Tripartite division of the soul

[Davidius]

For those of you who have read Plato, I was wondering if you could help me with regard to his tripartite division of the soul. My primary source is Book 4 of Republic.

In the book, Plato (through Socrates) uses what my professor refers to as a Principle of Opposites (PO) to argue that the human soul must be divided into three parts because humans experience related yet conflicting desires. In his commentary, Dr. Reeve (my prof) states that "PO is simply the principle of noncontradiction, formulated in terms of properties rather than propositions, and restricted to properties that are relational forms." I'll quote some of Plato (with some of my own paraphrasing) to flesh this out a little.

It is clear that the same thing cannot do or undergo opposite things; not, at any rate, in the same respect, in relation to the same thing, at the same time. So, if we ever find that happening here, we will know that we are not dealing with one and the same thing, but with many.

It is not possible for the same thing, at the same time, and in the same respect, to be standing still and moving. If one were to say that this were true of a spinning top, we would say that objects of this sort have multiple axes and that, while the object is moving with regard to one axis, it is still with regard to the other.

Now, wouldn't you consider assent and dissent, wanting to have something and rejecting it, taking something and pushing it away, as all being pairs of mutual opposites - whether of opposite doings or of opposite undergoings does not matter?

Now, we would say, wouldn't we, that some people are thirsty sometimes, yet unwilling to drink? What then would we say about them? Isn't there an element in their soul urging them to drink, and also one stopping them - something different that masters the one doing the urging? And doesn't the element doing the stopping in such cases arise - when it does arise - from rational calculation, while the things that drive and drag are present because of feelings?

It would not be unreasonable for us to claim, then, that there are two elements, different from one another; and to call the element in the soul with which it calculates the rationally calculating element; and the one with whch it feels passions, hungers, thirsts, and is stirred by other appetites, the irrational and appetitive element.

Socrates to go on in saying that there is yet a third division of the soul, the spirited part. This part is sensitive to things such as honor, anger, valor, shame, etc. I won't go into too much detail with this part unless someone asks. I'm mainly interested in dealing with the PO, the very premise for the entire deal. At one point, Socrates states that the entire things falls apart if this premise can be proven false. I've read several articles, one of the best of which was by John Murray, on a scriptural response to trichotomy but I was wondering if anyone can help me answer Plato's philosophical argument from a philosophical standpoint. If a man wants to commit adultery because of sexual urges (appetitive) but also does not want to because of moral or other reasons, does this reasoning on his part prove that his soul is ontologically divided? I'm currently writing a paper in response to another paper on the "spirited element" of the soul and I'd like to refute the entire notion of trichotomy while also showing inconsistencies with the writer of the paper's notions of the spirited element and Plato's.

 

[Dieter Schneider]

For those of you who have read Plato, I was wondering if you could help me with regard to his tripartite division of the soul. My primary source is Book 4 of Republic.

In the book, Plato (through Socrates) uses what my professor refers to as a Principle of Opposites (PO) to argue that the human soul must be divided into three parts because humans experience related yet conflicting desires. In his commentary, Dr. Reeve (my prof) states that "PO is simply the principle of noncontradiction, formulated in terms of properties rather than propositions, and restricted to properties that are relational forms." I'll quote some of Plato (with some of my own paraphrasing) to flesh this out a little.


Socrates to go on in saying that there is yet a third division of the soul, the spirited part. This part is sensitive to things such as honor, anger, valor, shame, etc. I won't go into too much detail with this part unless someone asks. I'm mainly interested in dealing with the PO, the very premise for the entire deal. At one point, Socrates states that the entire things falls apart if this premise can be proven false. I've read several articles, one of the best of which was by John Murray, on a scriptural response to trichotomy but I was wondering if anyone can help me answer Plato's philosophical argument from a philosophical standpoint. If a man wants to commit adultery because of sexual urges (appetitive) but also does not want to because of moral or other reasons, does this reasoning on his part prove that his soul is ontologically divided? I'm currently writing a paper in response to another paper on the "spirited element" of the soul and I'd like to refute the entire notion of trichotomy while also showing inconsistencies with the writer of the paper's notions of the spirited element and Plato's.

Are you familiar with http://www.thirdmill.org/sermons/compile_topic.asp/site/iiim/category/subjects/topic/Nature of Man also see http://www.monergism.com/directory/...imple&search_kind=and&phrase=trichotomy&B1=Go

 

[VanVos]

See here also for a paper by Dr.Bahnsen on the mind/body problem

http://www.cmfnow.com/articles/pa143.htm

 

[Davidius]

Thanks, guys! Anyone else?

 

[bookslover]

When I was a boy, I had several cans of Plato, which came in various colors. Never tried to eat the stuff, though, like some kids.

 

[Davidius]

When I was a boy, I had several cans of Plato, which came in various colors. Never tried to eat the stuff, though, like some kids.

har har har