Turretin's Method of Theology (or how not to be a Campbellite)

[RamistThomist]

This concept strikes me as being at the heart of the current debate. What is the intellectual pathway, termed "relation," to conclude that God is possessed of essence, and the alternate path to conclude that They are possessed of Persons? Please understand, I affirm that the Trinity is possessed of both essence and Personhood, in agreement, I am sure, with all contributors to this thread. But the claim that this doctrine is logical depends on the nature of these two "relations."

"is possessed of" is a very awkward phrase. Few (if any) in church history have spoken thus of the Trinity. A subject does the possessing, so if one says God is "possessed of" person and essence, then we are introducing a new term into the Trinity. In this case, we now have a subject possessing the persons AND a subject possessing the essence, along with the previous three persons in the Trinity.

I know how the church has confessed person and relation. I do not know what you mean by your novel use of these terms in the discussion.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

I find this discussion to be mostly confused and fruitless. Ectypal theology (that is the knowledge of theology accommodated to creaturely capacity) is not inherently paradoxical. That is not to say that by knowing things as a creature we comprehend God and His knowledge of HImself (archetypal theology). Our knowledge is creaturely and His knowledge is divine. We apprehend things revealed. He comprehensively knows all things in Himself.

What God reveals to us, however, is not inherently contradictory or paradoxical simply because it is analogical. There seems to be a confusion that certain revealed truths are either beyond "logic" in the sense that what can be known by a creature must be apprehended only by way of paradox. This is false.

What God reveals to us can be relied upon and understood as it is accommodated to our understanding. He has revealed to us that the Father is God, that the Son is God, and that the Spirit is God but that there is only one God. He has revealed to us that the Father is neither begotten nor proceeds, that the Son is eternally begotten of the Father, and that the Spirit eternally proceeds from the Father and the Son.

Is there more about the Divine essence and the hypostases that is true? Yes, as God knows HImself but creaturely knowledge of these profound realities about the nature of God is limited to creaturely capacity. We are not missing propositions. We are creatures and our capacity, even in glory, will never penetrate the divine essence.

Saying that these ideas are "supra-logical" misses the point. The issue in sound theology has always been to hold fast to the things that God has revealed and to believe that what has been revealed to creatures can be apprehended by His children. This means they can believe what God has revealed and detect when others are departing from those truths because they are either unstable or unlearned.

This means that when a Church man confuses or dissembles on ideas that have long been understood by the Church catholic, he ought to be rebuked in the most serious way possible to warn him of departing from the Christian faith. Saying that our revealed understanding of the Trinity and the relationship of the persons and the essence is somehow supra-logical is foolish. Elders in NAPARC Churches ought to be sound enough to know where it is dangerous to tread.

 

[CovenantWord]

Here you have (unintentionally I presume) given man the power to create logic without God. You read in Genesis that Cain - under the common grace of bearing God's image - built a city from a wooded area and have reversed the order in which this act was possible.

You inferred that Cain used a hammer and etc and the logic needed to construct a hammer, a city et al and then presume Cain developed the logic underpinning the mechanics of building a city, forgetting that the image of God inside Cain is indeed deeply marred but not absent.

The first principles of logic is not introduced de novo by the mind of man; it is eternal inherent within God's order, God's knowledge, God's wisdom, God's dominion and introduced in the mind of man (originally dust) as the image of the God who could not possibly be anything but order and logical.

By definition, logic is an intellectual activity that brings into existence new knowledge (awareness, insight, or propositions). This activity depends upon God in a number of ways, including His creating man with knowledge (the ability, curiosity, and mandate to engage in mentation).

Could you explain the statement that logic is eternally inherent in God's order? An example might help.

 

[CovenantWord]

Yes, sir. From the doctrine of the Trinity to the Creator-created relationships within laws of logic to the doctrine of the Incarnation, we are on it! hahaha

No offense, and if my take is wrong then I will be happy to correct, but it seems to me that you are not really honestly engaging in good faith here.

I have perhaps not been as explanatory as I should have been, as I labored under the misimpression that the connection would be self evident. I have in mind a set of doctrines, a set of fundamental Christian truths. The elements of this set include (but are not necessarily limited to) the Trinity, the Incarnation, creation de novo, miracles, man's responsibility vs. God's sovereignty, substitutionary atonement, and election. I propose that all the elements of this set share a significant characteristic, namely, that their certainty, integrity, importance, and applicability cannot be arrived at by human inferential reasoning. They must be extracted from special revelation. This extraction operates on the principles of systematic exegesis (grammar, definition, comparisons within Scripture, etc.), which is a specialized field of logic. I apparently have not communicated this point clearly enough, so allow me to repeat it in direct propositional form: The source and character of the doctrines in this set is supralogical; the exegesis and systemization of these doctrines is distinctively logical.

This thread, of course, is primarily focused on the leading element in this set, namely, the Trinity, since the point under consideration is whether God can appropriately be deemed logical. Comments involving other members of this set, along with comments involving any other topic, should be directly applicable to the point (God is properly deemed logical) or helpfully illustrative thereof.

 

[CovenantWord]

You have repeatedly ignored historical-theological definitions regarding "Person" and "Being" and "Nature".

I will interpret this comment as a request to define these terms, with the demand that those definitions be recognizable from orthodox tradition. All right, fair enough.

Being: The quality or state of having existence. "There is but one only, living, and true God: who is infinite in being and perfection" (WCF 2.1) "There is but one uncreated and immeasurable being" (Athanasian Creed).

Nature: hupostasia, substantia, essentia. The essential character, unchangeable by external events or forces. "God . . . is . . . immutable, immense, eternal, incomprehensible, almighty, most wise, most holy, most free, most absolute," etc. (WCF 2.1). "God [is] . . . uncreated, . . . immeasurable, . . . . eternal" (Athanasian Creed)

Person: ousia, individuum, suppositum. "In brief, the term [persona] has traditionally indicated an objective and distinct mode or manner of being, a subsistence or subsistent individual, not necessarily substantially separate from like personae" (Muller, Richard. Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, p 226-227, as helpfully quoted by @No Other Name above.) Though united in will, the three Persons sustain different relationships with each other:

The Father was neither made nor created nor begotten from anyone.
The Son was neither made nor created;
he was begotten from the Father alone.
The Holy Spirit was neither made nor created nor begotten;
he proceeds from the Father and the Son. (Athanasian Creed)

The three Persons also undertake distinct functions in creation and redemption.

The Being of the Trinity comprises unity of essence and diversity of Persons inseparably. "In the unity of the Godhead there be three persons" (WCF 2.3). "[W]e worship one God in trinity and the trinity in unity, / neither blending their persons / nor dividing their essence" (Athanasian Creed). "n trinitarian usage, three personae subsist in the divine substantia or essentia (q.v.) without division" (Muller, ibid.)

I trust this clarifies my position?

 

[RamistThomist]

The Being of the Trinity comprises unity of essence and diversity of Persons inseparably. "In the unity of the Godhead there be three persons" (WCF 2.3). "[W]e worship one God in trinity and the trinity in unity, / neither blending their persons / nor dividing their essence" (Athanasian Creed). "n trinitarian usage, three personae subsist in the divine substantia or essentia (q.v.) without division" (Muller, ibid.)

Is the being singular or plural?

 

[CovenantWord]

Our knowledge is creaturely and His knowledge is divine. We apprehend things revealed. He comprehensively knows all things in Himself.

Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. You have recast my point into language more familiar to PB contributors. I very much appreciate that.

Man apprehends, by special revelation, that the Trinity is three Persons; man also apprehends that the Trinity is one essence. Man does not and cannot comprehend how both are true of one Being, but he knows that it truly is. Man apprehends that the Incarnation is fully God and fully man. Man does not and cannot comprehend how both are true of one Person. Logic is intimately and essentially supportive of apprehension; yet, when comprehension is not possible, logic cannot assist. This is exactly my original point.

Supralogical does not mean dismissive of, or contemptuous of, logic. It does not mean antilogical or illogical. Quite the opposite. Yes, it is a neologism, but it is only a slightly more specialized form of suprarational, which is found in the dictionary. Suprarational means "that which cannot be comprehended by reason alone" (emphasis added). I used supralogical instead, in hopes of meeting the original claim on its own terms as much as possible. By using "supralogical," I aimed at the same target as your statement: "Our knowledge is creaturely and His knowledge is divine. We apprehend things revealed. He comprehensively knows all things in Himself."

Paradoxical does not mean "inherently contradictory." Quite the opposite. A paradox is a literary device intended to induce the reader into thinking more deeply about the subject presented, in his attempt to resolve the apparent contradiction expressed. The eventual resolution, and the effort to achieve that resolution, induce the reader to understand the idea more deeply and more vividly. The difference with divine paradox is that man apprehends the apparent contradiction, but the Divine reserves to Himself the comprehension of the resolution. Man knows that a true resolution exists, even while realizing the resolution is beyond his logical powers. Although not the primary purpose of these and like fundamental doctrines, their character as paradox does glorify God by inducing the contemplation of the unknowability of the Divine; the unfathomable depths of His love; the unceasing grievousness of sin; and the vast wonders of man's creation, redemption, and glorification.

