McCosh's Scottish Philosophy

[MW]

James McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy: Biographical, Expository, Critical, from Hutcheson to Hamilton (1875).

This book is not just a history. It is a strategic articulation and defence of the Scottish philosophical view of common sense realism that has come to be identified with the name of Thomas Reid. For those who are interested in historical theology, especially in the Reformed tradition, this volume is of special interest. My aim in this post is not to describe its contents, but to analyse its main contentions in order to demonstrate that common sense realism is a decisive move away from historic Reformed theology.

The central shift comes in the articulation of a new principium cognoscendi. The Scottish project, as McCosh proudly defines it, is a methodological revolution with profound metaphysical consequences. The new method appeals to an induction from consciousness. Reformed Scholasticism began with divine revelation as the principium cognoscendi. Human reason, though a gift, is a ministerial tool operating within a fallen, analogical framework. Theology is the "queen of the sciences." The Scottish Philosophy begins with empirical observation of the human mind via consciousness. As McCosh states: "the human mind is to be studied exclusively by the method of observation." Now it is possible to draw all the laws of mental philosophy "from the observations of consciousness." McCosh celebrates this as progress.

After the central shift McCosh announces a crucial synthesis. Through induction, we discover "principles which are prior to and independent of experience." These are to be found "in the very constitution of the mind." It is even claimed that they have "the sanction of the Author of our nature." Reid's "common sense," Stewart's "fundamental laws," and Brown's "intuitions" are now raised to the level of "divine revelation." This contrasts with the Reformed View of "First Principles." The first truth is the existence and trustworthiness of the self-revealing Triune God. Innate ideas and the sensus divinitatis are corrupted by sin and insufficient for saving knowledge. They point to a need for special revelation. The Scottish school has effectively sanctified man's natural faculties. The "constitution of the mind" is now seen as reliably designed by God to give direct, trustworthy access to reality. The noetic effects of sin are minimised to correctable errors in reasoning, not a principial distortion of the knowing faculty itself.

This leads to a dynamic new view of human knowledge. Man's mental constitution provides self-evident, necessary, universal principles. There is no place for the old Reformed Scholastic distinctions between God's knowledge and man's knowledge. We do not need a special revelation to know how to know; our natural constitution tells us. These universal principles become the common ground for all rational persons, the believer and the sceptic alike. As a trustworthy revelation of God they can be used to build up an understanding of things "as they are," which then forms the basis for a rational defence of Christianity.

McCosh distinguishes the Scottish "inductive discovery of a priori principles" from the "dogmatic" or "a priori speculation" of older systems. He is critical of a deductive, syllogistic method and links this older method to pre-scientific "theosophies" and "scholastic times." This must include the structure of Reformed theology, which begins with the principium of Scripture and systematically deduces doctrines from it. Such "systems" are dismissed as pre-scientific dogmatism. In McCosh's narrative, the Scottish school represents the Enlightenment's application of the scientific method to the mind, finally freeing philosophy from outdated modes of thought.

This reverses the order of inquiry. Instead of starting with the doctrine of God (theology) to understand knowledge (epistemology), you start with an analysis of the knowing mind (epistemology) to determine what you can say about reality (theology). This is the distinctive feature of Enlightenment philosophy as over against the Reformed Scholastic commitment to Scripture.

According to McCosh the Scottish philosophy solidifies a dualistic ontology of "mind" and "matter" as two distinct substances, both known by their respective "senses" (internal and external). This replaces the richer, hierarchical Reformed ontology of Creator and creature, where both mind and matter are created as contingent realities under God's sovereign control. The primary metaphysical divide is no longer between the Infinite and the finite, but between thinking substance and extended substance.

In this new system, where does special revelation fit? McCosh gives a reverential acknowledgment at the end: the Scottish philosophy is a "bulwark in philosophy, morals, and theology." But note the order and the role: the Scottish philosophy of common sense is the bulwark for theology. Revelation is no longer the source and judge of philosophy; it is a supplementary body of truth that must be compatible with the foundational truths discovered by the universal "philosophy of consciousness." Theology becomes a tenant in a house built by philosophy.

McCosh was not naive. He saw the tension but he celebrated it: "Let it be their claim, that if they have not discovered all truth, they have discovered and settled some truth-- while they have not promulgated much error." The value of the Scottish philosophy, for McCosh, is its utility as a "breakwater to resist the assaults of scepticism." This was Reid's original goal: save Christian belief from Hume by making the mind's design logically prior to critical attacks. But at what price? Special revelation has been removed from the principium so as not to promulgate "much error."

That is the basic problem with apologetics. It is not what you know, but what you can show. What can you prove in this court of law where man stands as a judge of God? Not very much, it would appear. The Reformed Scholastics had the distinct advantage of bringing out all the claims of truth from God Himself as revealed in holy Scripture. The new philosophy of common sense realism is a poor replacement.

 

[RamistThomist]

Thank you for the review. What is his portrayal of Hamilton? I got the impression elsewhere that Hamilton imbibed elements from Kant that would have distanced Hamilton from Reid.

 

[MW]

Thank you for the review. What is his portrayal of Hamilton? I got the impression elsewhere that Hamilton imbibed elements from Kant that would have distanced Hamilton from Reid.

McCosh frames Hamilton as a union of the schools of Reid and Kant, but as one who "lost himself in Kantian distinctions." The system is therefore regarded as artificial: "All our knowledge is only relative." He calls this a "whirlpool" and "nihilism." Basically, for McCosh, Hamilton's system unwittingly lays the groundwork for complete agnosticism. The only thing that saved Hamilton was his devotion to Biblical revelation. Of course, that is equally true for CSR. One must make a desperate leap back to the safe rock of the Reformed scholastic principium. The Scholastics had the insight to see that the Bible must be placed first, not last. And the detour through other philosophies should give us the foresight to see the same thing.

