Polanus on Autotheos and the Generation of the Son

[Charles Johnson]

Here is what Polanus had to say on autotheos and the Father's communication of the divine essence to the Son in his generation:
"Thirdly, it is said of God that he exists from himself; that is, that he has an essence existing from itself. For αὐτουσία, that is, an essence existing from itself, is proper to God. That God exists is inherent to him from his very self. God cannot be one whose essence is not from himself. God exists through an essence that is from itself, and not from another essence. For this reason, the true God is αὐτοὼν, αὐτόθεον; that is, having the divine essence existing from itself.
There is a difference between having the divine essence from himself, and having the divine essence existing from itself, because one person can have the divine essence from another, as the Son from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son, yet in this way, that he has the divine essence existing from itself; that is, that he is God with that essence that is from itself, and not, rather, from another essence."
I thought I would share this, since Jacob mentioned recently in his review of Tipton's recent book that he opposes the Son as autotheos to his receiving the divine essence from the Father. I find this recent trend concerning, as I think it leads to Tritheism, and to viewing the Godhead as three individuals in a single species.

 

[Knight]

I would like to better understand the metaphysics going on here if someone is open to explaining it to me. If the Godhead is not "three individuals in a single species," then what is the alternative proposal?

I hope everyone enjoys a restful Lord's day tomorrow!

 

[Charles Johnson]

I would like to better understand the metaphysics going on here if someone is open to explaining it to me. If the Godhead is not "three individuals in a single species," then what is the alternative proposal?

I hope everyone enjoys a restful Lord's day tomorrow!

Classically, God is said not to belong to either genus or species. One issue with saying that God is three individuals in one species is that is makes the persons of the Godhead like three men (individuals) who share the species "human", but don't actually have any essential unity between them. There are other problems, given the way the terms 'genus' and 'species' are classically defined, beginning with Aristotle's Organon; that is just one.

 

[Knight]

Classically, God is said not to belong to either genus or species. One issue with saying that God is three individuals in one species is that is makes the persons of the Godhead like three men (individuals) who share the species "human", but don't actually have any essential unity between them. There are other problems, given the way the terms 'genus' and 'species' are classically defined, beginning with Aristotle's Organon; that is just one.

Certainly, the Father, Son, and Spirit each mutually indwell one another. Unlike you and I, each of their existences entail the others'. But can you elaborate on why that fact would preclude "the Godhead as three individuals in a single species"? That is, the way in which they would be three individuals in a single species would certainly differ from the way in which you and I are individuals in a single species, but given that disanalogy, I am still failing to see what is the matter with referring to "the Godhead as three individuals in a single species." If they are distinct yet divine, and if we maintain their perichoretic union, can you pinpoint the problem with the statement more specifically for me?

 

[Charles Johnson]

Certainly, the Father, Son, and Spirit each mutually indwell one another. Unlike you and I, each of their existences entail the others'. But can you elaborate on why that fact would preclude "the Godhead as three individuals in a single species"? That is, the way in which they would be three individuals in a single species would certainly differ from the way in which you and I are individuals in a single species, but given that disanalogy, I am still failing to see what is the matter with referring to "the Godhead as three individuals in a single species." If they are distinct yet divine, and if we maintain their perichoretic union, can you pinpoint the problem with the statement more specifically for me?