 

[RamistThomist]

Man apprehends, by special revelation, that the Trinity is three Persons; man also apprehends that the Trinity is one essence. Man does not and cannot comprehend how both are true of one Being, but he knows that it truly is.

You switched terms in this passage. I cannot comprehend one God is one essence and three persons, but I apprehend it sure enough.

 

[CovenantWord]

Is the being singular or plural?

It is both. That is the paradox, that is the apparent contradiction. Or, if you prefer: That is the description of the Trinity that man can apprehend, but not comprehend.

 

[CovenantWord]

I cannot comprehend one God is one essence and three persons, but I apprehend it sure enough.

Exactly.

 

[Request-Deleted member 11775]

There is only one single Divine Being. There is not more than one Divine Being. The Divine Being (or Essence) subsists in 3 persons, and a Divine Person is the Divine Essence/Being subsisting in an especial manner.

 

[RamistThomist]

It is both. That is the paradox, that is the apparent contradiction. Or, if you prefer: That is the description of the Trinity that man can apprehend, but not comprehend.

There is no apparent contradiction, since they are not divine and human in the same relationship. It is like saying my body is an apparent contradiction because I have one head (singular) and two arms (plural).

 

[No Other Name]

 

[CovenantWord]

There is no apparent contradiction, since they are not divine and human in the same relationship.

You have shifted from Trinity to Incarnation perhaps? I previously requested a definition of "relationship" in this context, but received no reply, so I request again. What is the nature of these relationships, and who/what are the parties to the relationships?

 

[RamistThomist]

You have shifted from Trinity to Incarnation perhaps? I previously requested a definition of "relationship" in this context, but received no reply, so I request again. What is the nature of these relationships, and who/what are the parties to the relationships?

I am simply giving the definition of the law of noncontradiction. If "relation" muddies the water, we can use "sense" or "aspect." In any case, person and nature are not the same thing, so there cannot be anything contradictory or paradoxical about it. A and B are not contradictories. A and ~A are. This is trinitarianism at its most basic level.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. You have recast my point into language more familiar to PB contributors. I very much appreciate that.

Man apprehends, by special revelation, that the Trinity is three Persons; man also apprehends that the Trinity is one essence. Man does not and cannot comprehend how both are true of one Being, but he knows that it truly is. Man apprehends that the Incarnation is fully God and fully man. Man does not and cannot comprehend how both are true of one Person. Logic is intimately and essentially supportive of apprehension; yet, when comprehension is not possible, logic cannot assist. This is exactly my original point.

Supralogical does not mean dismissive of, or contemptuous of, logic. It does not mean antilogical or illogical. Quite the opposite. Yes, it is a neologism, but it is only a slightly more specialized form of suprarational, which is found in the dictionary. Suprarational means "that which cannot be comprehended by reason alone" (emphasis added). I used supralogical instead, in hopes of meeting the original claim on its own terms as much as possible. By using "supralogical," I aimed at the same target as your statement: "Our knowledge is creaturely and His knowledge is divine. We apprehend things revealed. He comprehensively knows all things in Himself."

Paradoxical does not mean "inherently contradictory." Quite the opposite. A paradox is a literary device intended to induce the reader into thinking more deeply about the subject presented, in his attempt to resolve the apparent contradiction expressed. The eventual resolution, and the effort to achieve that resolution, induce the reader to understand the idea more deeply and more vividly. The difference with divine paradox is that man apprehends the apparent contradiction, but the Divine reserves to Himself the comprehension of the resolution. Man knows that a true resolution exists, even while realizing the resolution is beyond his logical powers. Although not the primary purpose of these and like fundamental doctrines, their character as paradox does glorify God by inducing the contemplation of the unknowability of the Divine; the unfathomable depths of His love; the unceasing grievousness of sin; and the vast wonders of man's creation, redemption, and glorification.

The problem I read in your definitions of "apparent contradiction" or paradox is that the creature is in a position to apprehend the contradiction. He is not. The analogical truths revealed are not contradictory, either real or perceived. The contradiction only appears to be contradictory when the creatue decides he must be in a position to move beyond ectypal knowledge.

That God is one in Being and three in Person is not apparently contradictory. It could only "appear" to be contradictory if the creature has the ability to move beyond ectypal knowledge. Because the divine essence and the subsistences are too wonderful and inscrutable to be comprehended then what is analogically revealed is true and firm. Anything we might think that could give us more "truth" is the lie of the serpent. Any imagined "missing premises" are attempts of the creature to claim to be God and have knowledge of things that only God can possess.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Here's a paper I wrote about 14 years ago:

5 Dec 2009

The Archetypal/Ectypal Distinction in Reformed Theology

​

First, then, when they inquire, let them remember that they are penetrating into the recesses of the divine wisdom, where he who rushes forward securely and confidently, instead of satisfying his curiosity will enter in inextricable labyrinth. For it is not right that man should with impunity pry into things which the Lord has been pleased to conceal within himself, and scan that sublime eternal wisdom which it is his pleasure that we should not apprehend but adore, that therein also his perfections may appear. Those secrets of his will, which he has seen it meet to manifest, are revealed in his word - revealed in so far as he knew to be conducive to our interest and welfare. – John Calvin



The Scriptures testify, and the Reformed Confessions bear witness, that we could never have any fruition through the knowledge that comes through nature by itself. There is another revelation, in the Scriptures, that is added to God’s revealing of Himself in nature that is supernaturally communicated. Natural revelation, in the beginning, was communicated via God’s covenant relationship with Adam (and mankind in general). Even the pursuit of “science”, in the naming of animals and the discovery of the created order by man, was rooted in the covenantal character of God with man. Scripture became necessary because of the covenant disobedience of Adam.[1]

Man’s approach to knowledge and science was always intended to be marked by obedience to the Creator. Man was created as an analogue of God; his thinking, his willing and his doing were to be understood to be analogical to the thinking and willing of God. In this sense, then, all knowledge comes from the Creator: philosophy, science, and theology are not to be thought of as independent spheres of knowledge but as part of a united truth insofar as they are analogically understood the way God reveals them.[2]

This Biblical notion of the nature of all truth and knowledge as originating in God the Creator is foreign not only to pagans today but many Christians as well. Many Christian systems treat supernatural knowledge as a sphere independent of natural knowledge. This divergence stems from the history of philosophy where man is the measure and knowledge is attained from the human mind working outwardly. The notion that man must bow the knee in obedience, that “…the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom…” is met with the scorn of unbelief. Because he is fallen in Sin, man is inclined to create systems of theology that see man as the subject of investigation and God as the speculative source of inquiry. The Reformed, however, not only had a distinct Creator/creature view of theology but it is an important feature that needs to be remembered as Christians of all ages are apt to fall into the pattern of human philosophy that does not glorify God. This Reformed distinction of theology is known as the Archetypal/Ectypal distinction.

True theology, both archetypal and ectypal, is knowledge that stands beyond doubt in contrast to the depraved opinion of false theology.[3] Archetypal theology is that theology which God knows “in se” (in Himself) while ectypal theology is true theology that is accommodated to creaturely understanding. True theology is one in its essence, whether it is found in God himself or understood by his creatures. The divisions of this theology into archetypal and ectypal respects the fact that there is not a single species of theology understood by degrees. In other words, God’s understanding and man’s understanding do not merely differ by degree of the same knowledge. Rather, this singular theology is understood absolutely and infinitely by the Creator (archetypal) while finitely and relatively by the creature (ectypal).[4]

Finite truth is grounded in the one, all-encompassing truth of God’s mind: not only theology, but all human knowledge looks to divine knowledge as its source and goal.[5] The archetype is theology in the truest sense, while all ectypal forms only bear a similitude to the archetype. Theology is in intelligent creatures as an image of the Creator. Theology is in God formally and eminently as His essential wisdom. He does not learn things by examining them or reasoning discursively about facts outside Himself but His is a simple intelligence to which all others can only be related by analogy. God knows things in Himself because it is in His essence to know. Creatures must discursively reason knowledge only insofar as they can analogically understand it but can never have knowledge as God has.[6]

The fact of the divine archetype is crucial to the existence of true yet finite human theology.[7] God understands divine things as He completely understands Himself. The secret things belong to Him alone and we do not peer into them nor can we but are to rely upon that which He accommodates to us. This understanding also guards against making the Creator “one of us”. Wisdom, for instance, does not indicate a genus of wise things of which God is one. Rather wisdom is an attribute of God: it is divine wisdom in the sense of being identical with the divine essence in its simplicity and freedom from composition.[8] A creature is said to be wise only insofar as it images the Creator but it can never possess divine wisdom as this is of the essence of God Himself.

