(2.) It is contended that instrumental music is to be ranked among
the circumstances allowed by the Confession of Faith, and that this is
proved by the fact that it is on the same foot as other circumstances
about which there is no dispute: such as houses of worship, reading
sermons, the length of sermons, of prayers and of singing, bells, tuning-
forks and pitch-pipes, tune-books, and the like.
One would be entitled to meet this argument upon the general
ground already so often and earnestly maintained, that all the circumstances
remitted by the Confession to the discretion "” the natural
judgment "” of the church are common to human actions and societies,
and are such as belong to the natural sphere in which the acts of all
societies are performed, and, therefore, cannot be distinctively spiritual
or even ecclesiastical. As instrumental music, used in professedly
spiritual and actually ecclesiastical worship, cannot possibly be
assigned to that category, it is for that patent reason ruled out by the
very terms of the Confessions statement.
192 This ground I hold to be impregnable. But inasmuch as it is a fact that
certain minds do consider instrumental music as saveable to the
church for the reason that it may be viewed as standing on the same
foot with the circumstances which have been mentioned, I will
endeavor to meet their difficulties, albeit at the conscious expense of
strict logical consistency, by following this argument into its minute
details; and I pray that the Spirit of God may bestow his guidance in
this last step of the discussion.
First, It has been argued, that the use of instrumental music is a circumstance
of the same kind with the building of a house of worship
and the selection of its arrangements; that it is not an absolutely necessary
condition of the church´s acts that it should hold its meetings in
edifices: they might be held, as has often in fact been done, in the open
air. To this the obvious reply is, that this circumstance is one common
to the acts of all societies. They must meet somewhere, and it is of
course competent to all of them to determine, whether they shall be
subjected to the inconveniences of open-air assemblages, or avail
themselves of the advantages afforded by buildings. So of the arrangements
and furniture of the edifices in which they convene. Every society,
even an infidel society, has this circumstance conditioning its
meetings and acts, either as necessary to any performance of them or
as necessary to their decorous and orderly discharge. But instrumental
music is not such a circumstance: it is not common to human actions
and societies. This destroys the alleged analogy, and consequently the
argument founded upon it fails.
193 Secondly, The same disproof is applicable to the assumed analogy
between the alleged circumstance of instrumental music and that of
reading sermons. It is urged that a sermon must be delivered in one of
two ways: either with or without reading, and there is discretion left to
the church to elect between them. If she thinks reading the better way,
she is at liberty to employ it. So with the choice of instrumental music
as a mode in which praise shall be sung. There might be, as there has
been, some discussion in regard to the legitimacy of reading sermons.
But that question aside, and the argument being considered on its own
ground, it is sufficient to reply that the analogy asserted does not
obtain. The delivery of discourses, speeches, reports and resolutions is
an act common to all human societies. Now, it is competent to all societies
to say whether they shall be simply spoken or read, whether the
delivery shall be extemporaneous or from manuscript. They can, each
for itself, determine the circumstance of the mode in which an act
common to all shall be performed. But the singing of praise in the
worship of God is not an act common to all societies. It is therefore
not one in regard to which the Confession grants the liberty to the
church of fixing the circumstance of the mode in which it shall be
done.1
Thirdly, The same line of argument, it is contended, holds good
with reference to the discretionary power of the church to order the
circumstances of the length
of sermons, of prayers, and of singing. But, it is replied, all societies
must, of necessity, fix the time allotted to their several exercises, or
their meetings would be failures. Nature itself dictates this. The
church, therefore, has the natural right to order this circumstance in
connection with all her services. But the question of determining the
length of an exercise is a very different one from that of introducing
the exercise at all. There is no analogy between the determination of
the time to be allowed to all acts, and the determination of the legitimacy
of some special act. The adjustment of the length of its exercises
is a circumstance common to all societies. The employment of instrumental
music, as a concomitant of worship, is a circumstance peculiar
to the church as a distinctive society. The analogy in every respect
breaks down.
Fourthly, If the church has bells, it is asked, why may it not have
organs? They are both instruments of sound which serve an ecclesiastical
purpose. The answer is so obvious that one feels almost ashamed
to give it. The bell is not directly connected with worship; the organ is.
The bell stops ringing before the worship begins, the organ accompanies
the worship itself. There is not the least likeness between them, so
far as this question is concerned. A bell simply marks the time for
assembling. So does a clock; and we may as well institute a comparison
between the hands of the clock at a certain hour and instruments
music in worship after that hour, as between the sound of the bell and
it. The question is in regard to a concomitant of worship, not as to
something that precedes it and gives way to it.