A species is a category with a definition, and everything is said to belong to that species that meets the definition. The relation of the persons of God to the Godhead is fundamentally not that of three members of a category to the category they are in, but the relation of three ὑποστασεις, 'hypostases', and τροποι ὑπάρξεως, 'manners of subsistance', to a single substance, which subsists in them. The issue is not that there is absolutely no broad sense of 'species' which would apply to the Godhead — if we are speaking very broadly, Tertullian actually described the persons (not the Godhead though) as species. The issue is that it is not a precise, or even an apt, description of the relation between the Godhead and the persons.
Polanus adds this on the matter of whether God is 'species':
"Moreover, when we say that τὸν μόνον ἀληθινὸν Θεὸν, the one true God, is one in number, we do so to distinguish, so that no one thinks that he is one in a very special species, or one in species, or one in genus. A species neither exists nor subsists by itself (therefore, it is called second substance by logicians); it does not speak or act by itself. But God is, speaks, and acts by himself. Therefore, God is not a species. Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are one in species or genus (for a subordinate species is also understood for a genus with respect to species constituted below it), either according to the unity of the human species, or of humankind, or with the unity of a species or genus. The Father, rather, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God with unity of number, or, they are one in number according to essence. In man, there is a common and a particular unity. Common unity is according to species, or a particular genus, according to the material individual. In God, rather, their is the most perfect Godhead, common according to essence, and particular by reason of persons, one in all things by unity of number: for God is the sole spiritual essence, not with materially divided persons, but persons that are really distinct in reason in the unity of the essence. The nature [of the unity of God and the unity of men] is dissimilar, because what is in man imperfectly, that he has a common and a particular humanity, is in God in the most perfect way, that the essence of God has the whole Deity in a common manner, and each person in a particular manner."

 

[Knight]

A species is a category with a definition, and everything is said to belong to that species that meets the definition. The relation of the persons of God to the Godhead is fundamentally not that of three members of a category to the category they are in, but the relation of three ὑποστασεις, 'hypostases', and τροποι ὑπάρξεως, 'manners of subsistance', to a single substance, which subsists in them. The issue is not that there is absolutely no broad sense of 'species' which would apply to the Godhead — if we are speaking very broadly, Tertullian actually described the persons (not the Godhead though) as species. The issue is that it is not a precise, or even an apt, description of the relation between the Godhead and the persons.
Polanus adds this on the matter of whether God is 'species':
"Moreover, when we say that τὸν μόνον ἀληθινὸν Θεὸν, the one true God, is one in number, we do so to distinguish, so that no one thinks that he is one in a very special species, or one in species, or one in genus. A species neither exists nor subsists by itself (therefore, it is called second substance by logicians); it does not speak or act by itself. But God is, speaks, and acts by himself. Therefore, God is not a species. Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are one in species or genus (for a subordinate species is also understood for a genus with respect to species constituted below it), either according to the unity of the human species, or of humankind, or with the unity of a species or genus. The Father, rather, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God with unity of number, or, they are one in number according to essence. In man, there is a common and a particular unity. Common unity is according to species, or a particular genus, according to the material individual. In God, rather, their is the most perfect Godhead, common according to essence, and particular by reason of persons, one in all things by unity of number: for God is the sole spiritual essence, not with materially divided persons, but persons that are really distinct in reason in the unity of the essence. The nature [of the unity of God and the unity of men] is dissimilar, because what is in man imperfectly, that he has a common and a particular humanity, is in God in the most perfect way, that the essence of God has the whole Deity in a common manner, and each person in a particular manner."

Ah. When you said "the Godhead," I thought you meant the persons. I see that this is my mistake - it is a reference to the divine essence, correct?

"A species neither exists nor subsists by itself (therefore, it is called second substance by logicians); it does not speak or act by itself. But God is, speaks, and acts by himself."

Is the referent of "God" here the Father, the divine essence, or something else?

"Common unity is according to species, or a particular genus, according to the material individual."

Why must common unity be according to material individuals? Surely, "angels" experience common unity in that they are creations, yet they are not material, right?

"The Father, rather, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God with unity of number, or, they are one in number according to essence... In God, rather, their [sic] is the most perfect Godhead, common according to essence, and particular by reason of persons, one in all things by unity of number..."

I'm not sure if I understand the concept of "unity of number." Can you elaborate on this? For example, does being "one in number according to essence" mean it would it be wrong to say the Son has a distinct mode of thought or will from the Father such that only the former could think "I am the Son" or choose to become incarnate? I understand the tritheistic concern at play, but I also think we would agree that we should strive to avoid Sabellian connotations (which, of course, Polanus would not intend - I am just trying to understand how the fine line is being walked given the concept in question).

Thank you for your engagement!

 

[Charles Johnson]

Ah. When you said "the Godhead," I thought you meant the persons. I see that this is my mistake - it is a reference to the divine essence, correct?

