Of God's Eternal Decree

[Michael Butterfield]

II. Although, in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the first Cause, all things come to pass immutably, and infallibly; yet, by the same providence, He orders them to fall out, according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently.

Note the Cause in the confession is with a captial "C" ! [/quote]

I have noted the capital "œC". However, the issue is not one of whether God is the "first Cause" or not. The issue is whether God is the cause of sin, which you assert. The confessional statements which you have mentioned do not assert that God causes sin. They in fact are pointing away from that view and that is why the confession speaks in chapter 3 of secondary causes and why you do not find the language of "œfirst Cause" in chapter 3. Yes, "œfirst Cause" language does appear in chapter 5, but now it is under a different theological loci. Providence is quite a different issue than the decrees. Certainly, in Q&A 8 of the WSC we come to understand and know that God "œexecuteth his decrees in the works of creation and providence," but this is a different operation than what we see in chapter 3 and in no way gives us a reason to believe that God is the cause of sin. In fact, the Confession elucidates this view for us when it states that "œ. . . all things come to pass immutably, and infallibly; yet, by the same providence, he ordereth them to fall out, according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently. These statements keep us from making cause/effect deductions and going beyond the language or the intent of the Confession.

 

[Michael Butterfield]

[align=center]God´s Decree Effective or Permissive.[/align]First. God´s decree "œforeordains whatsoever comes to pass"; there was no event in the womb of the future, the futurition of which was not made certain to God by it. But we believe that this certainty is effectuated in different ways, according to the different natures of God´s creatures. One class of effects God produces by His own immediate agency (as creations, regenerations, inspirations), and by physical causes, which are continually and immediately energized by His power. This latter subdivision is covered by what we call the laws of material nature. As to these, God´s purpose is called effective, because He Himself effects the results, without the agency of other intelligent agents. The other class of effects is, the spontaneous acts of rational free agents other than God. The being and powers of these are derived from and dependent on God. But yet He has been pleased to bestow on them a rational spontaneity of choice which makes them as truly agents, sources of self"“determined agency, in their little, dependent sphere of action, as though there were no sovereign over them. In my theory of the will, I admitted and claimed as a great truth of our consciousness, that man´s action is spontaneous, that the soul is self"“determined (though not the faculty of willing) in all its free acts, that the fountain of the volition is in the soul itself; and that the external object of the action is but the occasional cause of volition. Yet these spontaneous acts God has some way of directing (only partially known to us), and these are the objects of His permissive decree. By calling it permissive, we do not mean that their futurition is not certain to God; or that He has not made it certain; we mean that they are such acts as He efficiently brings about by simply leaving the spontaneity of other free agents, as upheld by His providence, to work of itself, under incitements, occasions, bounds and limitations, which His wisdom and power throw around. To this class may be attributed all the acts of rational free agents, except such as are evoked by God´s own grace, and especially, all their sinful acts.

R. L. Dabney

 

[VirginiaHuguenot]

 

[Arch2k]

Fisher\'s Questions on the Catechism

Q. 26. How does the decree of God extend to things naturally and morally good?

A. Effectively: because God is the author and efficient cause of all good, Phil. 2:13.

Q. 27. How does it extend to things morally evil?

A. Permissively and directively only, Acts 14:16.

Q. 28. Is the permissive decree a bare inactive permitting of evil?

A. No; it determines the event of the evil permitted, and overrules it to a good end, contrary to the intention both of the work and worker.

Q. 29. What scripture example is there of this?

A. God permits Joseph's brethren to sell him into Egypt, and Potiphar to throw him unjustly into prison, and yet overrules both these evils, and makes them means, contrary to the intention both of the work and workers, for executing the decree of his advancement to the greatest honour, Gen. 45:5-8; and 50:20 -- "Ye thought evil against me, (says Joseph to his brethren,) but God meant it unto good."

Q. 30. How can the decree of God be permissive and efficacious at the same time?

A. It is permissive, with respect to the sinfulness of the action as a moral evil; and efficacious, with respect to the matter of it as a natural act.


Q. 31. How do you prove that God cannot be the author of sin?

A. From the contrariety of it to his holy nature and law, and the indication he has manifested against it, in what Christ suffered on account of it; for he can never be the author of that of which he is the avenger.

 

[Michael Butterfield]

Originally posted by Jeff_Bartel
Q. 26. How does the decree of God extend to things naturally and morally good?

A. Effectively: because God is the author and efficient cause of all good, Phil. 2:13.

Q. 27. How does it extend to things morally evil?

A. Permissively and directively only, Acts 14:16.

Q. 28. Is the permissive decree a bare inactive permitting of evil?

A. No; it determines the event of the evil permitted, and overrules it to a good end, contrary to the intention both of the work and worker.

Q. 29. What scripture example is there of this?

A. God permits Joseph's brethren to sell him into Egypt, and Potiphar to throw him unjustly into prison, and yet overrules both these evils, and makes them means, contrary to the intention both of the work and workers, for executing the decree of his advancement to the greatest honour, Gen. 45:5-8; and 50:20 -- "Ye thought evil against me, (says Joseph to his brethren,) but God meant it unto good."

Q. 30. How can the decree of God be permissive and efficacious at the same time?

A. It is permissive, with respect to the sinfulness of the action as a moral evil; and efficacious, with respect to the matter of it as a natural act.


Q. 31. How do you prove that God cannot be the author of sin?

A. From the contrariety of it to his holy nature and law, and the indication he has manifested against it, in what Christ suffered on account of it; for he can never be the author of that of which he is the avenger.

I am glad you have come to see as I see it!

Q. 27. How does it extend to things morally evil?

A. Permissively and directively only, Acts 14:16.

 

[Arch2k]

W.G.T. Shedd

"˜The permissive decree as related to the origin of sin presents a difficulty that does not exist in reference to the continuance of sin. The certainty of the continuance of sin in fallen man is easily explained, by merely leaving the fallen will to its self-determination. But merely leaving the unfallen will to its self-determination would not make its apostasy certain; because it was endowed by creation with a power to remain holy as created, and there was no punitive withdrawal of any grace given in creation until after apostasy. How, under these circumstances a permissive decree which does not operate by direct efficiency can make the fall of a holy being certain, is an inscrutable mystery. Respecting it, Turretin (VI. vii. i) makes the following remark: "˜Two extremes are to be avoided. First, that of defect, when an otiose permission of sin is ascribed to God. Second, that of excess, when the causality of sin is ascribed to him. Between these extremes, the orthodox hold the mean, who contend that the providence of God extends to sin in such way that He does not involuntarily permit it, as the Pelagians say, nor actively cause it as the Libertines assert, but voluntarily ordains and controls it´.

Source

 

[Arch2k]

Originally posted by Michael Butterfield
I am glad you have come to see as I see it!

Hey! That's a non sequitor!