Since divine knowledge is uncreated and identical with the essence of God, it must also be understood that it is incommunicable as are all the divine attributes when defined strictly as speaking of God. God does not share His essence with creatures. All that can be naturally communicated to created things of ultimate wisdom are faint images or vestiges. There is no analogical path from the created order to a full knowledge of god. It is thus God himself who is the source, origin, and efficient cause of what we know as true theology.[9] God’s infinite self-knowledge is transmitted to things in the created order. All things receive the imprint of God and finite creatures’ apprehension of revelation rests upon the image of God. As Augustine holds: “God alone is the theologian and we are truly his disciples.”[10]

Though this distinction of knowledge and theology is very complex it should not be viewed as a form of rationalism. The human mind is radically limited and separated from God’s perfect divine wisdom. It has no power of ascent into divine things apart from the help of God. The sovereignty and transcendence of God is preserved and man understands the gracious nature of revelation and that we understand only insofar as God is kind to reveal to His creatures. In short, in contrast to modern notions, man is not independent in his search for truth but all knowledge is fully reliant upon God.

Thus we must understand that all finite theology is ectypal. In noting this limitation, this is not to state that ectypal theology is one set of truths while archetypal is another. Rather, ectypal theology is the same Truth accommodated to creaturely understanding. God accommodates His truth to human capacity. Revelation, whether natural or supernatural, is suited to the present conditions of human knowing. This act of accommodation belongs to God and God determines the form of knowledge that we have of Him.[11] Against any neo-Orthodox notions that God’s “otherness” makes it impossible for God to communicate via human forms, the Scriptures preserve the transcendence of God in knowing things comprehensively while being able, as Creator, to communicate to His creatures. Ectypal theology is not “another Truth” but is, as it were, God lisping truth to us as a father lisps to His child.

Ectypal theology is also meant to be understood as the perfect form of true theology accommodated to creaturely understanding. It consists of the entire body, natural and supernatural, of knowledge that God has been pleased to reveal to His creatures. Yet, although this true Ectypal theology is revealed, man does not always properly apprehend the things that are revealed to Him. Not only does Sin darken man’s understanding such that he cannot have proper fruition in the natural order nor can he discern spiritual things while unregenerated but even regenerate man is still limited in what he can apprehend of the corpus of God’s truth. God has made our pilgrimage on this earth such that we will not have full happiness and blessedness in His truth but it is one of the things that we are to strive toward as a spiritual discipline as we pursue wisdom and it is also something that the Scriptures reveal that we will see fully only after we have been glorified. Paul reminds believers in 1 Corinthians not to become haughty and arrogant in our knowledge believing we have attained the fullness thereof. While we are sojourners, we know only in part but that imperfect knowledge is sufficient for us to know and be convinced that perfection is not present but is to be some day hoped for.[12] Yet, the hope for perfect knowledge is not that our minds will become co-extensive with God’s own but that, as creatures, we will have the fullness of knowledge that God is able to analogically communicate to His creatures. Even in consummation and in glory we will still be creatures and God will be the Creator.

We have in our midst the perfect human, ectypal theology, but it cannot be perfectly exposited by us – not because of our finitude, but because of our sin and the incompleteness of our sanctification. Our only hope for attaining a saving knowledge of God lies in the fact that Scripture and its perfection is joined to our imperfection according to the fact that we have been united with Christ and that the Holy Spirit is using that perfect Word to transform us by the renewing of our minds.[13]

In contrast to this Biblical form of knowledge, human philosophers do not allow analogical reasoning to understand the world. They start from nature and try to argue for a god who must be finite in nature. It starts with a "mute" universe that has no revelation and makes it revelational only with respect to the autonomous mind of man. No distinction is made between Creator and creature.[14]

Kant's great contribution to philosophy consisted in stressing the activity of the experiencing subject. Kant argued that since it is the thinking subject that itself contributes the categories of universality and necessity, we must not think of these as covering any reality that exists or may exist wholly independent of the human mind. The validity of universals is to be taken as frankly due to a motion and a vote; it is conventional and nothing more.[15]

Plato and Aristotle, as well as Kant, assumed the autonomy of man. On such a basis man may reason univocally (have the same mind as God) and reach a God who is just an extension of the creature or he may reason equivocally and reach a God who has no contact with him at all.[16] Man is left with either God being part of nature (pantheism) or being so transcendent that He cannot get into nature (deism).

We're now left with a world where the scientist supposedly interacts with the physical world and can learn about the world apart from any reference to God and "ministers" who speak about God's revelation that has no reference to history and interaction with the world. Man is fractured intellectually where reason deals with things of the world and faith deals with things that cannot affect reason or the world.

The very idea of Kant's Copernican revolution was that the autonomous mind itself must assume the responsibility for making all factual differentiation and logical validation. To such a mind the God of Christianity cannot speak. Such a mind will hear no voice but its own.[17]

God's revelation in nature, however, was always meant to serve alongside His special revelation. God is a revealing God and the perspicuity of nature is bound up in the fact that He voluntarily reveals. Both natural and special revelation would be impossible if God remained incomprehensible as He is in Himself (archetypal theology). Man cannot penetrate God as He is Himself - he cannot comprehend God. But created man may see clearly what is revealed clearly even if he does not see exhaustively. Man need not have exhaustive knowledge in order to know truly and certainly.[18]

The Psalmist doesn't declare that the heavens possibly or probably declare the glory of God. Paul does not say that the wrath of God is probably revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men. Scripture takes the clarity of God's revelation for granted at every stage of human history.[19] The God who speaks in Scripture cannot refer to anything that is not already authoritatively revelational of Himself for the evidence of His own existence.[20] Everything exists that is His creation.

It is no easier for sinners to accept God in nature than it is for them to accept Him in Scripture. The two are inseparable in their clarity. We need the Holy Spirit to understand both. Man must be a Christian to study nature in a proper frame of mind no less than he needs the same understanding to properly apprehend the Scriptures. Modern man is truly darkened in the futility of his thinking because he does not begin by bowing the knee before God before he seeks to understand himself and the world around him.

In summary, these ideas may seem arcane and needlessly precise to many Christians. Why even define a theology of the archetype which no creature can possibly know? Why state the idea of a perfect form of ectypal theology which cannot be attained now and is not of any use to us in our present condition? What is the use of all these distinctions? It is to humble man and to realize that all of his highest knowledge is dust from the very outset. No man who understands that he is a creature dependent upon a perfect God can become pretentious in any field of inquiry. In short, it is all grace. Sola gratia does not merely extend to an isolated corner of man’s existence where he worships God on Sunday and depends upon human reason the rest of the week. Rather, he is to enter into all of life with bended knee giving God the glory for the capacities he enjoys as an image bearer. He can take no more credit for his accomplishments any more than the dust can take pride that it produces fruit. Soli Deo Gloria!

Bibliography

David Van Drunnen, ed., The Pattern of Sound Doctrine. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2004. Print.

Richard Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003. Print.

N.B. Stonehouse & Paul Wooley, ed., The Infallible Word. Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1967. Print.

---

[1] Stonehouse and Woolley, The Infallible Word, New Jersey: P&R Publishing, 1967, p 269.
[2] Ibid, 270.
[3] Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2003, p 229.
[4] Ibid, 230.
[5] Ibid, 230.
[6] Ibid, 230-231.
[7] Ibid, 231.
[8] Ibid, 231.
[9] Ibid, 231-232.
[10] Ibid, 228.
[11] Ibid, 262.
[12] Ibid, 257.
[13] Ibid, 268.
[14] The Infallible Word, 295.
[15] Ibid, 296.
[16] Ibid, 297.
[17] Ibid, 298.
[18] Ibid, 278.
[19] Ibid, 278.
[20] Ibid, 279.

 

[CovenantWord]

I am simply giving the definition of the law of noncontradiction. If "relation" muddies the water, we can use "sense" or "aspect."

Thank you for the synonyms. This is helpful, and I plan to keep them in mind.

No, my question did not intend to convey that the term, relation, muddies the water. It intended to convey that an examination of this term is on the path to clarification. Yes, the "law of noncontradiction" is a powerful tool of logic, with many helpful applications in abstract inferential reasoning, including in systematic theology. What I am questioning is whether this law is capable of comprehensively describing the Trinity. I am hoping that a examination of this term will assist in confirming or denying my claim. If I propose a definition, would you be so good as to confirm its accuracy and applicability to the law of noncontradiction, or to modify the definition as needed?

Relation: An indefinitely large set of interactions between two parties, whose observed pattern serves to illuminate an aspect of character.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

What I am questioning is whether this law is capable of comprehensively describing the Trinity.

It seems like you're not reading or ignoring the responses of others regarding what human knowledge is capable of.

"Comprehending the Trinity" is archetypal theology. Only God comprehends Himself. He knows a se in a manner that is qualitatively different than we can know Him.

What we do apprehend of the Trinity is true and it is logical. Perfect ectypal theology does not contain contradictions, either real or perceived. It is true theology as far as the creature is capable of understanding what God has revealed of Himself, ourselves, and the world around us.

