Some musings on method

[RamistThomist]

This isn't an argument that one method is better than the other; rather, I seek to clarify where adherents and critics misfire. With Van Til I agree that Butler's Analogy is very weak. Most evidentialists agree as well. But to label Butler and Aquinas under the same method is almost laughable. Butler's arguments are probabilistic. Aquinas's are deductive. Deductive arguments aim at absolute certainty; probabilistic arguments do not. This is equivalent to saying Einstein and Euclid are doing the same thing.

Classicalists fault evidentialists for trying to prove miracles et al before they prove the God who makes miracles possible. There seems to be something to this. On the other hand, we don't really see people in the New Testament doing it in that order. Then again, few in the ancient world doubted the existence of a divine realm. Nonetheless, there is something elegant and beautiful about the classical arguments.

Evidentialists correctly point out that one cannot make the jump from a cosmological proof to the historicity of the New Testament, not quickly anyway.

 

[SojourningSøren]

I’m fairly new to all this. But wouldn’t the presuppositionalist insist all logic first starts with God? If such is the case, what does an evidentialist start with?

 

[RamistThomist]

I’m fairly new to all this. But wouldn’t the presuppositionalist insist all logic first starts with God? If such is the case, what does an evidentialist start with?

The classical apologist also starts with God in the order of being. The phrase "starts with God" is ambiguous. I'm not an evidentialist, so the best I can do is guess. He probably starts with the "evidence on the ground." The presup would counter there is no neutral fact or uninterpreted fact. That might be true, but it doesn't change the fact and it likely isn't the main point of disagreement. A better presup counter would say that there a different complex of events in which the fact fits. That's true, but that requires a lot more legwork than heroically asserting one's conclusion.

 

[faithandfreedom]

This isn't an argument that one method is better than the other; rather, I seek to clarify where adherents and critics misfire. With Van Til I agree that Butler's Analogy is very weak. Most evidentialists agree as well. But to label Butler and Aquinas under the same method is almost laughable. Butler's arguments are probabilistic. Aquinas's are deductive. Deductive arguments aim at absolute certainty; probabilistic arguments do not. This is equivalent to saying Einstein and Euclid are doing the same thing.

Classicalists fault evidentialists for trying to prove miracles et al before they prove the God who makes miracles possible. There seems to be something to this. On the other hand, we don't really see people in the New Testament doing it in that order. Then again, few in the ancient world doubted the existence of a divine realm. Nonetheless, there is something elegant and beautiful about the classical arguments.

Evidentialists correctly point out that one cannot make the jump from a cosmological proof to the historicity of the New Testament, not quickly anyway.

I wonder if it comes back to a nature grace dualism which seems to pervade the reformed world? Anything outside of scripture or the church is viewed as unspiritual - thus the use of logic is seen as worldly, when compared to exegesis.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Thanks for starting this discussion. I think one of the recurring problems in these debates is that we fail to distinguish things that actually need to be distinguished before we decide which "method" somebody belongs to.

For example, I don't think it helps to wrench Aquinas out of his own theological and metaphysical world and then read him as though "natural reason" means what autonomous reason came to mean after the Enlightenment. Aquinas certainly believes that natural reason can demonstrate truths about God without appealing to special revelation. But that is not the same thing as saying that reason is neutral, self-grounding, or independent of God. Those are different claims.

That distinction also helps with Van Til. Van Til's objection is not simply, "The traditional proofs use logic and therefore they are bad." He can speak quite positively about the force of theistic proofs when they are properly formulated. His objection is to an apologetic procedure in which God is effectively placed alongside the other facts of the universe and the creature sits in judgment over whether there is sufficient evidence to add "God" to the list of things he is willing to believe. God is not one more fact requiring validation by a supposedly autonomous knower. He is the One in whom facts, predication, logic, causality, and the knowing creature himself have their intelligibility.

That is a substantially different criticism than saying, "Aquinas used reason and Van Til used revelation."

I also don't think "nature/grace dualism" really explains the Reformed position. The Reformed tradition is full of appeals to the light of nature, natural revelation, natural law, reason, logic, causality, and the traditional arguments concerning God's existence. The Westminster Standards themselves assume these categories. The Reformed orthodox certainly did not regard logic as some sort of "worldly" activity that had to be replaced by exegesis. They used logic in doing exegesis and dogmatics because they regarded the rational creature and the created order as God's.