Godhead always refers to the essence. Compare shorter catechism #6, "How many persons are there in the Godhead?"

"A species neither exists nor subsists by itself (therefore, it is called second substance by logicians); it does not speak or act by itself. But God is, speaks, and acts by himself."

Is the referent of "God" here the Father, the divine essence, or something else?

The Godhead/essence.

"Common unity is according to species, or a particular genus, according to the material individual."

Why must common unity be according to material individuals? Surely, "angels" experience common unity in that they are creations, yet they are not material, right?

"Material" does not always refer to what is strictly physical. In logic, sometimes it is taken metaphorically. Many things are said to have a "material cause" that are not physical. In the sense in which Polanus uses "common unity" and "particular unity", it would be fine to refer the concept to angels, but not to God.

I'm not sure if I understand the concept of "unity of number." Can you elaborate on this? For example, does being "one in number according to essence" mean it would it be wrong to say the Son has a distinct mode of thought or will from the Father such that only the former could think "I am the Son" or choose to become incarnate? I understand the tritheistic concern at play, but I also think we would agree that we should strive to avoid Sabellian connotations (which, of course, Polanus would not intend - I am just trying to understand how the fine line is being walked given the concept in question).

Thank you for your engagement!

It would be wrong to say the Son, in his divine nature, has a different will than the Father. The divine essence, including the divine will, is common to all three persons.
Sabellianism teaches that God is one person. But remember that the divine persons are not distinguished, like human persons, by having distinct wills, bodies, etc. They are distinguished by their manner of subsistence. The Father is begetting and begets the Son, and spirates the Spirit. The Son is begotten of the Father and spirates the Spirit. The Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son and begets or spirates none.

 

[Knight]

The Godhead/essence.

In that case, is it proper to say "God is, speaks, and acts by himself"? The essence itself isn't a person, right? Or is this just a euphemism for the divine essence speaking, acting, etc. through a person of the Trinity?

"It would be wrong to say the Son, in his divine nature, has a different will than the Father. The divine essence, including the divine will, is common to all three persons."

Again, are you taking that to mean each of the persons do not reflect on His own manner of subsistence? Do the Son and Father not have thoughts like "I am the Son"? Surely the Father doesn't think that. But are you suggesting the Son also does not think that? John 17 would seem to straightforwardly imply the Son reflects and thinks distinct thoughts from His Father ("I" vs. "you" language).

How is the incarnation possible except that the Son alone chose to assume humanity?

I would hasten to add that the Trinity are always inseparably united in agreement (e.g. the covenant of redemption) - but inseparability, union, and agreement do not rule out distinction.

 

[Charles Johnson]

In that case, is it proper to say "God is, speaks, and acts by himself"? The essence itself isn't a person, right? Or is this just a euphemism for the divine essence speaking, acting, etc. through a person of the Trinity?

It is fine to speak of God doing something without specifying a person. The Scripture speaks this way very often. "Jehovah said", "Jehovah did".

Again, are you taking that to mean each of the persons do not reflect on His own manner of subsistence? Do the Son and Father not have thoughts like "I am the Son"? Surely the Father doesn't think that. But are you suggesting the Son also does not think that? John 17 would seem to straightforwardly imply the Son reflects and thinks distinct thoughts from His Father ("I" vs. "you" language).

Remember that Christ has both a human and divine will. His divine will is the same as the will of the Father, but his human will is not. The will of God is often called the will of the Father by appropriation, since the Father is the fount of the divinity. That is not to say that the divine will of the Son or the Spirit differ. When Christ says he comes not to do his will but the will of the Father, he is contrasting his human will, with its natural desire not to die, with the divine will, which requires his atoning sacrifice.

How is the incarnation possible except that the Son alone chose to assume humanity?

I would hasten to add that the Trinity are always inseparably united in agreement (e.g. the covenant of redemption) - but inseparability, union, and agreement do not rule out distinction.

You are contradicting yourself here. Either there is a covenant of redemption, or the Son chose alone. The covenant of redemption is an agreement with the Father, after all.

