RamistThomist
Puritanboard Assessor
How would we define the "soul?" Is it the image of God ala Calvin? Is it the ghostly, neo-Platonic aspect of man? How would we define it?
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I assumed them to be synonymous since I held to a dichotomous view.


The other constituent element of man is the soul, also referred to as his spirit. In Hebrew it is called [] (Nephesh), and in Greek [] (Pneuma).
Both words are derivatives of "to breathe," either because it was created by a symbolic act of breathing, is the cause of nasal breathing, or due to its invisibility and mobility.
The soul is a spiritual, incorporeal, invisible, intangible, and immortal personal entity adorned with intellect and will. In union with the body it constitutes a human being and by virtue of its inherent propensity is inclined to be and remain united with the body.
In union with the body it constitutes a human being
anyone who thinks we are without bodies while we wait for our resurrected bodies must say that they are *in fact* separate entities. Now, it is natural, best, the intention, etc., that we be *joined* or *united* with our bodies, but that doesn't mean that they are not logically distinct.
anyone who thinks we are without bodies while we wait for our resurrected bodies must say that they are *in fact* separate entities. Now, it is natural, best, the intention, etc., that we be *joined* or *united* with our bodies, but that doesn't mean that they are not logically distinct.
I can say a soul (think, "a human") can not be destroyed by cutting off their body.
Then I can destroy the rest of their body.
Doesn't that prove to much? Wouldn't those who have lost limbs and wait to be reunited with them at the resurrection also prove that limbs are separate entities and thus force us to divide the essence of a human up into even more separate entities?
anyone who thinks we are without bodies while we wait for our resurrected bodies must say that they are *in fact* separate entities. Now, it is natural, best, the intention, etc., that we be *joined* or *united* with our bodies, but that doesn't mean that they are not logically distinct.
I'll have to read up on holistic dualism, give me some time, though. I'm swamped with stuff like the Internal Revenue Code for the next few months.
But I'm not so sure about your first statement here. I acknowledge that there appear to be separate entities, but I'm not sure that there are "in fact" separate entities. I'm wrestling with the idea that the body is only a "body" when the immortal soul interfaces with time/space creation. Sure, when the soul is departed from time/space creation, some bones, etc. remain, but is that really a body at that point? I think it is more of a reminder that the particular soul operated in the physical world, and that it will again upon redemption of the universe.
The soul remains whatever it is--our essence. But when it is in physical world, I think it fair to say that it always is integrated with a body. A weak analogy might be something like an object that is red, and looks red, but only if there is red light in the light spectrum illuminating it. The "redness" may be an isolatable quality (analogous to the body), but it is not separate at all.
Pressing the analogy probably way too far, I might say that a soul demands a body, is created for living in time/space, but can and does survive outside of that fallen realm, just as a red object is created to look red, but does not look red if there is no red light.
if it makes you feel better, perhaps "not identical" is a better word.
Some forms of dualism would maintain that it is *integrated* with the body. C Stephen Evans had an article on that, but I can't find it on the web anymore (except for at Apollos ws, but you have to be a member to read it). That is is never spearate that way.
But, they key notion for the dualist is that of *logically separate.* Even if they never became disintergrated, they could still be distinct substances since properties could be true of one but not the other.
Last, you seem to imply that abstracta do not exist except if they are instantiated in concreta. I'd have to disagree seeing that "redness" is a concept in the mind of God, and it has existence apart from being instantiated in concreta.
Or, I could look at a red apple, get the mental image, and "see" red in my minds eye. Light waves and the like are out of bounds here.
Your last paragraph affirmed substance dualism.
I can say a soul (think, "a human") can not be destroyed by cutting off their body.
According to Leibniz's law of identity, you just gave another proof for soul/body dualism. You can attribute properties to the one while not the other. Your soul cannot be cut, your body can.
Then I can destroy the rest of their body.
You're talking like a dualist. *Their* body. As if it's something they *have.*
Doesn't that prove to much? Wouldn't those who have lost limbs and wait to be reunited with them at the resurrection also prove that limbs are separate entities and thus force us to divide the essence of a human up into even more separate entities?
The point was that the *person* or *soul* exists and lives while the body doesn't. If the body is "in the ground" and the soul is "present with the lord," then bidy and soul are not the same.
Now,
Do you mean people who are waiting during the intermediate state? I'd say you're just playing language games. Those people are waiting for their entire body, arm included.
Do you mean a guy who has lost an arm and is (rest of) bodily present when the Lord returns? Well, an Thomist would argue that the arm has its identity as a human arm in relation to the whole. In that it can fulfill its function. When it gets lopped off and is laying on the ground, it's not a human arm anymore. So, the separate human entity argument wouldn't work against an Thomistic dualist.
Or, one could argue that it may be a separate entity while it is lying on the ground in the it is spearate from the body, and you could attribute properties to it that you couldn't to the rest of the body, but it's not a different *kind* of spearate entity.
Or, one could say that they still wait until they get their resurrected *body* (as in the noraml human body - head, arms, legs, etc) and they don't have it right now. That is, to say the arm is separate from the *body* is wrong. They only have *part* of a body.
There's much that could be said. But (much to the Scripturalists chagrin) the Bible doesn't give us a worked out position on the matter. It seems that something like substance dualism fits the data best, but the many details are missing.
Lastly, it's not that the arguments for substance dualism are just from naive people who base their thoughts on the matter from experience or sensation. If you get the books I linked to above you can see that they have (a) theological arguments for their position, (b) philosophical arguments for their position, and (c) empirical arguments too.
Tom Bombadil said:"According to Leibniz's law of identity, you just gave another proof for soul/body dualism. You can attribute properties to the one while not the other. Your soul cannot be cut, your body can."
Tom Bombadil said:"Do you mean a guy who has lost an arm and is (rest of) bodily present when the Lord returns? Well, an Thomist would argue that the arm has its identity as a human arm in relation to the whole. In that it can fulfill its function. When it gets lopped off and is laying on the ground, it's not a human arm anymore. So, the separate human entity argument wouldn't work against an Thomistic dualist."