Murray's Critique of Hodge on Imputation

[MW]

This is a spin off from another thread.

Eastern Orthodoxy and Original Sin

I do, but I'm not sure how straightforward the issue is if our nature equally stood or fell in virtue of Adam's moral obedience or disobedience (given that it is through Adam's nature that he obeyed or disobeyed). I'll need to think about it more, and I'd like to see fuller context of De Moor's...

www.puritanboard.com

I was asked: "I'll put it this way; what do you think of Murray's analysis of Hodge in the context of the Reformed tradition on pgs. 72-85?"

I have mixed thoughts about the critique. On the one hand, I think he has pinpointed a weakness in Hodge's statement of imputation being limited to liability to satisfy justice. He has shown that there must be a corresponding forensic state in which the person is "constituted a sinner." But I think this is implied in Hodge's statement. I don't see that he would have denied this as being the direct consequence of imputation. It may be that his polemic against detractors of the doctrine consumed his thoughts on this particular point so that he did not see a need to give explicit expression to its consequence.

On the other hand, Murray wants to find something "real" in the sinner that forms part of the imputation. This is problematic. He expresses himself this way:

“The imputation is not thus conceived of as something causally antecedent to the depravity but as that which includes depravity as an element” (p. 92).

The problem does not lie in the fact that he has included depravity as part of the real condition of the sinner. That is necessary in its own place. He has now removed imputation as the cause going before depravity, that is, as its judicial basis. In doing so he has actually destroyed Hodge's argument for imputation. For Hodge imputation makes the posterity of Adam liable to punishment, and depravity is part of the punishment. For Murray depravity is part of the imputation itself. So now we are left without any judicial reason for depravity. It becomes a necessity of nature.

This creates all kinds of knock-on effects. Murray himself identifies the first one for us: "Furthermore, the relation of depravity to natural generation may also have to be formulated in a different fashion. It may not be strictly accurate to say that we become depraved by natural generation." We are now venturing into unexplored territory, and Murray has set himself up to guide us. But that is the end of the line. We don't go anywhere from this point. So Murray circles back, and says, "But the reason why we are naturally generated in sin is that, whenever we begin to be, we begin to be as sinful because of our solidarity with Adam in his sin." He has just defeated his own hypothesis. He has made our solidarity with Adam in his sin to be the antecedent cause of our depravity. It is hopeless!

Hodge is right after all. But we can be thankful Murray has exposed a weakness in his statement. The consequence of being forensically constituted sinners is a necessary part of the doctrine of imputation. Just as being forensically constituted righteous will be a necessary part of the imputation of Christ's righteousness to the believer.

Now this thread is opened I hope to use it to include quotations from other theologians to shed some light on this problem.

 

[MW]

William Cunningham, Historical Theology, 1:510, 511, gives the lay of the land and sets up the issue in a useful and transparent way:

"Those, then, who hold the Calvinistic view of the state of the case with respect to the moral character and condition of men, may not unreasonably be asked whether they can give any other account of the origin, or any explanation of the cause, of this fearful state of things. Now, in the history of the discussions which have taken place upon this subject, we can trace four pretty distinct courses which have been taken by theologians who all admitted the total native depravity of mankind: First, some have refused to attempt any explanation of the state of the case, beyond the general statement that Scripture represents it as in some way or other connected with, and resulting from, the fall of Adam, and have denied, expressly or by plain implication, the common Calvinistic doctrine of imputation. A second class, comprehending the great body of Calvinistic divines, have regarded it as, in some measure and to some extent, explained by the principle of its being a penal infliction upon men, resulting from the imputation to them of the guilt of Adam's first sin. A third class, while refusing to admit in words the doctrine of imputation, as commonly stated by orthodox divines, have yet put forth such views of the connection between Adam and his posterity, and of the bearing of his first sin upon them, as embody the sum and substance of all, or almost all, that the avowed defenders of the doctrine of imputation intend by it. And, lastly, there is a fourth class, who, while professing in words to hold the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin, yet practically and substantially neutralize it or explain it away, especially by means of a distinction they have devised between immediate or antecedent, and mediate or consequent imputation, -- denying the former, which is the only true and proper imputation, and admitting only the latter."