 

[Knight]

It is fine to speak of God doing something without specifying a person. The Scripture speaks this way very often. "Jehovah said", "Jehovah did".

Doesn't that beg the question that it is the divine essence qua divine essence that is the referent performing said actions rather than one of the persons (or perhaps, by synecdoche, all of them)?

I'm not sure what the human will of Christ has to do with anything. The point is that the divine Son assumed humanity - He had no human will logically prior to His incarnation. Likewise, Scripture says the Father sent His divine Son - the Son did not send Himself. These are relations and actions respecting the pre-existent Son, not the incarnate Son.

I'm still not understanding whether or not you think the Son has thoughts like "I am the Son." Can you clarify that for me?

"You are contradicting yourself here. Either there is a covenant of redemption, or the Son chose alone. The covenant of redemption is an agreement with the Father, after all."

What contradiction am I affirming? There is indeed a covenant of redemption; the Son does not alone agree to the terms of this covenant - actually, that's the point (there are two, distinct persons who are each coming to agreement). Agreeing to the terms of this covenant in particular entails that each person has distinct actions with respect to this covenant. The Father does not choose to assume humanity, the Son does. This, again, implies distinction in action or exercise of will. So I fail to understand the problem with affirming that the Father and Son each distinctly (yet necessarily, given their perichoretic, consubstantial union) choose to agree to the terms of the covenant and then each distinctly carry out their respective covenantal duties.

 

[Charles Johnson]

Doesn't that beg the question that it is the divine essence qua divine essence that is the referent performing said actions rather than one of the persons (or perhaps, by synecdoche, all of them)?

I merely asserted that the manner of speaking in Scripture that God did this or that is fine. No question begging here. But like I said earlier, the actions of God are not separate from the persons. It is not as if any act can be attributed to the essence but not to any person. Actually, any act of God ad extra can be attributed to all the persons, but they are often attributed to one in particular by appropriation.

I'm not sure what the human will of Christ has to do with anything. The point is that the divine Son assumed humanity - He had no human will logically prior to His incarnation. Likewise, Scripture says the Father sent His divine Son - the Son did not send Himself. These are relations and actions respecting the pre-existent Son, not the incarnate Son.

The human will of Christ is relevant because you mentioned John 17, and I was explaining how those verses are to be interpreted which imply a different between Christ's will and the Father's will.

I'm still not understanding whether or not you think the Son has thoughts like "I am the Son." Can you clarify that for me?

Why would God have any transitory thoughts at all like men have? To say that God thinks is already anthropomorphic language, since he is immutable and eternal. "My thoughts are not like your thoughts," as the Scripture says. The divine persons are certainly aware they are distinct persons, but I'm not comfortable speculating on what goes on in the mind of God in that regard or any other.

What contradiction am I affirming? There is indeed a covenant of redemption; the Son does not alone agree to the terms of this covenant - actually, that's the point (there are two, distinct persons who are each coming to agreement). Agreeing to the terms of this covenant in particular entails that each person has distinct actions with respect to this covenant. The Father does not choose to assume humanity, the Son does. This, again, implies distinction in action or exercise of will. So I fail to understand the problem with affirming that the Father and Son each distinctly (yet necessarily, given their perichoretic, consubstantial union) choose to agree to the terms of the covenant and then each distinctly carry out their respective covenantal duties.

You said in post #8 that the Son "alone" chose to become incarnate. Now you seem to be walking that back. Maybe you misspoke.

 

[Charles Johnson]

To understand why it is the case that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit have a single will, it is helpful to study the doctrine of divine simplicity, especially in Turretin. Unless one understands divine simplicity, it isn't going to be clear why it is inappropriate to attribute different thoughts, wills, ad extra actions, etc to the distinct persons, except by appropriation.

 

[Knight]

To understand why it is the case that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit have a single will, it is helpful to study the doctrine of divine simplicity, especially in Turretin. Unless one understands divine simplicity, it isn't going to be clear why it is inappropriate to attribute different thoughts, wills, ad extra actions, etc to the distinct persons, except by appropriation.