 

[MW]

In this post I am going to analyse the historical conditions in which "the Scottish Philosophy" emerged. McCosh paints an intriguing picture in his introductory view of the "State of Scotland." He demonstrates that Common Sense Realism was more than a philosophical school. It might be classified as a cultural-intellectual force.

Seventeenth century Scotland was a landscape of conflict. In the eighteenth century there was a reaction that was strongly disinclined to continue the battles of the past. Its anti‑controversial character was not accidental but essential. McCosh writes that, in the reaction, there was a disposition "to set little or no value on doctrinal differences, and to turn away with distaste from all disputes among ecclesiastical bodies." The appeal to common sense and human consent was a methodological strategy. McCosh is incisive when he observes that the great thinkers of the age spent their strength, "not so much in discussing doctrines disputed among Christians, as in defending religion in general, and in laying a deep foundation on which to rest the essential principles of morality and the eternal truths of religion, natural and revealed." The aim was to create a foundation broad enough to sustain communal life without reopening the wounds of the past.

In the older Evangelical-scholastic paradigm, truth is external. It is revealed in Scripture, articulated in confessions, and systematized through a principial method. The mind receives and organises what God has spoken. In the Common Sense framework, truth becomes internal and constitutive. The Creator has built into the human mind certain principles of common sense that cannot be doubted without destroying the possibility of reasoning. Authority thus moves inward from the contested text and its interpretation to the universal structures of consciousness. Anthropology replaces theology as the starting point for certainty. This comes to be reflected in a new preaching style. The preachers of the new school "decline doctrinal controversy," and instead came to "dwell much on truths, such as the immortality of the soul, common to Christianity and to natural religion."

The moral sense became central to this shift. It allowed philosophers to do for ethics what the Moderates were trying to do for religion: to affirm objective moral truths without first settling the doctrines on which they were established. Morality became autonomous in its discernment yet powerful to prove Christianity as divine in its origin. Hence the moderate party "were fond of depicting the high morality of the New Testament, and of recommending the example of Jesus." The moral sense was implanted by God and accessible to all. It was refined, universal, rational, and socially stabilising.

McCosh was not blind to the danger. Once the moral faculty becomes the primary organ of religious life, the gospel of grace is easily displaced by natural virtue. As he notes, "All this was offensive in the extreme to those who had been taught to value a deeper doctrine and a warmer piety. They complained that when they needed food they were presented with flowers." What is natural became normative; what is intuitive became sufficient. Christianity degenerated into moralism. "The design of those who favored this movement was no doubt to make religion attractive and respected. The result did not realize the expectation."

In an attempt to save the Scottish philosophy, McCosh tells us that the metaphysicians warned against bringing philosophy into the pulpit. Evangelicals found ways to do this with some degree of effectiveness. Yet it is hard to turn a blind eye to the unintended consequence that philosophy and theology slowly drifted apart. Philosophy became the domain of universal, natural, rational truths accessible to all; theology became the domain of revealed, supernatural, redemptive truths accessible only through grace. It is no wonder if the "metaphysicians" felt themselves to be above the power of the Christian message since the Christian message owed so much to them.

 

[MW]

McCosh now introduces the historical precursors to the Scottish school. It would appear that the key departure of Common Sense Realism from Reformed Orthodox methodology lies in a shift from abstract, deductive reasoning to a philosophy grounded in observation of the human mind.

The philosophical method of the 17th century is seen by McCosh as logical and rational, not observational. It treats philosophy as a series of deductions from abstract first principles and authoritative texts from Aristotle and the scholastics. He writes, "It is scarcely necessary to say that all topics are treated in a logical and rational, and not in an observational, manner and spirit" (p. 23). The old metaphysics was taken up with abstractions like "Ens," universals, substance, quality, and deductive physics. Logic is an "instrument" for structuring such discourse: "Logic is called the instrument to acquire other sciences, inasmuch as it prescribes rules for rightly apprehending, judging, and arguing. It is said to be defined by others as the science which directs the operations of the mind or finding out truth in every other science" (ibid.).

McCosh presents the departure from scholasticism as if it were breaking free from the bondage of Aristotle: "From the time of the revival of letters in the sixteenth century, almost every great and original thinker had thought it necessary to protest against the authority of Aristotle and the schoolmen" (p. 26). In particular the "ingenious world" had "grown quite weary of qualities and forms." Instead, quoting Glanvil, the recommendation was for a "knowledge of nature, without which our hypotheses are but dreams and romances" (p. 26).

Two streams broke the old pattern. There was the juridical-political stream of Grotius and Puffendorf. This shifted the focus to laws of nature applied to human society and moved away from purely metaphysical principia. But there was also an empirical-psychological shift that is attributed to Lockean influence. "It occurred to Locke ... to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with" (p. 27). In other words, a new psychology was needed to break the mould and liberate the world from scholastic philosophy and the principia method. "Locke's Essay was hailed with acclamation by all who were wearied of the old scholastic abstractions and distinctions, and who had caught the new spirit that was abroad" (p. 27). This was the stronger current and the direct precursor to the Scottish school. Its key move was to examine the mind's actual operations to find the foundations of knowledge.

The specific departure, via Locke, consisted in rejecting "innate ideas." Instead it would seek out new first principles in the innate structure and constitutive beliefs of the mind. This is a move from external, logical axioms to internal, psychological grounds. The Scottish school always paid respect to Locke even while dissenting from him. It was particularly in the area of morality that the lack of deeper principles was most felt. Afterall, if man does not have an innate belief in God, how can man have an innate responsibility to God, or be naturally bound to obey His law? Whereas 17th century divines like Tillotson took issue with the Trinitarian implications of Locke's teaching, the 18th century Scottish philosophers were consumed with the moral argument. This in itself indicates the shifting focus from "theology" to "anthropology." And so began the adventure "to show that there was a moral government in the world; and that revealed religion was suited to the constitution of the mind, and to the position in which man is placed" (p. 28). At this point Butler is introduced as having a direct influence on the Scots.