At the same time, I would be hesitant to reverse the mistake and conclude that, because Reformed theologians used natural law, scholastic distinctions, Aristotelian categories, or arguments also found in Aquinas, they were therefore simply "Thomists." The post-Reformation Reformed were notoriously eclectic in their appropriation of the catholic tradition. They could use Thomas here, Scotus there, an Aristotelian distinction somewhere else, reject all three on another question, and subordinate the whole enterprise to their confessional and exegetical commitments. Historical taxonomy gets misleading very quickly when similarity of vocabulary is treated as identity of system.

That is why I increasingly think a good deal of the apologetics debate involves people talking past each other. "Reason," "natural theology," "proof," "presupposition," "nature," and even "classical" are frequently being used without first determining whether everybody means the same thing by them.

People like neat categories. Aquinas or Van Til. Classical or presuppositional. Nature or grace. Thomist or anti-Thomist. Pick the good guy and then explain the other side in terms that make the taxonomy work.

The history is considerably messier than that, and I think the theology is considerably more interesting once we allow the necessary distinctions to remain in place.

 

[RamistThomist]

I've posted something like this in the past:

With the natural theology guys, we agree that there is a rationality in nature that points towards God and to which even the unbeliever has access. Against the natural theology guys, this rationality is more along the lines of post-Newtonian models and not simply Aristotle’s causality .With the Van Tillians I agree that without God this rationality would be impossible, as it would no longer be contingent. Against the Van Tillians, it is better to pursue this as seeing a God-given rationality within nature rather than bizarre transcendental models. Bottom line: the extreme Van Tillians are wrong to reject natural theology as proposed above. The classical theists, although correct on the doctrine of God, need to move beyond Plato and Aristotle. In other words, more Polanyi and Alister McGrath.

I'm at the point where I can concede that the Transcendental Argument for God might be logically fine. Even so, it's unnecessary. Why would someone need to reason transcendentally in the first place? Kant did so because he said you cannot know the thing in itself. You must first ask what conditions make knowledge possible. I don't think that's necessary. Modern science seems to think we can know the ding-an-sich (atomic number of an element, etc).

I know Van Tillians say there is a place for the traditional arguments. I've just never seen them do it. When Charles Hodge enunciates the traditional arguments, where does he go wrong and how would a Van Tillian use these traditional arguments?

 

[Ryan&Amber2013]

I personally like all three and have used elements of all three when talking to people about God. I'm not sure why there has to be 3 camps. It seems like they can all blend into 1.

At the heart of the matter people need to number one, recognize the existence of God, and then number two, recognize Christianity as the only valid religion. All three camps seek to do the same thing. People deny God's existence or Christianity for many different reasons, so it's good to address those reasons with people rather than trying to give them some sort of formula. Someone might need more evidence, one person might love their sin too much but realize God is real, another person might think they are very logical and need to realize they are borrowing their logic from what God has given them.

 

[jwright82]