As to the cause of depravity, Cunningham observes, "the great body of Calvinistic divines, have regarded it as, in some measure and to some extent, explained by the principle of its being a penal infliction upon men, resulting from the imputation to them of the guilt of Adam's first sin. It is undoubtedly this particular position as held by the great body of Calvinistic divines that our problem is concerned with.

 

[MW]

William Cunningham, The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation, 374, 375, explains what is meant by the common Calvinistic doctrine in precise terminology.

"The doctrine which has been held upon this subject, by the great body of Calvinistic divines, is this, that in virtue of a federal headship or representative identity, established by God between Adam and all descending from him by ordinary generation, his first sin is imputed to them, or put down to their account; and they are regarded and treated by God as if they had all committed it in their own person, to the effect of their being subjected to its legal penal consequences, -- so that, in this sense, they may be truly said to have sinned in him and fallen with him in his first transgression. Upon this theory, the direct and immediate imputation of Adam's first sin to his posterity, or the holding them as involved in the guilt or reatus of that offence, is regarded as prior in the order of nature and causality to the transmission and universal prevalence among men of a depraved moral nature; and as being, to some extent, the cause or ground, -- the rationale or explanation, -- of the fearful fact that man is morally what he is, a thoroughly ungodly and depraved being. The great body of Calvinistic theologians have believed, that Scripture sufficiently warrants this definite doctrine about the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, or about the true character of the relation subsisting between him and them, and the bearing of the results of this relation upon their condition; and in this belief we are persuaded they are right."

In precise terms, then, the Calvinistic doctrine is that the imputation of Adam's sin is the antecedent cause of depravity, not that depravity is a part of the imputation. It is not just that the imputation is immediate, but is causally antecedent to the corruption of human nature. Cunningham's article goes on to relate how this doctrine developed in the reformed tradition.

 

[MW]

The distinction of guilt as reatus culpae and reatus poenae is masterfully explained by Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 245, 246. The consequences of rejecting it are immense, both for the doctrine of personal responsibility for sin, and for the doctrine of the justification of sinners.

" The word "guilt" expresses the relation which sin bears to justice or, as the older theologians put it, to the penalty of the law. He who is guilty stands in a penal relation to the law. We can speak of guilt in a twofold sense, namely, as reatus culpae and as reatus poenae. The former, which Turretin calls "potential guilt," is the intrinsic moral ill-desert of an act or state. This is of the essence of sin and is an inseparable part of its sinfulness. It attaches only to those who have themselves committed sinful deeds, and attaches to them permanently. It cannot be removed by forgiveness, and is not removed by justification on the basis of the merits of Jesus Christ, and much less by mere pardon. Man's sins are inherently ill-deserving even after he is justified. Guilt in this sense cannot be transferred from one person to another. The usual sense, however, in which we speak of guilt in theology, is that of reatus poenae. By this is meant desert of punishment, or obligation to render satisfaction to God's justice for self-determined violation of the law. Guilt in this sense is not of the essence of sin, but is rather a relation to the penal sanction of the law. If there had been no sanction attached to the disregard of moral relations, every departure from the law would have been sin, but would not have involved liability to punishment. Guilt in this sense may be removed by the satisfaction of justice, either personally or vicariously. It may be transferred from one person to another, or assumed by one person for another. It is removed from believers by justification, so that their sins, though inherently ill-deserving, do not make them liable to punishment."

 

[MW]

Berkhof's explanation accords with his teacher, Geerhardus Vos, Reformed Dogmatics, 243, 244, who gives a more formal account of it.

"Sin includes guilt and pollution. Pollution is understood as spiritual, inherent depravity to which a sinful soul falls prey. Pollution is therefore not present before the soul itself is present. It is inconceivable without antecedent and subsequent guilt. Guilt, however, is conceivable without pollution. In Adam’s first sinful motion, guilt and pollution coincided. Guilt does not necessarily presuppose the actual presence of the soul. One can be guilty covenantally. It is not something that was a reality in man but a reality with respect to man. Guilt exists in the judgment of God. It is called reatus [liability] by the theologians.

One distinguishes, then, between a) reatus culpae [liability to guilt] and b) reatus poenae [liability to punishment]. By reatus culpae, one means the turpitude and criminality that is inseparable from any sin in the judgment of God and men. As something individual, it cannot be transmitted to another. It is otherwise for reatus poenae, obligation to punishment. This is transferable."