Thank you for mentioning this. I do struggle to accept divine simplicity. For example, I asked the following question about it in another thread for which I did not receive an answer: "How can God as pure act avoid various collapses (modal, property, etc.)? For example, if God's will is identical to His nature (contra Athanasius, Third Discourse Against the Arians, Chapter 30, paragraph 62), then doesn't necessitarianism follow?" I have read quite a bit on the subject, but I haven't found a satisfactory answer. What do you think?

"The human will of Christ is relevant because you mentioned John 17, and I was explaining how those verses are to be interpreted which imply a different between Christ's will and the Father's will."

The point is that several statements in John 17 cannot refer to the human will of Christ - e.g. John 17:3-5 - so the human will of Christ is not relevant to what I am getting at. The Son was not incarnate when He was glorified in the presence of the Father, nor was the Son already incarnate when He was sent to assume humanity. Christ's activity of assuming humanity is something He did, not something the Father did.

"Why would God have any transitory thoughts at all like men have?"

Wait - what would be transitory about the thought "I am the Son"? The Son never transitions to not being the Son.

Isaiah 55 is metaphorical: we would agree, of course, that it makes no sense for one thought to be literally "higher" than another. As such, how we interpret the metaphor ought to harmonize with clear, Scriptural statements. Is it not clear that the Son prays to His own Father about His own, pre-incarnate person using language which could not be used by the Father in speaking to His Son ("I" vs. "you")?

"You said in post #8 that the Son "alone" chose to become incarnate. Now you seem to be walking that back. Maybe you misspoke."

I did not misspeak. I am saying that it seems to me the Son alone chose to become incarnate. That choice or activity, however, is due to an agreement the Son made with the Father, an agreement in which He was not alone. To put it another way, the Son wasn't the only person who agreed to this covenant. However, the duties of this covenant were different for the different parties involved, one such duty involving the assumption of humanity (which, obviously, the Father did not do and the Son did).

 

[Charles Johnson]

Thank you for mentioning this. I do struggle to accept divine simplicity. For example, I asked the following question about it in another thread for which I did not receive an answer: "How can God as pure act avoid various collapses (modal, property, etc.)? For example, if God's will is identical to His nature (contra Athanasius, Third Discourse Against the Arians, Chapter 30, paragraph 62), then doesn't necessitarianism follow?" I have read quite a bit on the subject, but I haven't found a satisfactory answer. What do you think?

It doesn't avoid modal collapses, and it doesn't need to. Modal collapse is implied in every honest, classical treatment of the matter. If the will and decree of God is eternal and immutable, part of his very essence, then it is necessarily the case that God's decree could not have been otherwise, and is necessary, at least as far as his essence is concerned. This isn't really a problem for the Reformed. We have always said that God has immutably decreed all things, including the salvation of the elect. What we need to avoid is making God dependent on creatures, so that anything in creation necessitates anything in God. God is absolutely free from creation; no created thing constrains or compels him; only his own will. If God does as he wills, that is hardly servile, even if the will is immutable.

For example, if God's will is identical to His nature (contra Athanasius, Third Discourse Against the Arians, Chapter 30, paragraph 62)

I don't think Athanasius is contradicting the doctrine of divine simplicity here (simply from a historical perspective, divine simplicity as a dogma in church history precedes Athanasius by at least two centuries). Athanasius is responding following fallacious argument for the inferiority of the Son to the Father (I paraphrase):
"Either the Father begets the Son voluntarily or involuntarily. He cannot beget the Son involuntarily, because then he would not be free. Therefore, he begets the Son voluntarily. But if he begets the Son voluntarily, then he could will not to beget the Son, and the Son is a creature. Therefore, the Son is inferior to the Father, and a creature."
Athanasius is saying, wait a second, there is a tertium quid, which is that the begetting of the Son, as an eternal act of God, entirely supersedes the categories of voluntarily and involuntarily, and will of God itself. It is neither a result of the divine will nor contrary to it, but an essential act apart from it.
But there is a big difference between saying that the generation of the Son does not follow from the divine will, which is what Athanasius means here when he distinguishes will and nature, and saying that God's attributes, decree, etc are distinct from his nature. The reason is that the generation of the Son is an ad intra work of the Father alone, but these other things are common to the essence.