Classical Apologetics center's around deductive arguments, that's it's method. Which is perfectly fine for anyone to use.
Evidentialism center's around inductive arguments, that's it's method. Which is perfectly fine for anyone to use.
Now those methods can be applied to many different types of things. CA generally puts forward arguments that are more philosophical in nature, the "First Cause" (Cosmological Argument for instance). E generally puts forth arguments that are more evidence based, evidence for the resurrection for instance.
Reformed Epistemology is somewhat different but similar in that, in simple terms, it's really a position against skeptical claims about God. It appeals to other types of beliefs that no one in their right mind (properly functioning mental capabilities) would doubt without some kind of argument or evidence to the contrary.
After all even the most harden skeptic about the existence of the world around them (supposedly can't prove it's not an illusion or Matrix simulation) still obeys traffic laws in the "Matrix illusion" world.
Their method is to counteract this skeptical claim about God making belief in God like those other beliefs that no one doubts. The skeptic must first produce reasons to doubt that belief. So the "method" (I realize that this is a weak link in my overall point but ride with me here) is dealing with individual arguments against the analogical argument that "belief in God is like belief in the external world or similar beliefs".
Now Van Til has been criticized for never putting forth a formal argument for everyone to analyze, there's some truth to that (he never really actually did that except for predication). But what if he's just doing what the other's are doing and putting out a method?
That's a distinction that many people miss. CA is fine, in my opinion, with it's deductive method. It's individual arguments that we evaluate for soundness, not the method. It's true that Van Til was highly critical of the "Traditional Approach" (think CA and E rolled into one) but I'm less so. I choose to focus on the uniqueness of Van Til's method over his criticism of others (one of his weakest points).
So then what is Van Til's method? It's the "Transcendental Method of Argumentation", that's a million dollar phrase for sure but what does it mean? The method basically goes like this: the world we experience around us could not be the way it is unless Christian Theism is true. Everything would be different or non-existent more likely.
That's a bold claim but think about it, if everything in your experience depends upon the truth of Christian Theism to be as it is then everything "proves" that truth. No matter what part of experience you point to in principle you can develop an argument from that.
So the method is still a method like the other methods and if they can do it then so can we right? And just like the other methods you have good and bad arguments or sometimes bad actors presenting the arguments. So that's an "us problem" not just a Presuppositional problem.
So the argument that basically says "even if it's a valid argument, it's still over people's heads" or "no one can even understand or care about TAG (a horrendous acronym that needs to be dropped)". I say "yeah because people are sitting around worried about causality you know and how to answer Hume's criticisms". Never experienced that in my life. That's the philosophical debate about causality not the idea of cause and effect (which everyone is concerned with on some level).
The Apologist would just respond that they'd tailor the argument to the audience, guess what we can to. That's being a human being. It's what you do if you care about people and the truth.
So that particular argument against Van Til is wanting in my opinion and possibly guilty of "special pleading". It's ok for us to do it but not for you. If everyone is doing this and utilizing good or bad arguments from good or bad actors then it doesn't count as an argument against Van Til's method just like it's not an argument against the other methods. The same goes for the "unintelligible argument" as I've shown above, no one understands "Transcendental Reasoning" but apparently they are just fine with intense philosophical debates over causality?
They're not. But I've presented Van Til's method, what makes it unique? Well considering that you can literally start anywhere and build an argument makes it pretty adaptable over a more fixed method. Other views in practice overcome this dilemma by utilizing the flow of conversation and keeping the discussion on the level of the participants.
So do we but it's built into our method upfront, so that's an advantage. So go out there and utilize whatever method you want and maybe we should stop being at each other's throats and just defend the faith like we're commanded to.

 

[RamistThomist]

Classical Apologetics center's around deductive arguments, that's it's method. Which is perfectly fine for anyone to use.
Evidentialism center's around inductive arguments, that's it's method. Which is perfectly fine for anyone to use.
Now those methods can be applied to many different types of things. CA generally puts forward arguments that are more philosophical in nature, the "First Cause" (Cosmological Argument for instance). E generally puts forth arguments that are more evidence based, evidence for the resurrection for instance.
Reformed Epistemology is somewhat different but similar in that, in simple terms, it's really a position against skeptical claims about God. It appeals to other types of beliefs that no one in their right mind (properly functioning mental capabilities) would doubt without some kind of argument or evidence to the contrary.
After all even the most harden skeptic about the existence of the world around them (supposedly can't prove it's not an illusion or Matrix simulation) still obeys traffic laws in the "Matrix illusion" world.
Their method is to counteract this skeptical claim about God making belief in God like those other beliefs that no one doubts. The skeptic must first produce reasons to doubt that belief. So the "method" (I realize that this is a weak link in my overall point but ride with me here) is dealing with individual arguments against the analogical argument that "belief in God is like belief in the external world or similar beliefs".
Now Van Til has been criticized for never putting forth a formal argument for everyone to analyze, there's some truth to that (he never really actually did that except for predication). But what if he's just doing what the other's are doing and putting out a method?
That's a distinction that many people miss. CA is fine, in my opinion, with it's deductive method. It's individual arguments that we evaluate for soundness, not the method. It's true that Van Til was highly critical of the "Traditional Approach" (think CA and E rolled into one) but I'm less so. I choose to focus on the uniqueness of Van Til's method over his criticism of others (one of his weakest points).
So then what is Van Til's method? It's the "Transcendental Method of Argumentation", that's a million dollar phrase for sure but what does it mean? The method basically goes like this: the world we experience around us could not be the way it is unless Christian Theism is true. Everything would be different or non-existent more likely.
That's a bold claim but think about it, if everything in your experience depends upon the truth of Christian Theism to be as it is then everything "proves" that truth. No matter what part of experience you point to in principle you can develop an argument from that.
So the method is still a method like the other methods and if they can do it then so can we right? And just like the other methods you have good and bad arguments or sometimes bad actors presenting the arguments. So that's an "us problem" not just a Presuppositional problem.
So the argument that basically says "even if it's a valid argument, it's still over people's heads" or "no one can even understand or care about TAG (a horrendous acronym that needs to be dropped)". I say "yeah because people are sitting around worried about causality you know and how to answer Hume's criticisms". Never experienced that in my life. That's the philosophical debate about causality not the idea of cause and effect (which everyone is concerned with on some level).
The Apologist would just respond that they'd tailor the argument to the audience, guess what we can to. That's being a human being. It's what you do if you care about people and the truth.
So that particular argument against Van Til is wanting in my opinion and possibly guilty of "special pleading". It's ok for us to do it but not for you. If everyone is doing this and utilizing good or bad arguments from good or bad actors then it doesn't count as an argument against Van Til's method just like it's not an argument against the other methods. The same goes for the "unintelligible argument" as I've shown above, no one understands "Transcendental Reasoning" but apparently they are just fine with intense philosophical debates over causality?
They're not. But I've presented Van Til's method, what makes it unique? Well considering that you can literally start anywhere and build an argument makes it pretty adaptable over a more fixed method. Other views in practice overcome this dilemma by utilizing the flow of conversation and keeping the discussion on the level of the participants.
So do we but it's built into our method upfront, so that's an advantage. So go out there and utilize whatever method you want and maybe we should stop being at each other's throats and just defend the faith like we're commanded to.