 

[Knight]

For my part, I will be more interested in theologians who precede Hodge. Regarding Vos, for example, I already knew that I disagree with his following statement (link): "...the righteousness by which he stands righteous before God is transmitted to him by imputation... Without effecting a life-union between Christ and believers, God still could have transmitted His righteousness to them."

This sort of voluntarism is problematic for similar reasons I mention in the thread from which the original post stems. See also the Westminster Larger Catechism:

WLC Q. 66. What is that union which the elect have with Christ?

A. The union which the elect have with Christ is the work of God’s grace, whereby they are spiritually and mystically, yet really and inseparably, joined to Christ as their head and husband; which is done in their effectual calling.

This effectual calling logically precedes justification, not proceeds from it.

Anyways, thank you for the response. What do you think of Murray's remark that for "Reformed theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries... there can be no poena or, for that matter, reatus poena apart from culpa" (pgs. 79-80)? Then on page 81, he summarizes a statement by Calvin to mean that "...this is to say that there is no liability to penalty without blameworthiness." And so forth for several more pages. Are you willing to concede that Hodge's statements diverged from the Reformed tradition? Let me repeat Hodge's problematic contentions:

Hodge: "Imputation does not imply a participation of the criminality of the sin imputed."

Hodge: To impute sin, in Scriptural and theological language, is to impute the guilt of sin. And by guilt is meant not criminality or moral ill-desert, or demerit, much less moral pollution, but the judicial obligation to satisfy justice.

I am less interested in theorizing what Hodge might have held had he been alive today. I am also less interested in Murray's own view, as Murray is not a realist. You are of course welcome to add anything else you like, I am just focusing on the original intent of my question from the other thread: "What sort of "justice" does not take into account criminality and so forth when judging?"

 

[MW]

Anyways, thank you for the response. What do you think of Murray's remark that for "Reformed theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries... there can be no poena or, for that matter, reatus poena apart from culpa" (pgs. 79-80)? Then on page 81, he summarizes a statement by Calvin to mean that "...this is to say that there is no liability to penalty without blameworthiness." And so forth for several more pages. Are you willing to concede that Hodge's statements diverged from the Reformed tradition? Let me repeat Hodge's problematic contentions:

I am not willing to concede that at all. Hodge is right. Murray has failed to parse the issue. The divines are not saying these are two different things that are imputed. They are saying, in the matter of imputation, that they are the same thing, that is, that guilt only pertains to liability to punishment. They say everything that Hodge, Cunningham, Vos, and Berkhof have maintained.

If you like I can use this thread for the purpose of demonstrating this. But will it really matter in the scheme of things? None of these divines are realists. So they will fall into the same category as Murray as far as your position is concerned.

 

[Knight]

I am not willing to concede that at all. Hodge is right. Murray has failed to parse the issue. The divines are not saying these are two different things that are imputed. They are saying, in the matter of imputation, that they are the same thing, that is, that guilt only pertains to liability to punishment. They say everything that Hodge, Cunningham, Vos, and Berkhof have maintained.

That is decidedly false inasmuch as it completely ignores Murray's citations regarding culpa, the very thing Hodge rejects.

You are free to use this thread for whatever purposes you like, of course. I only stated my own interest in the matter.

 

[MW]

John Murray's quotation of John Owen is as follows:

"“Much less is there any thing of weight in the distinction of ‘reatus culpae’ and ‘reatus poenae;’ for this ‘reatus culpae’ is nothing but ‘dignitas poenae propter culpam’ …. So, therefore, there can be no punishment, nor ‘reatus poenae,’ the guilt of it, but where there is ‘reatus culpae,’ or sin considered with its guilt…”

According to Murray, "This latter quotation conveniently introduces us to what may well be considered as the consensus of Reformed theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries."

Murray is taking Owen to mean they are two different things. Owen is actually saying culpae is nothing but the worthiness of punishment on account of the fault. Murray has clearly failed to interpret Owen correctly.

Murray then turns to Van Mastricht: "On the relations of these three elements, the definition of Van Mastricht is representative and, in any event, most succinct: 'Reatus is therefore the medium quid between culpa and poena, for it arises from culpa and leads to poena, so that it is at the same time the reatus of culpa and of poena and, as a medium, intervenes between these two termini and takes its name from both equally'."