So what has been the net result? A methodological shift from deduction to introspective observation. As Locke decided, one must first "examine our own abilities." The Scottish school adopts this empirical starting point, but it departs from Locke's sensationalism and his shallow foundation for morality. They sought "deeper principles" to anchor virtue, necessary truth, and belief in an external world. In particular there were two rising armies that must be neutralised. These were Berkeleyan idealism and emerging materialism.

McCosh exits from this historical survey by preparing to introduce one more key figure -- Shaftesbury. He was "a writer to whom both Butler and Hutcheson, and the early Scottish school generally, were under deeper obligation than to any other author, or all other authors, and who deserves in consequence a more special notice" (p. 29). We will leave this for another post.

In summary, the Scottish school did not merely replace deductive principia with inductive ones; it relocated the foundations of knowledge from metaphysical essences to the constitutive structure of human cognition. It is a shift from ontology to psychology, from the nature of being to the nature of belief.

 

[CasualWestminsterEnjoyer]

Common sense and the trustworthiness of sense was a common point in all Reformed Orthodox responses to Cartesianism.

Examples include Johann Wirz's disputation De Sensuum Testimonio (Zurich, 1650)
Samuel Maresius's arguments in Systema Theologicum (1673)
Petrus van Mastricht in Novitatum cartesianarum Gangraena
Samuel Leemann, De certitudine Sensuum (Bern, 1698)

You bring up that for the Reformed, divine revelation was the principle of knowing, but of knowing what? Theology, of course. None of them ever stated that as a philosophical axiom, or claimed that divine revelation is a proper ground for knowing the world at large, which is what the philosophy of common sense had in mind.

 

[MW]

Common sense and the trustworthiness of sense was a common point in all Reformed Orthodox responses to Cartesianism.

What exactly is your claim about Common Sense Realism and the later Scottish Philosophy as McCosh describes it? Are you suggesting that because the Reformed affirmed the reliability of the senses, they therefore held a proto–common-sense realist epistemology? That conclusion simply doesn’t follow. The Reformed scholastic defence of the senses was reactive, not constructive. They never elevated "common sense," consciousness, or observation to the status of epistemic first principles. Sense perception was treated as a created faculty functioning according to the order of nature. It is reliable because God ordained it, but never foundational in the way Reid or McCosh later make it. They retained the older principia framework that McCosh explicitly says Scottish Philosophy departed from. That is precisely why I’m drawing on McCosh: he is clear that the Scottish program represents a deviation from earlier models, not a continuation of them.

You bring up that for the Reformed, divine revelation was the principle of knowing, but of knowing what? Theology, of course. None of them ever stated that as a philosophical axiom, or claimed that divine revelation is a proper ground for knowing the world at large, which is what the philosophy of common sense had in mind.

But what follows from that? Are you arguing that the Reformed were constructing a philosophical system grounded in “common sense,” making sense perception or consciousness the foundation of all human knowledge? Or that they anticipated a proto-Reidian epistemology? Nothing in their anti-Cartesian writings suggests this. Their defence of the senses was aimed at resisting methodic doubt, which they saw as theologically and philosophically corrosive. They were safeguarding the possibility of natural knowledge and protecting the structure of theology from rationalist encroachment. They were not building a philosophical system on common sense principles. They affirmed the senses because Cartesianism threatened the conditions under which theology, exegesis, and natural knowledge could function. There is no indication they were articulating anything like the later Scottish appeal to self-evident first principles.

 

[CasualWestminsterEnjoyer]

What exactly is your claim about Common Sense Realism and the later Scottish Philosophy as McCosh describes it? Are you suggesting that because the Reformed affirmed the reliability of the senses, they therefore held a proto–common-sense realist epistemology? That conclusion simply doesn’t follow. The Reformed scholastic defence of the senses was reactive, not constructive. They never elevated "common sense," consciousness, or observation to the status of epistemic first principles. Sense perception was treated as a created faculty functioning according to the order of nature. It is reliable because God ordained it, but never foundational in the way Reid or McCosh later make it. They retained the older principia framework that McCosh explicitly says Scottish Philosophy departed from. That is precisely why I’m drawing on McCosh: he is clear that the Scottish program represents a deviation from earlier models, not a continuation of them.



But what follows from that? Are you arguing that the Reformed were constructing a philosophical system grounded in “common sense,” making sense perception or consciousness the foundation of all human knowledge? Or that they anticipated a proto-Reidian epistemology? Nothing in their anti-Cartesian writings suggests this. Their defence of the senses was aimed at resisting methodic doubt, which they saw as theologically and philosophically corrosive. They were safeguarding the possibility of natural knowledge and protecting the structure of theology from rationalist encroachment. They were not building a philosophical system on common sense principles. They affirmed the senses because Cartesianism threatened the conditions under which theology, exegesis, and natural knowledge could function. There is no indication they were articulating anything like the later Scottish appeal to self-evident first principles.

Would I say that they're pro-Reidians? No. They can stand on their own. My point is to emphasize that significant aspects of Reid's thought were consistent with Reformed Orthodoxy. Was absolutely all of it a continuation of prior thought? I'm not prepared to say that's the case.

But I would sooner say that than claim that they're proto-Van Tillians, or proto-presuppositionalists, which seems to be your drift recently.

 

[jwright82]

Would I say that they're pro-Reidians? No. They can stand on their own. My point is to emphasize that significant aspects of Reid's thought were consistent with Reformed Orthodoxy. Was absolutely all of it a continuation of prior thought? I'm not prepared to say that's the case.

But I would sooner say that than claim that they're proto-Van Tillians, or proto-presuppositionalists, which seems to be your drift recently.

What's wrong with that? If Van Til is building in some way off of Reformed Scholastics than that's history. This thread is about a book I gather and I think Mathew has done a fine job laying it out. Thank you Mathew.