195 Fifthly, It is by some gravely contended that if tuning-forks and
pitch-pipes may be used, so may organs. The same answer as was
returned to the immediately foregoing argument is pertinent here. Did
those who submit this argument ever notice the use made of a tuningfork
or a pitch-pipe by a leader of singing? It is struck or sounded in a
way to be heard by the leader himself, and when by means of it he has
got the pitch of the tune to be sung, it is put into his pocket, where it
snugly and silently rests while the singing proceeds. It no more
accompanies the worship than does a bell. Like it, it stops sounding
before the act of worship begins. What analogy is there between it and
an instrument that accompanies every note of the singing by a corresponding
note of its own. Assign to the organ the same office as the
humbler tuning-fork or pitch-pipe, namely, merely to give the leader
of the simple singing the pitch of the tunes, and who would object to
it? The question of organs would be as quiet as they would be. One
toot before the singing, and then they would be, what they ought to be
during the public singing of praise, as silent as the grave. One cannot
help wondering that the admirers of this "œmajestic instrument" would
employ a comparison which reduces it to a pitch so low!
Sixthly, There is only one other argument of this minute class
which will be considered. It is one which I have known some brethren
to maintain as men do a last redoubt. It is argued that instrumental
music is just as fairly entitled to rank among the circumstances indicated
by the Confession of Faith as is a tune-book.
196 Does a tune-book assist the singing of praise? So does an organ. If the
church has discretion in employing one kind of assistance to singing,
why not another?
Has it not occurred to the minds of those who insist so strenuously
upon this view that they may be using a tune-book to accomplish an
office to which it may be inadequate, when they wield it to knock
down arguments derived from the Old Testament and the New Testament
Scriptures, from the old dispensation and the new, from the practice
of the Jewish synagogue, of the apostles, of the whole church for
twelve hundred years, and of the Calvinistic Reformed Church for
centuries? Does it not occur to them also that there may be a flaw in
the statement of their argument? Expanded, it is this: Whatever assists
the singing of praise is a legitimate circumstance; the tune-book and
the organ alike assist, etc., therefore they are alike legitimate circumstances.
The true statement would be, whatever is necessary to the
singing of praise is a legitimate circumstance; the tune-book and the
organ are alike so necessary; therefore they are alike legitimate circumstances.
It behooves them to show that the organ is necessary to
the singing of praise. It is not enough to say that it assists it. They cannot
prove its necessity. Praise has been and is sung without the organ.
But it also behooves me to show that the tune-book is necessary to the
singing of praise, that it is a condition without which it could not be
done. If this can be evinced, as the organ is not necessary to singing, it
does not, as is assumed, stand on the same foot with the tune-book,
and the argument is unfounded.
197 It will be granted that a tune is necessary to modulated singing "”
that is, to singing which is not merely the prolongation of a single
note, and that could not be denominated singing. But the tune-book
gives the tune. The tune is necessary to singing; the tune-book is necessary
to the tune; therefore the tune-book is necessary to singing.
Need this simple argument be pressed? Whence the tune, if not from
the tune-book? Is it improvised by the leading singer? Suppose that it
may be, and he would be the only singer. It would be impossible for
others to unite with him.
It may be replied that the organ also gives the tune. This is a mistake.
The organ is as much indebted to the tune-book for the tune as is
a leading singer. If the organist should improvise the tune, where
would be the singing? It will hardly be contended that a solo on the
organ would be the singing of the congregation, or that the organ sings
at all.
It may still be said that the tune-book is not necessary to singing,
since it is a fact that singing is often done without it. This is a mistake
also. The tune-book may be absent as a book, but the tune it contains
is present in the mind of the leading singer, he remembers what he got
from it. It is a necessity to him, whether literally absent or present, he
cannot sing without the tune, and the tune is in the tune-book.
Finally, the mighty contest may yet be maintained on the ground
that some leading singers do not know the musical notes, and, therefore,
cannot depend on
198 the tune-book for the tune. True, there are some who are ignorant of
the notes, but all the same they depend on the tune-book, not immediately,
but mediately and really. For the tune is learned, in the first
instance, only from some one who does know the notes and got the
tune from the book. The tune-book is the first cause of the tune, and is
necessary to its existence. Of course, tunes are learned by the ear.
Most members of a congregation so learn them. But these persons
acquire them from the leading singer, and he received them from the
tune-book. So that, look at the matter as we may, the tune-book is necessary
to the singing of praise: it conditions its performance.
If, now, it be objected that the tune-book is a circumstance not
common to human actions and societies, and is equally, with instrumental
music, according to this argument, excluded from the discretionary
control of the church, I answer, That is true. It is circumstances
in the natural sphere, those which attend actions as actions, and not
this or that particular action of a distinctive society, that fall within the
discretion of the church. Consequently both of these circumstances "”
the tune-book and instrumental music "” fall without that discretion.
They both condition the performance of an act peculiar to the church.
But the difference between them is this: One is necessary to the performance
of a commanded duty, namely, the singing of praise, and the
other is not. The singing of praise is undoubtedly a commanded duty,
and it follows that what is a necessary condition of its discharge
comes also under the scope of command. It is, therefore, not discretionary
with the church to employ it; it is obligatory. It must be
employed, or the commanded
199 duty fails to be done. It is not so with instrumental music. It is not a
condition necessary to the commanded duty of singing praise; neither
is it a natural circumstance conditioning the acts of all societies. It is,
therefore, neither obligatory upon nor discretionary with the church to
use it. It is consequently excluded.