Here reatus is ONE THING, not TWO. Van Mastricht is explaining how guilt stands as a MEDIUM between the fault and its punishment. Murray takes them as two things.

I will follow up with quotations which demonstrate Hodge's position was essentially correct.

 

[MW]

The quotation from John Owen (Works, 5:199) follows in full. It clearly articulates what he means, as he distinguishes it from the formal nature of sin and the stain of filth it brings on the soul. He states unequivocally that it is nothing but its respect unto punishment. There are not two things, as Murray imagines, but one thing, and that one thing concerns "the revenge due to sin"

Much less is there any thing of weight in the distinction of "reatus culpæ" and "reatus pœnæ;" for this "reatus culpæ" is nothing but "dignitas pœnæ propter culpam." Sin hath other considerations, -- namely, its formal nature, as it is a transgression of the law, and the stain of filth that it brings upon the soul; but the guilt of it is nothing but its respect unto punishment from the sanction of the law. And so, indeed, "reatus culpæe" is "reatus pœnæ," guilt of sin is its desert of punishment. And where there is not this "reatus culpa" there can be no "poena," no punishment properly so called; for "pœna" is "vindicta noxæ," -- the revenge due to sin.

Owen goes on to make the point that they must be of the same signification otherwise there would be an equivocation leading to an uncouth conclusion. The one signification he gives these terms has respect to punishment:

And if this distinction should be apprehended to be of "reatus," from its formal respect unto sin and punishment, it must, in both parts of the distinction, be of the same signification, otherwise there is an equivocation in the subject of it. But "reatus pœnæ" is a liableness, an obnoxiousness unto punishment according to the sentence of the law, that whereby a sinner becomes ódios T &* and then "reatus culpa" must be an obnoxiousness unto sin; which is uncouth. There is, therefore, no imputation of sin where there is no imputation of its guilt; for the guilt of punishment, which is not its respect unto the desert of sin, is a plain fiction, -- there is no such thing "in rerum natura." There is no guilt of sin, but in its relation unto punishment.

 

[MW]

Van Mastricht is quoted in Baird's The First and the Second Adam, p. 465. He explicitly states, "the distinction is made without a difference," contrary to Murray's reading of him

Of the distinction between reatus pœnæ and reatus culpæ, this writer says, "All guilt consists in obligation to punishment; therefore the distinction is made without a difference; for guilt is a medium between crime and punishment, which, growing out of the crime, leads to the punishment, -- coalescing with both, and constituting a medium which embraces both, and is designated as much from the one as from the other."

As noted above, it is one and the same thing, not two different things.

 

[MW]

John Flavel (Works 3:580) interprets Owen in the same way, showing that guilt is obnoxiousness unto punishment, and is not the formal nature of sin itself.

Besides the transgression of the preceptive part of the law, there is an obnoxiousness unto punishment, arising from the sanction of the law, which we call the guilt of sin; and this (as judicious Dr. Owen observes) is separable from sin; and if it were not separable from the former, no sinner in the world could either be pardoned or saved.

 

[MW]

Moving on to other theologians. First, Fisher's Catechism.

Q. 5. What do you understand by the guilt of sin?
A. An obligation to punishment on account of sin, Rom, 6:23.
Q. 6. How are all mankind guilty of Adam’s first sin?
A. By imputation, Rom. 5:19 -- “By one man’s disobedience, many were made sinners.”
Q. 7. Upon what account is Adam’s first sin imputed to his posterity?
A. On account of the legal union between him and them, he being their legal head and representative, and the covenant made with him, not for himself only, but for his posterity likewise, 1 Cor. 15:22 - “In Adam all die.”
Q. 8. Why was Adam’s first sin imputed, and none of his after sins?
A. Because the covenant being broken by his first sin, his federal headship ceased; for being then legally dead, and his posterity in him and with him, he stood afterwards merely as a single person for himself, and no longer in the capacity of their public representative in that covenant of life, which, by that first sin, brought him and them under the sentence of death, Rom. 5:12, 13.