I would add one thing: abductive reasoning. I hold to the Cumulative Case method, inference to the best explanation. It's neither purely inductive or deductive. It's more of seeing patterns and which patterns fit the evidence. Its strength is its explanatory power (and also it resembles the way the mind works and beliefs are formed)> It's weakness is philosophers and theologians haven't always been clear on abductive reasoning.

It more resembles a detective novel than a syllogism.

 

[jwright82]

I would add one thing: abductive reasoning. I hold to the Cumulative Case method, inference to the best explanation. It's neither purely inductive or deductive. It's more of seeing patterns and which patterns fit the evidence. Its strength is its explanatory power (and also it resembles the way the mind works and beliefs are formed)> It's weakness is philosophers and theologians haven't always been clear on abductive reasoning.

It more resembles a detective novel than a syllogism.

Thanks for adding to the list. Not very familiar with this one. I've been aware of it but never really looked into it.

 

[RamistThomist]

Thanks for adding to the list. Not very familiar with this one. I've been aware of it but never really looked into it.

If you can decipher Charles Peirce, it's similar to that. If you can't decipher him, and I probably can't, then Dorothy Sayers' novels get at the same thing.

 

[jwright82]

If you can decipher Charles Peirce, it's similar to that. If you can't decipher him, and I probably can't, then Dorothy Sayers' novels get at the same thing.

Do you mean Charles Sanders Peirce, the Pragmatist? I'm already some what familiar with him, through James of course. Never read Dorothy Sayers, so thanks for the recommendation.

 

[ZackF]

A popular version of abductive reasoning apologetics would be from detective J. Warner Wallace. He’s all over YouTube. I enjoy his works.

 

[RamistThomist]

Do you mean Charles Sanders Peirce, the Pragmatist? I'm already some what familiar with him, through James of course. Never read Dorothy Sayers, so thanks for the recommendation.

Yes. Sayers' earlier Lord Peter novels are the best, especially if you can find the Ian Carmichael audiobooks. It is the pure essence of High British culture. Unfortunately, she created such a powerful character in Lord Peter that her later novels suffer when he isn't the main character.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

I've posted something like this in the past:

With the natural theology guys, we agree that there is a rationality in nature that points towards God and to which even the unbeliever has access. Against the natural theology guys, this rationality is more along the lines of post-Newtonian models and not simply Aristotle’s causality .With the Van Tillians I agree that without God this rationality would be impossible, as it would no longer be contingent. Against the Van Tillians, it is better to pursue this as seeing a God-given rationality within nature rather than bizarre transcendental models. Bottom line: the extreme Van Tillians are wrong to reject natural theology as proposed above. The classical theists, although correct on the doctrine of God, need to move beyond Plato and Aristotle. In other words, more Polanyi and Alister McGrath.