"Why would God have any transitory thoughts at all like men have?"

Wait - what would be transitory about the thought "I am the Son"? The Son never transitions to not being the Son.

Fair enough. Nevertheless, the "mind of God" is generally understood in classical theism to be singular, just like his will. "For who has known the mind of the Lord?" 1 Cor. 2:16. I don't think it's helpful or wise to speculate on the distinct persons having distinct thoughts, except perhaps metaphorically.

Is it not clear that the Son prays to His own Father about His own, pre-incarnate person using language which could not be used by the Father in speaking to His Son ("I" vs. "you")?

I would not say it is clear that the pre-incarnate Son literally prays or speaks to the Father, any more than God literally has hands or feet.

I did not misspeak. I am saying that it seems to me the Son alone chose to become incarnate. That choice or activity, however, is due to an agreement the Son made with the Father, an agreement in which He was not alone. To put it another way, the Son wasn't the only person who agreed to this covenant. However, the duties of this covenant were different for the different parties involved, one such duty involving the assumption of humanity (which, obviously, the Father did not do and the Son did).

Ok, I think I understand what you are saying. My position is that the will of God is expressed an covenantal language, from which the idea of the covenant of redemption is derived. There is one will of God, but in the language of Scripture, the Son in his divine person is said to agree to things to represent the truths that 1) while there is one will of God, that will subsists distinctly in the person of the Son, 2) that the Son willed to undertake things the Father would not in the plan of redemption, and 3) that the Son did so freely. All of those truths are compatible with classical theism.

 

[Knight]

It doesn't avoid modal collapses, and it doesn't need to. Modal collapse is implied in every honest, classical treatment of the matter. If the will and decree of God is eternal and immutable, part of his very essence, then it is necessarily the case that God's decree could not have been otherwise, and is necessary, at least as far as his essence is concerned. This isn't really a problem for the Reformed. We have always said that God has immutably decreed all things, including the salvation of the elect. What we need to avoid is making God dependent on creatures, so that anything in creation necessitates anything in God. God is absolutely free from creation; no created thing constrains or compels him; only his own will. If God does as he wills, that is hardly servile, even if the will is immutable.

Most Reformed theologians deny necessitarianism (e.g. Richard Muller's Post Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, Vol. III, pg. 412ff). I used to affirm necessitarianism but have abandoned it for the very reason that I think it entails what you say we need to avoid:

Consider what it would mean for God and creation to be ontologically distinct yet for the latter to be necessitated by the former. This would be analogous to a particular understanding of the doctrine of eternal generation - which, even if untrue, highlights the point. If the Father necessarily generates the Son, the Father and Son would be mutually dependent upon one another. Obviously, the Son would depend upon the Father, being necessitated by Him. In turn, however, the Father could be who He is ("Father") without a Son.

So, too, a necessitated creation would mean that the Creator and creature are mutually dependent such that God cannot be who He is ("Creator") without a creation. If necessitarianism is true, then God not only needs to create to be Creator, He needs to be Creator. Creation is no longer contingent, so God as Creator isn't a contingent predicate either. Indeed, it's essential or necessary that He be Creator. There is, then, a real dependence on creation in order for one to be able to refer to God as what He essentially and necessarily must be - Creator.

The point needn't be that the Father-Son relationship is exactly the same as the Creator-creature relationship. One could maintain (as I did and do) that the Father and Son are of the same nature, whereas God and creation are not. In both cases, however, necessitation entails mutual dependency, and this is what changed my mind.

[Side note: on a theistic-contingentarian position, God is still the Creator, but such is not essential to who He is. There is no mutual dependency, guarding divine sufficiency. On theistic-necessitarianism, on the other hand, there is no apparent reason why being "Creator" would be any less integral to the essence of God than any commonly regarded divine attribute. Indeed, perhaps this line of reasoning begins to show that Karofsky's reductive monism does follow from necessitarianism (and, hence, why Christians must disagree with Karofsky).]