 

[MW]

Samuel Rutherford, Trial and Triumph of Faith, 175, 176:

Hence there is a twofold guilt, one fundamental, potential, reatus culpae; the guilt of sin as sin, this is all one with sin, being the very essence, soul, and formal being of sin, and this guilt of sin you cannot remove from sin, so as sin shall remain sin; take this away, and you take away sin itself. But this is removed in sanctification as perfected, not in justification... But there is another guilt in sin, called Reatus poenae, reatus persone, reatus actualis, the guilt or obligation to punishment, the actual guilt, or actual obligation of the person, who hath sinned to punishment; and this guilt is a thing far different from sin itself, and is separable from sin, and may be, and is removed from sin without the destruction of the essence of sin, and is fully removed in justification.

So for Rutherford sin in its formal nature as reatus culpae can never be separated from sin itself. Hence the need of sanctification. But reatus poenae, the obligation to punishment, is different from sin itself, and is separable from sin. Hence justification.

He then goes on to prove this separation in the case of Christ, as both Owen and Flavel have done in the quotations provided above.

 

[MW]

Having dispensed with Murray's misinterpretation of the primary sources I will return to the original point of difference with Hodge. I recall that difference to consist in the fact that Hodge makes imputation of guilt the causal antecedent of depravity or inherent sin, whereas Murray wants to make depravity itself a part of the imputation. For Hodge depravity is a penal consequence of imputation, whereas for Murray it is an element of imputation.

My first witness on behalf of Hodge is Robert Abbot, A Defence of the Reformed Catholicke of M.W. Perkins, p. 406:

"doth your learning serve you no better, but to make infection the whole matter of original sin? You should know, that original sin containeth reatum [guilt] & maculam [spot], first a guilt of actual transgression, and consequently a blot of infection. For of this infection or pollution of nature St. Austin in infinite places doth rightly observe, that it is so a sin, as that it is also a punishment of sin. Now a punishment presupposeth a guilt of that sin whereof it is a punishment.

 

[MW]

Edward Reynolds (An Explication of the Hundreth and Tenth Psalme, 444, 445).

For the clearing of this objection, we must note that there is a two-fold manner of guilt, (as I have before touched,) either such as grows out of inherent sin, which is the deserving of punishment, as it is in us; or such as grows out of imputed sin, and that not by reason of natural union, as the guilt of Adam's sin is imputed unto us, (which manner of imputation is likewise the foundation of our demerit, and causeth us to deserve punishment).

 

[Knight]

It is honestly baffling to read so many posts which make my point for me. In fact, you seem to completely misunderstand the point, which is strange inasmuch as I summarized it in one line in my last post: "That is decidedly false inasmuch as it completely ignores Murray's citations regarding culpa, the very thing Hodge rejects."

Each of these men you cite tie reatus culpa to reatus poena. This is precisely what Hodge denies, as I evidence in post 6. So you are quite wrong when you argue that "guilt only pertains to liability to punishment." J. V. Fesko corrects you in Death in Adam, Life in Christ, writing:

Hodge believed that when God imputed Adam’s sin to humanity, He only imputed the penalty, not Adam’s guilt or moral corruption. Hodge explains: ‘To impute sin, in Scriptural and theological language, is to impute the guilt of sin. And by guilt is meant not criminality or moral ill-desert, or demerit, much less moral pollution, but the judicial obligation to satisfy justice.’ 48 In technical terms, Hodge maintains that Adam’s imputed sin is not his guilt (reatus culpae), nor the demeritum (demerit), but the penalty (reatus poenae).49 Hodge’s opinion diverges from the majority report within the tradition; namely, theologians argued that God imputed both guilt (reatus culpae) and penalty (reatus poenae)... Hodge argued that God imputed Adam’s sin to his offspring, which only entailed the liability to penalty (reatus poenae), not Adam’s guilt (reatus culpae).

So when you cite Owen, Rutherford, Van Mastricht, Abbot, Reynolds, etc. explicitly affirm reatus culpa, demerit, and so forth - the very things Hodge denies - excuse me for being somewhat amused that you consider them to be witnesses to Hodge's position! I am tempted to lend you more time to provide support against your own contention, but this must come to an end.

By the way, Fisher's Catechism is irrelevant. Not all realists deny a federal union.

Here's Augustine for good measure:

Is a non-baptized infant bound by this sentence or not? If you say he is not bound, they you will be vanquished and punished by the evangelical truth and by the testimony of Pelagius himself, for where is the life of God except in the kingdom of God, into which none but those born again of water and the Spirit can enter?3 But, if you assert that he is bound, you acknowledge the punishment. Then you must acknowledge the guilt (culpam). You confess the torment—confess, then, that it is deserved.