I'm at the point where I can concede that the Transcendental Argument for God might be logically fine. Even so, it's unnecessary. Why would someone need to reason transcendentally in the first place? Kant did so because he said you cannot know the thing in itself. You must first ask what conditions make knowledge possible. I don't think that's necessary. Modern science seems to think we can know the ding-an-sich (atomic number of an element, etc).

I know Van Tillians say there is a place for the traditional arguments. I've just never seen them do it. When Charles Hodge enunciates the traditional arguments, where does he go wrong and how would a Van Tillian use these traditional arguments?

Yeah, I agree. I got the latest book by Camden Bucey, Defending Our Hope. I kind of hoped it would move the conversation forward a little, but it just sort of catches people up to what Van Tillians already believe, in a way that explains that it has a Reformed pedigree. It does a decent job of criticizing approaches that are essentially unbelieving as well, but I always find it a little bit lacking to just land on TAG as the end of the story.

The thing I liked about the book praising Robbie George was how many arguments he has made that capture the public consciousness even if everyone doesn't agree with Thomism or Natural Law. The point is that his arguments have purchase outside of first showing that a person's worldview is faulty. I know that's a gross simplification of Van Til approaches but it does seem like the approach lends more toward showing someone is bankrupt in how they think rather than putting forward public arguments for something that any sane person could understand.

 

[RamistThomist]

Yeah, I agree. I got the latest book by Camden Bucey, Defending Our Hope. I kind of hoped it would move the conversation forward a little, but it just sort of catches people up to what Van Tillians already believe, in a way that explains that it has a Reformed pedigree. It does a decent job of criticizing approaches that are essentially unbelieving as well, but I always find it a little bit lacking to just land on TAG as the end of the story.

The thing I liked about the book praising Robbie George was how many arguments he has made that capture the public consciousness even if everyone doesn't agree with Thomism or Natural Law. The point is that his arguments have purchase outside of first showing that a person's worldview is faulty. I know that's a gross simplification of Van Til approaches but it does seem like the approach lends more toward showing someone is bankrupt in how they think rather than putting forward public arguments for something that any sane person could understand.

For my own part, I don't think there will ever be any sort of rapproachment between Van Tillianism and classical theological realism (Thomism, Scotus, etc). Both sides are too entrenched. The only way forward, if anyone actually wants to go forward, is to ditch both projects. Historic Reformed orthodoxy, specifically at the level of prolegomena, has the advantage of being connected with a powerful intellectual system that was used by the church, namely a variant of Aristotelianism. While Aristotle's system is great on virtue, it leaves much to be desired in terms of cosmology and physics. Theology after Aristotle finds itself stuck in a system of causes which do not always match biblical revelation.

Van Til's system is stuck in debates that took place in the early 20th century. I think he won those debates, and for that we are grateful. No one, however, is worried about those questions today (much the same as no one talks about the "humors" in biology). On the other hand, because Van Til is not indebted to any form of Aristotelianism, his disciples have the chance to move forward without as much baggage. Very few of them do. Instead they write books praising Van Til. James Anderson is a blessed exception.

I think some epistemological form as found in McGrath and others is probably the best starting point.

 

[faithandfreedom]

Going back to the original post, my concern is that Van Til seems to suggest that the methods used by those who preceded him were faulty and his method is the one that is in accordance with Scripture.

I think this attitude can be seen in other areas of the Reformed world and I don’t think it is good.

 

[jwright82]

For my own part, I don't think there will ever be any sort of rapproachment between Van Tillianism and classical theological realism (Thomism, Scotus, etc). Both sides are too entrenched. The only way forward, if anyone actually wants to go forward, is to ditch both projects. Historic Reformed orthodoxy, specifically at the level of prolegomena, has the advantage of being connected with a powerful intellectual system that was used by the church, namely a variant of Aristotelianism. While Aristotle's system is great on virtue, it leaves much to be desired in terms of cosmology and physics. Theology after Aristotle finds itself stuck in a system of causes which do not always match biblical revelation.

Van Til's system is stuck in debates that took place in the early 20th century. I think he won those debates, and for that we are grateful. No one, however, is worried about those questions today (much the same as no one talks about the "humors" in biology). On the other hand, because Van Til is not indebted to any form of Aristotelianism, his disciples have the chance to move forward without as much baggage. Very few of them do. Instead they write books praising Van Til. James Anderson is a blessed exception.