In short, for a Christian, theistic-necessitarianism is caught on the horns of a dilemma: 1) a pantheistic concession (such as a theistic-Karofskyan necessitarian would make) would salvage the doctrine of divine sufficiency at the expense of the Creator-creature distinction; 2) on the other hand, a concession that there is a mutual dependency between an ontologically distinct Creator and creation would salvage the doctrine of the Creator-creature distinction at the expense of divine sufficiency. (https://unapologetica.blogspot.com/2022/07/necessitarianism-and-eternal-omniscience.html)

Nevertheless, the "mind of God" is generally understood in classical theism to be singular, just like his will. "For who has known the mind of the Lord?" 1 Cor. 2:16. I don't think it's helpful or wise to speculate on the distinct persons having distinct thoughts, except perhaps metaphorically.

I would not say it is clear that the pre-incarnate Son literally prays or speaks to the Father, any more than God literally has hands or feet.

Well, I suppose here is where you and I would disagree. I would argue that Paul is quite consistent in referring to the Father as "God" and the Son as "Lord" in 1 Corinthians 1-2. You left off the last part of the question in 1 Corinthians 2:16, viz. "...so as to instruct him?" Paul is talking about the mind of a person, not an essence. I would also point out that Paul talks about the thoughts of God and persons in 2:11.

This isn't speculation, and the prayer of the Son to His Father is no metaphor: it's a literal, historically recorded event (although I never said the pre-incarnate Son was praying - I said that "the Son prays to His own Father about His own, pre-incarnate person," which is a big difference). So I would argue that if a commitment to a rather abstract, philosophical view tends to deny biblical history, that is what is unhelpful or unwise.

Ok, I think I understand what you are saying. My position is that the will of God is expressed an covenantal language, from which the idea of the covenant of redemption is derived. There is one will of God, but in the language of Scripture, the Son in his divine person is said to agree to things to represent the truths that 1) while there is one will of God, that will subsists distinctly in the person of the Son, 2) that the Son willed to undertake things the Father would not in the plan of redemption, and 3) that the Son did so freely. All of those truths are compatible with classical theism.

The bold is probably as close as we have come to agreeing. But this would mean that the Son's operations, activities, free exercises of will, etc. are not identical to those of His Father. While this would be compatible with a softer view of divine simplicity for which I, for example, would have more sympathy, it would not be compatible with the sort of divine simplicity to which classical theists typically hold (e.g. God is Pure Act).

 

[Charles Johnson]

Most Reformed theologians deny necessitarianism (e.g. Richard Muller's Post Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, Vol. III, pg. 412ff).

Muller doesn't deny what I've said here. He says the divine will is free from three kinds of necessity: "freedom from coaction, from servitude, and from suffering." I wholeheartedly agree. Compare Walaeus and Turretin on the matter, where this is affirmed, but also the senses in which God's will is necessary, which Muller also hints at ("In a sense, it can be argued that God must will some things and must will them in a certain way").

 

[Knight]

Muller doesn't deny what I've said here. He says the divine will is free from three kinds of necessity: "freedom from coaction, from servitude, and from suffering." I wholeheartedly agree. Compare Walaeus and Turretin on the matter, where this is affirmed, but also the senses in which God's will is necessary, which Muller also hints at ("In a sense, it can be argued that God must will some things and must will them in a certain way").

You may be right about Muller. I seem to recall Paul Manata and James Anderson took issue with him on this point.

I don't have a problem with saying God must will some things, by the way. I have a problem with saying God must create.

 

[Taylor]

This is an honest question; I’ve been thinking about this for years now. What do we do with Calvin here?