 

[MW]

It is honestly baffling to read so many posts which make my point for me. In fact, you seem to completely misunderstand the point, which is strange inasmuch as I summarized it in one line in my last post: "That is decidedly false inasmuch as it completely ignores Murray's citations regarding culpa, the very thing Hodge rejects."

Each of these men you cite tie reatus culpa to reatus poena. This is precisely what Hodge denies, as I evidence in post 6. So you are quite wrong when you argue that "guilt only pertains to liability to punishment." J. V. Fesko corrects you in Death in Adam, Life in Christ, writing:

Try to discern the state of the question before you write on it. The state of the question is, whether these are divided in the act of imputation. Hodge denies; Murray affirms. They are one and the same, as my quotations have demonstrated.

Your ability to impose your own mental framework as the sum and substance of an issue is truly amazing! If you made an attempt to step outside your own mental categories and explore the issue objectively you might not be so easily baffled.

 

[Knight]

You said: "The divines are not saying these are two different things that are imputed. They are saying, in the matter of imputation, that they are the same thing, that is, that guilt only pertains to liability to punishment."

You were wrong, as your own sources indicate.

As for Murray, he writes:

There can be little doubt, therefore, that the most representative of Reformed theologians were jealous to maintain that reatus and poena and, if we will, reatus poenae, always presuppose culpa and that, therefore, our involvement in the reatus, the obligation to penalty, of Adam’s sin means that we were also involved in the culpa of his sin. To use Turretine’s formula, ‘‘poena ... nonnisi propter culpam potest infligi’’. If we have the reaius in common with Adam we must likewise have his culpa.

He's right - and that's precisely why Hodge is out of step with the Reformed tradition.

 

[MW]

Resuming the issue of inherent sin or depravity as consequential to imputed guilt, we next have Anthony Burgess, Doctrine of Original Sin, 32:

as in and by Christ there is an imputed Righteousness, which is that properly that justifieth, and as the effect of this, we have also an inherent Righteousness, which in Heaven will be completed and perfected: Thus by Adam we have imputed sin with the guilt of it, and inherent sin the effect of it.

 

[MW]

Murray says, "that we were also involved in the culpa of his sin." No, say the divines quoted; we are only liable to punishment on account of his sin." What is one thing for them comprises two things for Murray. Murray is wrong!

 

[KMK]

The distinction of guilt as reatus culpae and reatus poenae is masterfully explained by Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 245, 246. The consequences of rejecting it are immense, both for the doctrine of personal responsibility for sin, and for the doctrine of the justification of sinners.

" The word "guilt" expresses the relation which sin bears to justice or, as the older theologians put it, to the penalty of the law. He who is guilty stands in a penal relation to the law. We can speak of guilt in a twofold sense, namely, as reatus culpae and as reatus poenae. The former, which Turretin calls "potential guilt," is the intrinsic moral ill-desert of an act or state. This is of the essence of sin and is an inseparable part of its sinfulness. It attaches only to those who have themselves committed sinful deeds, and attaches to them permanently. It cannot be removed by forgiveness, and is not removed by justification on the basis of the merits of Jesus Christ, and much less by mere pardon. Man's sins are inherently ill-deserving even after he is justified. Guilt in this sense cannot be transferred from one person to another. The usual sense, however, in which we speak of guilt in theology, is that of reatus poenae. By this is meant desert of punishment, or obligation to render satisfaction to God's justice for self-determined violation of the law. Guilt in this sense is not of the essence of sin, but is rather a relation to the penal sanction of the law. If there had been no sanction attached to the disregard of moral relations, every departure from the law would have been sin, but would not have involved liability to punishment. Guilt in this sense may be removed by the satisfaction of justice, either personally or vicariously. It may be transferred from one person to another, or assumed by one person for another. It is removed from believers by justification, so that their sins, though inherently ill-deserving, do not make them liable to punishment."

This is extremely helpful.

 

[Knight]

Consider this my last post in either thread.