 

[MW]

Would I say that they're pro-Reidians? No. They can stand on their own. My point is to emphasize that significant aspects of Reid's thought were consistent with Reformed Orthodoxy. Was absolutely all of it a continuation of prior thought? I'm not prepared to say that's the case.

But I would sooner say that than claim that they're proto-Van Tillians, or proto-presuppositionalists, which seems to be your drift recently.

I haven't made any claim that it is proto-presuppositional. However, I have pointed out lines of presuppositional thought with which presuppositionalism is consistent. One of those lines is the principial structure of Reformed orthodox thought. Natural theology is undertaken WITHIN that structure, which provides the lines of presuppositional thought. McCosh's Scottish Philosophy demonstrates that part of the new observational bent of realism included a break with the "deductive," principial systems of the 17th century. That is documented above.

 

[CasualWestminsterEnjoyer]

I haven't made any claim that it is proto-presuppositional. However, I have pointed out lines of presuppositional thought with which presuppositionalism is consistent. One of those lines is the principial structure of Reformed orthodox thought. Natural theology is undertaken WITHIN that structure, which provides the lines of presuppositional thought. McCosh's Scottish Philosophy demonstrates that part of the new observational bent of realism included a break with the "deductive," principial systems of the 17th century. That is documented above.

A break with "deductive" systems is actually a point of continuity with the Puritans and non-conformists (and to a certain extent the Ramists), who observed the following: 1) the traditional methods of metaphysical inquiry were not capable of new discoveries, and logic only serves to prove what you already know, and 2) the Baconian, inductive "new science" was capable of new discoveries, as demonstrated by the work of Tycho Brahe and Isaac Newton.

Cotton Mather said the following about logic and metaphysics:

"Nor can I encourage you to spend very much Time, in that which goes under the Name of LOGIC. If my excellent Friend Langius, in his Noble Medicina Mentis, [which I commend unto you, to be diligently perused, as an Introduction to all your Studies of the Sciences,] had not compelled me to a Contempt of the Vulgar Logic, learnt in our Colleges, as a sort of meer Morology, yet a little serious Recollection would have brought me to it. What is there usually got by the Vulgar Logic, but only to be furnished with a Parcel of Terms, which instead of leading the Mind into the Truth, enables one rather to carry on Altercations, and Logomachies, by which the Force of Truth may be at Pleasure, and by some little Trick, evaded. The Power and Process of Reason is Natural to the Soul of Man; And those Masters of Reason, who argue the most Rationally, and make the most Rational Researches into the true State of Things, and who take the most Reasonable Measures for their Conduct, and who in all things arrive to the most notable Discoveries, I pray, what sort of Logicians are they? Either they never once read a Page of any Burgesdicius, or else they have unlearnt and forgot all their Vulgar Logic. I am sure, they rarely trouble their Heads to recall the Old Rules which they have recited unto their Tutors. To exhibit in the pompous Form of an Art, what every One does by meer Nature and Custom, and fabricate it into such a shape as that of the Vulgar Logic, and with such trifling Applications and Illustrations, as 'tis usually done, appears as impertinent, as if one should with much Formality teach the Art of Eating or Drinking or Walking. And it might with equal Solemnity be shown, what Points of Regular Ma|nagement are exemplified by the Boys playing at their Marbles. The most Valuable Thing in Logic, and the very Termination of it, is, The Doctrine of Syllogisms. And yet it is notorious, that as all Syllogizing is only to confirm you in a Truth which you are already the Owner of, so, no Logic has yet given us all the several Ways of Syllogizing that may be run into; And it is as notorious, that while an expanded Syllogizing is rec|koned no other than an Indecency in ordinary Writing as well as Talking, our only Syllogizing is that which we call, An Enthymeme: Such a thing is evident, and therefore such a Thing to be inferred from it, is also evident. Notwithstanding, lest we should offend them, go dip into your Logic. But count it enough, if you have gone through a Milton, or a Gutberleth, or a Watts. Indeed, some Treatises, that clear up the Maxims of Reason, and may Strengthen you and Sharpen you in the Use of it, you may do well to look into. The Ars Cogitendi, may pass for One of those: And though' for some Reasons, I would be excused from Re|commending an Essay of Humane Understanding, which is much in Vogue, yet I can approve your perusing of Oldfield, his Improvement of Reason. But for the Vulgar Logic, I must freely say, you lose Time, if you steer any otherwise in it, than, Touch and Go.

What I say of Logic, I say of Metaphysicks; which a learned Man too justly calls, Disciplinarum Omnium Excrementum, though' she would set up for the Queen of Sciences. If you have got a Maccovius, or a Jacchaeus into your Head, you have as much as I should care for: To which indeed some Acquaintance with a Castanaeus, or some such Fencer for Distinctions, may be added. But then to Weave any more Cobwebs in your Brains; to what Purpose is it? This however, is one of the Things, which I will Affirm constantly; That as a Suarez, than whom you cannot easily find a greater dealer in Metaphysicks, after all declared, The Hours which he took in Studying and Examining and Rectifying his own Heart, were of infinitely more Use and Worth to him than all his Metaphysical and Voluminous Lucubrations; you shall in like manner find, that you may easily employ your Hours to better Purpose, than in Metaphysical and Imaginary Disquisitions... When I said, Natural Phylosophy, you may be sure, I did not mean, the Peripatetic: For I hear|tily subscribe to the Censure of Christianus Thomasius upon it; Omne Tempus pro Perdito judicandum, quod in Physicam Peripateticor•m impenditur; ita inepta et stulta ibi sunt Omnia...
Nevertheless, I would have you take what may appear least likely to prove Romantic: And therefore, as thorough an Insight as you can get into the Principles of our Perpetual Dictator, the Incomparable Sr. Isaac Newton, is what I mighti|ly commend unto you. Be sure, The Experimental Philosophy is that, in which alone your Mind can be at all established."
"

 

[MW]

A break with "deductive" systems is actually a point of continuity with the Puritans and non-conformists (and to a certain extent the Ramists), who observed the following: 1) the traditional methods of metaphysical inquiry were not capable of new discoveries, and logic only serves to prove what you already know, and 2) the Baconian, inductive "new science" was capable of new discoveries, as demonstrated by the work of Tycho Brahe and Isaac Newton.