You are using the terms "apparent contradiction" and "paradox" to refer to archetypal theology. This is a category error. Simply because we don't have archetypal knowledge does not make the knowledge we have paradoxical or apparently contradictory. The existence of Divine mystery isn't God saying to us: "I know that seems like a contradiction to you, but I have a resolution to that problem of evil that you have discovered." The mystery is that we cannot penetrate the Divine essence and there are places where Revelation ends and we need to be content with the limits of being a creature.

That's not to say that we ought to ignore people when they have questions. Some legitimate questions can be answered when we study the Word and some will be more clear when we possess perfect theology. Yet, others (as Calvin noted) are created by man when He thinks he is in a position to rush headlong into things that are not revealed. He forgets he is a creature and believes he has some premise or premises that give us access to the Divine mystery. He then perceives an apparent contradiction in God. Bad theology also creates these apparent contradictions as a person adopts some semi-Pelagian view of man and sin and then tells others that the love of God and the punishment of sinners are apparently contradictory.

The point of all of this is not to focus on logic and call what we know of God a paradox or apparently contradictory. It is more Biblical (and historically Reformed) to acknowledge the Creator/creature distinction and then one accepts that what we know of God and what we are able to understand is limited.

 

[CovenantWord]

There is no apparent contradiction, since they are not divine and human in the same relationship. It is like saying my body is an apparent contradiction because I have one head (singular) and two arms (plural).

I am simply giving the definition of the law of noncontradiction. If "relation" muddies the water, we can use "sense" or "aspect." In any case, person and nature are not the same thing, so there cannot be anything contradictory or paradoxical about it. A and B are not contradictories. A and ~A are. This is trinitarianism at its most basic level.

This choice of analogy discovers the weakness of this line of reasoning. The human being is divisible, having parts; whereas the divine Being is indivisible, not having parts.

I hope the following analysis will clarify:

Proposition: The Trinity is unitary. This proposition is true, because it arises from an infallible source, e.g. Deuteronomy 6:4. This proposition is not logical, because it is not the product of inferential reasoning; it is received by faith. This proposition is logical, because it can and does often serve as premise for inferential reasoning. This proposition is understandable, because exact analogies are frequently observed within the created order, and these analogies are constantly manipulated by its steward, notably in theology and science. This proposition does not violate the law of noncontradiction; because it occurs at the same "time," i.e., throughout time and into eternity, and because it describes one sense of the Divinity, namely, essence.

Proposition: The Trinity is multiple. This proposition is true, because it arises from an infallible source, e.g. Luke 3:22. This proposition is not logical, because it is not the product of inferential reasoning; it is received by faith. This proposition is logical, because it can and often does serve as premise for inferential reasoning. This proposition is understandable, because exact analogies are frequently observed within the created order, and these analogies are constantly manipulated by its steward, notably in theology and art. This proposition does not violate the law of noncontradiction, because it occurs at the same "time," i.e., throughout time and into eternity, and because it describes a sense of the Divinity, namely, Personhood.

Proposition: The Trinity is unitary and multiple simultaneously. This proposition is true, because it arises from an infallible source, e.g., John 10:30. This proposition is not logical, because it is not the product of inferential reasoning; it is received by faith. This proposition is logical, because it can serve as premise for inferential reasoning, notably in contemplative worship. This proposition is not understandable -- or more precisely, it is not comprehensible -- because there are no exact analogies to be found within the created order. This proposition violates the law of noncontradiction, because, although it is occurs at the same "time," i.e., throughout time and into eternity, it posits two mutually exclusive descriptions of one sense of the Divinity, namely, Being. Note that these two descriptions are "mutually exclusive" per the limiting requirements of human logic, but not per the infinite character of the divine Being.

 

[Request-Deleted member 11775]

This choice of analogy discovers the weakness of this line of reasoning. The human being is divisible, having parts; whereas the divine Being is indivisible, not having parts.

I hope the following analysis will clarify:

Proposition: The Trinity is unitary. This proposition is true, because it arises from an infallible source, e.g. Deuteronomy 6:4. This proposition is not logical, because it is not the product of inferential reasoning; it is received by faith. This proposition is logical, because it can and does often serve as premise for inferential reasoning. This proposition is understandable, because exact analogies are frequently observed within the created order, and these analogies are constantly manipulated by its steward, notably in theology and science. This proposition does not violate the law of noncontradiction; because it occurs at the same "time," i.e., throughout time and into eternity, and because it describes one sense of the Divinity, namely, essence.

Proposition: The Trinity is multiple. This proposition is true, because it arises from an infallible source, e.g. Luke 3:22. This proposition is not logical, because it is not the product of inferential reasoning; it is received by faith. This proposition is logical, because it can and often does serve as premise for inferential reasoning. This proposition is understandable, because exact analogies are frequently observed within the created order, and these analogies are constantly manipulated by its steward, notably in theology and art. This proposition does not violate the law of noncontradiction, because it occurs at the same "time," i.e., throughout time and into eternity, and because it describes a sense of the Divinity, namely, Personhood.

Proposition: The Trinity is unitary and multiple simultaneously. This proposition is true, because it arises from an infallible source, e.g., John 10:30. This proposition is not logical, because it is not the product of inferential reasoning; it is received by faith. This proposition is logical, because it can serve as premise for inferential reasoning, notably in contemplative worship. This proposition is not understandable -- or more precisely, it is not comprehensible -- because there are no exact analogies to be found within the created order. This proposition violates the law of noncontradiction, because, although it is occurs at the same "time," i.e., throughout time and into eternity, it posits two mutually exclusive descriptions of one sense of the Divinity, namely, Being. Note that these two descriptions are "mutually exclusive" per the limiting requirements of human logic, but not per the infinite character of the divine Being.

This isn't the way Reformed orthodoxy has viewed the subject of the trinity. The Confessional formulations of the doctrine have avoided violating the law of non-contradiction by saying that God is one in essence, but three in person.

 

[RamistThomist]

Proposition: The Trinity is unitary and multiple simultaneously.

But not in the same way. I really don't know what else to say.

 

[No Other Name]

As logic is at the heart of the subject I teach professionally (high school math)

But not in the same way. I really don't know what else to say.

 

[CovenantWord]

Here's a paper I wrote about 14 years ago:

5 Dec 2009

The Archetypal/Ectypal Distinction in Reformed Theology

​

First, then, when they inquire, let them remember that they are penetrating into the recesses of the divine wisdom, where he who rushes forward securely and confidently, instead of satisfying his curiosity will enter in inextricable labyrinth. For it is not right that man should with impunity pry into things which the Lord has been pleased to conceal within himself, and scan that sublime eternal wisdom which it is his pleasure that we should not apprehend but adore, that therein also his perfections may appear. Those secrets of his will, which he has seen it meet to manifest, are revealed in his word - revealed in so far as he knew to be conducive to our interest and welfare. – John Calvin



The Scriptures testify, and the Reformed Confessions bear witness, that we could never have any fruition through the knowledge that comes through nature by itself. There is another revelation, in the Scriptures, that is added to God’s revealing of Himself in nature that is supernaturally communicated. Natural revelation, in the beginning, was communicated via God’s covenant relationship with Adam (and mankind in general). Even the pursuit of “science”, in the naming of animals and the discovery of the created order by man, was rooted in the covenantal character of God with man. Scripture became necessary because of the covenant disobedience of Adam.[1]

Man’s approach to knowledge and science was always intended to be marked by obedience to the Creator. Man was created as an analogue of God; his thinking, his willing and his doing were to be understood to be analogical to the thinking and willing of God. In this sense, then, all knowledge comes from the Creator: philosophy, science, and theology are not to be thought of as independent spheres of knowledge but as part of a united truth insofar as they are analogically understood the way God reveals them.[2]

This Biblical notion of the nature of all truth and knowledge as originating in God the Creator is foreign not only to pagans today but many Christians as well. Many Christian systems treat supernatural knowledge as a sphere independent of natural knowledge. This divergence stems from the history of philosophy where man is the measure and knowledge is attained from the human mind working outwardly. The notion that man must bow the knee in obedience, that “…the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom…” is met with the scorn of unbelief. Because he is fallen in Sin, man is inclined to create systems of theology that see man as the subject of investigation and God as the speculative source of inquiry. The Reformed, however, not only had a distinct Creator/creature view of theology but it is an important feature that needs to be remembered as Christians of all ages are apt to fall into the pattern of human philosophy that does not glorify God. This Reformed distinction of theology is known as the Archetypal/Ectypal distinction.