Reverend Winzer opposes literally all scholarship (Fesko, Murray, Hutchinson, Wilborn, etc.) of which I'm aware on the question of whether Hodge followed his predecessors in the Reformed tradition in rejecting reatus culpa. If this is inseparable from raetus poenae, so much the worse for Hodge, who separates them to reject the former. Hodge's own contemporaries pointed out his novelty, and I don't just mean realists. See Hutchinson's book. Dabney, Landis, etc. took Hodge to task in their own time (not to mention Baird, Shedd, and Thornwell). Reverend Winzer has not and, I suspect, cannot cite one scholar who agrees with him on this point, because I frankly don't know if he understands the issue. Readers should read the reasons these scholars give for their conclusions, of course, but this outlines the limits of on online forum.

Reverend Winzer, feel free to eviscerate me now No hard feelings on my side, this just seems to have become a waste of time. I have a 6 week old boy in need of more attention than these threads.

 

[Ploutos]

I have a 6 week old boy in need of more attention than these threads.

Wow, he's that challenging of a newborn?

6 weeks old... congratulations, sir.

 

[Knight]

Wow, he's that challenging of a newborn?

6 weeks old... congratulations, sir.

My firstborn, and my wife is working... from home, but still... cut me some slack!

 

[Ploutos]

My firstborn, and my wife is working... from home, but still... cut me some slack!

I was making a rather obscure slight about how demanding these threads are. But seriously, congrats! It's a big adjustment.

 

[MW]

Getting back to Hodge v. Murray on imputation and punishment, we have William Ames, Marrow of Sacred Divinity (Works, 67).

Original sin, seeing it is formally a privation of original righteousness, and this privation doth follow the first sin as a punishment, hence it hath the respect of a punishment in order of nature before it hath the respect of a sin. As by the justice of God that original righteousness is denied, so far forth it is a punishment. As it ought to be in us, and yet through man's fault is wanting, so far forth it is a sin.

 

[MW]

Thomas Boston (Works, 1:276).

All fell under the loss of God's image, and the corruption of nature with him. How comes it that all men must say with David, Psal. ii. 5, "Behold I was shapen in iniquity; and in sin did my mother conceive me?" Take away the imputation of Adam's sin, and there is no foundation for the corruption of nature. It must be some sin that God punishes with the deprivation of original righteousness, which can be no other than the first sin of Adam.

 

[MW]

Thomas Goodwin (Works, 10:20).

Hence, therefore (I repeat the force of my reason again), if he will convey this image acquired by his sin as sinful, there must be a guilt of that act of his sin which was the cause of it, and therefore he must be a public person in that first act of sin; so as without this, as the case stood, the law of nature could not have had its course.

But this sinful image, considered as sinful, was to come in wholly and merely from a sinful act, as the sole efficient or meritorious cause of it; and that was it alone could bereave him of it, and which alone could make the want of that righteousness to be sin.

 

[pgwolv]

This is a spin off from another thread.

Eastern Orthodoxy and Original Sin

I do, but I'm not sure how straightforward the issue is if our nature equally stood or fell in virtue of Adam's moral obedience or disobedience (given that it is through Adam's nature that he obeyed or disobeyed). I'll need to think about it more, and I'd like to see fuller context of De Moor's...

www.puritanboard.com

I was asked: "I'll put it this way; what do you think of Murray's analysis of Hodge in the context of the Reformed tradition on pgs. 72-85?"

I have mixed thoughts about the critique. On the one hand, I think he has pinpointed a weakness in Hodge's statement of imputation being limited to liability to satisfy justice. He has shown that there must be a corresponding forensic state in which the person is "constituted a sinner." But I think this is implied in Hodge's statement. I don't see that he would have denied this as being the direct consequence of imputation. It may be that his polemic against detractors of the doctrine consumed his thoughts on this particular point so that he did not see a need to give explicit expression to its consequence.

On the other hand, Murray wants to find something "real" in the sinner that forms part of the imputation. This is problematic. He expresses himself this way:

“The imputation is not thus conceived of as something causally antecedent to the depravity but as that which includes depravity as an element” (p. 92).

The problem does not lie in the fact that he has included depravity as part of the real condition of the sinner. That is necessary in its own place. He has now removed imputation as the cause going before depravity, that is, as its judicial basis. In doing so he has actually destroyed Hodge's argument for imputation. For Hodge imputation makes the posterity of Adam liable to punishment, and depravity is part of the punishment. For Murray depravity is part of the imputation itself. So now we are left without any judicial reason for depravity. It becomes a necessity of nature.