Not really. See Muller, PRRD 1. This is the kind of weak historical association he dismantles. Ramism did not represent a break with scholastic deduction or with the principia‑structure of theology; it was a methodological variation within Protestant scholasticism.

And Mather doesn't help your point either. Note his remark: "If you have got a Maccovius, or a Jacchaeus into your head…" This shows the opposite of what you are claiming. He explicitly affirms the value of moderate Reformed scholastic theology, and only rejects the excesses of late‑scholastic metaphysics. In other words, he wants some scholastic method, not a replacement of it. So the quotation isn't doing the work you want it to do.

 

[CasualWestminsterEnjoyer]

Not really. See Muller, PRRD 1. This is the kind of weak historical association he dismantles. Ramism did not represent a break with scholastic deduction or with the principia‑structure of theology; it was a methodological variation within Protestant scholasticism.

If Muller says that, he's wrong. I've read the sources.

And Mather doesn't help your point either. Note his remark: "If you have got a Maccovius, or a Jacchaeus into your head…" This shows the opposite of what you are claiming. He explicitly affirms the value of moderate Reformed scholastic theology, and only rejects the excesses of late‑scholastic metaphysics. In other words, he wants some scholastic method, not a replacement of it. So the quotation isn't doing the work you want it to do.

He calls metaphysics "cobwebs" while heaping praise on the new science. Maccovius and Jacchaeus are some of the shortest works on metaphysics from the Reformed Orthodox era. I'm wrong because he wanted his students to do the bare minimum, rather than nothing at all, to be familiar with scholastic metaphysics?

 

[MW]

If Muller says that, he's wrong. I've read the sources.

You are basically reviving the Calvin v. Calvinist thesis. Those who hold to this thesis have presumably read the sources also.

He calls metaphysics "cobwebs" while heaping praise on the new science. Maccovius and Jacchaeus are some of the shortest works on metaphysics from the Reformed Orthodox era. I'm wrong because he wanted his students to do the bare minimum, rather than nothing at all, to be familiar with scholastic metaphysics?

These are still deductive systems. You are wrong because you are not suggesting an alternative that serves as a bridge to the Scottish Philosophy. If you follow along with McCosh you will see its historical precursors and development. If one is going to buy into CSR he should want to know what it holds and why. Its "realism," if it can be called that, is distinctive. McCosh brings this out rather well.

 

[CasualWestminsterEnjoyer]

You are basically reviving the Calvin v. Calvinist thesis. Those who hold to this thesis have presumably read the sources also.

(Rightfully) pointing out the anti-metaphysical bent of the English Puritans has very little to do with the Calvin vs. the Calvinist thesis, but even if it had everything to do with that thesis, the claim still deserves to be evaluated on its own merits.

Here is William Ames, a major Ramist and influential among the New Englanders, in his Marrow of Theology, on Metaphysics:


"Metaphysics is the faith of the Aristotelians."

 

[MW]

McCosh identifies Shaftesbury as the fountainhead of the Scottish School, not merely for his phrases, but for his philosophical revolution. He provided the template for replacing a deductive, theocentric system with an inductive, anthropocentric one. The Scottish Common Sense philosophers like Hutcheson, Reid, and Beattie would systematise this, using the bedrock of subjective "common sense" to build a defence against both Hobbesian materialism and Humean skepticism. In doing so, they inherited Shaftesbury's crucial assumption: that human nature, though perhaps requiring cultivation, remains essentially sound. Its instinctive senses were viewed as a reliable guide to truth and goodness. This created a "moral philosophy" that felt intuitively familiar to a culture shaped by Christianity.

Shaftesbury and the Scottish Philosophy begin from the bottom-up with the individual's faculties -- "common sense," "moral sense," and a "sense of beauty." Truth is not deduced from external, revealed axioms but is "naturally known" (p. 31) through internal, subjective senses. As Shaftesbury states, foundational truths are so evident that it would be easier to believe "half mankind to have run mad" (pp. 31-32) than to deny them.

One might ask, where does this view of human nature come from? The fact is, Shaftesbury assumes much of the Christian view of human nature while stripping away its theology. This is a critical point. He retains the Scholastic/Augustinian concept of an ordered human nature with a specific telos. Human nature is an "economy" with a "constitution" and "frame" (p. 33). These are terms that echo the Scholastic language of ordo (order). His virtue consists in a harmony of affections, which is a secularised version of the well-ordered soul living in accordance with its God-given design.

However, he severely dilutes the doctrine of sin. In Reformed Scholasticism, the imago Dei is radically defaced by the Fall. The human will is enslaved, and reason is darkened. For Shaftesbury, while our natural senses may require "use, practice, and culture" (p. 32), they are fundamentally intact, reliable, and orient us naturally towards the good and beautiful. Vice is not a radical corruption but a simple imbalance: "when the public affections are weak ... or the private affections are too strong" (p. 33). This is a shift from a theology of redemption to a philosophy of self-cultivation.

This move has profound consequences. Shaftesbury explicitly argues that virtue must be "really estimable in itself" (p. 33), independent of divine command or future judgment. To ground ethics in rewards and punishments, he claims, is to "betray" religion and "overthrow" Christianity (p. 34). The moral sense, not divine law, becomes the immediate arbiter of good and evil. As he argues, we know injustice is odious not because God forbids it, but because "every sensible creature may be said to have a conscience" that reflects on its own affections (p. 35).