For although the essence does not enter into the distinction as a part or a member of the Trinity, nevertheless the persons are not without it, or outside it; because the Father, unless he were God, could not have been the Father; and the Son could not have been the Son, unless he were God. Therefore we say that deity in an absolute sense exists of itself; whence likewise we confess that the Son since he is God, exists of himself, but not in respect of his Person; indeed, since he is the Son, we say that he exists from the Father. Thus his essence is without beginning; while the beginning of his person is God himself. Those orthodox writers who formerly spoke concerning the Trinity applied this name only to the persons, since it would have been not only an absurd error but even the sheerest impiety to embrace the essence in this distinction.​

​

—Institutes, I.xiii.25.​

Some—such as Benjamin Warfield, Morton Smith, Robert Reymond, and Scott Swain.—have concluded that Calvin’s doctrine of the Son as autotheos, and his consequent reformulation of eternal generation to speak only of person and not of essence, put him in a minority both with those before him and the Reformed scholastics after him.

 

[RamistThomist]

This is an honest question; I’ve been thinking about this for years now. What do we do with Calvin here?

For although the essence does not enter into the distinction as a part or a member of the Trinity, nevertheless the persons are not without it, or outside it; because the Father, unless he were God, could not have been the Father; and the Son could not have been the Son, unless he were God. Therefore we say that deity in an absolute sense exists of itself; whence likewise we confess that the Son since he is God, exists of himself, but not in respect of his Person; indeed, since he is the Son, we say that he exists from the Father. Thus his essence is without beginning; while the beginning of his person is God himself. Those orthodox writers who formerly spoke concerning the Trinity applied this name only to the persons, since it would have been not only an absurd error but even the sheerest impiety to embrace the essence in this distinction.​

​

—Institutes, I.xiii.25.​

Some—such as Benjamin Warfield, Morton Smith, Robert Reymond, and Scott Swain.—have concluded that Calvin’s doctrine of the Son as autotheos, and his consequent reformulation of eternal generation to speak only of person and not of essence, put him in a minority both with those before him and the Reformed scholastics after him.

If Calvin is teaching an extreme version of autotheos, then he is in the minority. It's not heretical, though. Even Bellarmine conceded as much. And for much of Reformed history, Calvin was just one teacher among others. By no means the standard (not saying you are saying he is).

 

[Taylor]

If Calvin is teaching an extreme version of autotheos, then he is in the minority. It's not heretical, though. Even Bellarmine conceded as much. And for much of Reformed history, Calvin was just one teacher among others. By no means the standard (not saying you are saying he is).

That's helpful, thank you. Yeah, I'm not saying Calvin is the standard. I mainly just bring him up because this has been a point of controversy as of late, it seems to me.

 

[Charles Johnson]

This is an honest question; I’ve been thinking about this for years now. What do we do with Calvin here?

For although the essence does not enter into the distinction as a part or a member of the Trinity, nevertheless the persons are not without it, or outside it; because the Father, unless he were God, could not have been the Father; and the Son could not have been the Son, unless he were God. Therefore we say that deity in an absolute sense exists of itself; whence likewise we confess that the Son since he is God, exists of himself, but not in respect of his Person; indeed, since he is the Son, we say that he exists from the Father. Thus his essence is without beginning; while the beginning of his person is God himself. Those orthodox writers who formerly spoke concerning the Trinity applied this name only to the persons, since it would have been not only an absurd error but even the sheerest impiety to embrace the essence in this distinction.​

​

—Institutes, I.xiii.25.​

Some—such as Benjamin Warfield, Morton Smith, Robert Reymond, and Scott Swain.—have concluded that Calvin’s doctrine of the Son as autotheos, and his consequent reformulation of eternal generation to speak only of person and not of essence, put him in a minority both with those before him and the Reformed scholastics after him.

The view that the Father communicates, not essence, but personhood, to the Son has historically been associated with Lucas Trelcatius Jr., if for no other reason than that it is not totally clear what Calvin is saying. Voetius didn't think he was teaching the same thing as Trelcatius, for example.
Trelcatius's explanation is a bit puzzling, because he doesn't explain how personhood could be communicated without essence if a divine person is, by definition, an individual subsistence of the essence. He also appears to make the godhead four "things", one essence and three persons, which Calvin denies in the portion you cited here ("the essence does not enter into the distinction as a part or member of the Trinity").