This creates all kinds of knock-on effects. Murray himself identifies the first one for us: "Furthermore, the relation of depravity to natural generation may also have to be formulated in a different fashion. It may not be strictly accurate to say that we become depraved by natural generation." We are now venturing into unexplored territory, and Murray has set himself up to guide us. But that is the end of the line. We don't go anywhere from this point. So Murray circles back, and says, "But the reason why we are naturally generated in sin is that, whenever we begin to be, we begin to be as sinful because of our solidarity with Adam in his sin." He has just defeated his own hypothesis. He has made our solidarity with Adam in his sin to be the antecedent cause of our depravity. It is hopeless!

Hodge is right after all. But we can be thankful Murray has exposed a weakness in his statement. The consequence of being forensically constituted sinners is a necessary part of the doctrine of imputation. Just as being forensically constituted righteous will be a necessary part of the imputation of Christ's righteousness to the believer.

Now this thread is opened I hope to use it to include quotations from other theologians to shed some light on this problem.

The Latin terminology used in this thread is foreign to me (no pun intended). I get the feeling that you an Ryan are talking past each other because of some fundamental misunderstanding of the matter on the part of one of you or a misunderstanding of each other. To get things straight in my own head, I would like your assessment of my understanding of this post.

1) Hodge: Imputation is limited to liability to satisfy justice.

Murray: There must be a corresponding forensic state in which the person is "constituted a sinner."

My question: Is this forensic state reatus?

So, is the weakness in Hodge’s statement that he seems to limit imputation to reatus poenae and exclude reatus culpae because he is specifying “liability to satisfy justice” rather than just “liability,” even though he would probably agree with the latter? And is Murray misinterpreting Hodge because Murray is splitting reatus into two things, whereas Hodge is likely implying the one in the other, as is the typical Reformed position?

From your other quotes, culpae is the cause, reatus the medium, and poenae the effect; does this mean that reatus is the thing imputed, rather than culpae or poenae? Thus, reatus poenae (liability to receive punishment/satisfy justice) and reatus culpae (liability because of sin) are imputed inseparably. So, reatus does not belong to either to culpae or poenae but is the means by which the former causes the latter.

Further, is the imputability of reatus because it is a forensic property, and the unimputability of culpae because it is a personal act?

2) It seems that Murray believes that reatus (liability) cannot be imputed where depravity is not also present. This seems to misunderstand what imputation is (making depravity a necessity of nature, as you say), and it seems to go against Murray’s status as not being a realist.

From what I can gather, the majority Reformed position is that imputation is the judicial basis for our depravity, and that our depravity is a part of the punishment. “The wages of sin is death” – does this mean that depravity is a “species” of death? That then means that a part of Adam’s punishment (poenae) for his sin (culpae) was depravity. And am I correct to say that our solidarity with Adam in his sin is the basis of the imputation of our liability (reatus), a part of the punishment for which is depravity? And that that depravity (here, the poenae) is the reason why each of us sins (the culpae, thus the reverse cause and effect to what we see in Adam), adding a real personal reatus culpae to the imputed reatus culpae?

Is the following summary correct? Because Adam is our federal head, we have solidarity with him in his actions, which is the basis for imputation of liability. Adam sinned, making him liable for punishment. A part of the punishment was depravity of nature. We do not “inherit” a depraved nature (not directly; the only non-biological property we inherit from Adam is federal sonship); rather, Adam’s liability for his sin is imputed to us. Therefore, he and us are both punished with depravity (his culpae, leading to his and our poenae, via his and our reatus). In Adam, that depravity would lead to further sin, in us to all our sin. Adam was innocent when he was created, for he had no imputed sin and no sin of his own. Adam was guilty after the fall, all for his own sin. Newly conceived infants are guilty because of imputed sin. All of Adam’s progeny who reach the age at which they first sin are guilty because of imputed sin plus their own sin.

Thus, is Murray really incorrect in saying, “It may not be strictly accurate to say that we become depraved by natural generation"? We do not “become depraved” (not directly) because of “natural generation,” but rather we are “punished with depravity” because of imputed liability owing to solidarity with Adam’s sin.