At this point there is a direct borrowing from the Platonic system that connects "beauty and good" (p. 35). This further subjectivises and internalises the foundation of ethics. Virtue is not obedience but a kind of perceptive harmony -- a "higher kind of beauty" discerned by an "inward eye" (p. 34). This replaces the objective standard of God's holy nature and law with a subjective standard of aesthetic taste and internal proportion.

The combined effect is a proto-Pelagian optimism about human capacity, which directly counters the Reformed Orthodox emphasis on human inability post-Fall. The "Sensus Communis" is presented as an infallible, universal tribunal. The problem of error or radical disagreement, which the Reformed would attribute to sin, is largely dismissed. The goal of life becomes "living according to nature" (p. 33), a classical Stoic ideal, achievable through the cultivation of our innate senses. The virtues he lists -- "candor, benignity, and good-nature" (p. 33) -- are social and gentlemanly, a far cry from the "stern
standard of the Stoics" and light-years from the Christian virtues of humility, repentance, and sacrificial love that require divine grace.

In the end, Shaftesbury’s legacy marks a decisive reorientation in moral philosophy. What begins as a seemingly modest appeal to "common sense" and the "moral sense" becomes a comprehensive shift: from a theocentric order grounded in divine law to an internal tribunal grounded in the presumed reliability of human faculties. By retaining the Christian grammar of teleology while discarding the Christian diagnosis of sin, Shaftesbury constructs a moral system that feels familiar yet functions on entirely different foundations. It is a vision of humanity that no longer needs redemption but only refinement, no longer requires revelation but only introspection. The cost of this shift is the quiet displacement of grace by nature, of divine authority by human sentiment, and of objective moral order by the inward gaze. What emerges is a moral philosophy that flatters human intuition but ultimately severs itself from the theological roots that once gave those intuitions their depth, coherence, and accountability.

 

[MW]

Here is William Ames, a major Ramist and influential among the New Englanders, in his Marrow of Theology, on Metaphysics:

The passage explicitly rejects the idea that theology arises from observation. Look at §2: "Partitionis hujus proprium est … ut fluat ex objecti natura." "The proper quality of this division is that it flows from the nature of the object." This is old school realism which upholds real causality and presence in the object presented to the mind. This is the opposite of observational science. Theology is not built from experience, introspection, empirical data, or human faculties. It is built from the nature of spiritual life, which is known through revelation, not observation. The passage also reinforces the deductive order: faith to obedience.

Allow Muller to provide a bigger picture of what is going on here: "Finally, the importance of Ramus to the rise of scholastic Protestantism ought to be recognized as essentially methodological rather than theological or philosophical. Moltmann’s attempt to associate Ramism with a salvation-historical and a posteriori rather than a synthetic, metaphysical, or a priori approach to theology is simply contrary to fact. A covenant theologian like Olevianus, whose theology avoids metaphysical and a priori patterning, argued strongly for Aristotelian philosophy against Ramism and, when it did use the Ramist model of bifurcation never assumed that it either brought its own content to theology or undermined the use of basic Aristotelian categories. Perkins, whose approach is decidedly Ramist, uses the Ramist bifurcations as the organizational pattern of A Golden Chaine, one of the most decidedly synthetic, a priori, and even metaphysical documents in the history of Reformed theology. Perkins’ definitions of predestination, moreover, albeit developed in the context offered by Ramist method and following a Ramist definition of theology, are quite congruous with the doctrine of the anti-Ramist, Beza. Keckermann, who drew on Zabarella to develop an analytical or resolutive model in his theology, avoided a radically Ramist model in his theological exposition but included bifurcatory charts in his Systema theologiae. Keckermann also developed an accommodation of Aristotle to aspects of Ramism in his logical treatises—at the same time that he critiqued Ramus’ argumentative models and his antagonism to metaphysics. What Ramus provided was an impetus toward extreme clarity in the organization of argument, as witnessed by the method of Polanus’ Partitiones, Alsted’s Methodus and Ames’ Medulla, at a time when Protestant theologians were engaged in the primary work of establishing the structure of orthodox dogmatics. In an era characterized by a search for method, for the way through a discipline, Ramism considerably facilitated the establishment of a basic, architecturally cohesive method and, as manifest by Mastricht’s late-seventeenth-century system, succeeded in imprinting that clarity on Reformed theology decades after the demise of Ramism as a viable form of logic or dialectic. What we do not see in the historical materials, however, is any identifiable difference between the Reformed orthodox theology of the Ramists and the Reformed orthodox theology of their non-Ramist or Aristotelian contemporaries. Even the so-called “Ramist” definition of theology as a fundamentally practical science can be found in other, non-Ramist trajectories of the Reformed. In the case of Ramism, as in the case of “scholasticism,” the method had little impact on actual doctrinal or theological content."

 

[CasualWestminsterEnjoyer]

The passage explicitly rejects the idea that theology arises from observation. Look at §2: "Partitionis hujus proprium est … ut fluat ex objecti natura." "The proper quality of this division is that it flows from the nature of the object." This is old school realism which upholds real causality and presence in the object presented to the mind. This is the opposite of observational science. Theology is not built from experience, introspection, empirical data, or human faculties. It is built from the nature of spiritual life, which is known through revelation, not observation. The passage also reinforces the deductive order: faith to obedience.

The inductive element was not wide-spread in Ames's day, being confined to Bacon and a few others. What was widespread, however, was a disillusionment with the possibilities of the old metaphysics and logic, which would pave the way for a wider reception of Bacon's methods once their usefulness was conclusively demonstrated by the likes of Newton and Brahe.

What we do not see in the historical materials, however, is any identifiable difference between the Reformed orthodox theology of the Ramists and the Reformed orthodox theology of their non-Ramist or Aristotelian contemporaries.

My claim is not that Ramists had a different theology, but that they had a different philosophy, and in particular that their views of metaphysics and ethics differed from the Aristotelians.