I think some epistemological form as found in McGrath and others is probably the best starting point.

Yeah, I agree. I got the latest book by Camden Bucey, Defending Our Hope. I kind of hoped it would move the conversation forward a little, but it just sort of catches people up to what Van Tillians already believe, in a way that explains that it has a Reformed pedigree. It does a decent job of criticizing approaches that are essentially unbelieving as well, but I always find it a little bit lacking to just land on TAG as the end of the story.

The thing I liked about the book praising Robbie George was how many arguments he has made that capture the public consciousness even if everyone doesn't agree with Thomism or Natural Law. The point is that his arguments have purchase outside of first showing that a person's worldview is faulty. I know that's a gross simplification of Van Til approaches but it does seem like the approach lends more toward showing someone is bankrupt in how they think rather than putting forward public arguments for something that any sane person could understand.

Yeah I agree that I expected more out of Reformed Forum. I got Tipton's book on "Vantillian Apologetics" (published through them), Rich, and in PM I believe that I complained about the same thing to Jacob (you can correct me if I'm wrong).
I didn't recommend it to him because it only "broadly" introduces Van Til's Apologetics and it seemed like it was pushing to sell Tipton's class on Van Til. It leaves so many questions unanswered. Like y'all I'm tired of reading the same old same old. Although Bosserman did write an amazing PhD thesis on Van Til's Apologetics. I second James Anderson as well.
Jacob I think you're right about "reproachment" between the two schools which is why I recommend agreeing to disagree. We use two different methods and you can't find common ground there if the extreme people on both sides are arguing that "their method is the Reformed Method". Obviously this is a person by person, for both sides, basis who can move in and out of Reformed Orthodoxy but we all have that problem.
I for one have been trying (and I think failing overall) to break down the uniqueness of the "Transcendental Method of Argumentation" to a level that a "sane person can understand". It's really very unique and I think the positive element is starting from the truth that reality as we experience it really is God's created reality, not just as a sort of "subjective Worldview thing" that merely "explains reality" but that it couldn't be any other way. We "live, move, and have our being" in His world not some neutral place we can all come up with accounts of, in a compare and contrast WV's way to see who "wins".
It's not as though we live in a take it or leave it reality that anyone can explain (neutrality in creation if you will) and we just argue over which one (Worldview) subjectively gives the most satisfying explanation. But that it really is God's created world pure and simple, objectively.
So the concept of "borrowed capital" makes sense here. If created beings are using created tools (reason, logic, scientific use of those things and the senses, imagination for creating beautiful things, etc) then in theory that's only possible because creation is creation, God's creation and we are His image bearer's. It can't be any other way.
So that (in theory) even attempts to use those created tools to undermine the truth of Christian Theism in a way provide evidence or proof of that truth. That's the genius of Van Til's method, no matter what anyone does it's proof and evidence for the truth of Christian Theism, in theory. So methodologically we can start anywhere in our apologetic move towards the truth of Christian Theism.
I think I have a good approach to challenge the Christian on that, though it's never worked out before (probably wishful thinking on my part). It's only silenced them but not been very persuasive over all because they don't seem like they want to admit the conclusion that creation can't be anything other then creation but it's the next step to a positive argument to demonstrate that truth, that I lack and that's what I think they really want to see before admitting Van Til could be right. I hope that all makes sense.
It's like I can get them to silently agree that the world we experience is God's creation and it screams at all of us that truth but since the discussion is always in the context of defending Van Til against misrepresentation my lack of a positive element is where it stops. They, it appears, want a syllogism when I can only provide a method and those are two different things.
But in theory Van Til is right, no matter how you slice it, creation is creation and only that perspective can make sense about how we all exist (this is taking the breadth of human experience into account) and the world we experience, from science or logic or love we only have those things because creation is creation (therefore God's existence and the truth of Christian Theism is transcendentally argued for). I hope this makes sense as well.
To be fair to myself though, since I'm simply defending a method and not a particular argument and the vast majority of my applications of the method are conversational then that's hard to translate into a quick argument because conversations go any which way. But I've had as much success as anyone else.
That's more work for me and I personally think that Bahnsen did the world a favor with his apologetic application of the method but "idiots on the internet" took things they didn't understand and rabidly applied them to any innocent bystander thus behaving in a most unchristian way.
That's why I wish that William Edgar would have written more on this because I've noticed that no one drags him into the mud when complaining about Vantillian's. He's too nice, to be honest, and some young men all amped up on the whole "confrontation thing" don't relate to that.
I also wonder if good applications of Robert Knudsen's work could be "translated" into everyday language. I know he was a Dooyeweerd devotee but he was an expert on Existentialism and applying Van Til's Apologetics to that and Existentialism is always popular amongst the youth (what's more "existential" then "brooding" about life and meaning). College students relate to that in my experience.
My own experience, working with young people on a daily basis, is that from the "intellectual" to the not caring crowd they have a deep moral sense that some kind of "right and wrong" exists in "some way" that we should be concerned about. And seek to change things, "hope" another useful angle in apologetics.
Since my apologetical "bug" is always on, I observe their questions and concerns and try to work that into my conversations with them. It's amazing how much they don't know about the hard parts of life and are flabbergasted about the way things used to be.
You'd think the world didn't exist before cell phones and the internet and they're tired of the "apathy" us "old folks" have about what's going on. That's a strategy to engage with them on. Because whatever is an Armageddon moment in time to them is just another day for me, I've heard that language my whole life and we're still here.
The not caring crowd is more like the "lost generation" of the 1920's and the hipster "Existentialists" of the 50's and 60's. So that's an angle to engage with them, of course in general they don't care but we all have to deal with that.
So to sum up my response, I tried to show where I think things are bad in Van Til's camp (agreeing with both of you) but hopefully also explaining avenues we can draw on to take our apologetic into the future, that new book by Westminster Theological Seminary on the "future of Reformed Apologetics" looks promising.
For myself I've tried, and overall failed, to translate Van Til's method into language anyone can understand. Any constructive criticism would be most appreciated.
Sorry about my rambling and my, probably, over use of quotation marks.