True theology, both archetypal and ectypal, is knowledge that stands beyond doubt in contrast to the depraved opinion of false theology.[3] Archetypal theology is that theology which God knows “in se” (in Himself) while ectypal theology is true theology that is accommodated to creaturely understanding. True theology is one in its essence, whether it is found in God himself or understood by his creatures. The divisions of this theology into archetypal and ectypal respects the fact that there is not a single species of theology understood by degrees. In other words, God’s understanding and man’s understanding do not merely differ by degree of the same knowledge. Rather, this singular theology is understood absolutely and infinitely by the Creator (archetypal) while finitely and relatively by the creature (ectypal).[4]

Finite truth is grounded in the one, all-encompassing truth of God’s mind: not only theology, but all human knowledge looks to divine knowledge as its source and goal.[5] The archetype is theology in the truest sense, while all ectypal forms only bear a similitude to the archetype. Theology is in intelligent creatures as an image of the Creator. Theology is in God formally and eminently as His essential wisdom. He does not learn things by examining them or reasoning discursively about facts outside Himself but His is a simple intelligence to which all others can only be related by analogy. God knows things in Himself because it is in His essence to know. Creatures must discursively reason knowledge only insofar as they can analogically understand it but can never have knowledge as God has.[6]

The fact of the divine archetype is crucial to the existence of true yet finite human theology.[7] God understands divine things as He completely understands Himself. The secret things belong to Him alone and we do not peer into them nor can we but are to rely upon that which He accommodates to us. This understanding also guards against making the Creator “one of us”. Wisdom, for instance, does not indicate a genus of wise things of which God is one. Rather wisdom is an attribute of God: it is divine wisdom in the sense of being identical with the divine essence in its simplicity and freedom from composition.[8] A creature is said to be wise only insofar as it images the Creator but it can never possess divine wisdom as this is of the essence of God Himself.

Since divine knowledge is uncreated and identical with the essence of God, it must also be understood that it is incommunicable as are all the divine attributes when defined strictly as speaking of God. God does not share His essence with creatures. All that can be naturally communicated to created things of ultimate wisdom are faint images or vestiges. There is no analogical path from the created order to a full knowledge of god. It is thus God himself who is the source, origin, and efficient cause of what we know as true theology.[9] God’s infinite self-knowledge is transmitted to things in the created order. All things receive the imprint of God and finite creatures’ apprehension of revelation rests upon the image of God. As Augustine holds: “God alone is the theologian and we are truly his disciples.”[10]

Though this distinction of knowledge and theology is very complex it should not be viewed as a form of rationalism. The human mind is radically limited and separated from God’s perfect divine wisdom. It has no power of ascent into divine things apart from the help of God. The sovereignty and transcendence of God is preserved and man understands the gracious nature of revelation and that we understand only insofar as God is kind to reveal to His creatures. In short, in contrast to modern notions, man is not independent in his search for truth but all knowledge is fully reliant upon God.

Thus we must understand that all finite theology is ectypal. In noting this limitation, this is not to state that ectypal theology is one set of truths while archetypal is another. Rather, ectypal theology is the same Truth accommodated to creaturely understanding. God accommodates His truth to human capacity. Revelation, whether natural or supernatural, is suited to the present conditions of human knowing. This act of accommodation belongs to God and God determines the form of knowledge that we have of Him.[11] Against any neo-Orthodox notions that God’s “otherness” makes it impossible for God to communicate via human forms, the Scriptures preserve the transcendence of God in knowing things comprehensively while being able, as Creator, to communicate to His creatures. Ectypal theology is not “another Truth” but is, as it were, God lisping truth to us as a father lisps to His child.

Ectypal theology is also meant to be understood as the perfect form of true theology accommodated to creaturely understanding. It consists of the entire body, natural and supernatural, of knowledge that God has been pleased to reveal to His creatures. Yet, although this true Ectypal theology is revealed, man does not always properly apprehend the things that are revealed to Him. Not only does Sin darken man’s understanding such that he cannot have proper fruition in the natural order nor can he discern spiritual things while unregenerated but even regenerate man is still limited in what he can apprehend of the corpus of God’s truth. God has made our pilgrimage on this earth such that we will not have full happiness and blessedness in His truth but it is one of the things that we are to strive toward as a spiritual discipline as we pursue wisdom and it is also something that the Scriptures reveal that we will see fully only after we have been glorified. Paul reminds believers in 1 Corinthians not to become haughty and arrogant in our knowledge believing we have attained the fullness thereof. While we are sojourners, we know only in part but that imperfect knowledge is sufficient for us to know and be convinced that perfection is not present but is to be some day hoped for.[12] Yet, the hope for perfect knowledge is not that our minds will become co-extensive with God’s own but that, as creatures, we will have the fullness of knowledge that God is able to analogically communicate to His creatures. Even in consummation and in glory we will still be creatures and God will be the Creator.

We have in our midst the perfect human, ectypal theology, but it cannot be perfectly exposited by us – not because of our finitude, but because of our sin and the incompleteness of our sanctification. Our only hope for attaining a saving knowledge of God lies in the fact that Scripture and its perfection is joined to our imperfection according to the fact that we have been united with Christ and that the Holy Spirit is using that perfect Word to transform us by the renewing of our minds.[13]

In contrast to this Biblical form of knowledge, human philosophers do not allow analogical reasoning to understand the world. They start from nature and try to argue for a god who must be finite in nature. It starts with a "mute" universe that has no revelation and makes it revelational only with respect to the autonomous mind of man. No distinction is made between Creator and creature.[14]

Kant's great contribution to philosophy consisted in stressing the activity of the experiencing subject. Kant argued that since it is the thinking subject that itself contributes the categories of universality and necessity, we must not think of these as covering any reality that exists or may exist wholly independent of the human mind. The validity of universals is to be taken as frankly due to a motion and a vote; it is conventional and nothing more.[15]

Plato and Aristotle, as well as Kant, assumed the autonomy of man. On such a basis man may reason univocally (have the same mind as God) and reach a God who is just an extension of the creature or he may reason equivocally and reach a God who has no contact with him at all.[16] Man is left with either God being part of nature (pantheism) or being so transcendent that He cannot get into nature (deism).

We're now left with a world where the scientist supposedly interacts with the physical world and can learn about the world apart from any reference to God and "ministers" who speak about God's revelation that has no reference to history and interaction with the world. Man is fractured intellectually where reason deals with things of the world and faith deals with things that cannot affect reason or the world.

The very idea of Kant's Copernican revolution was that the autonomous mind itself must assume the responsibility for making all factual differentiation and logical validation. To such a mind the God of Christianity cannot speak. Such a mind will hear no voice but its own.[17]

God's revelation in nature, however, was always meant to serve alongside His special revelation. God is a revealing God and the perspicuity of nature is bound up in the fact that He voluntarily reveals. Both natural and special revelation would be impossible if God remained incomprehensible as He is in Himself (archetypal theology). Man cannot penetrate God as He is Himself - he cannot comprehend God. But created man may see clearly what is revealed clearly even if he does not see exhaustively. Man need not have exhaustive knowledge in order to know truly and certainly.[18]

The Psalmist doesn't declare that the heavens possibly or probably declare the glory of God. Paul does not say that the wrath of God is probably revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men. Scripture takes the clarity of God's revelation for granted at every stage of human history.[19] The God who speaks in Scripture cannot refer to anything that is not already authoritatively revelational of Himself for the evidence of His own existence.[20] Everything exists that is His creation.

It is no easier for sinners to accept God in nature than it is for them to accept Him in Scripture. The two are inseparable in their clarity. We need the Holy Spirit to understand both. Man must be a Christian to study nature in a proper frame of mind no less than he needs the same understanding to properly apprehend the Scriptures. Modern man is truly darkened in the futility of his thinking because he does not begin by bowing the knee before God before he seeks to understand himself and the world around him.

In summary, these ideas may seem arcane and needlessly precise to many Christians. Why even define a theology of the archetype which no creature can possibly know? Why state the idea of a perfect form of ectypal theology which cannot be attained now and is not of any use to us in our present condition? What is the use of all these distinctions? It is to humble man and to realize that all of his highest knowledge is dust from the very outset. No man who understands that he is a creature dependent upon a perfect God can become pretentious in any field of inquiry. In short, it is all grace. Sola gratia does not merely extend to an isolated corner of man’s existence where he worships God on Sunday and depends upon human reason the rest of the week. Rather, he is to enter into all of life with bended knee giving God the glory for the capacities he enjoys as an image bearer. He can take no more credit for his accomplishments any more than the dust can take pride that it produces fruit. Soli Deo Gloria!

Thank you very much for presenting this paper in this thread. I apologize for my tardy response. For several days recently, I visited an area lacking Internet access.

I was happy to note several important areas of overlap between your presentation and the position I have advocated in this thread.

You quoted Calvin's warning against seeking to pry into the areas of divine wisdom. You stated: "Archetypal theology is that theology which God knows 'in se' (in Himself) while ectypal theology is true theology that is accommodated to creaturely understanding. True theology is one in its essence, whether it is found in God himself or understood by his creatures." You also observed that "[God] does not learn things by examining them or reasoning discursively about facts outside Himself but His is a simple intelligence." Consonant with these principles is my proposition that God's comprehension of theology cannot be, and thus man's apprehension of special revelation should not be expected to be, confined within the parameters of human logic.

