RamistThomist
Puritanboard Assessor
Nelson, Eric. The Royalist Revolution: Monarchy and the American Founding. Harvard University Press, 2014.
This is political theology in its best and purest sense. As we expound Eric Nelson’s thesis, we have to make clear what he is not saying: he is not saying that the patriots were secretly monarchists. Although it is true that Adams and Wilson praised monarchy, and Alexander Hamilton practically wanted one by a different name, that would be going beyond the evidence. The royalists wanted a strong prerogative in the executive branch, one far stronger than was found in the English monarchy.
Flow of argument:
Dominion theory: The colonists were subject to the king, not Parliament because “the king’s prerogative crossed the ocean, but Parliament’s authority ended at Britain’s shore” (Nelson 30-31). They had history on their side, too, as most colonies began as some sort of charter from King James I or Charles I. Therefore, any attempt by Parliament to tax the colonists was in fact an attack on the king’s prerogative. This means, strangely enough, that certain patriots were actually arguing for the prerogative exercised in the days of the Stuart monarchy.
From here Nelson marshals numerous primary sources detailing the King’s prerogative over the colonies. I can only refer the reader to pages 38-52. The most telling passage is from Alexander Hamilton himself. Hamilton notes, “There must indeed be some connecting, pervading principle; but this is found in the person and prerogative of the King…His power is equal to his purpose, and his interest binds him to the due prosecution of it” (Farmer Refuted, 16, quoted in Nelson 58).
Representation
Who speaks for whom? All sides struggled with the difficulty of how one representative actually represents his people. Neither side had a particularly satisfactory answer. Republicans might think that one man, a king, cannot represent the diversity of people in his realm. But it is not clear how republicanism can escape this charge, either. This is one of Nelson’s best chapters. Even if one disagrees with him, such that the monarch better represents the people, one leaves with a clear sense of what “representation” actually entails.
Parliamentarian Theory: People can only be truly represented by an assembly, as argued originally by John Milton and Marchamont Nedham (66-67). In other words, legitimate representation can only happen if there is a sufficient enough image of those represented (69).
“Any agency” theory: This view was maintained by John Adams. For Adams, any agency, whether king or parliament, can represent a people (68).
Royalists countered the Parliamentarian Theory with the simple observation that any “authorized” agency can function as a legitimate representative. This claim came with a devastating inference, one which patriots felt most keenly: as Parliament had no authority beyond Britain, it could not legitimately represent the colonies (71).
There are even simpler problems with the Parliamentarian Theory. For example, it is not clear why elected representatives, almost none of whom I have voted for, better represent me than a monarch. To be sure, later American theorists were able to alleviate much of this problem with the invention of a bicameral legislature.
Moreover, most Englishmen, even with Parliamentarian representation, had little to no say about the actual laws of England, so it is not immediately clear what representation would change in America. The Parliamentarian Theory needed, which it probably got only too late, “some sort of mechanism by which the consent of some could stand for the consent of all” (71). As we will say, and as it played out in America, Parliament needed a “geometrically proportionate” image of the people,” capturing “the essence of the kingdom” (73).
As it stood, though, Parliament could never claim to be a real image of the people. Whatever the problems of monarchy, representative governments are always subject to factionalism, “whereas the king’s interests always align with the kingdom” (77). He “can only prosper if the kingdom prospers” (78).
Common Sense
Even though Thomas Paine was an ungodly buffoon, and even though his arguments were terrible, he did turn the intellectual tide. In short, if patriots were represented by the king, then they could directly indict the king for failing to promote their interests. Godly patriots had simply complained against the type of king George (or Charles Stuart) was, and 1 Samuel 8 was only an attack on bad kings. Paine and Milton saw it as an attack on kingship itself (though they never explained Deuteronomy 17 or the prophets' glowing references to Davis's kingship).