 

[jwright82]

Going back to the original post, my concern is that Van Til seems to suggest that the methods used by those who preceded him were faulty and his method is the one that is in accordance with Scripture.

I think this attitude can be seen in other areas of the Reformed world and I don’t think it is good.

Couldn't agree more, my friend.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

I think part of the problem with the idea of "rapprochement" is that we may be comparing two things that are no longer institutionally symmetrical.

Thomism is still a living intellectual project. A Roman Catholic who wants to understand Thomas has schools, professors, journals, institutes, and scholars who keep developing and applying that tradition. There is an intellectual ecosystem there.

I'm not sure we really have an equivalent in the Reformed world.

There is a lot of excellent retrieval going on. Muller helped recover the world of Reformed orthodoxy, and we now have much better access to Van Mastricht, Turretin, Voetius, Junius, Maccovius, Polanus, and others. But notice that we call it "retrieval." We are mostly recovering an intellectual world that once existed rather than participating in an institutionally continuous version of it.

I think that matters for Westminster. The divines inhabited a theological culture shaped by scholastic habits of defining terms, making distinctions, identifying the actual question in dispute, testing consequences, and determining what follows from what. Sometimes I think we have inherited many of their conclusions without inheriting enough of the method that produced them.

I see this with GNC. Reformed men will sometimes ask, "Where does the Bible say that?" as though a doctrine has to appear in Scripture in nearly the same verbal form in which we confess it. But WCF 1.6 expressly includes what may be deduced by good and necessary consequence. That assumes legitimate inference, synthesis, distinctions, and entailment.

I don't think every seventeenth-century pastor carried Owen or Van Mastricht around in his head either. The difference was that men like Owen, Goodwin, Voetius, Van Mastricht, and Turretin existed within a larger ecclesiastical and academic culture that kept doing that work for the Church. There was a kind of division of theological labor.

I think we have lost a lot of that, which may explain part of Van Til's appeal. Van Til gives the modern Reformed minister something very important. He gives him the Creator-creature distinction, warns against autonomous reason, insists that facts are God's facts, and denies that the unbeliever stands as a neutral judge over God.

I think he is basically right about those things.

But Van Til does not provide anything like the comprehensive metaphysical and theological architecture that Thomas provides for a Thomist, or that the broader Reformed orthodox tradition once provided for Reformed theology. At the popular level, Van Til can become more of a boundary marker telling us what the Reformed position is not.

