Murray's Critique of Hodge on Imputation

[pgwolv]

What do you think of Murray's remark that for "Reformed theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries... there can be no poena or, for that matter, reatus poena apart from culpa" (pgs. 79-80)? Then on page 81, he summarizes a statement by Calvin to mean that "...this is to say that there is no liability to penalty without blameworthiness."

From my understanding, this is correct; there can be no reatus poenae apart from culpae, but that does not mean that the culpae has to belong to the same person who receives the poenae. According to the common Reformed understanding of imputation, the progeny of Adam receive reatus poenae (liability to receive punishment) and reatus culpae (liability because of sin), but the cause (the sin, the culpae) belongs personally to Adam, whereas the poenae is given to Adam and his progeny, because both Adam and his progeny share in the liability (the reatus).

Therefore, I think that Hodge is correct to say,

"Imputation does not imply a participation of the criminality of the sin imputed."

and

To impute sin, in Scriptural and theological language, is to impute the guilt of sin.

I am less clear on

And by guilt is meant not criminality or moral ill-desert, or demerit, much less moral pollution, but the judicial obligation to satisfy justice.

If he means “participation” (or culpae itself) again, his statement is fine, but if he really does mean that “guilt because of (Adam’s) sin” (reatus culpae) is not imputed, then it seems a mistake.

"What sort of "justice" does not take into account criminality and so forth when judging?"

Your question itself seems to be begging one. I think that the nominalist (?; I can't remember if this is the term used for non-realists) view is that God’s justice does take into account criminality, but particularly that of Adam, not only of the one being punished. EDIT: So I guess your question is actually, What sort of justice does not take into account personal criminality?

 

[pgwolv]

That is decidedly false inasmuch as it completely ignores Murray's citations regarding culpa, the very thing Hodge rejects.

You are free to use this thread for whatever purposes you like, of course. I only stated my own interest in the matter.

It seems to me that MW’s statement, "that guilt only pertains to liability to punishment" was unclear. I think his emphasis was on “liability” rather than on “punishment.” That is, I think he meant, guilt only pertains to liability to punishment rather than to participation in the cause of that punishment.” I believe you read it as “guilt only pertains to liability to punishment, not to liability for sin” (which I think is fair, given the wording, but not fair given MW’s other explanations, unless he was being inconsistent). For instance, MW quotes Owen in Post 10, saying, “the guilt of [sin] is nothing but its respect unto punishment from the sanction of the law.”

Perhaps MW’s wording was guilty (no pun intended) of the same charge as Hodge’s wording, implying that reatus is the same for culpae and to poenae, but seeming to mean that imputed reatus is only reatus poenae.

Readers should read the reasons these scholars give for their conclusions, of course, but this outlines the limits of on online forum.

Good point; I will have to read them to understand why they differ from Rev Winzer on Hodge.

 

[MW]

Perhaps MW’s wording was guilty (no pun intended) of the same charge as Hodge’s wording, implying that reatus is the same for culpae and to poenae, but seeming to mean that imputed reatus is only reatus poenae.

Thankyou for your thoughts on this subject. I think in the main you are analysing the issue correctly. What happens in discussions is that broader issues focus into narrower points of difference. It is important at that point to stay with the state of the question. That is what Hodge does with liability to punishment, and I am simply following him. It should be understood from what is said in the broader context that the liability is "on account of sin." But "on account of" is the proper language of imputation -- reckoning to one's account. "Participation" is vague and open to a realist interpretation.

I'm sorry for the Latin terms but they are part and parcel of our medieval inheritance. I think you have interpreted them well.

Zooming out for a moment, there is a broader unstated difference between Hodge and Murray. Hodge grounded imputation in the covenant of works. Murray did not do this, and eventually went on to deny the covenant of works. Without a federal union it is easy to see why Murray would grasp for a real one, and that no doubt is the reason why he has to make depravity an element of the imputation.

 

[MW]

Thus, is Murray really incorrect in saying, “It may not be strictly accurate to say that we become depraved by natural generation"? We do not “become depraved” (not directly) because of “natural generation,” but rather we are “punished with depravity” because of imputed liability owing to solidarity with Adam’s sin.

Depravity is a punishment. It is conveyed to us by natural, ordinary generation. This is the "real" part of original sin.

We are punished with it because of the imputation of guilt (liability to punishment), and we are imputed with guilt because of our federal solidarity with Adam's sin, but the punishment itself is the depravity of our nature, and this becomes ours by natural generation -- that which is of the flesh is flesh.

 

[pgwolv]

Depravity is a punishment. It is conveyed to us by natural, ordinary generation. This is the "real" part of original sin.

We are punished with it because of the imputation of guilt (liability to punishment), and we are imputed with guilt because of our federal solidarity with Adam's sin, but the punishment itself is the depravity of our nature, and this becomes ours by natural generation -- that which is of the flesh is flesh.

Thank you, that makes sense.

I'm sorry for the Latin terms but they are part and parcel of our medieval inheritance.

I appreciate that and it is a useful language to learn.

Zooming out for a moment, there is a broader unstated difference between Hodge and Murray. Hodge grounded imputation in the covenant of works. Murray did not do this, and eventually went on to deny the covenant of works.

Do you have a quote or reference for this? I would like to see Murray's thoughts to understand him better on this issue.

 

[MW]

Do you have a quote or reference for this? I would like to see Murray's thoughts to understand him better on this issue.

Murray's developed view is found in "The Adamic Administration," where he attempts to do away with the covenant of works and fails miserably. There is no federal headship to establish a legal union. There is only God's government and justice, which includes "perfect legal reciprocity." At no point does he reach to the height of the old federalism's view of representation. Apparently Adam did not need to know of his headship or its consequences (as if the name "Adam" didn't alert him to this fact). The Mosaic administration is made entirely redemptive, following in a line of continuity from Abraham, which contradicts Paul's statement that the law was "added" for specific reasons connected with "transgressions."