Accordingly, earlier writings defined “respublica to denote any correctly ordered state” (116). Now it meant representative government without a king. Although Nelson does not mention it, one can see a reverse idolatry here: as long as you do not have a king in your government, your government is good. Even better: if you have the sacred words “republic” or “representation,” your government is biblical. In light of that, Nelson does make the following observation: “The danger of Paine’s position…is that it encourages colonial readers to become anxious about precisely the wrong things–to pursue shadow over substance” (130).
Royalism Revisited
In chapters four and following, Nelson returns to the royalist argument. As it became clear that George would not budge, although he was technically following custom and tradition, royalist patriots revised their argument: they strengthened the executives prerogatives beyond what George had while removing the formal trappings of kingship.
For all practical purposes, and Alexander Hamilton’s skillful work made this very clear, Americans now had a monarch more powerful than George, for Hamilton wanted a “robust prerogative within reasonable bounds of a true mixed monarchy” (169). Or, as John Adams so frequently remarked, what they wanted, in spirit if not in form, is a republican monarchy: “England is a republic, a monarchical republic it is true, but a republic still: because the sovereignty, which is the legislative power, is vested in more than one man” (Defence, quoted in Nelson 206).
Evaluation
I agree with Nelson’s theory. There is one remaining doubt: if the original founders, most of them anyway, were sympathetic with the idea of monarchy, then why did America’s narrative of being “anti-king” gain such sway? We cannot simply blame it on modern education, nor can we blame most of it on the Deist Thomas Paine, though he shares some of the blame.
In terms of an intellectual argument, the “Patriot Royalists” were entirely correct. I do not see how one can argue against Nelson’s use of the sources. Strangely enough, even discounting Paine’s bombastic rhetoric, it seems clear that the Royalist narrative was destined to lose, and I think there are reasons for that. Whatever else may be true of King George and the earlier Stuarts, George had no intention of being a Stuart monarch (63). That is why Nelson’s thesis, although true, has a strange feel about it. By not modeling himself after a tyrannical monarch, George was seen as a tyrannical monarch! That is the main problem with Nelson’s argument, if it is actually a problem. The facts bear it out, however strange it may appear.
This is political theology in its best and purest sense. As we expound Eric Nelson’s thesis, we have to make clear what he is not saying: he is not saying that the patriots were secretly monarchists. Although it is true that Adams and Wilson praised monarchy, and Alexander Hamilton practically wanted one by a different name, that would be going beyond the evidence. The royalists wanted a strong prerogative in the executive branch, one far stronger than was found in the English monarchy.
Flow of argument:
Dominion theory: The colonists were subject to the king, not Parliament because “the king’s prerogative crossed the ocean, but Parliament’s authority ended at Britain’s shore” (Nelson 30-31). They had history on their side, too, as most colonies began as some sort of charter from King James I or Charles I. Therefore, any attempt by Parliament to tax the colonists was in fact an attack on the king’s prerogative. This means, strangely enough, that certain patriots were actually arguing for the prerogative exercised in the days of the Stuart monarchy.
From here Nelson marshals numerous primary sources detailing the King’s prerogative over the colonies. I can only refer the reader to pages 38-52. The most telling passage is from Alexander Hamilton himself. Hamilton notes, “There must indeed be some connecting, pervading principle; but this is found in the person and prerogative of the King…His power is equal to his purpose, and his interest binds him to the due prosecution of it” (Farmer Refuted, 16, quoted in Nelson 58).
Representation
Who speaks for whom? All sides struggled with the difficulty of how one representative actually represents his people. Neither side had a particularly satisfactory answer. Republicans might think that one man, a king, cannot represent the diversity of people in his realm. But it is not clear how republicanism can escape this charge, either. This is one of Nelson’s best chapters. Even if one disagrees with him, such that the monarch better represents the people, one leaves with a clear sense of what “representation” actually entails.
Parliamentarian Theory: People can only be truly represented by an assembly, as argued originally by John Milton and Marchamont Nedham (66-67). In other words, legitimate representation can only happen if there is a sufficient enough image of those represented (69).