So I wonder if the answer is not really a rapprochement between Thomas and Van Til. Maybe the more interesting project is recovering the broader Reformed catholic and scholastic tradition and then actually continuing it.

That seems more useful to me than deciding whether Thomas or Van Til has to be the good guy.

 

[RamistThomist]

This is from Doug Kelly's Systematic Theology, vol. 1. It is akin to what Torrance called "kataphysical theology." Reality presses itself upon our mind and our mind responds by a "mental reflex." Torrance and Kelly later fill in the theological data.

 

[83r17h]

So I wonder if the answer is not really a rapprochement between Thomas and Van Til. Maybe the more interesting project is recovering the broader Reformed catholic and scholastic tradition and then actually continuing it.

I think the "continuing it" is where a lot of contemporary scholars I read seem to part ways. Almost every Reformed retrieval work that I've read spends some amount of time arguing that "repristinating" (whatever that means) is bad, or in a lot of cases that it is "impossible." I was always confused about what they think it is, and why they think it is bad. Bannerman's discussions of the various meanings of the word "Church" in Scripture, for instance, and his method of demonstrating it, hardly rely on premises that we deny today.

 

[faithandfreedom]

I was reading the Summa this week and was struck by the way Thomas elegantly distinguishes natural and supernatural revelation.

“It was necessary for man's salvation that there should be a knowledge revealed by Godbesides philosophical science built up by human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as to an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason: "The eye hath not seen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them that wait for Thee" (Isaiah 64:4)….Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths about God which human reasoncould have discovered, it was necessary that manshould be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors. Whereas man'swhole salvation, which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was therefore necessary that besides philosophical sciencebuilt up by reason, there should be a sacred science learned through revelation.”

 

[faithandfreedom]

From Muller's review of Oliphint on Aquinas, which is relevant because it focusses on showing that Oliphint (mis)reads Aquinas through a Van Tillian lens:
" There are several reasons why a balanced understanding of the thought of Thomas Aquinas is needed in Reformed circles. First and most obvious, Aquinas is one of the truly great thinkers in the Christian tradition, aspects of whose work continue to influence the framing of theology, philosophy, and apologetics. Second, as much recent scholarship on early modern Reformed thought has demonstrated, there are significant continuities between the Reformed thought of the Reformation and post-Reformation eras and the thought of the Middle Ages, notably with the Thomist tradition. Third, there has often been significant misinterpretation of Aquinas’s thought on the part of Protestant theologians. Scott Oliphint’s work on Aquinas exemplifies one particular pattern of misinterpretation, namely, the Van Tilian."

" The Reformed, like Aquinas (and, by the way, like Saint Paul) assumed that fallen human reason can come to some proper conclusions concerning God, his existence, and his will—which is what leaves people without excuse. They also held that the Greek philosophers did arrive at truths, some concerning God and quite a few concerning the nature of humanity and of the world order: neither Aquinas nor the Reformed would claim an utter “antithesis” between what the ancient Greeks understood and what Christians can know. For Aquinas, reason, “the light of nature,” itself a gift of God to human beings in the original creation of humanity, is capable of knowing not only that God exists but also that God is good, wise, and powerful. Given, however, its finitude, its rootedness in sense perception, and the errors brought about by sin, reason cannot know the truths of salvation without the aid of revelation. This “Thomistic” assumption should have a familiar ring in Reformed circles. It is paralleled by the very first sentence of the Westminster Confession—as also by the second article of the Belgic Confession."

" Oliphint’s disagreement with Aquinas on the issue of the status of truths drawn from the light of nature, namely reason, also represents a departure from the perspective of Calvin, traditional Reformed orthodoxy and, moreover, the Westminster Confession. Oliphint’s claim that Aquinas’s reading has “no basis” in the text of Scripture becomes an indictment of Calvin and the Reformed tradition as well."

 

[jwithnell]

Would common sense realism have come about without Aquinas? And in appreciation of the distinction made above regarding natural theology pre- and post- enlightenment, how much is common sense realism a product of the enlightenment?

 

[jwright82]

Would common sense realism have come about without Aquinas? And in appreciation of the distinction made above regarding natural theology pre- and post- enlightenment, how much is common sense realism a product of the enlightenment?

Maybe. It's hard to tell. He certainly layed a foundation for Enlightenment philosopher's to work from. Common Sense Realism was a direct response to Hume, so yeah it was a product of the Enlightenment.