You stated: "Finite truth is grounded in the one, all-encompassing truth of God’s mind: not only theology, but all human knowledge looks to divine knowledge as its source and goal." I certainly endorse your reminder that "the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom" for God is Creator, Providence, Father, Shepherd, and Judge of all that man thinks and does.

You stated: "There is no analogical path from the created order to a full knowledge of [G]od." Also: "The human mind is radically limited and separated from God’s perfect divine wisdom." This is precisely my point. As logic is the quintessence of the orderliness of creation, observed and systematized by man, it (logic) is an inappropriate means to attempt to characterize God.

You stated: "Man is fractured intellectually where reason deals with things of the world and faith deals with things that cannot affect reason or the world." Also: "Man need not have exhaustive knowledge in order to know truly and certainly." Also: "No man who understands that he is a creature dependent upon a perfect God can become pretentious in any field of inquiry." I appreciate these edifying exhortations, richly applicable.

You stated: "Rather, this singular theology is understood absolutely and infinitely by the Creator (archetypal) while finitely and relatively by the creature (ectypal)." I was quite interested in this doctrine, so I looked up your footnote (Muller, p. 230), but what I found deals with another matter (https://archive.org/details/postreformationr0002mull/page/230/mode/2up?q=230). I wonder whether you would take a moment to set my inquiry in a better direction.

 

[RamistThomist]

Thank you very much for presenting this paper in this thread. I apologize for my tardy response. For several days recently, I visited an area lacking Internet access.

I was happy to note several important areas of overlap between your presentation and the position I have advocated in this thread.

You quoted Calvin's warning against seeking to pry into the areas of divine wisdom. You stated: "Archetypal theology is that theology which God knows 'in se' (in Himself) while ectypal theology is true theology that is accommodated to creaturely understanding. True theology is one in its essence, whether it is found in God himself or understood by his creatures." You also observed that "[God] does not learn things by examining them or reasoning discursively about facts outside Himself but His is a simple intelligence." Consonant with these principles is my proposition that God's comprehension of theology cannot be, and thus man's apprehension of special revelation should not be expected to be, confined within the parameters of human logic.

You stated: "Finite truth is grounded in the one, all-encompassing truth of God’s mind: not only theology, but all human knowledge looks to divine knowledge as its source and goal." I certainly endorse your reminder that "the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom" for God is Creator, Providence, Father, Shepherd, and Judge of all that man thinks and does.

You stated: "There is no analogical path from the created order to a full knowledge of [G]od." Also: "The human mind is radically limited and separated from God’s perfect divine wisdom." This is precisely my point. As logic is the quintessence of the orderliness of creation, observed and systematized by man, it (logic) is an inappropriate means to attempt to characterize God.

You stated: "Man is fractured intellectually where reason deals with things of the world and faith deals with things that cannot affect reason or the world." Also: "Man need not have exhaustive knowledge in order to know truly and certainly." Also: "No man who understands that he is a creature dependent upon a perfect God can become pretentious in any field of inquiry." I appreciate these edifying exhortations, richly applicable.

You stated: "Rather, this singular theology is understood absolutely and infinitely by the Creator (archetypal) while finitely and relatively by the creature (ectypal)." I was quite interested in this doctrine, so I looked up your footnote (Muller, p. 230), but what I found deals with another matter (https://archive.org/details/postreformationr0002mull/page/230/mode/2up?q=230). I wonder whether you would take a moment to set my inquiry in a better direction.

 

[Semper Fidelis]

Thanks, @RamistThomist Here is a more readable extract from PRRD 1:

2. The Reformed orthodox definition and discussion of archetypal theology. True theology, both archetypal and ectypal, can be identified as knowledge that stands beyond doubt (cognitio indubitata) over against the depraved opinion (opinio depravata) of false theology.25 The orthodox recognize, then, the necessity of arguing a set of criteria for and a paradigm of true theology, beginning with the divine archetype that must underlie all truth about God and continuing through the several orders of rational creatures capable of knowing God. Although true theology is diverse or “multiplex” considered according to its modes of communication and the “subjects” or knowers in which it is found, true theology is one according to substance, whether it is found in God himself or in his creatures. The divisions into archetypal and ectypal, and of ectypal into theologies of the vision, of union, and of revelation, respects the fact that there is not one “species of theology” found in a series of “degrees” or gradus.26 This substantially singular theology, as known infinitely and absolutely by the divine subject, God, is archetypal; as known finitely and relatively by the creaturely subject, ectypal.27 There are, Alsted notes, three causes or grounds for the identification of this theologia vera: first, that it arises from the source that is truth itself (qui ipsissima est veritas); second, that those who study it receive or achieve truth in their statements; and third, that it is internally harmonious, inasmuch as the mutual agreement and consent of all parts of a given body of ideas with one another’s is an index of truth.28

Echoing Keckermann, Alsted concludes from his discussion of the nature of truth that the truth is one and that there cannot ultimately be more than one truth, that is, no truth can exist in ultimate contradiction with another truth.29 Indeed, the Reformed orthodox generally assumed the unity of truth given the necessary grounding of all finite truth in the one, all-encompassing truth of the divine mind: not only theology, but all human knowledge looks, ultimately, to the divine knowledge as its source and goal.30 This conclusion, in turn, points toward the unity of theology and analogically toward the division or distinction of its forms: the divine archetype is theology in the truest sense, while all ectypal forms are identifiable as theologia vera secondarily because of their “similitude to the archetype.” Thus, “theology is and is said to be in intelligent creatures as an image, the archetype of which is in God.”31 “Theology is in God formally and eminently” (formaliter et eminenter) as his “essential wisdom.” It is not a discursive knowing but a simple intelligence to which all others can be related only by analogy: and inasmuch as sapientia, in humans, implies both principia and conclusions, the term cannot be predicated univocally of God. Archtypal theology is, thus, a “nondiscursive” divine sapientia.32

The archetype, as Turretin noted, is not in any sense equivalent to our theology: the human mind cannot know the archetype, as such, and the term “theology” cannot be predicated univocally of our theology and of the divine archetype.33 Nonetheless, as the early orthodox dogmaticians point out, the fact of the divine archetype is crucial to the existence of true yet finite human theology: “Archetypal theology is the divine Wisdom concerning divine things: this we truly adore, but we do not inquire into it.”34 This, adds Junius, is not a definition but rather a description by analogy with things known to us, by the application of our terms to divine things. Wisdom (sapientia) is predicated univocally only of God inasmuch as God alone is truly wise—and therefore is predicated equivocally of human beings. Therefore, when predicated of God, wisdom does not indicate a genus of wise things of which God is one. The divine sapientia is a proper attribute of God: it is divine wisdom in the sense of being identical with the divine essence in its utter simplicity and its freedom from all composition. The theologia archetypa, then, is God himself, the identity of self and self-knowledge in the absolutely and essentially wise God.35

Polanus thus remarks that the division of theology into the categories of archetypal and ectypal is by analogy. Primarily and principally, theologia is theologia archetypa and only secondarily and by similitude is it theologia ectypa. This must be the case since all wisdom, goodness, righteousness, power, and other creaturely qualities in rational creatures are from God in whom they find their archetype—their imago.36 That there is theology in God appears from the fact that God has wisdom concerning rerum divinarum and from the fact that all perfections “that are in us, are also in God,” but on an exalted level. Thus, “archetypal theology is the wisdom of divine things that is resident in God, essential to him and uncreated.”37 This might also be called theologia prototypa or, as the scholastics termed it, theologia Dei or “exemplary theology, to which as to an immutable, primary and primordial idea and exemplar, all created theology is conformed as a likeness, such divine theology we adore but do not search into.”38 This language draws directly upon that of Junius, with some amplification of definition.