 

[MW]

The inductive element was not wide-spread in Ames's day, being confined to Bacon and a few others. What was widespread, however, was a disillusionment with the possibilities of the old metaphysics and logic, which would pave the way for a wider reception of Bacon's methods once their usefulness was conclusively demonstrated by the likes of Newton and Brahe.

Your “disillusionment” does not produce anything other than a desire for clarity. Ramist logic was a pedagogical reorganisation, not a philosophical revolution. That much is clear from Muller. There is no hint of empiricism, induction, observation, faculty psychology, internal senses, or even a proto‑Baconian method. There is no epistemic innovation that has anything to do with the development of CSR. This is a thread about CSR. As far as the Scholastics were concerned an object was immediately and directly present to the mind. Yesterday's Polanus reading made that clear.

My claim is not that Ramists had a different theology, but that they had a different philosophy, and in particular that their views of metaphysics and ethics differed from the Aristotelians.

Ramist philosophy is not a distinct philosophical system. It is a pedagogical method applied to existing scholastic metaphysics.

 

[MW]

Petrus van Mastricht in Novitatum cartesianarum Gangraena

I didn't have time to look this up a few days ago, but having some extra time today I was able to locate Adriaan Neele's analysis that bears directly on the Cartesian question and shows the way in which theology was constructed within the lines of the principia: "The second reason for the location of the chapter on faith could be connected to Mastricht’s view of the principia theologiæ and the nature of faith. With respect to the former, Mastricht recognizes Scripture as the principium cognoscendi received inwardly by faith at the inception of spiritual life. As we have noted earlier in our discussion of reason, Mastricht rejected the rising Cartesian notion in the seventeenth century that sought to elevate reason from the ancillary, instrumental or argumentative position to a principal position. In this context, Muller argues, the question was raised as to a resident principle, in man, upon which theology might rest, or in the language of Scholasticism, a habitus of the soul upon which theology might be internally grounded. For Mastricht this disposition was the habitus fidei and not habitus sciendi. Once theological truths are received by the habitus credendi, then reason can use this truth as a basis for drawing conclusions. However, reason itself is never an ultimate ground of theological argument. With this theological basis, Mastricht answers the principal question by placing the chapter De Fide salvifica immediately between the doctrine of Scripture and the doctrine of God as a statement concerning the way in which revelation, as external to the mind and as objectively given Word, becomes effective inwardly. It is fides, not ratio, that provides the point of entry into the doctrine of God."

 

[jwright82]

The inductive element was not wide-spread in Ames's day, being confined to Bacon and a few others. What was widespread, however, was a disillusionment with the possibilities of the old metaphysics and logic, which would pave the way for a wider reception of Bacon's methods once their usefulness was conclusively demonstrated by the likes of Newton and Brahe.


My claim is not that Ramists had a different theology, but that they had a different philosophy, and in particular that their views of metaphysics and ethics differed from the Aristotelians.

After reading the back and forth between you and Mathew, I'm still left wondering what your point is? You seem to be, and please correct me if I'm wrong, arguing for something but I can't put my finger on what that is. I know it's anti-Vantillian in nature but I don't think that promoting him was Mathew's point in this incredible thread he started. Thanks again Mathew, very enlightening.
Also you seem to be arguing for a closer connection between CSR and Reformed Orthodoxy. But what would that "prove" if anything? I think Mathew's correct that they're two different animals all together but you seem to want to say that one incorporated the other.
So I find myself wondering what's your point? Without knowing that then there's no moving forward.

 

[RamistThomist]

. I know it's anti-Vantillian in nature but I don't think that promoting him was Mathew's point in this incredible thread he started.

Without presuming to speak for Charles, I think the point is something along the lines there isn't much overlap between Van Til and the Reformed Orthodox. Rev. Winzer thinks there is.

 

[MW]

Without presuming to speak for Charles, I think the point is something along the lines there isn't much overlap between Van Til and the Reformed Orthodox. Rev. Winzer thinks there is.

I'm not sure "overlap" is the right word, nor is "Van Til" in and of himself of any direct concern to me; but criticisms on certain facets of his thought are criticisms on certain presuppositions that reside in the Reformed Scholastic system. The fact is the Reformed Scholastics saw natural theology within a principial framework. The framework is removed in CSR. McCosh was the last great defender of CSR and has articulated its development very well. He himself shows us the differences. We only need to be willing to see it.

 

[RamistThomist]

The fact is the Reformed Scholastics saw natural theology within a principial framework. The framework is removed in CSR

I think I can agree with that. I know some Van Tillians accept natural theology in principle, but most deny it (sometimes emphatically) in practice.

 

[jwright82]

Without presuming to speak for Charles, I think the point is something along the lines there isn't much overlap between Van Til and the Reformed Orthodox. Rev. Winzer thinks there is.

Reading what Mathew and Rich have pointed out in these threads and Lane Tipton's work has convinced me that there is, of the kind that Mathew is referring to.
I personally think that that whole debate is pointless. You have to have a terminal point somewhere, who misunderstood the tradition? Where did it start? Van Til building off of Bavinck, Warfield, and Vos did he misunderstand them or did they misunderstand the tradition? No one would argue that Van Til wasn't original in many places but he was building off of others who conveniently get a free pass while Van Til is thrown under the bus. I say where did the misunderstanding start? Why won't anyone advocating this pick somebody and then make their argument.?
Sorry Mathew, I know this is about CSR. I didn't mean to go off on a tangent.

 

[RamistThomist]

Reading what Mathew and Rich have pointed out in these threads and Lane Tipton's work has convinced me that there is, of the kind that Mathew is referring to.
I personally think that that whole debate is pointless. You have to have a terminal point somewhere, who misunderstood the tradition? Where did it start? Van Til building off of Bavinck, Warfield, and Vos did he misunderstand them or did they misunderstand the tradition? No one would argue that Van Til wasn't original in many places but he was building off of others who conveniently get a free pass while Van Til is thrown under the bus. I say where did the misunderstanding start? Why won't anyone advocating this pick somebody and then make their argument.?
Sorry Mathew, I know this is about CSR. I didn't mean to go off on a tangent.