“Any agency” theory: This view was maintained by John Adams. For Adams, any agency, whether king or parliament, can represent a people (68).
Royalists countered the Parliamentarian Theory with the simple observation that any “authorized” agency can function as a legitimate representative. This claim came with a devastating inference, one which patriots felt most keenly: as Parliament had no authority beyond Britain, it could not legitimately represent the colonies (71).
There are even simpler problems with the Parliamentarian Theory. For example, it is not clear why elected representatives, almost none of whom I have voted for, better represent me than a monarch. To be sure, later American theorists were able to alleviate much of this problem with the invention of a bicameral legislature.
Moreover, most Englishmen, even with Parliamentarian representation, had little to no say about the actual laws of England, so it is not immediately clear what representation would change in America. The Parliamentarian Theory needed, which it probably got only too late, “some sort of mechanism by which the consent of some could stand for the consent of all” (71). As we will say, and as it played out in America, Parliament needed a “geometrically proportionate” image of the people,” capturing “the essence of the kingdom” (73).
As it stood, though, Parliament could never claim to be a real image of the people. Whatever the problems of monarchy, representative governments are always subject to factionalism, “whereas the king’s interests always align with the kingdom” (77). He “can only prosper if the kingdom prospers” (78).
Common Sense
Even though Thomas Paine was an ungodly buffoon, and even though his arguments were terrible, he did turn the intellectual tide. In short, if patriots were represented by the king, then they could directly indict the king for failing to promote their interests. Godly patriots had simply complained against the type of king George (or Charles Stuart) was, and 1 Samuel 8 was only an attack on bad kings. Paine and Milton saw it as an attack on kingship itself (though they never explained Deuteronomy 17 or the prophets' glowing references to Davis's kingship).
Accordingly, earlier writings defined “respublica to denote any correctly ordered state” (116). Now it meant representative government without a king. Although Nelson does not mention it, one can see a reverse idolatry here: as long as you do not have a king in your government, your government is good. Even better: if you have the sacred words “republic” or “representation,” your government is biblical. In light of that, Nelson does make the following observation: “The danger of Paine’s position…is that it encourages colonial readers to become anxious about precisely the wrong things–to pursue shadow over substance” (130).
Royalism Revisited
In chapters four and following, Nelson returns to the royalist argument. As it became clear that George would not budge, although he was technically following custom and tradition, royalist patriots revised their argument: they strengthened the executives prerogatives beyond what George had while removing the formal trappings of kingship.
For all practical purposes, and Alexander Hamilton’s skillful work made this very clear, Americans now had a monarch more powerful than George, for Hamilton wanted a “robust prerogative within reasonable bounds of a true mixed monarchy” (169). Or, as John Adams so frequently remarked, what they wanted, in spirit if not in form, is a republican monarchy: “England is a republic, a monarchical republic it is true, but a republic still: because the sovereignty, which is the legislative power, is vested in more than one man” (Defence, quoted in Nelson 206).
Evaluation
I agree with Nelson’s theory. There is one remaining doubt: if the original founders, most of them anyway, were sympathetic with the idea of monarchy, then why did America’s narrative of being “anti-king” gain such sway? We cannot simply blame it on modern education, nor can we blame most of it on the Deist Thomas Paine, though he shares some of the blame.
In terms of an intellectual argument, the “Patriot Royalists” were entirely correct. I do not see how one can argue against Nelson’s use of the sources. Strangely enough, even discounting Paine’s bombastic rhetoric, it seems clear that the Royalist narrative was destined to lose, and I think there are reasons for that. Whatever else may be true of King George and the earlier Stuarts, George had no intention of being a Stuart monarch (63). That is why Nelson’s thesis, although true, has a strange feel about it. By not modeling himself after a tyrannical monarch, George was seen as a tyrannical monarch! That is the main problem with Nelson’s argument, if it is actually a problem. The facts bear it out, however strange it may appear.