Since, moreover, this “divine knowledge concerning divine things” is uncreated (increata), identical with the form or essence of God (formalis), absolute, infinite, utterly simple or incomplex (simplicissima), and utterly simultaneous (tota simul), that is, without either temporal or logical sequence, it must also be incommunicable (incommunicabilis), as indeed are all the divine attributes when defined strictly or univocally. All that can be naturally communicated to created things of such an ultimate wisdom are but faint images or vestiges (imagines aut etiam vestigia). There is no analogical path from the divine imprint upon the created order to a full knowledge of God.39 It is therefore God himself who is the source, origin and efficient cause of what we know in this life as true theology.40 The nature of this archetype and its function as the source of all that finite creatures know about God poses a final paradox in the Protestant scholastic discussion of the “attributes” of archetypal theology: it is both incommunicable (incommunicabilis) and communicative (communicativa). The identity of theologia archetypa with the infinite essence of God renders it incapable of communication to creatures. Nonetheless, God’s infinite self-knowledge is transmitted to things in the created order. In creation, all things receive the imprint of the divine and the ability of finite creatures to apprehend revelation, to have theology, rests upon the image of God according to which they have been created.41

A somewhat different approach to the problem of theologia is evident in a few of the early orthodox systems. Thus, Trelcatius begins his introductory remarks by dividing the subject into a discussion of theology and its nature and an analysis of the method he proposes to use throughout his institutio. “Theology” does not indicate the pattern or knowledge of “God himself” or “that which is in God.” God is a “simple Essence” who “by an indivisible and unchangeable act … knows both himself in himself and out of himself all and singular things by himself.” What we know of God is his own “revelation or communication” of divine knowledge either “according to the universal nature of all men, or according to special grace and the rule of Scripture in the Church.”42 According to Trelcatius, “theology” properly so-called is a word about God known to man. By stating the definition in this way he manifests an early point of disagreement among the framers of the Reformed prolegomena: he refuses to develop the concept of an archetypal theology and begins with knowledge of God as given in revelation, what Junius, Polanus, and Scharpius refer to as theologia ectypa. This position can perhaps be viewed as less speculative than that of Junius, Polanus and Scharpius insofar as it refuses to discuss or even to identify a theologia that stands beyond human grasp. Although Trelcatius’ position never became that of the majority of Reformed orthodox, it was carried forward among the Dutch Reformed by Gomarus and Walaeus, both of whom shy away from the identification of a theologia archetypa and discuss only revealed theology.43 By implication, at least, this focus on theologia revelata, coupled with an unwillingness to develop the larger paradigm may also be found in the thought of British writers like Perkins and Ames, who offer praxis-oriented definitions of theology: they do not discuss the distinction, and the thrust of their argumentation points away from an emphasis on the archetype. This possible implication of the so-called Ramist definition of theology is evident; moreover, it remains so a generation after Perkins in the work of Stoughton.44 Focus on ectypal theology is also echoed among the later orthodox, by Turretin’s and Owen’s reluctance to identify theologia archetypa as a “proper” usage of the term theology.45

This disagreement arises out of the fact that the term theologia cannot be applied properly or univocally to both archetype and ectype. Which then is truly theology and who, to reiterate Scotus’ Augustinian query, is truly the theologian? Trelcatius’ and Turretin’s definitions apply the term theologia univocally to human theology and view the use of the term as a description of the divine self-knowledge as somewhat less than appropriate (minus proprius). Following Junius’ argument from the divine attributes, however, some of the early orthodox—like Polanus—argue that the term is used correctly and most properly (proprissime) of the divine self-knowledge and only derivatively of our knowledge of God. God, therefore, is properly called “theologian” and is recognized as the first (primus), highest (optimus) and most perfect (perfectissimus) Theologian:

Theology therefore most properly is that knowledge of divine things which is in the divine mind, so that God alone is called Theologian: and accordingly, God is understood to be the first, highest and most perfect theologian.

Moreover, this [theology] is a formal wisdom (sapientia formalis), absolute or perfect, infinite, utterly simultaneous, incommunicable, and such that only its image or reflection (imaginem) can be communicated to rational creatures.

It is formal: since it is essential (essentialis) and the form of God or Deity, which is the purest form (purissima forma) .…

It is most perfect: since it is not only of all things, but is indeed all the knowledge that it is possible for God to have concerning all things.46

Unlike Turretin’s, this position delineates clearly the path of theological knowing as revelational, from God to the creature, rather than as rational, from the creature to God. Turretin’s view, however, better reflects the logic of predication in view of the impossibility of a univocal use of the term theology in discussing the relationship between God’s self-knowledge and our knowledge of God—and, of course, neither Junius nor Turretin intended to imply the possibility of rational ascent to perfect knowledge of God.

This divergence of opinion arises naturally out of the terminology itself and the problem of predication, a problem already seen in the medieval materials. On the one hand, Scotus’ terminology presses a distinction between the infinite, divine, and ideal order (theologia in se, or, in Protestant scholastic usage, theologia archetypa) and the finite order known to us (theologia nostra or theologia in subiecto). On the other hand, Scotus, the nominalists after him, and virtually all of the formulators of Protestant theology denied the Thomist analogia entis and declared that no proportion exists between the finite and the infinite (finiti et infiniti nulla proportio). Late medieval debate, therefore, adumbrated the quandary of the Reformed orthodox: Scotus had declared God to be the only true Theologian and theologia in se to be the only theology properly so-called.

Identification of archetypal theology as the eternal or divine pattern for the perfect truth of supernatural revelation offered the Reformed, moreover, a rather anti-speculative solution to the problem of the relationship of the ultimate divine self-knowledge to our theology: following the language of the divine attributes that will appear in the subsequent loci of the theological system, Reformed theologians could identify an ultimate divine knowledge that God, as God, must have—the scientia necessaria or necessary knowledge of the divine essence and of all possibility.47 It is clear, however, that neither the infinite divine self-knowledge nor the necessary divine knowledge of all possibility—including the possibilities not actualized by God—has little or no relevance to the special saving revelation of God and does not easily function as the eternal pattern for a fundamentally soteric theologia ectypa.

This latter issue also created a minor disagreement among the Reformed: the earlier definitions found in Junius, Polanus, and others of their generation, tend to identify the theologia archetypa with the scientia necessaria. Cocceius, on the other hand, made clear that he viewed the theologia archetypa as only a portion of the scientia necessaria. Thus, according to Cocceius, the theologia archetypa, is not the entirety of “that perfect knowledge by which God knows himself,” but the eternal type of the truth that will conform human beings to the divine image: theologia archetypa is not the divine scientia necessaria, but the precise pattern in the mind of God for the earthly revelation of salvation—it is the eternal basis for the finite, but fully sufficient revelation at the foundation of the true theologia ectypa: the theologia ectypa is, thus, only a portion of the divine scientia necessaria.48 In Cocceius’ view, moreover, the theologia archetypa is an inward trinitarian knowing, the Father knowing the Son, the Son knowing the Father, and the Spirit searching out the deep things of God—a cognitive parallel with Cocceius’ doctrine of the pactum salutis.49 Cocceius’ definition of archetypal theology also coincides with his insistence that theology is a practical discipline oriented toward the goal of salvation. The more inclusive identification of archetypal theology with necessary knowledge conforms more to the understanding of theology as a mixed discipline, both speculative and practical.50

---

25 Alsted, Praecognita, I.iv.
26 Maresius, Collegium theol., I.iii; cf. Poliander et al., Synopsis purioris, I.iii; Burman, Synopsis theol., I.ii.39.
27 Maresius, Collegium theol., I.iii; cf. Poliander et al., Synopsis purioris, I.iii.
28 Alsted, Methodus, praecognita, I.iv.
29 Cf. Muller, After Calvin, pp. 127–130.
30 See Keith L Sprunger, “Technometria, pp. 115–117; cf. Dillenberger, Protestant Thought and Natural Science, pp. 57–58.
31 Alsted, Methodus, praecognita, I.iv.
32 Alsted, Methodus, praecognita, I.iv.
33 Turretin, Inst. theol., I.i.9. Note the radical misreading of Turretin in Rogers and McKim, Authority and Interpretation, p. 187: “While scholastic theologians did not claim to know all that God knew extensively, they claimed a one-to-one correspondence between the theological knowledge they had and the way in which God himself knew it.” What is in fact lacking is anything like a one-to-one correspondence between Rogers’ statements and the seventeenth-century materials.
34 Junius, De vera theologia, iv; cited verbatim in Alsted, Praecognita, I.iv.
35 Junius, De vera theologia, iv; cf. Scharpius, Cursus theologicus, col. 2.
36 Polanus, Syntagma, I.iii.
37 Polanus, Syntagma, I.iii.
38 Polanus, Syntagma, I.iii.
39 Cf. Junius, De vera theologia, iv; Alsted, Praecognita, I.iv.
40 Junius, De vera theologia, v; cf. Owen, Theologoumena, I.iii.2.
41 Alsted, Praecognita, I.iv. The discussion in this and the two preceding paragraphs reflects the problems of the classification and predication of divine attributes and once again establishes the intimate relationship of the prolegomena to the theological system as a whole. Further discussion of these two problems appears in PRRD, III, 3.3.
42 Lucas Trelcatius, Scholastica et methodica locorum communium institutio (London, 1604), Lib. I, pp. 1–2.
43 Gomarus, Disputationes, I.xv–xvii; Walaeus, Loci communes, I.
44 Stoughton, Learned Treatise of Divinity, pp. 22–25, citing Ramus as an antecedent of his definition of theology as “a doctrine of mans happinesse,” argued in the context of discussion of the practical nature of the discipline. Cf. Ames, Medulla, I.i.1–13; ii.1–2.
45 Turretin, Inst. theol. elencticae, I.ii.6; Owen, Theologoumena, I.iii.2.
46 Polanus, Syntagma, I.iii.
47 Trelcatius, Schol. meth., I.iii; Rijssen, Summa theol., III.xxiv; and PRRD, III, 5.3 (E.1–2).
48 Cocceius, Aphorismi prolixiores, I.3; cf. Turretin, Inst. theol. elencticae, I.ii.6.
49 Cocceius, Summa theol., I.i.3–4; cf. Van Asselt, Federal Theology, pp. 66, 230–236.
50 For these definitions, see below, 7.3 (B).