Van Til built off of *some* parts of Bavinck (he thought, probably erroneously, that Bavinck was too Thomist in other parts). We have no evidence of Van Til building off of specific analyses of Turretin and the other scholastics. In fact, we have very little (any?) evidence of his interacting with them.

 

[jwright82]

Van Til built off of *some* parts of Bavinck (he thought, probably erroneously, that Bavinck was too Thomist in other parts). We have no evidence of Van Til building off of specific analyses of Turretin and the other scholastics. In fact, we have very little (any?) evidence of his interacting with them.

So what happened to Warfield and Vos? Did they build off of Turretin? Did the part's Van Til accepted in Bavinck incorporate Turretin? You see it's a pointless debate. Please pick who misunderstood the tradition and make your case.
I'm not trying to be blunt but without the terminal point, your argument is just free-floating up there somewhere. Mathew and Rich have provided textual evidence of his reliance on the tradition. Tipton has done the same in many different places the opposing argument is readily available for anyone but this argument is just free-floating up there somewhere.
"No evidence of his interacting with them" ignores the question of "did Vos, Bavinck, and Warfield interact with them?" You see the argument proves too much, beyond what it can prove. So again, where did the misunderstanding start? Who's to blame and what's the argument for that?

 

[RamistThomist]

So what happened to Warfield and Vos? Did they build off of Turretin?

Vos, probably, since he explicitly held to natural theology. And Warfield was much closer to me than to Van Til. As to explicitly building off Turretin, I don't know. I haven't seen whether they interacted with him or not.

Did the part's Van Til accepted in Bavinck incorporate Turretin?

I doubt it.

You see it's a pointless debate. Please pick who misunderstood the tradition and make your case.

I think we have dozens of threads where people try (with varying degrees of success) to do that.

Mathew and Rich have provided textual evidence of his reliance on the tradition.

Of his reliance on "some" parts of the tradition. Matthew showed where Van Til held to a principial theology. I agree. There is more to Reformed Orthodoxy than that, though.

"No evidence of his interacting with them" ignores the question of "did Vos, Bavinck, and Warfield interact with them?"

I stand by my argument. If V, B, and W held to Reformed Orthodoxy, well and good. But if Van Til says, "I agree with those guys," not so fast. It's one of thing to agree with them. It is another to work out one's argument on those points and explicitly with those authors. And Bavinck more often alluded to authors than actually cited them. And van Til attacked large parts of Warfield's apologetics.

 

[jwright82]

Vos, probably, since he explicitly held to natural theology. And Warfield was much closer to me than to Van Til. As to explicitly building off Turretin, I don't know. I haven't seen whether they interacted with him or not.

But they were influenced by the tradition and influenced Van Til, you seem to want to ignore that line of reasoning.

I doubt it.

Is that because Bavinck rejected Turretin or what? I think you need to flesh that argument out a little bit. That's my main point here. This accusation is thrown out there but never actually defended with any kind of documentation or anything.
The historical record stands in my opinion due to lack of any kind of historical argument.

I think we have dozens of threads where people try (with varying degrees of success) to do that.

And yet, despite participating in those, I never got a response. It seems people didn't really think it through, again sorry to be blunt.

Of his reliance on "some" parts of the tradition. Matthew showed where Van Til held to a principial theology. I agree. There is more to Reformed Orthodoxy than that, though.

Ok but where did the division start? And who's to blame for his departure?

I stand by my argument. If V, B, and W held to Reformed Orthodoxy, well and good. But if Van Til says, "I agree with those guys," not so fast. It's one of thing to agree with them. It is another to work out one's argument on those points and explicitly with those authors. And Bavinck more often alluded to authors than actually cited them. And van Til attacked large parts of Warfield's apologetics.

The historical record is more than "I agree with those guys". I stand by my argument that historically speaking Van Til is building off of Reformed Orthodoxy. Unless I see any other reason to doubt that then I can't agree my friend.
The statement about Warfield's apologetics is odd because it would imply his apologetics developed from his theology and therefore if we accept (on some level) his theology we must accept his apologetics. But Van Til didn't accept wholesale his theology or apologetics, so his theology must be suspect along with his apologetics.
So I would assume that the same mistake was made with Vos and Bavinck as well as Hodge and Calvin (let's not forget Kuyper to). So the misunderstanding begins and ends with Van Til. He personally knew Vos (preached his funeral service in fact) and Warfield and yet somehow misunderstood them so bad that his thinking was off in spots?
The list just keeps getting longer, who misunderstood what that led to Van Til's misunderstanding? You have not answered that question, please do. The historical picture I'm (along with all the other Vantillian's) painting is simple, they built off of the tradition and Van Til built off of them and there's a nice simple story to track.
I hate to say it but your story begs the question that you won't answer nor anyone else for that matter, so why don't we move passed it to more meaningful disagreements like "yes he thought he was keeping the tradition alive but he misinterpreted it in some way". Show where that was and then we can discuss it, the natural theology thing has already been dealt with.
It seems that Van Til must be guilty of rejecting the tradition in some significant ways to be beyond considering the historical record. Tipton, for one among many, has completely demolished that argument. It's all out there for anyone to read or listen. If he's wrong then we can discuss that but the argument is demolished unless someone can critique it. Props to Dr Fesko in the introduction to Vos' "Natural Theology" book for recognizing this problem and addressing it.

 

[MW]

I think I can agree with that. I know some Van Tillians accept natural theology in principle, but most deny it (sometimes emphatically) in practice.

Whatever Van Tillians do (there are so many different strands I can hardly keep up with them), I think we have well and truly settled the fact that Van Til himself was firmly for a well-articulated natural theology. The question is, where does it fit in the system of things?