ability of Christ to sin revisits the early Monophysite heresy and makes his temptation “a sham”.

He goes nuclear. But with his misunderstanding of "nature" it blows up in his face. He doesn't factor in the basic understanding that "natures" do not act. A person acts according to his nature. The nature only enables the act.
 
I agree with Rev Winzer. To use an illustration: an invincible army cannot lose, but it can still be attacked. Its invincibility doesn't make the attack less real.
 
"He was trying to get the human nature of Christ to sin, so that he would not be qualified to be the Savior."

This statement from Sproul helps to show a basic misunderstanding. From a classical Christological standpoint it is nonsense. A nature cannot be tempted in isolation from the person. Satan was not tempting a nature; he was tempting the eternal Son of God. He was tempting the Person. And that Person, by virtue of being God, is holy, immutable, and impeccable.

The Person is the acting subject. This does not make the temptation less real, as Sproul seems to suppose. It reveals that Satan's project was futile because he was attacking a Person whose fundamental identity made moral failure impossible. The victory of Christ was not in avoiding a possible fall, but in actively and righteously conquering the tempter as the "Son." The whole temptation is predicated on the Father's testimony, "This is my Son in whom I am well pleased." Everything we confess about Christ is predicated on that fundamental truth, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God."
I feel like we may have had this same exchange before. You say that natures cannot be tempted in isolation from the person, but we acknowledge that Christ has two wills, meaning the wills pertain to his two natures, and if natures have wills why cannot the temptations that relate to one will or the other be ascribed to one nature or the other?
 
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I feel like we may have had this same exchange before. You say that natures cannot be tempted in isolation from the person, but we acknowledge that Christ has two wills, meaning the wills pertain to his two natures, and if natures have wills why cannot the temptations that pertain to one will or the other be ascribed to one nature or the other?
My understanding is that both of Christ's wills have to act in accordance with one another. (I could be wrong)
 
My understanding is that both of Christ's wills have to act in accordance with one another. (I could be wrong)
Have to, or will to? If the human will were constrained by necessity to accordance with the divine will, wouldn't that be a communication of attributes from nature to nature such that he could not truly possess the will of a man like we possess?
 
Have to, or will to? If the human will were constrained by necessity to accordance with the divine will, wouldn't that be a communication of attributes from nature to nature such that he could not truly possess the will of a man like we possess?
Now you’re making me think! The divine and human nature are not independent entities. The divine nature takes on human nature and the natures are united in the person of Christ. Natures do not act, but persons do. If one nature acted out of accord with the other, it would necessitate two persons.

I might be completely wrong here. I’ll do a bit of reading and come back and amend if necessary.
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Quote from the Definition of Faith produced by the ecumenical council Constantinople III:
we likewise declare that in him are two natural wills and two natural operations indivisibly, inconvertibly, inseparably, inconfusedly, according to the teaching of the holyFathers. And these two natural wills are not contrary the one to the other (God forbid!) as the impious heretics assert, but his human will follows and that not as resisting and reluctant, but rather as subject to his divine and omnipotent will. For it was right that the flesh should be moved but subject to the divine will, according to the most wise Athanasius. For as his flesh is called and is the flesh of God the Word, so also the natural will of his flesh is called and is the proper will of God the Word, as he himself says: I came down from heaven, not that I might do my own will but the will of the Father which sent me! where he calls his own will the will of his flesh, inasmuch as his flesh was also his own. For as his most holy and immaculate animated flesh was not destroyed because it was deified but continued in its own state and nature (ὄρῳ τε καὶ λόγῳ), so also his human will, although deified, was not suppressed, but was rather preserved according to the saying of Gregory Theologus: His will [i.e., the Saviour's] is not contrary to God but altogether deified.
 
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I feel like we may have had this same exchange before. You say that natures cannot be tempted in isolation from the person, but we acknowledge that Christ has two wills, meaning the wills pertain to his two natures, and if natures have wills why cannot the temptations that relate to one will or the other be ascribed to one nature or the other?

I cannot recollect it. Sorry.

The human will, as part of the human nature, subsists in the Person of the Logos. It has no independent personality of its own. As it was the Person of the Logos who acted through His human nature, including His human will, He was not able to sin because that Person is not able to sin.

Perhaps Geerhardus Vos could assist in thinking about this: "The person works through, in, and behind the fully human nature of the Mediator. The unity of the person is not merely verbal but answers to a reality. The human nature, though it has self-consciousness and will and feeling, does not operate of itself but is at every moment the instrument of the person who bears it. It does have substance but no subsistence in itself... It is the Logos who makes use of the human nature existing in Him as its organ... the Logos is the person for the human nature, the starting point for all its thoughts and emotions. Here for us lies the mystery in the doctrine of the Mediator as God-man. We cannot explain how human understanding, human will, and human feeling were joined to and united with the person of the Son of God."

There is also the consideration that to the human nature was given the plenitude of the Spirit both in gifts and graces to equip Christ to do the work of the Mediator for us. At every moment He acted under the sanctifying operation of the Spirit in which He was conceived and separated from sin.
 
I agree with Rev Winzer. To use an illustration: an invincible army cannot lose, but it can still be attacked. Its invincibility doesn't make the attack less real.
Your illustration helps! I remember reading something similar about a rowboat attacking a battleship...

Shedd shed some helpful light on this subject for me

"It is objected to the doctrine of Christ's impeccability that it is inconsistent with his temptability. A person who cannot sin, it is said, cannot be tempted to sin. This is not correct; any more than it would be correct to say that because an army cannot be conquered it cannot be attacked. Temptability depends upon constitutional susceptibility, while impeccability depends upon the will. So far as his natural susceptibility, both physical and mental, was concerned, Jesus Christ was open to all forms of human temptation excepting those that spring out of lust or corruption of nature. But his peccability, or possibility of being overcome by those temptations would depend upon the amount of voluntary resistance which he was able to bring to bear against them. Those temptations were very strong, but if the self determination of his holy will was stronger than they, then they could not induce him to sin, and he would be impeccable. And yet plainly he would be temptable....It is foolish to attempt to decide what the human nature of Christ would have done if not joined to the divine nature. The fact remains that the human nature was joined to the divine nature and, while it's own realm was entirely human, it could not involve the person of Christ in sin. On the ground of omnipotence, then, it may be concluded that Christ could not sin because He had infinite power to resist temptation "
 
Thanks for the Shedd quote. It would have been interesting to get Sproul's response on it. In my mind the peccability point is a non-issue because it's a matter of perspective and Sproul was trying to defend the magnitude of Christ's resisting temptation. I think he would have agreed with "impeccability" if defined as Shedd did above, as depending upon the will.
 
He goes nuclear. But with his misunderstanding of "nature" it blows up in his face. He doesn't factor in the basic understanding that "natures" do not act. A person acts according to his nature. The nature only enables the act.
I’m with you. But this doesn’t account for his assertion that the human nature of Jesus (acquired from Mary) was capable of sin regardless of his faithfulness. Sproul suggests that the bigger picture at hand is the decree of God, much the same as our own will not being violated in the fulfillment of any divine purpose. Yet one would scarcely argue that our wills don’t have the ability to sin even as the decree of God is carried out.
 
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