 

[CovenantWord]

But not in the same way. I really don't know what else to say.

I regret that I have caused you frustration. This post intends to be eirenic.

Will it help to say that I agree with the following proposition (which I understand to be your primary point)?:. In one sense, the Trinity is properly described as singular, namely, in the "sense" of describing the numerical attribute of His essence. In another sense, the Trinity is properly described as three, namely, in the "sense" of describing the numerical attribute of His Persons. Considered individually, these descriptions of the numerical aspects of the Trinity do not violate the parameters of the law of noncontradiction.

My objection is that this proposition does not constitute a comprehensive description of the Trinity, Who transcends logic. These separated descriptions of aspects of the Trinity cannot be deemed ultimate or complete, because such a claim would contradict the doctrine of the simplicity of God.

I submit that my objection is comfortably within the range of historical Reformed theology: "[M]an cannot give a definition of God in the proper sense of the word, but only a partial description. A logical definition is impossible, because God cannot be subsumed under some higher genus. At the same time . . . man can obtain a knowledge of God that is perfectly adequate for the realization of the divine purpose in the life of man." (Berkhof, 4th rev. enl., 1941, p 30)

 

[RamistThomist]

My objection is that this proposition does not constitute a comprehensive description of the Trinity, Who transcends logic. These separated descriptions of aspects of the Trinity cannot be deemed ultimate or complete, because such a claim would contradict the doctrine of the simplicity of God.

Comprehensive description belongs to archetypal theology, which we cannot do. No one here has tried to do that.

I submit that my objection is comfortably within the range of historical Reformed theology: "[M]an cannot give a definition of God in the proper sense of the word, but only a partial description. A logical definition is impossible, because God cannot be subsumed under some higher genus. At the same time . . . man can obtain a knowledge of God that is perfectly adequate for the realization of the divine purpose in the life of man." (Berkhof, 4th rev. enl., 1941, p 30)

That's good, but that wasn't the sense you gave us throughout this discussion.

 

[earl40]

Not reading all of this thread, I wonder if the word "mystery" has been used? I have found that when that word has not been used when discussing The Trinity one can drift into dangerous waters.

 

[CovenantWord]

2. The Reformed orthodox definition and discussion of archetypal theology. True theology, both archetypal and ectypal, can be identified as knowledge that stands beyond doubt (cognitio indubitata) over against the depraved opinion (opinio depravata) of false theology.25 The orthodox recognize, then, the necessity of arguing a set of criteria for and a paradigm of true theology, beginning with the divine archetype that must underlie all truth about God and continuing through the several orders of rational creatures capable of knowing God. Although true theology is diverse or “multiplex” considered according to its modes of communication and the “subjects” or knowers in which it is found, true theology is one according to substance, whether it is found in God himself or in his creatures. The divisions into archetypal and ectypal, and of ectypal into theologies of the vision, of union, and of revelation, respects the fact that there is not one “species of theology” found in a series of “degrees” or gradus.26 This substantially singular theology, as known infinitely and absolutely by the divine subject, God, is archetypal; as known finitely and relatively by the creaturely subject, ectypal.27 There are, Alsted notes, three causes or grounds for the identification of this theologia vera: first, that it arises from the source that is truth itself (qui ipsissima est veritas); second, that those who study it receive or achieve truth in their statements; and third, that it is internally harmonious, inasmuch as the mutual agreement and consent of all parts of a given body of ideas with one another’s is an index of truth.28

Echoing Keckermann, Alsted concludes from his discussion of the nature of truth that the truth is one and that there cannot ultimately be more than one truth, that is, no truth can exist in ultimate contradiction with another truth.29 Indeed, the Reformed orthodox generally assumed the unity of truth given the necessary grounding of all finite truth in the one, all-encompassing truth of the divine mind: not only theology, but all human knowledge looks, ultimately, to the divine knowledge as its source and goal.30 This conclusion, in turn, points toward the unity of theology and analogically toward the division or distinction of its forms: the divine archetype is theology in the truest sense, while all ectypal forms are identifiable as theologia vera secondarily because of their “similitude to the archetype.” Thus, “theology is and is said to be in intelligent creatures as an image, the archetype of which is in God.”31 “Theology is in God formally and eminently” (formaliter et eminenter) as his “essential wisdom.” It is not a discursive knowing but a simple intelligence to which all others can be related only by analogy: and inasmuch as sapientia, in humans, implies both principia and conclusions, the term cannot be predicated univocally of God. Archtypal theology is, thus, a “nondiscursive” divine sapientia.32

Thank you for retrieving this passage from Muller. After careful consideration, I offer a few observations that I deem relevant to our discussion:

-- "[T]rue theology is one according to substance. . . . This substantially singular theology, as known infinitely and absolutely by the divine subject, God, is archetypal; as known finitely and relatively by the creaturely subject, ectypal. There are, Alsted notes, three causes or grounds for the identification of this theologia vera: . . . third, that it is internally harmonious, inasmuch as the mutual agreement and consent of all parts of a given body of ideas with one another’s is an index of truth." An implication of the internal consistency of theology is that if logic can be shown to characterize God on ectypal level, then this same characterization necessarily applies within the archetype as well.

-- "Echoing Keckermann, Alsted concludes from his discussion of the nature of truth that the truth is one and that there cannot ultimately be more than one truth, that is, no truth can exist in ultimate contradiction with another truth." The use of "ultimate" allows for the possibility of proximate (apparent) contradiction, which, of course, would be resolvable ultimately.

-- "Indeed, the Reformed orthodox generally assumed the unity of truth given the necessary grounding of all finite truth in the one, all-encompassing truth of the divine mind: not only theology, but all human knowledge looks, ultimately, to the divine knowledge as its source and goal." Logic is proximally derived by man; yet, God is the source of logic; God is the goal of logic; God is the sustenance of both logic and the logician. God gives man the freedom -- indeed the mandate -- to exercise his stewardship gifts to develop and implement logic. God's sovereignty's is coincident with man's responsibility -- a paradox, no?

"Archtypal theology is, thus, a 'nondiscursive' divine sapientia." Since logic is discursive, logic cannot characterize God.

--"[T]he term 'theology' cannot be predicated univocally of our theology and of the divine archetype. . . . Wisdom (sapientia) is predicated univocally only of God inasmuch as God alone is truly wise—and therefore is predicated equivocally of human beings." Creation is characterized by order. Man abstracts an important aspect of this order into logic. Logic is an equivocal predication of God's wisdom that man apprehends. Surely, then, logic plays some part in God's nature; yet the univocal predication is simplicity. God alone comprehends the univocal resolution of the tension of these two truths.

--"The divine sapientia is a proper attribute of God: it is divine wisdom in the sense of being identical with the divine essence in its utter simplicity and its freedom from all composition." The three Persons of God are included in His one essence, but without composition. Viewed from within the scaffolding of logic, this proposition is internally contradictory. However, within ectypal theology, it is apprehended to be true, having been revealed as such, and thus it is received as being so in archetypal theology, as well.

--"Since, moreover, this 'divine knowledge concerning divine things' is uncreated (increata), identical with the form or essence of God (formalis), absolute, infinite, utterly simple or incomplex (simplicissima), and utterly simultaneous (tota simul), that is, without either temporal or logical sequence, it must also be incommunicable (incommunicabilis), as indeed are all the divine attributes when defined strictly or univocally." The law of noncontradiction, which requires that a proposition be analyzed into different times or different senses ("temporal or logical sequence"), cannot adequately describe the undivided inclusion of the three Persons within the one essence of God.

-- "There is no analogical path from the divine imprint upon the created order to a full knowledge of God." Man cannot reason from orderly creation to a fully logical Divine.

-- "The nature of this archetype and its function as the source of all that finite creatures know about God poses a final paradox in the Protestant scholastic discussion of the 'attributes' of archetypal theology: it is both incommunicable (incommunicabilis) and communicative (communicativa)." In significant part, God reveals His transcendence by communicating His attributes to be incommunicable. Within ectypal theology, those attributes, including the numerical ones, are not fully analyzable by the laws of logic.

-- "God’s infinite self-knowledge is transmitted to things in the created order. In creation, all things receive the imprint of the divine." The orderliness of creation reflects the nature of its Creator. In Himself, God is both orderly and transcendent -- another theological paradox perhaps?

I examined the balance of this quotation with interest, but I judged that further comment would not add much to the current discussion.

I thank you very much for this quotation. Working through it much strengthened and clarified my thought on this topic.

Question: Is it your position that logic is an attribute of God, based on the reasoning that the doctrine of the Trinity is fully analyzable by the law of noncontradiction?